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Chapter 1. Introduction and conceptual framework 
 
1.1 Introduction and outline of the dissertation 
When purchasing a particular food product, the consumer has an endless choice between 
different brands and labels, leaving the customer with the complex task of choosing the 
product that most closely fits with his quality preferences and expectations. The product 
quality is signalled to the customer by means of labels and certificates on the packaging. A lot 
of the claims made do no longer relate to the product itself, but refer to hidden quality 
characteristics such as healthiness or environmental friendliness. The question we pose 
ourselves in this dissertation is whether such labels and certifications work and contribute to 
sustainability.  
 
The objective of private market actors is private utility maximization, while the long term 
public interest is social welfare maximization. These two objectives do not necessarily 
coincide, especially for a series of ecological and social issues. Typically, market actors will 
try to evade costs and shift these to other parties. Examples are the emission of greenhouse 
gases or the pollution of aquifers. To counter this, public authorities dispose of a series of 
correction mechanisms such as a regulatory framework and economic instruments, of which 
taxes and subsidies are the two main examples. Public interference in the private market is, 
however, perceived as a market distortion. Furthermore, local governments have a decreasing 
influence on the globalizing economy. Promising is therefore the emergence of private 
mechanisms that specifically focus on the internalization of these social and ecological 
objectives into the firms’ business objectives. Private standards and certification schemes are 
developed to guide producers to reach certain social and ecological objectives. These 
certification schemes can be termed private institutions of sustainability (PIoS), which are 
sets of rules that a private actor voluntary follows to reach a sustainability target. A strong 
position on sustainability themes is thereby used as a mean to maximize private utility. 
Consequently, there is a potential win-win situation for both the private actor and the society. 
 
Thus, Private Institutions of Sustainability, by their very own nature, seem to reduce the 
asymmetry between long term sustainability objectives and short term market objectives. As 
such, these instruments are selfregulating mechanisms for the sustainability mismatch. 
However, given that PIoS are private institutions, the involved actors still make a trade-off 
between their short term economic objectives and the long term sustainability targets. The two 
objectives of this research are therefore to analyze 1) whether PIoS indeed reduce the 
mismatch between sustainability and private economic objectives and 2) whether further 
improvements in PIoS are possible. Objective one will lead to positive research, answering 
the question how it is done, while objective two is normative, answering the question how it 
should be done preferably.   
  
This PhD dissertation investigates whether certification schemes and labels as private 
institutions of sustainability are a promising tool to realize sustainable development. In  the 
positive research part of this thesis, we analyze existing private institutions of sustainability. 
We first measure whether they improve ecosystem sustainability, as this is what they claim. 
Next, we calculate whether the use of these institutions creates more added value, by 
stimulating a more efficient resource use. We can call this sustainable value creation. The 
social performance is investigated by analyzing the social supply chain performance.  
Introduction Conceptual framework Chapter 1 
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Due to their private nature, there will probably still be a mismatch with long term ecosystem 
sustainability targets.  In part 3 of this thesis, the normative research part, we model changes 
in the Private Institutions of Sustainability, with the aim of reaching the ecosystem 
sustainability target. The proposed changes may affect the willingness to participate of both 
the supply and demand side. Furthermore, the institutional rules will have to be aligned with 
the proposed physical changes.  
 
The remainder of this chapter introduces the conceptual framework that will be used as 
stepping stone for the following chapters. In this conceptual framework, which is based upon 
Hagedorn’s Institutions of Sustainability framework (2002, 2005, 2008), we combine several 
theories to describe the existence of Private Institutions of Sustainability. First, we will show 
the close link between system sustainability and the absence of externalities. Externalities  are 
uncompensated effects on other parties or on the ecosystem. Next, we introduce institutions as 
means to internalize externalities. We then make a distinction between public and private 
institutions of sustainability. Dynamic aspects of institutional change are also introduced. All 
the above elements are integrated in a conceptual framework. The hypotheses that will be 
tested in this doctoral thesis are then linked to the conceptual framework.  
 
1.2 Building blocks of Private institutions of sustainability 
 “Private institutions of sustainability” are defined in three steps. First, section 2.1 explains the 
term “sustainability”. In section 2.2 “institutions of sustainability” are introduced, while 
section 2.3 extends this to “private institutions of sustainability”.   
 
1.2.1 Sustainability of the ecosystem 
 
There are many ways of defining sustainability, and many authors have devoted a 
considerable number of pages to this. The first question is to identify which sustainability we 
want to assess. The sustainability of a farm not necessarily coincides with the sustainability of 
the surrounding ecosystem. In this dissertation, focus rests upon the sustainability of the 
ecosystem. As Ostrom (2005) and others also noted, what is a ‘whole’ system at one level is a 
part of a system at another level. Neoclassical economics consider the macroeconomy to be 
the whole (Hagedorn, 2007). In that case the environment is part of the macroeconomy. For 
ecological economics the Earthsystem is the whole, with the macroeconomy a subsystem of 
the Earthsystem.  
 
Following this system view, we can consider our Earthsystem as a nested system in which we 
find a supersystem and multiple subsystems, such as the natural and the social system. A 
sustainable lower level social system rests upon a sustainable supersystem. Sustainability is 
thereby defined as the ability of a system to continue over a certain time span (Hansen and 
Jones, 1996). Daly (1974) also sees our economy as a subsystem of the Earth, and the Earth 
apparently as a steady-state system. He adds that a subsystem cannot grow beyond the 
frontiers of the total system and that subsystems must at some point conform to the steady-
state mode, otherwise it will disrupt the functioning of the total system. This is especially true 
for our macro economy.  As explained by Hagedorn (2007), opportunity costs of economic 
growth in terms of demands on the Earth system exist. When the marginal cost of economic 
growth is higher than marginal benefits, “uneconomic growth” is realized. The problem of 
optimal scale therefore not only exists in microeconomics, but also in macroeconomics.  
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An interesting representation of the interrelation between the Earth system and its subsystems 
is given by Lawn (2007). In his “Linear throughput representation of the socio-economic 
process”, the macro economy is considered to be a subsystem of the social system, that is in 
turn a subsystem of the ecosystem. In line with the coevolutionary paradigm1
 
, it recognizes 
the ongoing exchange of matter, energy and information between these three major systems. 
Lawn (2007) distinguishes five elements that explain the dynamics of the linear throughput 
model. The first element, natural capital, is the original source of all human realizations, as it 
is the only source of low entropy resources; it is the ultimate waste assimilating sink; and it is 
the sole provider of the life-support services that maintain the habitability of the Earth. The 
second element is the throughput of matter-energy – that is, the input into macro economy of 
low entropy resources and the subsequent output of high entropy wastes. The throughput flow 
is the physical intermediary connecting natural and human-made capital. Human-made capital 
is the third element and is needed for human welfare to be greater than it would otherwise be 
if the socio-economic process did not take place. The fourth important element is net psychic 
income, which is the uncancelled benefit of socio-economic activity, originating from 
consumption of human made capital, being engaged in production activities, and non 
economic pursuits such as leisure time and enjoyment of the natural environment. Contrary to 
some opinions, human well-being in this representation depends not on the rate of production 
and consumption, but on the psychic enjoyment of life. The fifth and final element is the cost 
of lost natural capital services and arises because, in obtaining the throughput to produce and 
maintain human-made capital, natural capital must be manipulated and  exploited both as a 
source of low entropy and as a high entropy waste absorbing sink.  
Costanza and Daly (1992) discuss the link between natural capital and sustainable 
development. They consider constancy of total natural capital to be the key idea in sustainable 
development. Related to this is the distinction between weak and strong sustainability. The 
main difference between weak and strong sustainability is the degree to which substitutability 
between different forms of capital is allowed (Figge and Hahn, 2004). Weak sustainability 
implies that all forms of capital are substitutable by each other. Opponents to this view claim 
that at least some forms of capital have no substitutes or require a certain critical level which 
cannot be substituted (e.g. Costanza and Daly, 1992). The belief in non-substitutability of at 
least some forms of capital and, therefore, the need to conserve critical nonsubstitutable 
stocks are central features of strong sustainability (Figge and Hahn, 2004). The reason for this 
is that man-made and natural and/or social capital are (at least partly) complements. 
According to Figge and Hahn (2004), strong sustainability imposes, therefore, critical levels 
or safe minimum standards for—at least some—natural capital in order to avoid irreversible 
losses. 
 
For more refined definitions of sustainability, we refer to the writtings of Costanza and Daly 
(1992) and the associated stream of literature. An excellent overview is also given by Van 
Passel (2007).  
 
At the lower systemic levels externalities are created that might refrain the higher level 
system to attain its full life expectancy. Externalities are defined as actions of one or more 
economic agents that give rise to uncompensated physical and/or real economic effects for 
others (Vatn and Bromley, 1997). A positive effect is called an external benefit, while a 
negative effect is called an external cost. When the externality impacts on the ecosystem, its 
properties change and ecosystem sustainability is potentially endangered. The well known 
                                                          
1 Coevolution is the term used to describe the evolving relationships and feedback responses typically associated 
with two or more interdependent systems (Lawn, 2007) 
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example of the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) is illustrative, as multiple individuals 
(shepherds) acting independently in their own self-interest  ultimately destroy a shared limited 
resource (the common parcel of land, by overgrazing), even when it is clear that it is not in 
anyone's long term interest for this to happen. The shepherds do so in order to maximize their 
private utility while sharing the damage with the entire group. This is clearly at the expense of 
the local ecosystem. In this dissertation we consider the hierarchical supersystem (the 
ecosystem or the societal system, depending on the research issue) as the systemic level where 
the externalities have impact.  
 
Externalities create a problem for the effective functioning of the market to maximize the total 
utility of the society. Externalities in fact indicate the existence of market failure. The 
"external" portions of the costs and benefits of producing a good are not factored into the 
supply and demand functions of market actors because rational profit-maximizing buyers and 
sellers do not take into account costs and benefits they do not have to bear. Hence a portion of 
the costs or benefits will not be reflected in determining the market equilibrium prices and 
quantities of the good involved. This is shown graphically in Figure 1.1. With every extra unit 
of commodity X produced, extra externalities are created. The price of the good or service 
producing the externality will tend toward equality with the marginal personal cost to the 
producer and the marginal personal utility to the purchaser (Pm), rather than toward equality 
with the marginal social cost of production and the marginal social utility of consumption 
(P*). Thus, normal market incentives for the buyer and seller to maximize their personal 
utilities will lead to the over- or under-production (Qm) of the commodity in question from 
the point of view of society as a whole, not the socially optimal level of production (Q*
 
). 
Goods involving a positive externality will be "underproduced" from the point of view of 
society as a whole, while goods involving a negative externality will be "overproduced" from 
the point of view of society as a whole (Johnson, 2005).    
Figure 1.1. External costs and market outcomes when commodity X is produced. 
MEC=Marginal external cost; MPC=Marginal private cost; MSC=Marginal social cost. Based 
upon Field (1994). 
There is an intimate link between the creation of externalities and public goods. To define 
public goods, we first introduce the main characteristics for the classification of goods, which 
are ‘rivalry’ and ‘excludability’. Rivalry is present when use by one person prevents someone 
else from using it. Excludability occurs when someone can prevent others from using the 
good or resource. Based upon these two characteristics, we can distinguish between 4 cases 
(Devlin and Grafton,1998): private goods, club goods, common pool resources and public 
goods. For a private good, such as a house, rivalry and excludability are high. For a club 
good, rivalry is low and excludability is high. A typical example is a satellite television. For a 
common pool resource, rivalry is high and excludability low. Fish in the sea used to be a good 
€ € 
Quantity of commodity X produced Quantity of  
X produced 
MEC 
MSC=MEC+MPC MPC Demand 
Qm Q* 
Pm 
P* 
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example. Everybody wanted to catch these fish and nobody could be excluded from it. Public 
goods exhibit low rivalry and low excludability. Everybody can enjoy the air without 
necessary preventing other people from enjoying it. In the case of common pool resources and 
public goods, externalities can be easily created, as there is no excludability and property 
rights are ill defined. 
 
According to Demsetz (1967), property rights specify how persons may be benefited and 
harmed, and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify the actions taken by persons. The 
recognition of this leads easily to the close relationship between ill defined property rights and 
externalities. Hagedorn (2007) identifies following categories of property rights: (a) the right 
to use the asset (usus); (b) the right to appropriate the returns from the asset (usus fructus) and 
(c) the right to change its form, substance and location (abusus). When it is unclear who has 
the property rights, persons can use and abuse an asset without compensating the rightful 
owner. Also according to Demsetz (1967), the primary function of property rights is that of 
guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities. Every cost and benefit 
associated with social interdependencies is a potential externality. One condition is necessary 
to make costs and benefits externalities: the cost of a transaction in the rights between the 
parties (internalization) must exceed the gains from internalization.    
 
The first systematic analysis of pollution as an externality can be found in Pigou (1920). 
Pigou's most famous contribution is that of internalizing externalities associated with 
environmental damages (Van Passel, 2007). Pigou (1920) proposed to impose taxes on 
polluting firms in proportion to the output of the pollution, known as the Pigouvian tax. An 
important aspect of the Pigouvian solution to pollution was the ability of the polluter to get 
away with pollution because there are no defined property rights to environmental resources 
(Edwards-Jones et al., 2000). Ronald Coase (1937) argued that the distribution of private 
property rights is irrelevant for economic efficiency since negotiations between the parties 
will always result in the same Pareto-efficient level of the externality. This result, often 
known as the Coase Theorem, requires that: 
- Property rights are well defined  
- People act rationally  
- Transaction costs are minimal  
If all of these conditions apply, the private parties can bargain to solve the problem of 
externalities. Coase (1960) later noted that transaction costs, however, could not be neglected, 
and therefore, the initial allocation of property rights often matters. A  normative conclusion 
is that institutions which minimize transaction costs should be created, so as to allow 
misallocations of resources to be corrected as cheaply as possible.  
 
In this chapter we go a step further. We focus on private entities that identify existing (or 
potential) externalities and internalize these in order to create private utility from it. They 
therefore appeal to other private entities’ interest in removing these externalities. A practical 
example is organic farming, a production method that renounces amongst others the use of 
chemical pesticides. This restriction comes at a cost, because alternative and more expensive 
pest control measures have to be used and a lower yield is obtained. In order to guarantee 
farmer profitability, organic food prices are higher than the conventional counterpart. Only 
those consumers that are sufficiently susceptible to the externalities created by the pesticide 
use  will be willing to pay for the organic product. Of course, different reasons might exist 
why private entities want to internalize externalities. We identify these reasons further in the 
text. 
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1.2.2 Institutions of sustainability 
As discussed above, the natural and social system are in a permanent process of interaction. 
The social system changes due to economic and technological reasons and natural impact, 
while the ecological system changes due to natural reasons and human impact. Therefore, 
both systems co-evolve by mutual co-adaptation. Due to new technologies, increasing 
population and economic growth, human impact on eco-systems threatens to destroy our 
resource base. As Hagedorn (2005) amongst others argues, this should draw our attention to 
“sets of  rules” (or constraints) that we can, and actually do, impose on our interaction with 
nature. These sets of rules are called “Institutions of Sustainability (IoS)”. Institutions of 
Sustainability regulate the co-adaptation between the socio-economic and the natural system.  
 
In order to analyze the role of institutions with respect to sustainability, Hagedorn et al. 
(2002) formulated the ‘Institutions of Sustainability’-framework. When developing a 
framework for analysing or even designing institutions of sustainability, focus rests upon 
those transactions which are related to natural resources and ecological systems. This 
distinguishes the IoS framework from conventional transaction cost economics (Williamson) 
which has been developed against the background of transferring “commodities” (goods 
mostly produced by means of engineered processes). In the IoS-framework, “non-
commodities” are at stake; that means goods, services and resources which are received 
through those processes of self-organisation which are typical for ecosystems and only to a 
limited extent influenced by humans. The IoS framework relates four key elements that 
interact with each other to come to sustainable change: 
- the actors, characterized by values and beliefs, reputation and trustworthiness, power, 
information and knowledge, social environment and embeddedness; 
- the institutions, as formal and informal rules, property rights and duties; 
- the transaction, characterized by properties such as excludability and rivalry, assets 
specificity, separability, frequency, uncertainty, complexity, heterogeneity; 
- the governance structures, such as markets, hybrids and hierarchies, making the rules 
effective 
Depending on the type of transaction, the actors involved, the prevailing institutions and the 
associated governance structure, the outcome with respect to sustainability will be different. 
In what follows we will define each of these four elements further. 
 
According to Hagedorn (2005), institutional change depends on the characteristics and 
objectives of the actors involved in those transactions. This is not only true for individual 
actors whose values, interests and resources to exert influence (power) are very different, but 
also for groups of individuals like communities using organisations and networks to shape 
institutions according to their interest and to solve their conflicts. 
 
North (1990) defines institutions2
 
 as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. They reduce uncertainty by 
providing a structure to everyday life. Institutions can be both formal constraints, such as 
rules devised by human beings, and informal constraints, such as conventions and codes of 
behaviour. An essential part of the functioning of institutions is the costliness of ascertaining 
violations and the severity of punishment.  
                                                          
2 In this dissertation the term ‘institution’ encompasses both the defining set of rules and the chosen 
organisational structure aligned with these rules. 
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The neo-classical economic theory pictures the decision-making unit or firm as a black box, a 
production function, wherein inputs are transformed into outputs according to laws of 
technology (Williamson, 2003). A firm’s level of capital and labour is related to its productive 
output (Leiblein, 2003), whereby market pricing coordinates the use of resources (Demsetz, 
1983 cited in Williamson, 2003). This, however, will explain little on the inner workings, nor 
on the firms’ reaction on uncertainty or potential opportunism in contracting. It is therefore 
that Williamson (2003) proposes to look at agriculture through a “new lens”. It focuses on the 
“the costs of doing business, and the social rights and obligations (institutions) which people 
devise to reduce them”. 
 
Davis and North (1971) proposed to distinguish between institutional environment and 
institutional arrangements (this was later also used by North and Williamson). The 
institutional environment refers to the “set of fundamental political, social and legal ground 
rules that establishes the basis for production and distribution” (Davis and North, 1971); it is 
the broader set of institutions within which transactions occur. The institutional arrangements 
are “the arrangements between economic units that govern the ways in which these units can 
cooperate and/or compete” (Davis and North, 1971); they are the contracts or arrangements 
set up for particular transactions, also referred to as governance structure. North, as others, 
therefore distinguishes between institutions as rules and governance structures as the 
organisational solutions for making rules effective. Ménard (1995) reasons that institutions 
establish and delineate the conditions under which goods are produced and exchanged. 
Organisations, on the other hand, are “the players of the game” and include firms, community 
groups and agencies (North, 1990).  
 
The institutional environment consists of institutions that are in itself the result of institutional 
arrangements. Within the institutional environment, new institutional arrangements are set up. 
Each level of the institutional environment is a support for new negotiations and sets of 
arrangements. Williamson (2000) developed a framework in which he distinguishes between 
four levels of institutions. The top level is the socially embedded level and refers to the 
norms, customs, traditions and codes of conducts, i.e. informal constraints and social capital. 
The institutions at this level change very slowly. The institutional environment forms the 
second level and includes the formal rule of the game, i.e. constitution laws and property 
rights. The rules of the game are partly the product of evolutionary processes and partly the 
results of political action, and change in a period of 10 to 100 years. The third level 
accommodates the governance structures or institutional arrangements. The key question on 
this third level is “how to get the governance structures right” and therefore involves the study 
of the effectiveness and efficiency of different governance structures. These governance 
structures can change in a period of 1 to 10 years. The fourth level is the level at which the 
neo-classical economic theory applies. The firm is described by a production function, and its 
objective is to maximize utility by “getting the marginal conditions right”. Prices and 
quantities change continuously.  
 
Given the rules of the game (the institutions), the players of the game (the actors) engage or 
not in a transaction. A transaction, the third element of Hagedorn’s framework,  can be 
defined as a transfer of property rights. According to Williamson (1985), transactions differ 
in the degree to which relation-specific assets are involved, the amount of uncertainty about 
the future and about other parties involved, the complexity of trading arrangements and the 
frequency with which transactions occur (Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2009).  In the neo-
classical economic theory transaction costs are assumed to be zero. In this framework, 
resource allocation will not be influenced by the form of the governance structure. Yet, 
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transaction costs do matter. The risk of opportunistic behaviour of the trading partner and the 
bounded rationality result in high costs in time and resources to search for information on the 
contracting environment and the firm. McCann (1997) defines transaction costs as the 
resources used to define, establish, maintain, and transfer property rights. According to Hobbs 
(2003) transaction costs can be subdivided into search (information) costs, negotiation costs 
and monitoring and enforcement costs. Search costs arise prior to the contracting, as the 
partners collect information on the contract itself, on the economic and financial 
consequences, the possible work load and so on. Negotiation costs are the costs of drawing 
the contracts, while monitoring costs are ex-post to the transaction. They result from 
monitoring on the way the contract is complied with and include an assessment of the product 
quality, timely deliverance and efforts ensuring that the contract agreements are adhered to 
(Hobbs, 2003). Transaction cost economics  predicts that simple transactions are matched 
with a simple governance structure, while more complex exchanges are associated with more 
complex forms of organisations. Deviations are less efficient, and will incur high transaction 
costs (Leiblein, 2003). 
 
Depending on the characteristics of the transaction, different types of governance structures 
exist that guarantee transaction cost minimization. According to Van Huylenbroeck et al. 
(2009), there is a continuum of governance structures ranging from pure anonymous spot 
markets, in which market prices provide all relevant information and competition is the main 
safeguard, to hierarchies (firms), that mitigate risk but only provide weak incentives to 
maximize profits, while bearing additional bureaucratic costs. Ménard (2004) introduced the 
concept of hybrids as an intermediate form, which is a governance structure where actors 
have transferred part of their autonomous property rights to others, in order to allow for some 
coordination between partners. According to Menard (2004), hybrids share 3 fundamental 
characteristics:  
1. Pooling Resource. Whatever the form hybrid arrangements take, they are 
systematically oriented towards organizing activities through interfirm coordination 
and cooperation, so that key investment decisions must be made jointly. 
2. Contracting. Some more or less formal contracts exist, but they are reduced to a 
framework, to mitigate costs and rigidity. In this situation the choice of governance 
structure that can adequately complement contracts and contribute to their 
implementation becomes crucial. Mechanisms must be designed that are aligned with 
the characteristics of the transactions they support, filling blanks left in contracts, 
monitoring the arrangement, and solving problems without repeated renegotiation. 
3. Competing. In hybrids partners remain independent residual claimants with full 
capacity to make autonomous decisions as a last resort. Competitive pressures in 
hybrids operate in two directions. First, with the possible exception of bilateral 
contracts, partners to a hybrid agreement compete against each other. Second, hybrids 
usually compete with other arrangements, including other hybrids.  
Currently more advanced governance structures such as polycentricity, co-production, 
multifunctionality and cooperation are identified and analyzed (Hagedorn, 2005). Some 
sustainability issues require decentralised governance (f.e. protected areas), others highly 
centralised governance (f.e. plant genetic resources), and often we see combinations. The 
result is that governance structures are characterized by polycentricity and diversity.  
 
Hagedorn (2005, 2008) introduces the dichotomy of Integrative and Segregative 
Institutions3
                                                          
3 The terms integrative and segregative differ in meaning from the terms internalisation and externalisation used  
in conventional economics: 1) they do not just refer to the capacity of market mechanisms but to any type of 
 as basic concept underlying his theory of Institutions of Sustainability. 
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Integrative institutions allow actors, who make decisions on transactions, not only to profit 
from beneficial effects, but they also hold them fully responsible for adverse effects. 
Similarly, they not only force them to internalise the transaction costs they cause, but also 
protect them against transaction costs resulting from the activities of other agents. A good 
example is the avoidance of reputation damage for certification schemes (a form of PIoS) 
when a food scare occurs in the unregulated spot market. Segregative institutions force actors 
who make decisions on transactions to focus and refrain from receiving some beneficial 
effects, but also allow them to shift some of the burdens resulting from adverse effects to 
others. They may externalize transaction costs within limits, but can also not avoid bearing 
transaction costs which should rather be attributed to other agents. Hagedorn (2005) mentions 
that both integrative and segregative institutions cause private costs for the decision makers 
and social costs. He associates integration and segregation with two categories of costs: 
transaction costs and opportunity costs. The latter refer to the benefits foregone from 
additional integration when the rules and governance structures are seggregative (and vice 
versa). Given that PIoS are the set of rules designed to voluntary internalize externalities, they 
can be seen as an example of integrative institutions. 
 
1.2.3 Private institutions of sustainability 
 
Private Institutions of Sustainability (PIoS) can now be defined as a nonlegislative 
voluntary commitment to undertake additional efforts to reduce the production of negative - 
and increase the production of positive - externalities. Two main characteristics make these 
PIoS a special type of Hagedorn’s Institutions of Sustainability: the central position of the 
private actor and the voluntary nature of his participation in (and often the initiation of) the 
PIoS.  
 
Furthermore a strong parallel exists between PIoS and the process of ‘self-organisation’, as 
identified by Ostrom (2009). She found through research in multiple disciplines that, opposite 
to accepted theory, some government policies accelerate resource destruction, whereas 
opposite to this, some resource users have successfully invested time and energy to achieve 
sustainability. She calls this latter process ‘self-organisation’4
1.2.3.1 Public versus private institutions 
.  
To maintain and even improve the current level of environmental sustainability, initiatives can 
originate at public or private level. Basically, all measures aiming to do so can be subdivided 
into three distinctive categories. Two categories principally reside under public authority, 
while the third is situated in the private sphere.  
When the market is deficient in regulating the externalities caused by production processes, 
public authorities are there to intervene. Policy makers dispose of two different options to 
implement public regulations. The first one, the Command-and-Control option, is based on 
the coercive power of the State, in which the public authorities change the structure of 
property rights and impose regulations aimed at preventing the occurrence of negative 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
institution and governance structure; 2) they do not only focus on the responsibility of actors for physical effects 
they caused but at the same time on the nature of the social/political process associated with regularizing actors’ 
interdependencies (Hagedorn, 2005) 
4 Ostrom introduces a framework that helps to describe the probability of self organisation when socio-
ecosystem sustainability is under threat. In this framework, she identifies four key elements that interact and will 
determine the outcome: the users of the socio-ecosystem (SES), the resource types, the resource systems and the 
governance structures in place. For each of these elements, and for the interactions and the outcomes, the key 
determining features for self organisation are also identified. Given the focus on ‘self-organisation’, Ostrom’s 
framework is also applicable to our case of private institutions of sustainability. 
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externalities or at inciting the production of positive externalities.  Although it certainly has its 
merits, the Command and Control instrument has been heavily criticised, mainly due to its 
environmental ineffectiveness with respect to certain types of pollution, its weak economic 
efficiency, the lack of flexibility, the absence of stimulations to innovate and the risks to be 
trapped in suboptimal technological solutions. The second category resides under the market 
mechanisms that, by integrating price mechanisms, push the regulated agents to internalize 
the environmental externalities. These economic instruments (taxes, retributions, subsidies, 
trading in property rights) make it possible to attribute prices to environmental goods, 
enabling agents to integrate these in their cost calculations. 
The third (and most recent) category corresponds to a more diverse set of options, with as 
principal and common characteristic its voluntary nature. This voluntary character mainly 
refers to the absence of the use of the State’s coercive power, implying that the adoption of 
the approaches depends on the good-will of the involved actors. These instruments play on the 
moral responsibility of the actors involved and on the social sanctions to which the latter will 
be exposed in case of non compliance.  
 
There is an intimate link between PIoS and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The EU 
definition of CSR is: “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis.”  (COM, 2001). While CSR mainly refers to intra firm processes, PIoS often 
refers to inter firm arrangements, and more specifically to hybrids, which are organisational 
structures where multiple actors cooperate and contract together, while still remaining 
competitors. Burke and Logsdon (1996) describe how CSR can actually create value for the 
firm, when it is applied strategically.  
1.2.3.2 Motives for participation in private institutions of sustainability 
Despite the variety of their types and subtypes, all voluntary approaches contain a common 
element: they are nonlegislative commitments to undertake additional efforts in reaching 
sustainability targets. In essence, a firm is not required by law to develop or adhere to a 
voluntary approach. As a consequence, in contrast to other instruments, voluntary approaches 
do not apply to all firms belonging to the same industry, contributing to the same adverse 
effect, or submitted to the same jurisdiction. Motivations for participation in PIoS can be 
found both in and outside the economic sphere. Often voluntary approaches are initiated in 
response to consumer and community pressure; competitive pressure; or a threat of a new 
regulation or tax (Börkey et al. 1999). The motives for participation can however also be 
purely ideological, as a response to the current overexploitation of the ecosystem. 
 
Going beyond legal compliance is counterintuitive because a firm is supposed to make money 
and internalizing externalities is costly. These expenditures will increase the production cost 
and as a result there will be either a decrease in demand due to increasing product prices, or a 
decrease in profit if the firm decides not to raise its product price. However, various economic 
motivations for adoption of voluntary strategies can be identified. Henriques and Sadorsky 
(2008) describe a variety of potential benefits to firms such as relief from existing 
environmental regulation (like a burdensome tax), the pre-emption of regulatory threats, or 
the influencing of future regulations; cost-efficiency; improved stakeholder relations; and the 
possibility of receiving technical assistance in kind or via some kind of incentive mechanism. 
Hence, organizations are motivated to increase their internal efficiency and external 
legitimacy, which can lead to competitive advantage and shareholder value creation. Khanna 
(2001) also provides an excellent overview of firms’ motives to participate in environmental 
management programs. A commonly expected gain associated with voluntary internalizing an 
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externality is avoiding the costs of public regulations. The government may plan to introduce 
a new standard or a new tax. In behaving proactively and deciding to reduce its emissions, a 
firm may expect to pre-empt public regulation (Maxwell et al., 2000). Benefits from voluntary 
internalization of externalities are not limited to regulatory gains. Internalization may result in 
a better use of, and access to, inputs. Such a case is called ‘no regret action’ and the classic 
example is that of energy savings. Environmental improvement of a process may be 
associated with a lower consumption of fuel or gas, and, therefore, may result in a reduction 
of energy costs. Another expected gain for firms’ voluntarily internalization is provided by 
product differentiation on environmental performances and their signalling to consumers via 
advertisement and labeling. Once the environmental performances are known, green 
consumers can express their willingness to pay for the environment in purchasing goods. High 
quality products will then be sold at higher prices. Even if consumers do not want to pay more 
for greener products, there may still be an advantage of differentiation. At the same price 
consumers opt for greener products and therefore the greener firm is rewarded by an increase 
in its market share. Finally, as a rule, product differentiation relaxes price competition. A third 
benefit which may outweigh the abatement costs is reputation gains vis-à-vis stakeholders (its 
employees and local communities).  
 
Motivation can also be found outside the economic sphere. Vatn (2009) explains that the 
human motivation is much more complex than that described by the standard model of 
rational choice, which aims at maximizing individual utility. Schlüter (2009) argues that, as 
many environmental goods cannot, and in the eyes of many citizens should not, be regulated 
by the market, we can expect that in the field of the environment many other forms of 
rationality than the homo economicus prevail. Gintis (2000) also distinguishes between 
different types of people, depending on their rationality. The homo economicus’s rationality is 
to maximize individual utility. The economic motivations outlined in the previous paragraph 
relate to this type of people. The homo egualis on his turn prefers equality and the homo 
parochius distinguishes between insiders and outsiders. The homo reciprocans on his turn 
exhibits a propensity to cooperate and share with others that are similarly disposed, even at 
personal cost, and a willingness to punish those who violate cooperative and other social 
norms, even when punishing is personally costly. The reasons for voluntary participating in 
PIoS are therefore not necessarily economically inspired. Some degree of altruism, inspired 
by a genuine concern for the Earth and its future inhabitants can be part of the rationality of 
the participants. Related to this is the ‘warm glow’ effect (Andreoni, 1989), which refers to 
actors’ engagement in philanthropy ‘to feel the glow’ that comes with altruistic behaviour. 
1.2.3.3 Dual objective of Private Institutions of Sustainability  
PIoS have the dual objective of simultaneously improving ecological sustainability and 
maximizing private utility of the actors implementing the PIoS. These systems therefore 
contribute to ‘sustainable development’, as the commodities that result from the PIoS 
simultaneously create added value for the firm and contribute to the sustainability of the Earth 
system.  
 
With this dual objective a possible contradiction is associated, as the institutions implemented 
to attain the sustainability objective might constrain the actor in attaining his private utility 
maximization objective. The actors involved in PIoS than have to make a trade off between 
the long term sustainability goal and the short term private utility maximization objective. As 
the primary objective of private economic actors is to reap economic rents from the creation 
of added value, the long term sustainability goal is often made subordinate to the short term 
private utility maximization objective. This is in conflict with the ecological economist view 
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of the Earth as supersystem and the micro-economic agent as a dependent subsystem, as 
explained earlier in the text. We can go one step further in this. As the long term sustainability 
objective of PIoS is reflected in the end product as a credence attribute, it is difficult to 
evaluate by economic actors, enabling free riders to make an environmental claim that is in 
reality not met. To avoid this, extra institutions need to be created for monitoring and 
enforcing the institutional rules that actually guarantee the claim.  
Conversely, some of the institutions defining the PIoS can be designed as such that both 
objectives are met simultaneously, and work mutually reinforcing. By implementing new 
resource saving technologies, economic rents can be created while contributing to ecological 
sustainability.  
 
Schaltegger and Synnestvedt (2002) explain the above relation between environmental 
performance and economic success more formally, as displayed graphically in figure 1.2. 
Either there is a negative relationship between better environmental performance and 
economic performance (lower curve), when the corporate environmental protection conflicts 
with the other business objectives, or there is a parabolic relationship (upper curve), where 
economic results are increasingly improved by environmental protection practices, up to a 
point where marginal benefits from environmental protection are decreasing. The type of 
relation depends on the type of environmental problem and the applied technology.        
 
Figure 1.2. Relation between firm environmental performance (EnvP) and firm economic 
performance (EP). Source: Schaltegger and Synnestvedt (2002) 
1.2.3.4 Types of private institutions of sustainability 
Four main types of voluntary approaches can be distinguished depending on the parties 
involved (Börkey et al. 1999, Khanna, 2001): 
1. unilateral commitments made by (groups of ) private actors (f.e. polluters); 
2. agreements achieved through direct bargaining between private parties (f.e. polluters and 
pollutes); 
3. environmental agreements negotiated between industry and public authorities; 
4. voluntary programmes developed by public authorities (e.g., environmental agencies) to 
which individual firms are invited to participate. 
The latter two imply an important role played by public authorities, the former two fully 
reside in the private sphere (private voluntary mechanisms). 
 
Unilateral commitments consist of environmental improvement programmes set up by firms 
and communicated to their stakeholders (employees, shareholders, clients, etc.). The 
Economic 
performance 
Environmental performance 0 
EP* 
EP0 
EnvP* 
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definition of the environmental targets as well as of the provisions governing compliance, are 
determined by the firms themselves. Nevertheless, firms may delegate monitoring and dispute 
resolution to a third party in order to strengthen the credibility and the environmental 
effectiveness of their commitments (Croci & Pesaro, 1996). 
 
Private agreements are contracts between a firm (or sometimes a group of firms) and those 
who are harmed by its emissions (workers, local inhabitants, neighbouring firms, etc.) or their 
representatives (community organizations, environmental associations, trade unions, business 
associations). The contract stipulates the undertaking of an environmental management 
programme and/or the setting of a pollution abatement device. 
 
Contracts between the public (local, national, federal or regional) authorities and industry are 
known as negotiated agreements. They contain a target (i.e., a pollution abatement 
objective) and a time schedule to achieve it. The public authority commitment generally 
consists of not introducing a new piece of legislation (e.g., a compulsory environmental 
standard or an environmental tax) unless the voluntary action fails to meet the agreed target. 
 
Within public voluntary programmes, participating firms agree to standards (related to their 
performance, their technology or their management) which have been developed by public 
bodies such as environmental agencies. The scheme defines the conditions of individual 
membership, the provisions to be complied with by the firms, the monitoring criteria and the 
evaluation of the results. Economic benefits in the form of R&D subsidies, technical 
assistance, and reputation (for example by being permitted to use an environmental logo) can 
be provided by the public body. 
 
1.2.3.5 Key features of private institutions of sustainability 
Some key features can be identified that make voluntary approaches differ from each other. 
An excellent overview is given by Börkey et al. (1999). 
 
We can distinguish between individual or collective voluntary approaches. Voluntary 
approaches may be developed by single firms (hierarchy) or by coalitions of firms (hybrids). 
Whether voluntary approaches are collective or individual is a key distinction, for the former 
involve inter firm cooperation whereas the latter do not. This directly influences the costs of 
voluntary approaches, in particular the costs of monitoring and sanctioning non compliance to 
limit free riding (free riding occurs when it is in the interest of economic agents not to 
contribute to an action because they will benefit from it without paying its costs). We can 
distinguish between horizontal and vertical alliances within PIoS in the food chain. In this 
dissertation our attention will be focused on collective voluntary approaches as primary food 
production is characterized by many suppliers (farmers).  
 
Voluntary approaches cover the whole spectrum of geographic delimitations. They may take 
place at a local, national, federal or regional level.  
 
Agreements can be binding or non-binding. The legal form of voluntary approaches is an 
important element of their success. Agreements are binding for both parties when they include 
sanctions in the case of non compliance and are enforceable through a court’s decision. 
Binding agreements, as opposed to nonbinding agreements, or gentlemen’s agreements, are 
more likely to be effective.  
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As they operate outside the regular legislative process, voluntary approaches are not 
necessarily transparent and open to all vested interests. However, the involvement of 
additional parties is possible. Third parties, like community organizations and green groups, 
play an increasing role in unilateral commitments as well as in negotiated agreements. 
 
Voluntary approaches may concern setting pollution abatement objectives and/or the 
implementation of measures to achieve them. Where the environmental objective is set by the 
party(ies) involved in the voluntary approach, the voluntary approach is called target based. 
Where the target is set within the framework of the regular legislative process by government, 
and the voluntary approach only consists of selecting and implementing the measures to 
achieve it, the voluntary approach is termed implementation based. 
 
PIoS result into credence attributes of food products and therefore need to be signalled to the 
buyer or consumer. A useful classification of quality dimensions for food, based on the theory 
of the economics of information, is into search, experience, and credence dimensions. While 
search and experience attributes can be verified before or during consumption, credence 
attributes are not revealed even after consuming the product. Typical examples are 
environmental impact or animal welfare (Marette et al.,1999; Nelson, 1970, 1974; Darby & 
Karni, 1973). Credence attributes mainly focus on the quality of the production process, and 
less on the core product itself. Therefore, quality-of-life issues, such as food ethics, 
environment and health cannot be verified upon purchase or consumption. In recent years 
however, these attributes have become crucial as components of buyer and consumer value 
(Teisl et al., 1999; Schröder and McEachern, 2004; Bernués et al.,2003; Miles and Frewer, 
2001; Wandel and Bugge, 1997). Grunert (2002) puts quality labels as a possible solution, 
giving buyers/consumers information about credence characteristics of food products. A 
typical process-related quality trait, and consequently a credence attribute, is organic 
agriculture (Grunert et al., 2000).  
 
Moreover, to check the legitimacy of the environmental claim a monitoring and control 
system is put in place. As explained by Tanner (2000), one can distinguish between first, 
second and third party certification. Third-party certifiers are independent from buyers and 
sellers in agrifood commodity chains. In case of first party certification suppliers audit 
themselves, while in case of second party certification retailers’ paid technicians audit the 
suppliers. The third party certification is considered to be more reliable as third party certifiers 
are thought to have no stake in the outcome of the transaction (Golan et al., 2001). 
 
1.3 Institutional change in PIoS 
Social and economic conditions in a society change continuously as new things become 
scarce, as prices change, as tastes and preferences change, as population increases and as 
technology opens up new possibilities and problems (Bromley, 1989). These changes are 
normally treated as exogenous. The theory of institutional change attempts to explain and 
predict the probable response of economic actors to these changes. One of these responses are 
PIoS.  
 
When making an institutional choice, Denzau and North (1994) argue that we need our mental 
models, our beliefs, and our filters, in order to interpret data (such as prices, and other 
information about an outcome of a choice) and choose the solution the individual considers to 
be the wisest at a particular moment in time (Schlüter in Beckmann p322). North (1990) notes 
that it is usually some mixture of external change and internal learning that triggers the 
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choices that lead to institutional change. The actor will assess the gains to be derived from 
recontracting within the existing institutional framework compared to the gains from devoting 
resources to altering that framework. According to North (1990) the process of change is 
mostly incremental as economies of scope, complementarities5
  
 and the network externalities 
arising from a given institutional environment bias costs and benefits in favour of choices 
consistent with the existing framework. Institutional change will occur at the margins most 
pliable in the context of the bargaining power of the interested parties. The direction of 
change is therefore determined by path dependency.  
Bromley (2006) questions North and others’ idea of rational and utility maximizing behavior 
as the driver for institutional change. According to him, institutional change results from a 
process of changing our beliefs, our cognitive and normative models, when the current 
institutional arrangements cannot satisfactory explain a particular phenomenon. In this 
process we search for ‘sufficient reasons’ that support a new institutional choice. The 
accepted view of institutional change is that such a change is either directed towards 
improving the ‘efficiency’ of the economy, in which one party is made better off and no other 
party is made worse off, or it is merely ‘redistributional’ in nature such that the gain to one 
party is offset by a loss to others (Bromley, 1989). Bromley adds to these categories of 
institutional change the category of ‘reallocating economic opportunity’, and that of 
‘redistributing economic advantage’. The latter consists in the creation of institutional 
arrangements that find no support in the social welfare function. These arrangements  
redistribute economic advantage in favour of some economic agents who are able to use their 
special position at the expense of others. The ‘reallocation of economic opportunity’ is an 
ongoing process of modifying institutional arrangements  in response to the changing nature 
of attitudes and preferences in society as a whole. According to Bromley, it is not something 
driven by the relentless pursuit of productive efficiency as for any given structure of 
institutions there are infinitely many productively efficient points along production 
possibilities frontiers and there are infinitely many institutional possibilities as well.  
 
In the introduction to this paragraph we noted that institutional change is the economic 
response to exogenous changes. This view however ignores the possibility of endogenous 
institutional change. Aoki (2005), who explains institutional change from a game theoretic 
perspective, notices that institutions, as rules of the game, are treated in two different ways: 
either they are considered exogenously predetermined outside the domain of economic 
transactions (as in the institutional environment of North, 1990 or Williamson, 2000), or they 
are treated as endogenously shaped and sustained in the repeated operational plays of the 
game itself. While the exogenous view takes a dichotomy approach to separate the rule 
making game and the operational game, the endogenous view takes an integrative approach. 
Following the endogenous view, Aoki (2005) states that, as the patterns of play structured by 
institutions repeat themselves, the cumulative consequences of repeated plays may start to 
generate internal inconsistencies and/or endanger the sustained compatibility with the 
environments. In such situations, mutant strategies that have been suboptimal thereto may 
exhibit an increasing viability. The transitional process to new institutions converges when a 
new pattern of plays of game emerges and is collectively recognized as the way how the game 
is now being played. Additionally, agents’ new action choices given this new pattern of play 
should generate satisfactory pay-offs to them to make the institutional change successful.  
 
                                                          
5 in institutions (see Aoki, 2005 also) 
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Whether we follow the endogenous or exogenous view to institutional change, depends on the 
institutional level we analyse. Ostrom (1990) distinguishes between multiple levels of nested 
institutions. According to her, institutional change is a continuous process of adjustments 
across these nested levels. At the lowest level we find ‘operational rules’, which directly 
affect day to day decisions made by participants in any setting. Changes in these rules will 
lead to changes in physical variables. Here participants interact in light of internal and 
external incentives they face to generate outcomes directly in the world. At the second level, 
‘collective choice rules’ are situated. These rules determine who is eligible to be participant 
and the specific rules to be used at the operational rule level. Participants at this level not 
necessarily are the same as those at the operational level. At the deepest level, we find 
‘constitutional choice rules’. They first affect collective choice activities by determining who 
is eligible to be a participant and the rules to be used in crafting the set of collective choice 
rules that, in turn, affect the set of operational rules.  
 
Hagedorn (2002) describes institutional change in the area of environmental coordination as a 
response to technological, biological and economic factors on the one hand and societal and 
political influences on the other hand.  In his IoS-framework (see figure 1.3 below), the 
interaction between nature and actors depends upon the properties of the transactions and the 
characteristics of the actors. Changes in both will determine which institutional arrangements 
emerge. These arrangements define the appropriate changes in property rights to nature 
components as well as the accompanied changes in governance structures that enforce these 
property rights.  
 
Figure 1.3. Institutions of sustainability framework (Hagedorn, 2002) 
PIoS can be seen as the result of economic actors’ dissatisfaction with the current institutions 
that regulate private actors’ interaction with nature. This dissatisfaction emerged due to 
external changes and associated changes in private actors’ mental models. All four of 
Bromley’s arguments for institutional change can be associated with PIoS. But maybe the 
most prominent is the argument ‘reallocation of economic opportunity’ referring to the 
modification of institutional arrangements  in response to the changing nature of attitudes and 
preferences in society as a whole. Given the increased knowledge, awareness and sensitivity 
about the human impact on the ecosystem, the societal voice for a change in behaviour sounds 
louder. PIoS is the private answer to this voice. Following Aoki (2005), PIoS are recognized 
by a group of private actors as the way the game should be played now. They are convinced 
that these PIoS will generate satisfactory payoffs. The latter are not necessarily restricted to 
economic payoffs. 
PIoS are not only a response to changes, they themselves are also subject to change due to 
continuous processes of external changes and internal learning.      
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1.4 Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
1.4.1 The conceptual framework 
Institutions are created and changed by economic actors with the objective of attaining a 
desired outcome. As explained in the previous paragraph, Bromley (1989) identifies different 
intended ‘outcomes’ of institutional change, such as efficiency improvement, redistribution 
and reallocation (or herorientation). In Ostrom’s framework for analyzing social-ecological 
systems (SES), the interaction between resource systems, users, resource units and 
governance systems leads to certain outcomes. Ostrom (2009) makes a distinction between 
the social performance of a SES, the ecological performance and externalities created to other 
SES’s. With social performance she associates social performance measures such as 
efficiency, equity, accountability and social sustainability. Ecological performance measures 
are ecological sustainability, biodiversity, resilience, overharvesting etc. Also PIoS are 
devised to attain a certain outcome. In Hagedorn’s Institutions of Sustainability framework, 
the interaction between actors, institutions, governance structures and transactions in an action 
arena will define the outcome, which he terms the institutional performance. When the 
institutional performance is satisfactory, there is no need for institutional change (see figure 
1.3). 
 
In this dissertation we intend to measure the performance of PIoS. As explained, PIoS claim 
to have a dual objective, to simultaneously contribute to sustainability and economic 
development. PIoS’ endogenously shaped institutions and governance structures are aimed at 
reaching this dual objective. As our measure for the performance of PIoS, we distinguish 
between the institutional effectiveness, the institutional efficiency and the institutional equity 
of PIoS. Institutional effectiveness indicates to what extend the desired effect is reached 
given the set of endogenously and exogenously determined institutions, while institutional 
efficiency indicates whether this is done in the most economic way. Institutional equity on 
its turn refers here to the fair division of value among actors participating in the PIoS.    
 
As PIoS have a dual objective, institutional effectiveness can relate to both. Do these systems 
contribute to sustainability and to economic development? When defining sustainability we 
introduced the system view, with the economic system subordinate to the social and the 
ecosystem. In this dissertation, the institutional effectiveness of PIoS is primarily related to 
their claimed objective of contributing to ecosystem sustainability. As mentioned by Lepoutre 
(2008), remarkably little studies actually assess whether firms with a proactive environmental 
strategy (PES) are successful in achieving improved environmental performance. Most studies 
seem to assume, however, that the adoption of proactive environmental practices 
automatically generates good environmental performance. The few existing studies that do 
investigate the PES - environmental performance relationship come to opposing conclusions. 
Majority of authors find a positive connection (see  Lepoutre, 2008 for an overview). 
However, the paper of Hertin et al. (2008) shows that there is currently no evidence that 
environmental management systems (EMS) have a consistent and significant positive impact 
on environmental performance. They conclude that policy action based on the simple 
assumption that companies with an EMS perform better than those without therefore seems 
inappropriate. Rivera et al. (2006) focus on two main questions: 1) Are voluntary programs 
effective in promoting higher environmental performance by participant firms? 2) If so, which 
distinct areas of environmental performance are more likely to be improved by firms joining a 
voluntary environmental program? They found hardly no evidence that firms following an 
EMS are performing greener than their counterpart. 
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The institutional efficiency indicates whether the ecosystem sustainability target is reached in 
the most efficient way, i.e. with the highest economic rent for the employed resources. The 
effect of an environmental management system on economic performance is more widely 
studied in the literature. The relationship between environmental and economic performance 
is explained earlier in paragraph 1.2.3.3.  
 
Institutional equity of PIoS focuses on the value distribution among participants in the PIoS 
and can be seen as a measure for the social performance of PIoS.  When multiple actors are 
involved in PIoS, a hybrid governance structure emerges. Particular is that partners to a 
hybrid agreement remain to some extent competitors. In food production all kinds of hybrids 
exist. Codron et al. (2005) classified these partnerships into three main groups: (1) farmer-
driven initiatives, (2) retail driven vertical alliances between producers, manufacturers and 
retailers and (3) generic standards common to several retailers. When one partner to the 
hybrid has a dominant position, bargaining power can be exhibited. Evidence of retailers’ 
dominant position in the food chain is given by McCorriston (2001 and 2002), Gohin and 
Guyomard (2000), Giraud-Héraud et al. (2003 and 2005). According to Bunte (2003), social 
welfare – in this case social supply-chain performance – depends on two elements: (1) 
efficiency (profit) and (2) equity (people). Efficiency is concerned with the creation of value 
added; equity is concerned with the division of value added over the respective stakeholders. 
One of the most heavily studied equity issues related to pricing studied in industrial 
organization is price transmission. It refers to the way prices at one level in the product chain 
react to changes at another level.   
 
The measurement of effectiveness, efficiency and equity require the definition of a 
benchmark, a point of comparison. The benchmark reflects the opportunity costs of the 
employment of resources. Opportunity costs refer to the value that the best available 
alternative would have generated with the employed resources. Value not necessarily needs to 
refer to the economic value created. This can also be the ecosystem services provided, 
environmental degradation avoided etc. The benchmark can either be normative, representing 
an ideal use of the resources, or positive, based upon existing options in the market. The 
logical benchmark when the effectiveness is measured is the target effect itself. The concrete 
target measure for PIoS is the contribution of the PIoS to the actual ecosystem sustainability 
of the Earth system. To measure the efficiency, the appropriate benchmark is, in the spirit of 
opportunity cost thinking, the best available economic alternative. Currently, the best 
available alternative to the PIoS for the production of commodities is the market itself. Equity 
on its turn can be measured as the proximity of the PIoS to the ideal configuration according 
to the different stakeholders. Configuration here refers to the rights and duties of the different 
partners in the scheme. In an ideal configuration where inequity is zero, we find a correct 
division of costs and benefits across partners according to their contribution in the PIoS. 
 
The current endogenous institutional structure of a PIoS will determine the sustainability 
outcome and the socio-economic performance, or the institutional effectiveness, efficiency 
and equity as defined above. Benchmarks (firms, hybrids, markets not participating in PIoS) 
operating in the same exogenously determined institutional environment, but with a different 
set of endogenously determined institutions, will have a different institutional effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity. By comparing PIoS with these benchmarks changes can be proposed 
that improve the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of the PIoS. These changes will alter the 
institutional structure, which will, on its turn, alter the effectiveness, efficiency and equity 
ones more. This is the dynamics of PIoS. The graphical representation of this cycle is shown 
in figure 1.4 below.  
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Figure 1.4. Framework of analysis 
1.4.2 Hypotheses 
Given this framework, the following research questions (RQs) are of interest: 
 
with respect to the actual performance of PIoS: 
Research question 1. Do Private Institutions of Sustainability lead to more ecosystem 
sustainability?  
  
Research question 2. Do Private Institutions of Sustainability lead to more economic value 
creation?  
 
Research question 3. Do Private Institutions of Sustainability lead to more equity among 
participants? 
 
with respect to institutional change and further improvement of the performance of PIoS: 
Research question 4. What is the cost of improving the environmental performance of PIoS?   
 
Research question 5. What is the desired compensation for endogenous changes in the 
institutions underlying PIoS ? 
 
Research question 6. How does the sustainable efficiency of  farms  participating in the PIoS 
system change when new sustainability targets are introduced? 
  
The first three research questions analyse the situation as it is and therefore lead to positive 
research. The last three research questions are more normative, as they focus on 
improvements of the current system and consequences of these improvements.  
 
The link between environmental, social and economic performance and these research 
questions is indicated in figure 1.5, which extends figure 1.2. The figure shows the 
interrelation between environmental and economic performance for the market (market 
curve), the PIoS (PIoS curve) and an optimized PIoS (Optimized PIoS curve). Many different 
PIoS-systems can exist in the market. Accordingly, different PIoS-curves can be drawn. Of 
these curves, one outperforms the rest, which is the optimal PIoS-curve in figure 1.5. The 
figure also shows the potential relationship between the environmental and social 
performance. Suppose that a farm participating in the PIoS system is currently situated in 
Institutional structure of PIoS 
Institutional effectiveness, efficiency  
and equity of PIoS 
Institutional change of PIoS 
Institutional structure of benchmarks 
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point A on the PIoS curve, characterized by an economic performance EPPIoS and an 
environmental performance EnvPPIoS
 
. In this part of the curve economic and environmental 
performance reinforce each other. Another farm participating in the regular market is on its 
turn situated in point F, as this point guarantees maximum economic performance given the 
market curve. We can also distinguish between unsustainable and sustainable resource use, 
depending on whether the sustainability threshold is surpassed or not.   
 
 
Figure 1.5. Link between research questions and environmental (EnvP) and economic (EP) 
performance of PIoS. The dotted line shows the technology of the market, while the full line 
shows the technology of the PIoS. The sustainability threshold is also indicated 
RQ1 investigates the environmental effectiveness of PIoS. PIoS claim to be better for the 
environment. As this claim cannot be verified upon sale, it is a credence attribute, that is 
signalled to the buyers by means of a certification book or a label. Both from the buyers and 
societal point of view it is interesting to know whether this claim is actually met. In figure 1.5, 
if the farm participating in the PIoS is situated in point A and the farm participating in the 
market in point F, a different environmental performance should be noticeable (RQ1) between 
these farms (EnvPPIoS - EnvPmarket
 
).  
RQ2
 
 focuses on the economic performance of the PIoS. Are these systems the most efficient 
way to attain the environmental performance level of the PIoS? How much value would farms 
in the regular market create when they have to meet this environmental performance? This 
RQ can be related to the opportunity cost of using capital (or capital forms). Do policy makers 
better invest their resources in these PIoS systems or in other systems? In Figure 1.5, the 
difference between point A and point D can be interpreted as the difference in value created 
by the PIoS and the market system at the environmental performance level of the PIoS.  
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RQ3
 
 focuses on the institutional equity of PIoS and refers to the distribution of value among 
participants in PIoS. Do these systems contribute to equity in the supply chain or do they 
facilitate exhibition of market power? In figure 1.5 the level of equity in the market is  
indicated by point J, while PIoS potentially reside in point I to H.  
To guarantee sustainability, firms will have to become more environmentally friendly. PIoS 
seem promising vehicles as they are especially designed for this. When the sustainability 
targets of PIoS are changed the underlying institutions of PIoS have to change to guarantee 
that these targets are met. This will have implications for the participants of PIoS. Assuming 
that these participants optimize the environmental and economic performance of their PIoS 
(point A in Figure 1.5), introducing extra sustainability constraints will affect the economic 
performance. In Figure 1.5, firms move from point A on the PIoS-curve in the direction of 
point G. Economic performance then deteriorates from point A to point M in figure 1.5. 
Private actors will only accept this economic performance deterioration when an appropriate 
compensation is given. RQ4 
 
focuses on the actors desired compensation for changes in the 
institutions underlying PIoS in the direction of more sustainable production.    
The previous research question considers the members of the PIoS to be homogenous and 
does not take the differential stakes between members into account. RQ5
 
 wants to investigate 
which compensation value-chain members expect for changes made by other value-chain 
members in the institutions underlying PIoS. The right compensation can result into more 
equity among the PIoS value chain members. Graphically this would mean that the equity in 
the PIoS moves in the direction of point K.        
Current resource use is probably still unsustainable, even within PIoS systems. As explained 
earlier, some critical stocks of natural capital need to be maintained to guarantee strong 
sustainability, which assumes only limited substitution between capital forms. These critical 
stocks can be regarded as the sustainability thresholds for these resources. Resource 
consumption has to remain below these ‘sustainability thresholds’ to guarantee sustainable 
resource use. Although PIoS might (or might not, see RQ2) be the more efficient system at 
their environmental performance level, the question is how efficient they are when these 
absolute sustainability thresholds are imposed. RQ6
 
 wants to analyze this. In Figure 1.5 point 
B reflects the point where environmental performance is in line with the earth’s sustainability 
threshold and economic performance is optimal given the possible technologies (the curves in 
the figure). This point thus creates highest ‘sustainable value’. To know whether firms 
participating in PIoS (f.e. firm A in figure 1.5) perform better than firms who do not (firm D 
in figure 1.5) with respect to absolute sustainability targets, these firms could be compared 
with this ideal point. 
The above research questions can now also be translated into following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. Firms participating in Private Institutions of Sustainability contribute more to 
ecosystem sustainability than firms who do not  
(figure 1.5, shift from EnvPpios to EnvPmarket
 
)  
Hypothesis 2. Firms participating in Private Institutions of Sustainability create more 
‘sustainable value’ than firms who do not  
(figure 1.5, shift from point D to A)  
 
Hypothesis 3. Private institutions of Sustainability can lead to more equity among value chain 
members  
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(figure 1.5, shift from point J to I) 
 
Hypothesis 4. Improving the environmental performance of PIoS will change the private 
actors’ desired pay-off structure   
(figure 1.5, shift from point A to G) 
 
Hypothesis 5. Institutional changes in PIoS can simultaneously improve the equity among 
value chain members 
(figure 1.5, shift from point J to K)    
 
Hypothesis 6. Farms participating in PIoS are more sustainable efficient than farms who do 
not when new sustainability targets are introduced  
(figure 1.5, shift from point A to B versus shift from D to B)  
  
1.5 Cases analysed 
To test the above hypotheses and related issues different case studies are used. PIoS in 
agriculture can be divided in two distinctive groups, based upon the motivation for 
participation and the associated impact towards environmental sustainability.  
In Figure 1.5, PIoS to the left of point A use improvements in their ecological performance to 
improve the economic performance, leading to a win-win for both. In the spirit of Bromley 
(1989), this optimization refers to efficiency improvement. In Ostrom’s nested institutions 
framework, main differences compared to conventional production systems will relate to the 
operational rules, i.e. the lowest level of institutions. This first type of PIoS systems, of which 
the Belgian vegetable certification standard Flandria/FlandriaGAP is a good example, are 
market oriented systems which integrate environmentally sound techniques up to the point 
that economic performance starts degrading. Their principal motivation for integrating 
environmentally sound techniques can be found in the economic sphere, and often has to do 
with safeguarding ‘reputation’. But, given the high numbers of participants in these schemes, 
their contribution to overall environmental sustainability might be more substantial compared 
to the second group, as explained next.  
 
The firms situated to the right of point A on the PIoS-curve in Figure 1.5 make a trade-off 
between economic and ecological performance. Drivers are, apart from ‘efficiency 
improvement’, also the ‘reallocation of economic opportunity’ as a response to changing 
attitudes in society and ‘redistribution’ between economic and ecological performance. 
Changes are more fundamental and require adaptation of rules at the constitutional level.    
This second group, of which organic farming is the main example, predominantly acts as 
facilitator of the introduction of more environmentally sound production methods. This group 
can be regarded as the innovators in the field of environmental sustainability, those who pave 
the way for the remaining majority of farmers. Participation often takes place for ideological 
reasons, and motivation is not necessarily economic. The real environmental performance, 
expressed as the contribution to an overall reduction in ecological degradation, remains 
marginal, due to the limited number of participants. These systems are niches in the market 
and they primarily have a signalling function, both towards private parties and policy makers.  
 
In this dissertation both the organic system and the integrated Flandria/FlandriaGAP farming 
system will be used as examples of PIoS. Both systems are briefly introduced below. The 
institutional context is explained in the next chapter. The benchmark for these systems is the 
conventional market system regulated by the public framework.  
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As for the type of voluntary approach, both cases are examples of unilateral commitments 
taken by private actors. Organic farming, as its principles are since 1992 framed in a 
European legislation, shares some similarities with public voluntary programmes, but the 
initiative comes from the private sector and its preconditions change under private agreement. 
Flandria/FlandriaGAP receives some governmental support for adhering to certain 
environmental standards and therefore also partly resembles to public voluntary programmes.  
 
As for the key features, both PIoS are collective voluntary approaches. In agriculture, single 
farmer initiatives for mainstream sales channels are rare, given that single farmers cannot 
guarantee sufficient supply for these channels. Given their collective nature, and the close 
relationship between farmers and their suppliers (especially in the case of FlandriaGAP, see 
chapter 7), both PIoS give rise to hybrid organisations. Via these hybrids, resources are 
pooled. An important contractual arrangement of the hybrid is the certification standard, 
consisting of a standards manual stipulating the rules and a monitoring and enforcement 
system. Given this, farmers participating in hybrids remain competitors of those participating 
in the PIoS as well as of rival PIoSes. Agreements made within both the organic and 
integrated farming system are binding, and non compliance is monitored by an independent 
controlling body. Transparency is largely limited to those participating in the PIoS. Both 
organic farming and Flandria-participation is signalled to the end consumer.    
 
Organic agriculture limits the use of external inputs and integrates several practices which are 
considered more environment friendly than conventional agriculture. The organic production 
system strives at a minimal disruption of the natural equilibrium, and at the same time, high-
quality food production by banning residues harmful for human and animal health. Therefore 
the use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and genetically modified organisms are prohibited.  
The organic principles of regulation also stimulate processes of recycling, closed loop 
systems, and the use of production techniques which allow domestic animals to exhibit 
species specific behaviour. For countries in the EU the regulation is stipulated in EEC 
regulation 2092/91 and subsequent. 
 
The Flandria quality vegetable label guarantees a high quality product, cultivated in an 
environmentally friendly way and perfectly traceable. Today there are more than thirty 
Flandria vegetable products offered at Belgian auctions. Environmentally friendly cultivation 
implies that for each type of cultivation particular specifications should be respected. For 
example, the use of organic resources is preferred over the use of synthetic resources and 
‘observe and alert’6
                                                          
6 Pest development on crops is monitored in special field trials. When the economic damage threshold is nearly 
reached, warning messages are given to farmers with these crops  
 messages must form the basis of crop protection. The use of fertilisers 
must be based on the results of soil analyses and considerable attention has to be paid to 
hygiene aspects. Strict requirements are also imposed to residue monitoring. In order to meet 
additional requirements from buyers and public authorities, the content of the quality label 
Flandria was extended by adding the FlandriaGAP Specifications. As a result of these 
specifications, the strict standards applying to Flandria for hygiene, planet-friendly planting 
and sustainable horticulture are now set even higher. Extra attention is paid to food safety, 
care for the environment and the work force. The auctions "Mechelse Veilingen" and "Veiling 
Hoogstraten" switched over completely to the FlandriaGAP Specifications in 2004. The first 
control of the products takes place at the auctions. An external control body is responsible for 
second-line control: it monitors the automatic control system within LAVA (Logistic and 
Administrative Auction association) and is responsible for the control of alien substances.  
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For each of the hypotheses defined above, one of these two PIoS will be used to illustrate the 
mechanisms at work.       
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Part 1 of this dissertation, consisting of three different chapters, investigates the market 
interest in PIoS. It can be considered as the part of the thesis that is setting the scene. In part 1 
the private nature of PIoS is investigated, while in part 2 and 3 we focus on the sustainability 
contribution of PIoS and changes therein. As opposed to public institutions of sustainability, 
PIoS are voluntarily initiated by market actors. This part 1 explains why market actors are 
interested in organizing or participating in these institutions. This knowledge is of interest for 
the research questions investigated in part 2 and part 3, as the motivation of private actors 
might differ from those of public actors.        
Chapter 2 compares PIoS with other strategies to achieve more sustainable production and 
consumption. After a literature review on different approaches to secure environmental 
sustainability, the results of a focus group session with representatives from the different 
stakeholder groups are discussed. This chapter will already qualitatively assess the first 
research question that PIoS reduce the asymmetry between private and social objectives. It 
will show that PIoS are considered one of the most promising tools to come to a successful 
increase in both environmental and economic sustainability.  
Chapter 3 explores by means of a choice experiment whether there is a consumer interest in 
the marketing of public goods and PIoS. It is investigated whether consumers are susceptible 
to the environmental claims made in PIoS systems and whether they are willing to engage in 
these systems, as this is an important precondition for the success of PIoS. This knowledge 
will be important when investigating research question 2, the economic performance of PIoS, 
as market based systems cannot be succesful without consumer interest.   
The farmer is not the only involved actor in the PIoS value-chain. An important driving force 
for private certification is the retail sector. In chapter 4 we discuss how PIoS are of strategic 
importance for retailers to strengthen their market positioning. This chapter will already show 
that market actors’ interest in PIoS not necessarily coincide. Equity issues within the PIoS 
value chain are further investigated in research question 3. 
 
From part 2 onwards the research questions outlined in the conceptual framework are 
investigated. This part, consisting of three chapters, focuses on the environmental, economic 
and social performance of PIoS. 
In Chapter 5 we present a quantitative assessment of the differences in ecological 
sustainability between a non-certified and a certified system (the PIoS), the conventional and 
organic farming system, respectively. Ecological sustainability is evaluated at a disaggregate 
level, i.e. it is decomposed into several ecological indicators which are all evaluated 
separately. The data in this chapter originate from an extensive literature review, and the 
difference between the two systems is calculated by means of a technique called meta-
analysis.  
From the former chapter we learn that the environmental performance (which is achieved by 
PIoS) may well come at an economic cost (lower output). To make the tradeoff between 
ecologic sustainability and private value maximization we need an evaluation tool that can 
assess both simultaneously. To do so, chapter 6 further improves the Sustainable Value 
method as developed by Figge and Hahn (2004) by redefining the opportunity costs. 
Furthermore, a practical application is presented and discussed in which the sustainable value 
creation of a PIoS system is compared with the conventional market system. 
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In the subsequent chapter 7 we discuss how PIoS are continuously evolving due to both 
market forces and changes in understanding of the concept of sustainability. This chapter 
focuses on the social performance of PIoS and discusses equity-related issues. This is done by 
analyzing the effects of the emergence of a premium private spot market, where the 
certification manual is only a license to enter. We also discuss the differential effects on the 
involved market parties.   
 
The previous parts show that we need a mix of ingredients from different systems to come to 
more sustainable and value maximizing systems. Taken PIoS as given, we can use them as 
mechanisms to further close the gap between private and public objectives. To that end the 
prescription rules have to be adapted. Changing the rules of production will create market 
effects. In Part 3, consisting of three chapters, we explore how changes in the rules of 
prescription of PIoS result into changes in the underlying institutional setting of PIoS and in 
the private utilities of the involved actors. We also investigate how value creation and 
environmental sustainability can be optimized jointly. 
From the introductory chapter we know that PIoS intend to internalize external costs. By 
changing the certification rules for the environmental better, more external costs are 
internalized. As these changes need to be implemented at the micro level, the farmer is 
confronted with higher costs and/or lower outputs. To do this without losing income  he will 
need a price premium. In chapter 8 we design an experiment in which we test certified 
farmers’ willingness to accept changes in the certification rules. The ecologic contribution of 
these rules is obtained from a multicriteria analysis.  By comparing the desired private pay-off 
structure with the ecological gains, the most favorable pathways can be determined. 
Changes in the certification rules can only be implemented successfully when other elements 
of the institutional setting of the PIoS also change. In the following chapter 9 we describe how 
changing the rules of prescription is a 2-stage-2-level game. The first stage is a negotiation 
between players at the rule making level, while the second stage takes place at the rule 
dependent (farm) level. In a choice experiment the farmer reaction to changes in the PIoS’s 
governance structure, the stakeholders’ bargaining position and the purpose of the PIoS are 
tested and discussed. Chapter 9 explains under which conditions institutional change can lead 
to more equity among the value chain members. 
The sustainable value method discussed in chapter 6 allows for analyzing the sustainable 
value creation of PIoS given the current resource consumption. For a number of resources our 
current consumption exceeds the maximum sustainable use. Chapter 10 introduces an 
efficiency based method that allows for estimating the improvement path for an industry when 
resource use needs to be further reduced. This improvement path simultaneously reduces 
resource use and optimizes value creation. In a practical application firms operating in PIoS 
are compared with conventional firms. In this chapter we also show that there is still room for 
improvement in sustainable efficiency of PIoS.  
 
Chapter 11 is the concluding chapter. It revisits the hypotheses and brings together the lessons 
that may be derived  for policy makers, practitioners and researchers. In this chapter we also 
explain the limits of this research and identify alleys for future research.     
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PART I: Market interest in farm certification 
systems 
In this dissertation private voluntary farm certification systems are studied, as examples of 
PIoS. In this first part we further position PIoS versus other sustainability oriented strategies 
and investigate the motivation of private actors to participate in these systems. PIoS differ 
from other IoS due to their private nature and market orientation. Private market actors 
engage in these demanding systems in order to create added value. The question is of course 
whether the market also perceives this added value and is interested in it, as this is a 
precondition for the success of these systems. In Part 1 this question is investigated. Part 1 
consists of three chapters:  
- Chapter 2: A qualitative assessment of stakeholders’ interest in PIoS – the case of 
pesticide reduction 
- Chapter 3: Consumer interest in PIoS 
- Chapter 4: Strategic importance of PIoS for retailers 
Chapter 2 indicates why PIoS contribute to environmental and economic sustainability, 
according to stakeholders. The real environmental performance is investigated in part 2, 
research question 1. Chapter 3 explains the consumer interest in PIoS, which is an important 
precondition for value creation within PIoS, futher investigated in part 2, research question 2. 
Chapter 4 explains the retailers’ interest in PIoS, which will be important when investigating 
equity issues within PIoS (part2, research question 3).   
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Chapter 2. A qualitative assessment of stakeholders’ interest in 
PIoS – the case of pesticide reduction 
2.1 Introduction to the chapter 
This chapter places PIoS between other strategies to make our production more 
environmentally friendly. As explained in chapter 1, PIoS differ from IoS due to their private 
and voluntary nature. We can term the institutions originating at the public level as Public 
Institutions of Sustainability (PuIoS). The main aim of this chapter is to reveal the mental 
models of the main stakeholders with respect to PIoS versus PuIoS. This chapter contributes 
to the discussion on the institutional effectiveness and efficiency of PIoS. In the following 
chapters ‘objective’ measures based upon quantitative data are constructed, while this chapter, 
which is based upon qualitative data, has a more subjective nature, as it discusses the 
perception of stakeholders with regard to the environmental and economic performance of 
PIoS compared to other strategies. In chapter 1 the motives of private actors to participate in 
PIoS are explained. According to Henriques and Sadorsky (2008) these can be brought back 
to relief from existing environmental regulation (like a burdensome tax), preemption of 
regulatory threats, or influencing of future regulations; cost-efficiency; improved stakeholder 
relations; and the possibility of receiving technical assistance in kind or via some kind of 
incentive mechanism. This chapter will relate the stakeholders’ attitude to these motives. 
 
To illustrate the discussion, this chapter focuses on measures aimed at reducing pesticide use 
in agriculture. In the first section, the research methodology is briefly explained. Secondly, 
pesticide reduction is associated with enhanced ecosystem sustainability. In a third section, 
different approaches to secure sustainable production are introduced and the possible role of 
private initiatives is explained. The chapter ends with a stakeholders’ assessment of the 
contribution of the different strategies to economic and ecologic sustainability. 
 
2.2 Research methodology 
The main source of information in this chapter is, apart from the consulted literature and in 
depth interviews, a series of focus group sessions with stakeholders of public and private 
institutions of sustainability.  From March, 2005 to June, 2005, six focus groups were 
conducted with the principal stakeholders including the vegetable growers, representatives 
from the auctions, pressure groups, retail and government. Each focus group covered a 
different subject and consisted of a different stakeholder group composition, in line with the 
subject. Table 2.1. reflects the structure of the focus group sessions. Throughout the chapter, 
wherever relevant, remarkable positions and points of view will be amplified. In general, 
focus groups are discussion sessions between several stakeholders under supervision of a 
moderator. The main subject of the discussion is fixed but, within this subject, the discussion 
topics evolve depending on the stakeholder group composition. The technique is particularly 
interesting for the exploration of the reasoning behind certain points of view.  
 
In addition private and governmental experts in the field of standards and labelling were 
consulted and their comments further strengthened (or challenged) the results from the focus 
groups cycle. These interviews included three meetings with representatives of the Auction of 
Mechelen, one with a representative of the Brava Auction and one with government officials 
from the Food Agency. During four user group meetings, the results of this (and related) 
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research were presented to and discussed with a total of 24 representatives from the auctions, 
retail sector, consumer groups, the farmers’ union, government officials and pressure groups. 
 
Table 2.1. Structure of focus group sessions 
 Stakeholder type Subject 
Focus group 1 Vegetable growers aligned to 3 different 
certification schemes * (9) 
- motivation for participation in the initiatives 
- (dis)advantages 
Focus group 2 Vegetable growers in FLANDRIAGAP 
and EUREPGAP (13) 
Consequences of participation at farm level  
Focus group 3a and 
Focus group 3b 
Certification representatives, 
auctioneers, retail, consumers and 
producer organizations (5+4) 
- producers’ stakes versus other stakeholders’ 
stakes 
- certification initiatives versus other measures 
aimed at reducing pesticide use 
Focus group 4 Vegetable growers, initiators, 
auctioneers, retail (6) 
driving forces and evolution within the initiative 
Focus group 5 All involved stakeholders (13) feed back and discussion  
  Number of participants in parentheses 
  * Biogarantie, FLANDRIA and GlobalGAP 
 
In this chapter we mainly use the information from focus group sessions 3a and 3b relating to 
the discussion topic PIoS versus other strategies to reduce pesticide pressure. An extensive 
report describing the focus group processes, constellation, dynamics and contents is available 
(Mondelaers et al., 2005).  
 
The use of two focus groups discussing the same question allowed triangulation. The 
objective of these focus group sessions was explorative research focusing on the associations 
participants make w.r.t. economic and ecological sustainability of alternative strategies for 
reduced pesticide use. The participants were representatives from certification organisations, 
the auctions, retail, producer organisations, consumer organisation and a government agency.  
A moderator from a professional bureau guided the focus groups along a semi-structured 
predefined scenario. A secretary indicated main findings on flip charts to structure the 
discussion. Two different observers made notes, while the process was also video taped. This 
procedure again allowed triangulation. Although social sustainability was also scheduled, it 
was only discussed for PIoS, due to time lack.  
 
The different strategies to improve sustainability were identified prior to the focus group, 
based upon a literature review. The focus group then started with the identification of missing 
or redundant strategies. In a next step, participants were asked to position the strategies on an 
axis indicating the contribution to (economic or ecological) sustainability. The group 
discussions resulted in a final position and a nuanced motivation for this position. In the 
second part of this chapter both the positions and the participants’ argumentation are 
reflected.   
 
2.3 Sustainable development and pesticide reduction 
In this section we briefly recapitulate the concept of sustainable development and relate it to 
pesticide reduction. Since the beginning of the 1990s a large number of publications have 
defined and discussed sustainable development (SD). Many of these start from the initial 
definition by the so-called Bruntland commission, namely that SD is “Development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs” (from the World Commission on Environment and Development’s report Our 
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Common Future – Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987). This definition contains huge 
challenges as it comprises well-balanced strategies to achieve social, environmental and 
economic goals.  The Belgian Federal Plan for Sustainable Development 2000-2004 indicates 
that the goals for SD can be divided into the following three groups:  
1. economic goals for SD should enable to meet the present needs without endangering 
the needs of the next generations. This implies the adoption of production and 
consumption patterns which comply with the human needs and which decrease the 
burden on the environment. This process should search for a balance between 
production and consumption that overcomes problems of over- or underproduction 
and over- or underconsumption of certain goods and services; 
2. social goals for SD should be pursued within and amongst communities, and include 
an equitable distribution of financial means, natural resources and cultural integration. 
These social goals urge for strategies to be developed and programmes to be 
implemented that aim at the decrease and eradication of poverty, the creation of jobs 
and income (stimulated by a dynamic labour market, promoted by an active labour 
market policy) and the provision of means and resources for all less/least developed 
areas over the world; 
3. environmental goals of SD are defined to ascertain the boundaries of natural 
resources in its management by taking technological development and institutional 
structures into account. These goals imply the recognition and respect for ecological 
norms, priorities for rational use of the environment and the development of national 
and international laws stipulating the responsibilities for pollution, environmental 
damage and the compensation for victims of both.  
 
A booming economy producing increasing numbers of goods and services puts a high stress 
on the environment. Obviously the objectives of economic growth conflict with 
environmental concerns, with externalities in particular being the major problem. Often, the 
polluters do not bear the full cost of their actions. The challenge for policy makers is therefore 
to “rectify market failures without losing the benefits that the market also brings” (cf. 
Cairncross, 2000). Government interference is considered important in the case of 
environmental sustainability, because external products of agriculture have a collective nature 
(non-exclusiveness and non-rivalry; everyone enjoys cleaner water, more biodiversity, cleaner 
air etc.). Private parties will not bear the transaction costs related to reducing the negative 
external effects of agriculture if other parties can enjoy freely from their efforts (free riders). 
Every one prefers a cleaner environment, but who will pay for it? 
 
Pesticides have become merely indispensable to maintain the current level of high 
productivity in conventional agri- and horticulture. The current intensive form of agricultural 
production is in fact partly realized due to the use of chemical pesticides. Advantages 
concerning pesticide use include harvest protection (quantity); high-quality production; 
efficient management (same production each year); stable price-making and production; 
employment (35.000 employees in EU) and reduction of certain risks (mycotoxins). The 
intensive production process, however, results into crops being more sensitive to diseases and 
plagues, creating techno-economic dependency on pesticides. Excessive use of pesticides can 
lead to undesired side effects because substances are assimilated by non targeted organisms or 
remain in the environment as residues. The main problems related to the use of pesticides are 
human toxicity, for the applicator, field worker, bystander and for the consumer (pesticide 
residues on/in food) on the one hand and environmental problems, such as drift (pollution of 
surface water, toxicity for aquatic organisms); leaching (pollution of ground water, toxicity 
for soil organisms); reduction of biodiversity and pseudo-estrogenic effects on the other hand.  
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The contradiction in case of pesticide usage is the fact that the ones that gain advantage 
(farmer, industry, consumer) differ from the ones that are at a disadvantage (civilians, 
consumers, environment, and bystanders). However, pesticide users continue to adapt their 
practices in response to market and pest pressures. The current drivers include: 
- public concerns over the health effects of pesticides including the cocktail effect and 
bystander exposure; 
- consumer sensitivity about pesticide residue levels in food, leading to action by 
supermarkets and the Food Agency; 
- public concern over the impact of pesticides on the environment; 
- costs of removing pesticides from water to meet EU drinking water standards; 
- legislative measures and proposals including the Water Framework Directive, 
proposals for new EU laws on pesticide approval, on Maximum Residue Levels and 
for the EU thematic strategy for sustainable use of pesticides; 
- continuing financial pressure on farming; 
- pesticide industry consolidation, coupled with the programme of reviewers under 
Directive 91/414, leading to reduced range of products. This creates particular 
problems for growers of minor crops in niche markets; 
- need to encourage innovation, for example the development of new chemical 
pesticides with improved safety/efficacy profiles or the development of alternative 
products and techniques. 
 
The literature review in the next sections gives an overview of the different mechanisms 
available to guarantee an increase in environmental sustainability. These mechanisms are 
illustrated on the case of pesticide reduction.  
 
2.4 Institutional context of pesticide use in the fresh vegetable sector 
2.4.1 The regulatory framework  
On 26 June 2003, EU farm ministers adopted a fundamental reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The vast majority of subsidies are now paid independently from 
the volume of production. These new "single farm payments" are linked to the respect of 
environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards ("cross-compliance"). The reformed 
CAP aims at a strengthened rural development policy with more EU money, new measures to 
promote the environment, quality and animal welfare and to help farmers to meet EU 
production standards starting in 2005.  
 
The European Community has developed a very comprehensive regulatory framework, 
Directive 91/414/EEC defining strict rules for the authorisation of plant protection products 
(PPPs). The Directive requires very extensive risk assessments for effects on health and 
environment to be carried out, before a PPP can be placed on the market and used. 
Community rules also exist that define maximum residue limits (MRLs) on food- and 
feedstuffs. These regulations focus particularly on the beginning and the end-of-life stages of 
such products. The actual phase in the life-cycle of plant protection products, which is a 
central key element for the determination of the risks they pose, is not sufficiently addressed 
by the existing regulatory framework. With respect to the quality of surface water and ground 
water, respectively Directive 75/440/EEC and, Directive 80/68/EEC outline the strategy and 
regulatory framework.  
 
Chapter 2 PIoS versus PuIoS Part 1 
32 
 
As a complement to the full implementation and review of the effectiveness of the existing 
legal framework, the concept of thematic strategies was introduced in the 6th
1. to minimise the hazards and risks to health and environment from the use of 
pesticides; 
 Environment 
Action Programme. In its Communication ‘Towards a Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable 
Use of Pesticides’ of July 2002, the European Commission launched a broad consultation of 
all stakeholders and institutions. With the adoption of the Council and the Parliament called 
for the elaboration of this Thematic Strategy and determined the goalposts and objectives of 
such a new tool. In particular, the objectives of the thematic strategy are the following: 
2. to improve controls on the use and distribution of pesticides; 
3. to reduce the levels of harmful active substances, in particular by replacing the most 
dangerous by safer (including non-chemical) alternatives; 
4. to encourage the use of low-input or pesticide-free crop farming; 
5. to establish a transparent system for reporting and monitoring progress including the 
development of appropriate indicators. 
The Thematic Strategy on the sustainable use of pesticides was adopted in 2006 by the 
European Commission, together with a proposal for a Framework Directive on the 
sustainable use of pesticides. It aims to fill the above mentioned current legislative gap 
regarding the use-phase of pesticides at EU level through setting minimum rules for the use of 
pesticides in the Community, so as to reduce risks to human health and the environment from 
the use of pesticides. Discussions on the Framework Directive on the sustainable use of 
pesticides (2009/128/EG) started in the European Parliament and the Council in 2006. The 
Framework Directive 2009/128/EG was accepted  in the 2nd semester of 2009. According to 
this directive, member states have to design national action plans for the reduction of 
pesticides before 2012. These action plans have to contain target figures.  
 
To implement the Directive 91/414/EEG at the Belgian level, the following decrees were put 
in place (see www. phytoweb.fgov.be for a more detailed description): 
- RD 28/02/1994 with reference to Plant Protection Products; 
- MD 07/04/1995 with reference to Plant Protection Products, amended in 2002; 
- RD 08/11/1998 with reference to Protection Certificates; 
- RD 13/03/2000 on Maximum Residues 
More recently, the RD 22/02/2005 has been approved, outlining the first Belgian reduction 
programme for plant protection products in agriculture and the use of biocides. The federal 
reduction programme aims at achieving a more sustainable use of pesticides and a significant 
general decrease in the risks associated with the use of pesticides, in balance with the 
necessary plant protection. The programme wants to reduce the negative impact of pesticide 
use in agriculture with 25% at 2010.  To this end several measures are proposed, such as 
legislative reform, total traceability, improvement of technical measures and additional 
measures to reduce the presence of pesticide residues. The first actualisation (2007 – 2008) 
improved the earlier version and defined priority actions for the coming periods. 
 
2.4.2 PIoS in the fresh vegetable sector 
Contrary to the meat sector, where control of the public standards is quite straightforward due 
to the presence of a single regulation in Europe and the capacity of governments to put in 
place credible monitoring systems (via slaughterhouses), the definition and monitoring of a 
safety Minimum Quality Standard (MQS) in the fresh vegetable sector, mainly relating to 
pesticide residues, is more complex. Rather than increased monitoring by increasing public 
expenditure, European governments prefer to depend on the private sector, increasing their 
legal responsibility and promoting the emergence of private standards and monitoring of these 
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standards by independent certification bodies (Codron et al., 2005). Figure 2.2 (based upon 
De Blaiser, 2005) illustrates the institutional context of certification in the Belgian produce 
sector.   
 
* ICB: Independent Control Body (private) 
* FA: the Food Agency (FAVV – AFSCA) 
* ICQC: Private Standard for Integral Chain Quality Control 
* Q&S: Quality and Certainty: German fresh fruit and vegetable standard  
Source: Baised upon De Blaiser (2005) 
Figure 2.1: Institutional context of private and public certification initiatives in the produce 
sector 
Process certification standards aim at steering the production process towards better 
agriculture practices. Product certification standards outline the minimum characteristics to 
which the end product has to comply.  Both on product and process level, the law can be 
considered as the base line, the minimum product and process requirements. In accordance to 
the General Food Law (Regulation (EC) 178/2002), Belgium has promulgated a law on self 
regulation, traceability and notification for the Belgian food and farm sector (RD14/11/2003), 
valid since 01/01/2005. This law focuses on the preservation of food safety at all stages in the 
food chain. The primary sector has to comply with a ‘light version’ of this law, with 
regulations concerning registration and good hygienic practices, because HACCP-like 
systems are too demanding for implementation at farm level. Control of this minimum 
standard is governed by the Food Agency (FA), through an auditing system. The audits are 
complemented with unannounced controls. Different mechanisms have been put in place to 
facilitate compliance with the law on self regulation. The most common option for a farmer is 
to comply with a sector guide, which is (usually) proposed by his sector federation and 
approved by the FA. Currently, 43 agricultural sectors are preparing sector guides and 20 will 
be approved before 2011 (www.favv.be). These privately initiated certification books 
stipulate all the legal demands that have to be met considering food safety, by introducing 
regulations concerning traceability and registration.   
 
To enhance the general process quality throughout the vegetable chain, major players (from 
production and processing level in various sectors) have proposed a common production and 
processing standard (the ICQC – standard; Integral Chain Quality Control). This standard 
integrates the specifications of the Sector Guide as well as other legal and supralegal 
prescriptions at stake in the agricultural sector. In the future this standard will be used to cover 
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the production conditions of Flandria (i.e. it will become their process standard), the major 
certification system for vegetables in Flanders. The past decade, several more restrictive 
certification standards have been initiated, to comply with the extra demands from market 
players downstream the food chain, as is the case for GlobalGAP, or for diversification 
purposes, as is the case for Flandria/FlandriaGAP.   
 
Thus, contemporary agri-food systems are increasingly governed by an array of inter-related 
public and private standards, both of which are becoming an a priori mandatory part of doing 
business in supply chains for agricultural and food products, beyond the most basic bulk 
commodities (Henson and Reardon, 2005). 
 
2.5 Different approaches to secure environmental sustainability 
As already explained in the previous chapter, one can distinguish between public and private 
institutions of sustainability, to address the adverse effects of excessive pesticide usage. 
Basically, all measures aimed at reducing these effects can be subdivided into four distinctive 
categories. Two categories principally reside under public authority, while the third is situated 
in the private sphere. The fourth category, as outlined further in the text, encompasses 
strategies aimed at increasing knowledge and information dissemination (see Figure 2.1 also). 
 
Policy makers dispose of two different options to implement public regulations. The first one, 
the Command-and-Control option, is based on the coercive power of the State, in which the 
public authorities change the structure of property rights and impose regulations aimed at 
preventing the occurrence of negative externalities or at stimulating the production of positive 
externalities.  Although it certainly has its merits, the Command-and-Control instrument has 
been heavily criticised, mainly due to its environmental ineffectiveness with respect to certain 
types of pollution, its weak economic efficiency, the lack of flexibility, the absence of 
stimulations to innovate and the risks to be trapped in suboptimal technological solutions. 
 
Public authorities can also influence market behaviour through market mechanisms that push 
the regulated agents to internalise the environmental externalities. These economic 
instruments (taxes, retributions, subsidies, trading in property rights) make it possible to 
attribute prices to environmental goods, enabling agents to integrate these in their cost 
calculations. 
 
Figure 2.2. Public and private options for an increase in environmental sustainability 
The third category corresponds with a more diverse set of options, with as principal and 
common characteristic its private and voluntary nature. This voluntary character mainly refers 
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to the absence of the use of the State’s coercive power, implying that the adoption of the 
approaches depends on the good-will of the involved actors. These instruments play on the 
moral responsibility of the actors involved and on the social sanctions to which the latter will 
be exposed in case of non compliance.  
 
A fourth category focuses on the creation of knowledge and on the reduction of information 
asymmetry currently present in the market. By stimulating and diffusing technological 
progress, environmental gains can be realized at low economic costs. These initiatives can be 
stimulated both by private or public actors.   
 
The next sections outline the different instruments both at the public and private level now (or 
potentially) applied in the field of pesticide use regulation. We start with explaining the 
specific institutional context of private voluntary certification in the Belgian fruit and 
vegetable sector.  
 
2.5.1 Command-and-control measures 
In the case of environmental policy, the command-and-control approach consists of relying on 
public standards to bring about improvements in environmental quality (Field, 1994). One can 
distinguish between ambient standards, referring to a maximum level for some pollutant in the 
ambient environment; emission standards, which are maximum levels of emissions directly 
originating from the pollution resource; and technology standards, which specify the 
technologies or practices that polluters have to adopt. The former two types are performance 
standards which regulate the output. Each farmer can, in function of his personal preferences, 
individually determine how to remain below the prescribed output. The technology standard is 
a design standard, which prescribes the path the farmers have to take. These standards are 
more easily controllable for the official bodies, but flexibility is lost for the individual 
farmers. Under this scenario the incentives for finding cheaper ways of reducing emissions 
are effectively zero. Additionally, uniform design standards across all farmers impose high 
costs to farmers due to differences in farm structure.  
 
Figure 2.3. Emission standard e1  and e2. In 
case of an efficient emission standard e1, 
marginal damage (MD) equals marginal 
abatement cost (MAC). MAC2
Figure 2.4. Emission standard e in the 
presence of low (EC
 shows how 
technological progress can be cost saving 
1) and high (EC2
 
) 
enforcement costs. Based upon Fields (1994). 
 
When setting standards the question is whether only damages should be taken into account or 
also abatement costs. Figure 2.3 shows the setting of an efficient emission standard at 
emission level e1, the level where marginal abatement costs of firm 1 (MAC1) equal marginal 
environmental damage. When the emission level is set to e2, firm 1 faces higher costs than the 
cost of the damage. Progress in technology can further reduce firm 1’s abatement costs (curve 
€ € MAC1 
MAC2 
MAC 
EC1 EC2 MD MD 
0 0 
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MAC2
 
). To identify free riders, public authorities need to monitor and control the standards, 
which brings about associated costs. Figure 2.4 shows the impact of enforcement costs on the 
optimal emission level. Higher enforcement costs increase the tolerable emission level.      
Future legislative options for the Belgian policy makers to further regulate the use of plant 
protection products, comprise of adding new measures to the current regulatory framework 
and adapting the current measures. Additional constraints can be imposed to producers based 
on type of pesticides, equipment, time of application and regional zones. Adherence should 
than be checked using an efficient and effective control system.  
 
To regulate the availability of chemical pesticides, several options can be pointed out:  
1. Pesticides could be obtained on prescription. This system is considered fairly 
bureaucratic and too time-consuming for the farmer (hence costly). 
2. Pesticide input quotas. At national level, an upper boundary on each group of active 
ingredients could be imposed. Based upon current and historical data, farmers obtain a 
quota per active ingredient group: restrictions can be imposed on company or field 
level.  
3. Transferable quotas (although this can be considered as a market mechanism) from 
year to year and between different farmers are an option, because application of 
pesticide doses is function of the climate, the pest population etc. In sales centres, 
farmers’ purchases have to be administered.  
4. Credit system: farmers receive a total of for example 10 credits per crop. When using 
a pesticide classified as dangerous, some points are deducted. Fewer points are lost 
when using less harmful pesticides. A negative score is permitted, as long as the 
farmer remains below the prescribed level of active ingredients. Compensatory 
measures, such as an extended buffer zone, the use of green electricity and habitat 
management should then be integrated. This system is considered as rather complex 
due to the compensation measures. This system is applied in AMK (Agro-
Environmental Label, The Netherlands), as documented by Manhoudt et al. (2002).  
The current system starts from approval and registration. As the construction of standards is 
dominated by eco-scientists, who focus on risk minimization, the economic consequences are 
largely neglected. A danger exists of overuse of the approved pesticides, leading to pest 
resistance. A more restrictive legislation is considered harmful for the agricultural sector, 
which is already under high pressure. A combination of a more restrictive legislation with a 
legislation more adapted to producers’ wishes and possibilities could be a better solution.   
 
2.5.2 Economic instruments for public policy makers  
Up to now, the negative external effects of agriculture are only to a limited extend 
incorporated in the product prices. In the case of environmental goods, government 
intervention could influence market actors’ behaviour. Different policy measures influencing 
market mechanisms, both compulsory and non compulsory, can be identified. 
 
At producers’ level, subsidies can be used to correct for the economic loss caused by 
measures aimed at increasing environmental sustainability. Agri-environmental measures 
(EU's sixth environment action programme) for example offer support for commitments on 
keeping records of actual use of pesticides, lower use of pesticides to protect soil, water, air 
and biodiversity, the use of integrated pest management techniques and conversion to organic 
farming. The problem with this kind of subsidies is that those who participate are not the 
biggest polluters. Craincross (2000) argues that subsidies in agriculture, while increasing 
production of a limited number of crops, decrease biodiversity and can become harmful for 
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the environment. An environmental policy for sustainable development could therefore better 
aim at reducing the subsidies which endanger the environment. This would reduce incentives 
to overuse natural resources, as well as increase the efficiency of the economy because the 
market would not be distorted anymore and market prices would reflect the true value of 
goods and services. At sector level, the State can reduce the price difference between 
environmentally sound products and conventional products, by subsidizing the sales of the 
environmentally sound products. These subsidies can be appointed to the processors of these 
products, because this is easily administrable (due to the relatively small number of 
processors). The problem in this case is whether and to what extent the decrease in prices will 
be visible at consumers’ level. Another possibility is a direct cut in consumer prices at retail 
level. A financially and administratively less demanding option is the sponsoring of 
advertisement campaigns. 
 
Taxes and charges aim at forcing the polluters to pay, and thereby overcoming externalities. 
Polluters are charged for the use of natural resources. The Belgian Federal Plan for 
Sustainable Development includes a number of tax measures to reduce the environmental 
burden of some industries, i.e. (1) taxes on unwanted social or ecological ways of producing 
and consuming and/or tax reductions on desirable production and consumption patterns; and 
(2) shifting the base on which taxes are calculated from labour to the level of use of 
environmental resources. Regulating taxes can be based upon the number of pollution units 
per hectare or farm (for example quantity of pesticides in water). The underlying idea is that 
external effects are valorised and integrated in the company costs, according to the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle. This relates back to the famous Pigouvian tax. Pigou (1920) stated that the 
negative externalities caused by pollution would be internalized by the market if polluters 
paid a tax equal to the marginal social cost of polluting emissions.  
 
Figure 2.5. Tax t on emission 
level e1. A firm’s total costs for 
emission control are abatement 
costs from e0 up to point e1 
(triangle e0-e1-a) and total tax 
payment (rectangle e1-0-t-a) for 
firm with MAC
Figure 2.6. Tradable permits. Firm 1 resp. 2 have marginal 
abatement cost curve 1 (MAC1) and 2 (MAC2). p is the 
price for a tradable permit, i.e. where supply and demand 
of permits meet. Firm 1 buys permits up to point e
1 
1. It is 
cheaper to remove the remainder of costs by abatement. 
Firm 2 buys permits up to level e2
 
 and abates the rest of the 
emissions.  
Figure 2.5 depicts this graphically. Opposite to figure 2.3, polluters now not only have to pay 
the abatement cost up to point e1 (i.e. triangle e0-e1-a), they also pay a tax (rectangle e1-0-t-
a). Farmers who can easily adapt their production process, will do so by investing in pollution 
reduction measures, to reduce the tax amount they have to pay. The rest will pay the full tax 
amount. In figure 2.5, firm 2 with technologically superior marginal abatement cost curve 2 
(MAC2) will pay less than firm 1 with MAC1 (0-t-b-e2 + e2-b-e0 versus 0-t-a-e1 + e1-a-e0). 
This system offers the farmers a choice between changing the production process and paying 
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the tax. This system also stimulates innovation. One of the main difficulties with the 
regulating tax is the correct definition of the relationship between tax level and pollution 
level. When it is too difficult to calculate the exact amount of pollution units per farm, the 
inputs (pesticides), the production process (conventional versus integrated versus organic) or 
the output (f.e. number of conventionally produced potatoes) can be taxed. These measures 
aim at generating tax incomes, which can be refunded to the market. 
 
Vat-differentiation at consumer level is another, similar, policy option influencing market 
behaviour. According to the degree of ecological efforts, the different production process 
strategies (f.e. conventional versus integrated versus organic farming) could be administered a 
different VAT-level. This strategy causes a major shift in the administration procedures. 
 
Permits, property rights and user rights aim at creating a price for negative effects. The 
government can administer property rights or user rights to the environment. Hence, a purely 
collective good becomes a purely individual good. The market actor obtains the exclusive 
right to use the environment. The government determines the price for the external effect and 
market actors enter into a contract to regulate the external effects. They are held responsible 
for the pollution. Permits are to a certain extent comparable with quotas. Permits primarily 
focus on the output, while the quota system measures the level of active ingredient input.  
Users of the environment (farmers) are given the possibility to reach a certain level of 
pollution (confer Manure Action Plan, MAP). A maximum pollution level is determined for 
the sector as a whole. These permits can also be made transferable. Defining property rights 
can be a powerful strategy for sustainable development because of the following two reasons: 
first, people will take more care of an asset which he or she owns compared to one which is 
communally owned. Communal property can easily lead to a tragedy of the commons. The 
concept was introduced by Hardin (1986) and is defined as the process where the “sink 
capacity is tampered by human contributors without having to pay for such a destruction” (in 
Rao, 2000). And second, property rights can be enforced by courts, so that polluters can be 
imposed a cost for their pollution. Figure 2.6 shows the optimal mix between buying permits 
and abatement in function of the firm’s abatement cost curve.  
 
Producers are risk averse, hence they might exaggerate their use of pesticides to reduce the 
risk on crop failure. Crop insurance could be the solution to this. The insurance premium 
should be lower than the cost for a standard pesticide application. This system is rather 
difficult because crop damage levels (as well as the causes) are difficult to estimate. 
 
Mandatory labelling as a tool is mainly used when a political consensus is absent concerning 
the negative effects of a strategy. Good examples are genetically modified crops. The 
government asks for mandatory labelling in case of asymmetric information (when one party 
is more informed than another), because consumers have the right to be informed of the 
product’s content. This tool is very efficient in case of a difference in consumer preferences.  
 
2.5.3 Know how and information dissemination 
The stimulation of research and the dissemination of knowledge can be regarded as one of the 
most promising and feasible solutions for the increased use of sustainable practices. The 
strategy can increase the use of sustainable practices significantly, at a relatively low cost for 
society. The most important condition should however be that the newly introduced methods 
and techniques imply a significant (economic) improvement for the implementers.    
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Organizing advice and training for farm managers can be successful in case of lack of 
information or misperception. The starting point should be to get farm managers acquainted 
with alternative production methods. The strategy could or could not be compulsory, with 
non-compulsory implicating that only a selective (interested) public will be reached. 
Problematic is also that alternative production methods, in most cases, impose higher costs to 
the producers. Implementation will therefore only be achieved when the alternative becomes 
compulsory or financially attractive. Some examples of alternative methods with a lower 
environmental pressure do exist. The use of bumblebees for fertilisation purposes is very cost-
effective compared to use of man labour, but some pesticides are extremely harmful for the 
bee population, hence alternative, less environmentally harmful strategies are introduced in 
horticulture. By financially supporting demonstration projects and after school education 
(courses, presentations and traineeships), the government tries to fill in the current knowledge 
gap.  
 
Consumer awareness campaigns can be an appropriate tool to alter consumption patterns in 
the long run. The recent trend towards ‘green consumerism’ confirms the validity of this 
approach. The problem is that many consumers are fairly uninterested in making these kinds 
of choices. They prefer other bodies to take the appropriate measures. Hence, awareness 
campaigns will demand an elaborated financial (government) investment plan and a long term 
vision. 
 
Stimulation of research and development is a third promising possibility. New pesticides 
should be developed with a low level of (harmful) active ingredients and suitable for spot 
application and new machinery should co-evolve with the pesticide types. To this end, some 
governmental efforts are essential. Because of the concentration in the pesticide industry, only 
a few multinational companies are important players in the field. For approval of new kinds of 
pesticides in the EU member states, the products of these companies have to be evaluated and 
approved in every country, which makes the process extremely costly. These companies 
hence don’t invest in economically less important crops, leading to limited options for the 
farmers. The farmers associations propose an approval system on EU level, based upon 
climate zones, instead of the country-specific approach.  Extra budget should also be released 
for research concerning alternative production methods (for example new type of crops etc.). 
 
2.5.4 Private Institutions of Sustainability 
As this chapter concentrates on pesticide use reduction in the fresh vegetable sector, we 
introduced some particularities of this sector when describing the institutional context. The 
PIoS present in this sector are examples of hybrid governance structures (see chapter 1 for a 
definition), as the market is characterized by multiple relatively small suppliers and some 
large buyers. The majority of vegetables are traded in one of the six Belgian vegetable 
auctions.  The hybrid governance structures allow intense coordination of the production 
process and product characteristics of the supplying farms for various reasons (see chapter 7 
also). Ménard (2004) describes different examples of hybrid configurations. The PIoS 
discussed here as multi-actor arrangements share a lot of similarity with the ‘collective 
trademarks’ identified by Ménard. Collective trademarks usually involve backward 
coordination and are principally initiated by suppliers. Because of the large number of 
partners involved, the risk of opportunism is high, while monitoring and control are difficult. 
This is opposite to franchising, where the existence of a franchisor makes the arrangement 
particularly well fitted to a principal–agent approach. In collective trademarks, the 
arrangement is most of the time developed by a group of peers, making enforcement 
particularly challenging. Different types of hybrid PIoS are explained below. 
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2.5.4.1 Types of hybrid PIoS 
All sector members can participate in a single PIoS, by jointly adhering to a Minimum 
Quality Standard (MQS) at sector level surpassing the legal requirements. Main reasons are 
retaining consumer trust and avoiding an impact on the sector due to an isolated crisis. The 
sector can also impose measures on the sector players to avoid governmental interference, 
when considered less optimal. This tool is typically used for products difficult to diversify in 
the market place (such as vegetables and fruits). The MQS in the fruit and vegetable sector is 
faced with difficulties concerning definition and control (Giraud-Heraud et al., 2003). The 
risks are only visible in the long run and difficult to identify. Government policy homologated 
a ban on dangerous active ingredients at EU-level. They also imposed Maximum Residue 
Levels (MRLs). However, due to the intensification in crop production, the globalisation and 
the decrease of consumer trust, government control is considered insufficient. Therefore 
sector players prefer private standards with independent control bodies (integrated in Good 
Agriculture Practises, GAPs). In the fruit and vegetable sector, the GAPs are privately 
initiated.   
 
Some sector players can jointly agree on extra product characteristics and standards or 
‘impose’ extra standards on their suppliers, as a diversification strategy or as a safety 
measure. This type of PIoS can be termed private voluntary certification. The measures are 
integrated in certification books and in most cases monitored by a third party. After a positive 
evaluation, producers receive a certificate, which enables them to sell their produce under the 
specific conditions of the certification initiative. When the certification strategy is 
accompanied with a label, we speak of Business to Consumer (BtoC) communication, if not, 
the certification standard is meant for Business to Business (BtoB) communication purposes.  
 
Both voluntary labels, developed by an individual or group of firms with a private objective, 
and mandatory labelling, issued by the government, with a social objective, try to target the 
consumers’ behaviour by attracting attention to certain product attributes. A consumer buys a 
product after clearly evaluating all attributes including search, experience and credence 
attributes. Search attributes are considered before the actual purchase of the product and are 
e.g. colour, price, size.  Experience attributes are those which consumers perceive after the 
purchase and use of the product. Consumers attach experience attributes to the product after 
purchase, while credence attributes are not accurately evaluated. They are better known by the 
producers than by the consumers, as is the case for environmental or ethical attributes. 
Grunert (2002) identifies quality labels as a possible solution, giving consumers information 
about credence characteristics of food products. A third-party assessment is commonly put in 
place to add to the credibility. The label acts as a proxy for more direct contact between 
consumer and producer (Golan, Kuchler et al. 2000; Bougherara and Grolleau, 2002). A 
consumer of labelled products is prepared to pay a premium for the extra attributes of these 
products. Labelling then increases economic efficiency by helping consumers to target 
expenditures towards products they most want (Golan et al., 2000). From the producer-firm or 
government side, the labelling decision is not an easy one because many attributes can be 
labelled, and it is not easy to know what the many and very different consumers find 
important. The effectiveness will depend on the type of information involved and the level of 
distribution of the costs and benefits of proving that information (Golan et al. 2000). 
 
Figure 2.7 shows the PIoS labelling strategy. A polluting firm 1 without private voluntary 
certification emits e1 and voluntary abates e0-e1. Firm 2 with a private voluntary certification 
standard emits e*. In order to signal this to buyers a fixed signalling cost of (p2-p*-b-c) is 
faced. Avoided societal costs are (e1-e*-b-d). The economic rent from this strategy must 
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accrue to the signalling and extra abatement cost (p2
 
-p*-b-c) + (e1-e*-b-a), otherwise firm 2 
better follows the strategy of firm 1. Society is better off when the extra fee charged by firm 2 
is lower than the avoided marginal damages MD, i.e. when (p2-p*-b-c)+(e1-e*-b-a) < (e1-e*-
b-d). 
Figure 2.7. PIoS with labelling. Desired emission is e*. Firm 1 without private voluntary 
certification emits e1 and voluntary abates e0-e1 at a cost of triangle e0-e1-a . Firm 2 with a 
private voluntary certification emits e*. In order to signal this to buyers a fixed extra signalling 
cost of p*-p2
Possible additional strategies at the point of sales could be internal cross subsidies on 
sustainable products in combination with higher margins on non sustainable products; saving 
and rewarding systems mainly focussing on sustainably produced goods; extra shelf space for 
sustainable goods (creating a positive retail image); advertisement for sustainably produced 
goods, financed through a ‘tax’ on food; no price stunting, except for commodities produced 
in a sustainable manner. 
-b-c is faced .  
2.5.4.2 Stakeholders participating in PIoS 
Different types of stakeholders are directly and indirectly involved in the hybrid PIoS. We 
will use the Flandria-initiative as an example for the PIoS-stakeholder configuration. The 
principal stakeholders in this PIoS are the participating farmers and six Belgian vegetable 
(and fruit) auctions, united in LAVA (Administrative and Logistic Association of Auctions), 
and independent controlling bodies (f.e. Certagro). Another closely involved stakeholder is 
the fruit and vegetable retail and distribution sector. Government, farm suppliers, pressure 
groups and consumers are more indirectly involved in/influenced by the initiative. The 
auctions and retailers both fulfil the same role, which is facilitating the transaction between 
producers and consumers by reducing transaction costs and adding surplus value to the 
product. 
 
The producers implement the certification standards at farm level. On individual level, they 
have a modest impact on the adaptations in the certification books.  
 
The auctions’ core business is to ensure that demand matches supply. As promoters of the 
Flandria certification initiative, they are the main actors in the construction and adaptation 
process of the certification book. Also part of their duties is motivating farmers to participate 
in the initiative. Furthermore, they have a consultancy role towards the farmers, amongst 
other with regard to the certification. They also participate in the communication efforts 
associated with the initiative. With respect to their customers, they have to guarantee choice, 
uniformity and quantity. To this end, grading, monitoring and control (both at farm and 
auction level) are also part of their core businesses.    
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With respect to certification books, the retail initiates and/or subscribes to certification 
initiatives. Based upon the type of initiative, they formulate extra demands in line with the 
firm policy and perform additional controls. As final actor in the chain, they have an 
important role in communicating the advantages of the certified produce towards the end 
consumer.   
 
The media, as a more indirect (i.e. a secondary) stakeholder, plays a vital role with respect to 
the way the food chain is presented to the general public, taking into account that they have 
become the primal source of information concerning food (and food scares) for the general 
public.  
 
Pressure groups (consumer, producer and environmental associations) try to influence the 
equilibrium in the certification books in a sense that their supporters’ stakes are defended the 
most. 
 
Whether the initiative will survive or not largely depends on the end consumers’ willingness 
to buy.  This partly depends on factors internal to the initiative, but to the same extend on the 
attitude of consumers themselves towards more sustainable production practises.  
 
The governmental bodies mainly influence the lower boundaries of certification initiatives. 
With legislation in continuous evolution, certification initiatives on their turn have to evolve 
in order to at least encompass the base legal level. The FA (Food Agency) checks whether 
these legal requirements within the food chain are met, irrespective of the type of private 
certificate already administered to the product or producer. Furthermore, sustainable 
production practises are financially supported at EU and country level, with a major influence 
on the persistence of the initiative as such.   
2.5.4.3 PIoS and transaction costs 
The many stakeholders have complex interrelations of pooling resources and contracting 
together while simultaneously competing against each other. The pooling of resources creates 
mutual dependency. Given the possibility of opportunistic behaviour, mechanisms are put in 
place to reduce uncertainty. The design and implementation of institutions that allow 
simultaneous coordination and competition creates transaction costs. 
 
As explained earlier, transactions differ in the degree to which relation-specific assets are 
involved, the amount of uncertainty about the future and about other parties involved, the 
complexity of trading arrangements and the frequency with which transactions occur. The risk 
of opportunistic behaviour of the trading partner and the bounded rationality result in high 
costs in time and resources to search for information on the contracting environment and the 
firm. In chapter 1 transaction costs are defined as the resources used to define, establish, 
maintain, and transfer property rights. Main categories of transaction costs relating to PIoS as 
sets of rules are: costs of information on potential PIoS-partners, costs of preparing and 
formulating the PIoS-rules, costs of negotiating the terms of the PIoS, costs of monitoring the 
fulfillment of the PIoS-rules, costs of enforcement of the PIoS-rules, costs of adjusting the 
PIoS-rules to new conditions.  
 
When designing and implementing PIoS, property right transfers take place at different levels. 
In the introductory chapter we explained that institutions constitute of different nested levels 
of rules. We distinguished between ‘constitutional choice rules’, defining who is eligible to be 
a participant in crafting the ‘collective choice rules’ and what rules should be used in crafting 
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these collective choice rules. ‘Collective choice rules’ determine who is eligible at the 
‘operational rules’-level and which rules govern the operational rules level. The ‘operational 
rules’ on its turn are the day to day rules. Ostrom (2005) distinguishes between different types 
of rules that we can associate with each of these levels. First, ‘boundary rules’ define the 
attributes and conditions required of those who enter a position in the action arena. These 
boundary rules define the general position of appropriators from the PIoS. Additional to the 
position of appropriator, the position of monitor can be created, when outlined in the ‘position 
rules’. ‘Choice rules’ on their turn determine which assets are under consideration and how 
these are allocated across appropriators. ‘Pay-off rules’ outlines the incentive mechanism to 
redirect the appropriations made from the PIoS, with rewards and penalties, such as fines, loss 
of appropriation rights, legal pursuits etc. ‘Information rules’ define what should be reported. 
Finally, ‘aggregation rules’ define whose interests are taken into account to what extend when 
designing and changing the rules. An example could be an equal weight for each appropriator.   
 
At each nested level the different transaction costs identified in the first paragraph can be 
associated with the different types of rules outlined in paragraph 2. We can first distinguish 
transaction costs relating to the design of the PIoS governance system. For example, when 
designing the ‘boundary rules’ for the ‘collective choice rule’-level, which is the level where 
the PIoS-standard is constructed, the actors at the ‘constitutional choice rule’-level will 
experience different costs. First they experience costs of information on potential 
appropriators, to determine which stakeholders should be considered for the design of the 
PIoS-rules. They also experience costs of preparing and formulating the boundary rules, i.e. 
the time and effort to craft the design rules. Other costs are costs of negotiating the terms of 
the boundary rules, i.e. which rules will be accepted under which condition, costs of 
monitoring the fulfillment of the boundary rules, i.e. how to guarantee that the designers 
remain within the boundary rules, costs of enforcement of the boundary rules, i.e. what to do 
if the designers neglect the rules, and finally costs of adjusting the boundary rules to new 
conditions, for example when new exogenous institutions require a new design process.  
 
In the case of the farmer driven Flandria-standard, for the ‘collective choice rule level’ a 
Redaction Committee is installed. It is composed of technicians from the auctions, and has 
received the authority from the ‘constitutional choice rule level’ to adapt the 
Flandria/FlandriaGAP certification standard, after analyzing existing certification books in the 
market place. At the constitutional choice rule level we find LAVA, as manager of the 
Flandria standard, who decides upon approval. At this level we also find government officials. 
These are not involved at redaction level, but they do play a role during accreditation, by 
checking whether the standards surpass the law and the correct procedures have been taken 
into account. For the accreditation procedure, an advisory committee is founded, consisting of 
representatives from environmental movements, the Farmers Union, consumers (Test 
Aankoop), two universities and the Belgian Federation of Distribution enterprises (FEDIS). 
The committee’s advice is not binding, but repeated denial will result into non accreditation 
from the Belgian Organisation for Accreditation (BELAC).  The Flandria standard covers 
both product and process certification, which are independently certified. The process 
certification is based upon the ICQM-standard (Integral Chain Quality Management), 
supervised by VegaPlan vzw. The product quality is independently certified. The average 
producer has no direct impact on the rules and formulations in the cahier de charge. To avoid 
unrealistic instruction books, groups of 10 to 20 farmers, together with 2 technicians from the 
auctions, discuss the practical feasibility and consequences of new rules. Other complaints are 
normally communicated towards the samplers at auction level. Based upon statistics from 
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these complaints and the control results, adaptations to certain bottleneck rules are made, 
normally discussed at a monthly reunion of the Redaction Committee. 
 
Transaction costs can also be associated with the implementation of the PIoS-rules by the 
appropriators. As an example, for the farmers subject to the PIoS operational rules transaction 
costs relate to the information costs to get acquainted with the standard, administrative costs 
to report adherence to the rules, and investment costs to guarantee that the standard can be 
met.   
 
Free riding as an important transaction cost 
In section 2.5.4.1. we explained that PIoS mainly relate to credence attributes, which are 
difficult to verify. This opens the possibility for opportunistic behaviour, which is taking 
selfish advantage of this lack of certainty, by claiming that an attribute is present or absent. A 
special case of opportunistic behaviour is free riding. Free riding is enjoying the benefits from 
an action while not bearing the costs. It typically occurs when multiple actors are involved in 
a collective action. In theory, free riding is likely to occur when compliance costs are high 
relative to the penalty and when control mechanisms are weak and easy to evade. A trade-off 
has to be made between the cost of free riding versus the cost of increased monitoring and 
control.   
 
The (potentially very high) cost of free riding is the loss of credibility and reputation of the 
PIoS. The very aim of the PIoS is to distinguish itself from non certified production. The 
product from a free rider claims to be different from non certified products while it is not. 
Hence there is no validity for setting this claim and accordingly, no legitimate ground for 
accruing associated benefits. To avoid this cost, a monitoring and control system is put in 
place. Many options exist and depending on the option, (the different types of) free riding can 
be avoided more effectively, while costs will also differ.    
 
Free riding can occur external and internal to the certification institution and can be exerted 
by the institution itself. Internal to the institution we can identify free riding within a 
stakeholder group versus free riding between groups of stakeholders. 
 
First, we should remember that a PIoS is in fact designed with the very aim to internalize 
external costs and thus to reduce free riding on public goods. As explained in chapter 1, the 
PIoS has different incentives to do so. It is however possible that a PIoS claims a non existing 
internalization and hence is exerting free riding. Note that this is exactly the first hypothesis 
that we want to test in this dissertation. There are different institutions put in place to counter 
this. A legal framework identifies the type of claims that can be made and how these have to 
be documented and proved. Second, a certification scheme normally has some kind of 
monitoring and control procedure (see further), as a guarantee towards stakeholders for the 
claims made.  
 
Under external free riding we can understand market parties external to the PIoS costless 
profiting from the efforts of the PIoS. As explained more into depth in chapter 7 and 9, one of 
the main reasons to install certification schemes is to avoid that averse behaviour of one 
private actor results into a negative image for all participants in a sector. The dioxin-crisis in 
Belgium was exemplary. Actors external to the certification scheme cannot use the 
certification manual as a proof of good conduct. Thus, the certification initiative here acts as 
safeguard for all those who participate in the scheme. Those who do not can sometimes profit 
from reputation related spill over effects, when the certification initiatives has a positive 
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influence on the sector’s image, but during times of crisis (such as a food scare), the non 
participants cannot use the certification manual as proof of trust.  
 
Most typical is the internal type of free riding where a producer claims to follow the 
certification rules but in fact does not. A less obvious type of internal free riding occurs 
between different stakeholder groups, when one group, f.e. the farmers, bears all the costs for 
a reputational claim, while another party, f.e. the retailers, free rides on these farmers’ efforts 
to attain this reputation.  
 
Private institutions to avoid free riding 
In order to avoid free riding at these different levels, different monitoring and controlling 
mechanisms are set in place. Verification of the authenticity of a claim made by a PIoS (for 
example on absence of residues) is performed by the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) 
and the Belgian Federal Public Service for Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment.  
 
To reduce internal free riding, as explained earlier, one can distinguish between first, second 
and third party certification (TPC) (Tanner, 2000). Third-party certifiers are independent from 
buyers and sellers in agrifood commodity chains. In case of first party certification suppliers 
audit themselves, while in case of second party certification retailers’ paid technicians audit 
the suppliers. The third party certification is considered to be more reliable as third party 
certifiers are thought to have no stake in the outcome of the transaction (Golan et al., 2001).  
 
As Hatanaka and Busch (2008) indicate, certifiers or controlling bodies (CBs) offer a 
combination of services, ranging from establishing standards, verifying the implementation of 
standards, issuing certification and making periodic audits to ensure continued compliance. 
Hatanaka and Busch (2008) also distinguish between two types of TPCs depending on 
whether the CB is accredited or not. If not, the CB sets its own standards and issues 
certificates based upon these. In the other case, the standards are set by an accreditation body 
(AB). The CB then needs approval from the accreditation body to provide TPC for certain 
standards. Normally the accreditation body itself is controlled by a public accreditation body. 
In the case of Flandria, there is an internal control at the auction level (i.e. second party 
control) of the vegetables delivered by farmers to the auctions. Additionally, Certagro, as 
independent CB, has been appointed by LAVA, the owner of Flandria, to perform third party 
controls. Certagro itself has been accredited by BELAC, the Belgian Organisation for 
Accreditation. Figure 2.8 shows the different steps before Belgian endive are allowed to be 
labelled Flandria. First, the farmer launches a request to plant the crop. During the production 
process the farmer registers several crop related issues, such as crop protection measures 
applied or fertilization. Before harvesting a residue control is performed by an independent 
laboratory. If not satisfactory, the harvest is postponed. Else, the crop can be harvested and 
several other types of control are effectuated at auction level, complemented with a possible 
farm audit. Only after approval the Flandria label can be used.   
 
Some question marks are placed with respect to the reliability of TPCs, as this might 
influence the transaction costs. Hatanaka and Busch (2008) argue that CBs, in the pursuit of 
their competitive business objectives, cannot always guarantee full independency, as they 
dependent on the audited companies or the ABs for their profit generation. So, although TPC 
should work transaction cost reducing, there is the hidden danger that real transaction costs 
increase, as it is uncertain that the standards are met while monitoring costs have to be paid. 
Furthermore, similar to the recent proliferation of environmental standards and labels, the 
number of CBs has increased dramatically. Each of these CBs often applies its own rules and 
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standards, as this is their basis for competition with other CBs. This again creates transaction 
costs for those farmers participating in different PIoS with different CBs, as they have to 
report the same issues multiple times in a slightly different way. In chapter 9, we return to the 
monitoring and control issue, when estimating farmers’ willingness to accept different types 
of controls.     
 
Figure 2.8. Steps before Belgian endive receives the Flandria label (source: LAVA). The 
coordinating controls are effectuated at farm and at auction level 
2.5.4.4 The optimal level of private voluntary internalization – a modelling perspective 
The fact that these private voluntary initiatives prevail in the market, indicates that they create 
added value for different potential beneficiaries ranging from the private producers who 
implement them, the consumer surplus due to increased quality perception and the society due 
to a reduction in externalities. The internalization is however limited up to the point that the 
producers’ benefit of the internalization no longer exceeds the costs of internalization. The 
latter relates not only to increased production costs but also to transaction costs borne to 
signal the internalization (to consumers, regulators etc). We argue here that, although there 
might still be some room for further internalization, producers renounce from this extra 
internalization because the private benefits no longer outweigh the costs. Furthermore this 
equilibrium situation is only from a metastable nature because due to either increases in the 
regulatory standards or cost reductions the degree of internalization increases again. Cost 
reductions at the input side might result from the introduction of new technologies, while 
transaction cost reductions can occur due to increased consumer awareness.  
 
The model we develop here combines amongst others insights from Lutz et al. (2000), who 
model quality differentiation in the presence of regulatory standards, Rodríguez-Ibeas (2007), 
who modelled the link between environmental product differentiation and environmental 
awareness and Roe and Sheldon (2007), who model the implicational of several policy 
approaches in the case of credence good labeling. These models are combined to 
appropriately reflect consumer behaviour in the presence of internalized externalities. We will 
also extend these models with transaction cost aspects. We will define equilibrium conditions 
both in prices and quantities for a product that internalizes an externality and a product that 
does not. In addition we will explore when social welfare profits from the internalization and 
the conditions for consumer surplus creation.   
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As is standard in vertical product differentiation models, we consider an industry of 2 firms i 
(i=h and i=l), of which one produces a high quality product (Qh) and the other a low quality 
product (Ql). We assume that the quality difference fully relates to the amount of internalized 
externalities. As such we can decompose the quality Qh into the intrinsic product quality Ql 
and the internalized externality Ei. To further simplify the reasoning, we assume that both 
firms face the same costs relating to Ql, and firm 1 has extra costs to internalize the 
externality (Cei) and to signal this to the buyer (Clabel). Firm 1 charges a higher price ph for its 
product compared to firm 2 (pl
 
).  
Assume furthermore that there is a continuum of consumers y, uniformly disturbed on the 
interval [0, 1] with density 1.  
 
Consumer utility for a product is function of the product quality Q, the consumer’s income y 
and the product price p, U=f(Q, y, p). Roe and Sheldon (2007) define consumer utility for a 
product with quality Q as U=Q*(y-p)7. They assume that preference for a quality level is 
driven by income. For products that signal the voluntary integration of an externality, we 
consider this assumption too restrictive. The proposition of  Rodríguez-Ibeas (2006) to 
distinguish between consumers who care for these extra quality attributes and those who not 
seems a valuable extension to this model. Logically, for those who care, preference for the 
‘high’ quality  product will still remain function of income. The quality of the product with 
internalized externalities can be decomposed into a part solely relating to the intrinsic product 
attributes Ql and a part relating to the externality Ei, in an additive function (Qh = Ql +Ei
This yields following general expression for consumer utility: 
).  
𝑈𝑈 = (𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)(𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝)         (1) 
For the ‘low’ quality product a price pl is charged. This enables us to decompose the price p 
into a component pl relating to the intrinsic product Ql and a price component pei = p-pl
𝑈𝑈ℎ = (𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)(𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖)        (2)  relating to the internalized externality. This makes the utility further decomposable into: 
𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙 = (𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙)(𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙)          (3) 
 
We assume that the intrinsic preference for internalized externalities is uniformly distributed 
across the population with percentage α for each income level y. Thus for each y we have α% 
of consumers that valuate Ei>0 and (1-α)% consumers that valuate Ei=0. For the latter utility 
becomes U=Ql(y-p), under the assumption that α and y are, for simplicity, independent. 
Whether the α% susceptible to Ei, buy Qh
 
 depends on their income level, as shown in figure 
2.9. 
A consumer susceptible to the externality and with income level y is indifferent between Qh 
and Ql when Uh=Ul
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 1� 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 = �𝑄𝑄ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 � 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙        (4) . This corresponds to an income level, based upon (2) and (3): 
  
Thus, α% of consumers with y > yindiff will prefer good Qh over good Ql, while (1-α)% will 
still prefer Ql
 
.  
                                                          
7 The choice of a multiplicative form of utility is common in this vein of the vertical differentiation literature 
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Figure 2.9. Consumers choosing Qh (=Ql
The firms’ demand functions then become: 
 +Ei) in function of income. From threshold y’ onwards, 
income is no longer restrictive and α% chooses Qh 
𝐷𝐷ℎ(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 ,𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼) = 𝛼𝛼�𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � = 𝛼𝛼 �𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − ��𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 1� 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙��      (5) 
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 ,𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼) = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � + � 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙� = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙= (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝛼𝛼 �𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 1� 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙  
Consumers with income y<pl will not buy the product Ql
 
.  
Firm H’s cost for internalizing the externality is C(Ei). We can safely assume that this cost is 
convex in Ei and 0 if Ei
𝐶𝐶(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)2   =0, which makes following representation appropriate:  
Furthermore, firm H faces fixed quality signaling costs Clabel (for Ei>0). The only difference 
in costs between firm H and firm L relates to the internalization, so we can assume away costs 
relating to Ql
𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻 = (𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙)𝛼𝛼 �𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − ��𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 1� 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�� −  𝛽𝛽(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)2 − 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙       . Profit functions for the two firms now become: 
𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿 = 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 �(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙) + 𝛼𝛼 �𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 1� 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 �   
 
By taking the first order conditions of these profit functions, i.e. by differentiating them with 
respect to pei and pl resp., we can obtain the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium8
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝑖𝑖 �𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,𝛼𝛼, 𝑄𝑄ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 �  : 
𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 = 𝑖𝑖 �𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,𝛼𝛼, 𝑄𝑄ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 �  
From these equilibrium prices we see that both price pei and pl are, apart from α and ymax, 
function of the ratio between Qh and Ei
For firm H to remain profitable, costs of internalization should not exceed benefits: 
, or the total quality level versus the extra quality due 
to the internalized externality.  
(𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙)𝛼𝛼 �𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − ��𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 1� 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�� >  𝛽𝛽(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙   
For firm H, ymax, the quality of the base product Ql versus Ei
 
 and α determine the profitability.  
As we now have a representation for equilibrium prices and demands, we can focus on the 
aggregate social welfare contribution of the private voluntary internalization of the 
externality. Confer Rodriguèz-Ibeas (2007), assume a fixed societal cost γ per marginal unit 
of externality. Social welfare consists of consumer surplus, producers’ profit and net of social 
damage avoided versus created. Etot signifies the total external damage when only Ql
                                                          
8 the complex result goes beyond the expository objective of this chapter 
 is 
produced by firm H and firm L. 
α 
y 
0 
1 threshold y’ 
% choosing Qh 
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𝑊𝑊(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼) + ∑𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼) − 𝛾𝛾(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)  
The question is now whether more welfare is created compared to the case without private 
internalization of externalities, confer the equation below: 
𝑊𝑊(𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙) + ∑𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 (𝑄𝑄𝑙𝑙) − 𝛾𝛾𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡   
This will primarily depend on Ei
 
, α and γ.  
In this dissertation we will show different ways to calculate and approximate IE, α and γ. 
Internalized Externalities (IE) refers to the externalities which PIoS internalize compared to 
conventional systems. It thus relates to the environmental or social surplus value created by 
PIoS. This is addressed in chapter 5 (and 6). Alpha (α) on its turn relates to the consumer 
interst in these kind of systems. Chapter 3 focuses on this question. Gamma (γ) on its turn is 
the societal cost for removing externalities. In chapter 8 we show how the willingness to 
accept of farmers can be used to approximate this societal cost. 
 
2.6 Sector players’ attitude towards PIoS versus alternative strategies for 
enhanced ecological  sustainability 
During focus groups organised with different sector players, a selection of the strategies 
outlined above were extensively discussed with the participants. In addition, sector players 
were asked to formulate missing strategies and to jointly scale the strategies based upon their 
contribution towards ecological sustainability. In the mean time, sector players were asked 
whether the strategies are economically viable for the sector. The different sector players 
questioned are: promoters of a labelling initiative and representatives of the Administration 
and of producers, retailers, consumers and the auctions.  
 
Figure 2.10 shows the perceived contribution of each initiative towards ecologic sustainability 
and the economic viability according to the participants. This figure should be interpreted as 
indicative, given the complexity of this subject. This figure is based upon qualitative 
information, hence the distance and level of contribution are only informative.  
 
The focus groups participants were asked to identify additional strategies above those 
presented by the researchers. The following were commonly agreed upon: 
- Short supply chain projects with direct communication between producers and 
consumers; 
- The stimulation of farmers’ awareness, resulting in more compliance with the laws; 
- Adapted legislation instead of more restrictive legislation: extra restrictions aren’t 
necessary, the legislation should be more in line with the reality in the field, improving 
compliance. 
- Regional labels; 
- More follow up from government (i.e. more and more appropriate controls) 
 
2.6.1 Contribution towards ecological sustainability 
 
According to the stakeholders, PIoS, in the form of voluntary labels (f.e. Flandria) and 
certification books (f.e. EurepGAP), are both an equally interesting tool for stimulating 
ecological sustainability. Within the different labelling initiatives, the sector players identify 
major differences in contribution towards sustainability. Organic labelling for example is 
perceived as highly favourable for ecological sustainability. On the other hand, the scale of 
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the initiative is also important, with scale referring to the number of participants. Some 
labelling initiatives are less restrictive compared to organic production, but their number of 
members widely exceeds the organic label membership, hence their overall contribution 
towards sustainability may be larger.  
In chapter 1 we listed some references with respect to ecological sustainability contribution of 
PIoS, which gave a rather mixed impression, especially because implementing a rule not 
necessary results into a measurable environmental effect.  
 
The Label-with–credits system is a variation of the credit system explained under the section 
Command-and-control measures. This system is, according to the stakeholders, perceived far 
too complex to be workable in practice. Labelling and certification systems evolve 
continuously. To adapt the complex label-with-credits system on a timely basis seems very 
laborious and it is likely to result in difficulties for the farmers to keep track of it. The 
advantage is that farmers can position themselves versus other farmers, as they have an exact 
measure of their contribution to ecological sustainability. From the perspective of excess 
usage reduction, this system clearly seems ecologically advantageous, because farmers’ 
excessive use of harmful products is punished. Potentially pesticide use will increase for those 
farmers who didn’t reach their upper limit yet.  
Manhoudt et al. (2002) have a similar opinion about the credit system used in the AMK 
standard. They consider the credit system to be very complex. The option of compensating 
pesticide use with credits earned for other management activities substantially reduces the 
transparency of the system, especially as every farmer has a different pesticide application 
schedule, they argue. 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Contribution of different strategies towards ecological and economic sustainability 
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According to the stakeholders, both more restrictive and adapted legislation have a positive 
impact on ecological sustainability. When the legislation becomes too severe, agriculture is no 
longer profitable, hence an adapted legislation is perceived as a better tool. The focus group 
members argue that the legislation should not be restricted further, to give market initiatives 
the possibility ‘to breath’. A more restrictive legislation can only work when it is applied all 
over the world. Another problem is the increased possibility of non-compliance and shifting 
away towards uncovered areas. High public costs for monitoring and control are therefore 
associated with more restrictive legislation. Adapted legislation means taking the production 
circumstances into account. An example: nowadays there is a fertilization stop starting from 
August 31st
 
. When September is very rainy, all fertilizers leach out in the groundwater. In that 
case, spreading the application of fertilizers is more effective and less harmful. However, in 
case of dry weather, this law is very effective.  
The stakeholders notice a clear ecological effect of subsidy, tax and VAT-differentiation 
measures, which is more directly measurable compared to voluntary labelling initiatives, 
because an increase in price reduces the demand. The problem with taxes is that, if they are 
not imposed on every product, they will always be evaded. They should also be imposed at 
the European level, otherwise farmers purchase pesticides in neighbouring countries. In case 
of a VAT-differentiation, it is very difficult to quantify the exact height of the levy. Another 
problem could be the building up of stocks when the tax is announced. 
 
Creating consumer awareness is considered successful when it leads to a change in 
purchasing behaviour. The impact is considered rather small because alerting consumers is 
very difficult. The consumer does not want to make this decision, other people should 
perform this task (f.e. by imposing a more restrictive legislation). The effect will only be 
measurable in the long run. A circular reasoning can be made: labels are not successful 
because the consumer is uninterested, and the consumer is uninterested because labels are not 
well communicated.  
  
Because farmers are the prime actors affected by strategies aiming at a change in pesticide 
use, all participants perceive increasing farmers’ awareness as essential for enhanced 
sustainability. The measure does not affect the target group financially, hence acceptance and 
success will be more than reasonable. New developments should be demonstrated by means 
of effective field tests. An example is a control field with calendar spraying versus a field 
sprayed only after monitoring. Farmers will believe the effectiveness of a measure when proof 
is delivered in practice.  
 
Because of the decrease in transportation distances, the contribution of short supply chains to 
ecologic sustainability is considered reasonable. In many cases, product packaging is also 
diminished, also decreasing the environmental burden. This system is only suited for a part of 
the producers and chain members, hence its impact will remain rather small. 
 
Regional labelling does not directly affect ecologic sustainability regarding pesticide use. It 
can motivate consumers to purchase locally produced food, reducing the transportation 
burden. A lot depends on the prescriptions in the ‘cahier de charge’. 
 
Some participants do not perceive quota on pesticides/active ingredients as ecologically 
sustainable, because farmers will always try to use their full quota. Concerning the amount of 
pesticides allowed, the legal standard is probably the reference, hence the contribution of this 
system can be considered equal to the legal situation. 
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Direct subsidies for farmers will have ecological benefits in the short run. If it results in 
changing the attitude of the participants, the long run effect can also be positive. The system 
‘observe and alert9
 
’ is a good example.  
In theory, the system of cross subsidies seems very suitable and promising for shifting 
consumption in a more environmentally sound direction. In practice however, this system is 
regarded as not applicable. Retailers fear difficult negotiations with suppliers and non 
cooperation of competitors. 
 
With better governmental monitoring and control, participants mean more controls, and 
more effective controls, predominantly aimed at the group of ‘free riding farmers’. The 
contribution towards ecological sustainability seems important, because it will eradicate 
current misuses effectively. The polluters will be punished, instead of the farmer community 
as a whole or the consumers. The measure is also less visible (compared to a change in price 
f.e.), hence acceptance will be larger. Problems are the time consuming controls, the 
administrative burden for the farmers, and the financing of the system. A penalty system 
could solve this last problem. 
 
2.6.2 Contribution towards economic sustainability 
 
The private voluntary label strategy can be an improvement in the field of economic 
sustainability. The Flandria-label for example adds surplus value to the product, it covers an 
extensive product range, it is well accepted in the domestic and export market and it groups 
the major part of Flemish vegetable growers among other things. Quality of GlobalGAP 
products is lower compared to FlandriaGAP products, but market certainty is equal for both 
certification schemes. Flandria is perceived as socio-economically more interesting than 
GlobalGAP, because farmers perceive a private cahier de charge (GlobalGAP) as an 
obligation, while participating in a farmer driven label (Flandria) is considered as an honour. 
The label stresses the distinctive features of the product. A cahier de charge without label is 
also interesting for farmers when it is widely accepted in the market place and when it offers 
new marketing opportunities. 
 
According to the focus group members, a label with governmental support is not giving 
enough market impulses to be viable in the long run. It is not because of governmental 
support that a label will be more economically viable. In the early stage, governmental 
support can be defendable to cover initiation costs. For example, the governmental support for 
communication is larger for organic products compared to Flandria (in percentage of the total 
private budget for communication). Whether this will result in continuation of organic 
farming will depend on the quality of the support provided. The participants face some 
difficulties with placing this initiative on the economic axis, because the effect can be either 
positive or negative. Players do agree that a label with governmental support has more 
chances. A lot of labels result from private initiatives, but their growth rates largely depend on 
the reception of governmental support.  
 
Because the label-with-credits system is too difficult to explain, to implement and to monitor, 
it is perceived as not viable. It is also technically not workable. The administrative burden is 
                                                          
9 Pest development on crops is monitored in special field trials. When the economic damage threshold is nearly 
reached, warning messages are given to farmers with these crops 
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quite large for the farmer and the controlling body. It is also too flexible, creating uncertainty 
for the farmers. Moreover, the system is too detailed. Every instruction book works per 
definition with one or another coding system, which is a mixture between workability and 
accurateness. This strategy is also very difficult to explain to the consumer. Because of the 
multitude of variables in food systems, the points system is not feasible. In the extreme case, a 
farmer has to choose between losing his crop and being punished.  
 
A more restrictive legislation will have an adverse effect according to the stakeholders. With 
the level of severity, adherence becomes more difficult and cheating more common. The only 
advantage is that measures for enhanced ecological sustainability are expanded to every 
farmer, resulting in a more equal distribution of the burden. This situation is comparable with 
the Flemish environmental policy. This policy is too extensive, resulting in a contra 
productive effect. Market actors reason: ‘To be able to drive 60 on average, one must 
accelerate to 70 from time to time’. Climatologic circumstances should also be given proper 
attention. A product that cannot be produced in Belgium, due to a restrictive legislation, will 
be imported, resulting in a worse off situation for ecological sustainability (due to 
transportation). The consumer wants to have everything at his/her disposal, at any time. 
Adapted legislation is considered more neutral, as it is more giving and taking. 
Administration, for example, is labour intensive, but in the end it is time and cost saving. 
Another example is the necessity for a unified pesticide regulation per climate zone at the EU 
level. The European and international legislative prescriptions should be taken into account 
before imposing a more restrictive policy. Adaptation of legislation will result in lower 
investment costs.  
 
For Methyl Bromide (MeBr) a kind of quota existed in Belgium (however, since 1/01/2006 it 
has been prohibited in Belgium). Because no alternative pesticides exist, the economic effects 
are disadvantageous, but the ecologic consequences are very positive. One should distinguish 
quota on resources (pesticides) from quota on production quantity. The focus group members 
fear that, in the latter case, a black market for the product will be created. Another distinction 
should be made between quota and managing the quota in a sustainable manner. If, for 
example, a farmer spills his complete quota in the creek at the border of his production area, 
ecologic sustainability will be worse off. Typically, every farmer will have used the full 
amount of his quota each year. Players regard this strategy as economically neutral. An 
international quota on the resources will result in an ecological advantage, but a quota per 
hectare (f.e. for the management of Phytophtora) will create an economically unviable 
situation at micro level.  
 
A VAT-differentiation (VAT = Value Added Tax) for sustainable products is considered 
economically advantageous. For organic products, price is a determining factor in the 
purchase decision, so for these products this system would be favourable. As demonstrated in 
numerous quantitative studies, price is considered as a key determining factor for the 
‘average’ consumer, therefore economic viability of the more ecologically inspired initiatives 
will most likely improve. In this case, integrated farming schemes such as Flandria will 
probably be positioned between organic and conventional farming. Because of the unstable 
political environment (changing ministers every 4 years), the tax levels could change 
continuously. Another option is levying taxes on the production resources (f.e. on pesticides). 
The influence on farmers’ economic situation will be negative, because the surplus prices at 
factor level will probably not result in higher prices downstream. 
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According to the focus group participants, the process of creating consumer awareness is 
considered very slow, hence the effects will only be visible in the long run. The stakeholders 
suggest that integration of certain topics, such as reading labels, in the education program of 
pupils could be a means. Normally, awareness should be created mainly through the product 
label, but consumers are generally uninterested in the extra information on the package. Two 
questions are at stake: do consumers understand the extra information and aren’t they 
frightened by it? A good example are the E-numbers, the consumer does not understand these. 
Another problem associated with the strategy, is the lack of confidence in scientific research. 
Legislation is based upon solid scientific research (for example in case of MRLs), if extra 
labelling is necessary the impression is created that policy makers fail in their duties (the 
creation of reliable standards). Creating awareness concerning production methods seems 
economically interesting, because a more informed consumer is prepared to pay more. 
Communication with the consumers should be as clear as possible. In chapter 3 we discuss the 
consumer awareness after 10 years of Flandria labelling. 
  
Initially, the strategy of creating producers’ awareness triggers costs for the informing and 
receiving parties, but the optimizations will result into beneficial economic effects in the 
longer run. The important role of meetings between farmers is also stressed. All participants 
do agree that this strategy is a must for increased sustainability.  
 
In the case of short supply chains, the producer (seller) acts as a label. This system is 
considered no better or worse than the auction system. It is a system that will probably remain 
a niche in the market place. A farmer has to opt for a sales system suitable for his company 
and his personality. One should not forget that this market form is time consuming, relatively 
uncertain and more demanding for the farmer (selling skills). It is more direct than the 
regional label system, resulting in a more stable cooperation between market actors; therefore 
its economic viability may be higher in the long run.  
 
A regional label is considered less structured, less coherent as private labelling and 
certification, because the composition of market actors is more subject to change (each time 
other industries cooperate together). In the short run it is economically viable, but the question 
is whether the fragile alliances will last in the long run, resulting in weak sustainability. 
Because a private label is more structured, it is probably more sustainable compared to 
regional labels and alliances. The quality difference between products in the same label can be 
substantial, because the only binding factor is the regional origin. Participants consider the 
basis too small to be successful. 
  
The environment is one of the four pillars to receive COM-support (support for Common 
Market Order for fruit and vegetables, mainly given to farmers unions). Environmental 
criteria are also of major importance for receiving farm level support from the VLIF (Flemish 
Agriculture Investment Fund). Supporting systems are nowadays usually linked to 
environmental measures. Participants are convinced of the economic stimulus given by 
subsidies. They perceive it as comparable to the strategy ‘labels with governmental support’. 
When governmental support for the auctions would be substantially reduced, the sector would 
be confronted with a serious economic viability problem (which may raise the question 
whether the auction system is viable in the long run). 
 
The retail sector does not consider the strategy cross subsidies as economically feasible, 
because the competition pressure is too high. In smaller retail shops as well, this strategy is 
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not workable, because they also face intensive competition and their product range is too 
small. Similarly, producers will not accept the shift in money.   
 
Governmental control is considered too lax. A good and fair control is advantageous for the 
honest producers and for the community as a whole. It can also reduce risk occurrence (a 
good example: pre harvest control in lettuce is currently done by the government). The fine 
level should also be considerable, otherwise abuse is stimulated.  
It should however be noted (as will be indicated in chapter 9) that farmers are generally not 
very keen on increasing number of controls, whether performed externally or internally. 
Nowadays, the Food Agency (FA) makes no distinction between producers participating in 
private schemes or not. The former are also privately controlled (mostly by a third party), the 
latter not, implying that the latter are far less subject to controls. Typically, the share of free 
riders is larger in the latter group, because the need for compliance with the private scheme 
regulations hampers abusive behaviour. The farmers participating in private schemes hence 
argue for more governmental control within the group of non participants, given that an 
isolated crisis can influence the sector as a whole.         
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Nowadays, different mechanisms operate in the market place to reduce the ecological burden 
from excessive pesticide use. These mechanisms can be subdivided into 4 distinguishable 
groups;  
1. Know how and information dissemination; 
2. Regulatory instruments (e.g. emission standards, product bans), whereby public 
authorities mandate the environmental performance to be achieved, or the technologies 
to be used, by firms; 
3. Economic instruments (e.g. taxes, tradable permits, refund systems), whereby firms or 
consumers are given financial incentives to reduce environmental damage; 
4. and Voluntary instruments, (e.g. voluntary codes, ecolabelling schemes) whereby 
firms make commitments to improve their environmental performance beyond what 
the law demands. 
 
Each of these mechanisms has an impact on both ecologic and economic sustainability. 
Private voluntary mechanisms are perceived as the new tool for a more market oriented 
restriction of the resource use. Several changes in the public and private institutional settings 
have promulgated the introduction and acceptance of various types of voluntary mechanisms. 
They play on the moral responsibility of the actors involved and on the social sanctions to 
which the latter will be exposed in case of non compliance.  
 
According to the focus group participants, the contribution of a particular measure to 
ecological and economic sustainability seems strongly correlated. Some measures with a poor 
chance of economic survival receive a comparably low score for ecological sustainability (f.e. 
cross subsidies or more restrictive legislation), although the strategy in practice could prove 
beneficial for ecology.  
 
The three ecologically most advantageous systems (training and advice for farmers, more 
governmental control and adapted legislation) can be positioned in the public policy sphere, 
aiming at an optimisation of the current policies. The two economically and ecologically 
most beneficial systems (training and control) do not require major (financial) adaptations 
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from the market players, instead, the government bears the extra costs. The implementation 
process for both strategies is also quite uncomplicated, and they result into a direct pay-off.  
 
The other strategies can be considered as ‘new’ tools, possibilities in the market place, to shift 
current practices away from unsustainable behaviour. Private initiatives (such as certification 
and labels) are perceived as beneficial for sustainability because they are voluntarily initiated 
by the private sector, hence their market support may be considerably higher compared to 
governmental initiatives. Private initiatives have an economic purpose, aiming at gaining or 
keeping a certain market share. When the diversification strategy is based on ecologic features 
of the product or production process, the contribution towards overall sustainability seems 
guaranteed. 
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Chapter 3. Consumer interest in PIoS 
 
 
This chapter is based upon Mondelaers, K., Verbeke, W. and Van Huylenbroeck, G. (2009). 
Importance of health and environment as quality traits in the buying decision of organic 
products. British Food Journal, 111 (10), 1120-1139. 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the consumer interest in PIoS, which is an important precondition 
for the success of the market oriented PIoS. PIoS differ from other commodities based upon 
their voluntary internalization of externalities. This internalization is not free of costs. 
Participants in PIoS hope to recover these costs partially or fully by attracting interested 
consumers. In this chapter an experiment is constructed that tests whether consumers are 
interested in environmental claims and whether they associate these claims more with 
products from PIoS compared to other products.  
 
The chapter focuses on organic vegetable products as PIoS-products, as they make the 
strongest environmental claim. For an overview of consumer attitude towards Flandria 
labelled vegetables, our other case of PIoS, we refer to the work of Verbeke et al. (2007). This 
paper addresses consumer attitudes, behaviour and perception towards tomatoes in general, 
and the Flandria tomato label in particular based on cross-sectional data collected through a 
self-administered consumer survey (n = 373). Buyers, who constitute 26.8% of the sample, 
perceive Flandria tomatoes as superior to other tomatoes because of their guarantee of origin, 
better taste and stricter production control. However, they also report the strongest perception 
of Flandria as an ordinary tomato as compared to nonbuyer segments. Overall, findings 
indicate that the Flandria label – after being intensively used for 10 years for a wide range of 
other fruits and vegetables besides tomatoes – has become fairly standard for tomatoes with 
little perceived differentiation apart from its certified production and origin.  
 
Consumer food choice is the result of the quality expectations before and quality experience 
after the purchase. Based on information economics theory, a useful classification of quality 
dimensions for food, is the division into search, experience, and credence dimensions. Search 
attributes, such as colour, price and size, are attributes that can be considered before the actual 
purchase of the product and experience attributes are those which consumers perceive after 
the purchase and use of the product. While search and experience characteristics can be 
verified before or during consumption, credence attributes such as environmental impact or 
animal welfare are not revealed even after consuming the product (Marette et al., 1999). 
Credence attributes mainly focus on the quality of the production process, and less on the 
intrinsic characteristics of the product itself. Therefore, quality-of-life issues, such as food 
ethics, environment and health cannot be verified upon purchase or consumption. In recent 
years however, these attributes have become more important as components of consumer 
value (Verbeke et al., 2008). Grunert (2002) mentions quality labels as a possible solution to 
inform consumers about credence characteristics of food products. A typical process-related 
quality aspect, and consequently a credence attribute, is organic agriculture (Grunert et al., 
2000).  
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In recent years we can notice an increasing demand for organic produce (Willer and Youssefi, 
2007). The reason behind this growing interest is that organic products are perceived as less 
damaging to the environment and healthier than conventionally grown food products by a 
growing number of consumers (Chen et al., 2007). Magnusson et al. (2003) also identify 
concerns for  health and for the environment as the two most commonly stated motives for 
purchasing organic foods with personal health being more important than concerns for the 
environment (Tregear, et al., 1994; Wandel and Bugge, 1997). According to Magnusson et al. 
(2003) health and environmental motives differ from each other because the health concern 
can be regarded as anthropocentric or egoistic (benefits to the individual or his/her family) 
while consideration for the environment and animal welfare are rather altruistic (benefits to 
society rather than the individual).  
 
According to Saher et al. (2006), there are indications that opinions about organic farming are 
from an intuitive nature, with supporters not purely relying on scientific facts but on personal 
experiences, convictions and beliefs. As explained by Saher et al. (2006), rational and 
intuitive thinking are the two orthogonal types of information processing, with rational 
thinking being defined as emotion-free, evidence based reasoning, and intuitive thinking 
predominantly as building on information sources such as personal experiences and feelings. 
Given the current lack of systematic scientific evidence arguing in favour of organic credence 
characteristics, consumers indeed have little other options than to form intuitive quality 
expectations.  
 
Verhoef (2005) investigated to what extent economic variables (such as price, quality), 
emotions, social norms and environmental attitudes could explain purchase intention and 
purchase frequency of organic meat. He concluded that perceived quality positively 
influences the purchase intention, while purchase frequency is not affected by quality 
perception. He furthermore finds that green behaviour only weakly influences purchase 
intention and does not result in increased purchase frequency. As indicated by Roberts et al. 
(1996) and Wong et al. (1996), the majority of people are not prepared to compromise on 
other functional characteristics like quality and convenience for a better environment.  
 
This study tests whether and to what extent consumers perceive organic products as healthier 
and more environmentally friendly than conventional products. We also test whether 
consumers consider health traits more important than environmental traits. Therefore, a choice 
experiment with an organic carrot label and two conventional carrot labels containing the 
same set of quality traits was presented to a sample of Flemish consumers. Relevant search 
and experience attributes were assumed identical for the three carrot labels. One of the two 
conventional carrot labels represents a non-branded or generic product, cheaply priced with 
base level credence attributes.  
 
The main objective of this chapter is thus to analyse whether health and environment related 
credence attributes are intuitively associated more with organic than with conventional 
products.  
 
The experiment also allows to test whether the perception concerning these credence 
attributes differs between organic user groups, as some consumers buy organic more often 
than others. To reach the traditionally small group of heavy users, choice based sampling was 
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applied.  Within this chapter, the following hypotheses, derived from the literature cited 
above, are tested10
1. Consumers prefer health over environment related quality traits;  
: 
2. The organic label plays a significant role in shaping consumers’ choice for organic 
products; 
3. Vegetables from organic farming are perceived as healthier and more environmentally 
friendly than vegetables from conventional farming; 
4. Purchase intention (buying or not buying organic products) is mainly driven by health 
related quality traits; 
5. Both health and environmental issues influence purchase frequency, though to a 
different extent.  
 
3.2 Materials and methods 
3.2.1 Methodology  
To test the above hypotheses we make use of  a stated choice preference experiment and 
modelling. In such an experiment consumers are placed within a hypothetic choice setting 
environment in which they are asked to choose their most preferred alternative from a 
predefined set of alternatives with certain characteristics.  
 
The stated choice preference technique allows an ex ante assessment of both the use and non 
use value of the main characteristics of a good or service, opposite to revealed preference or 
contingent valuation, being an ex post analysis method and restricted to goods or services as a 
whole, respectively. To model choice behaviour by a decision maker (e.g. a consumer), most 
studies depart from the principles of the Random Utility Theory (McFadden, 1974) and the 
Characteristics Theory of Value (Lancaster, 1966). The latter states that individuals derive 
utility from the characteristics of goods rather than directly from the goods themselves. 
Random utility models are derived from assumptions about individuals’ evaluation of goods 
and services. These assumptions about individuals’ behaviour are introduced to account for 
the researcher’s inability to fully represent all variables that explain all preferences in an 
individual’s utility function. The random utility hypothesis states that individual agents 
choose among the available alternatives the one that maximises their utility and that the 
distribution of choices made in a population is a reflection of the distribution of individual 
preferences. Therefore, the probability (Pin) that a consumer n chooses alternative i (which 
has an attribute vector Xin
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) > 𝑃𝑃�𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖       (1) ) from a choice set of J alternatives (in our research limited to three) can be written as (1): 
 
This equation indicates that a consumer will choose alternative i in the choice set only when 
this alternative has the highest utility, compared to the other two alternatives in the choice set. 
The utility function U can be further decomposed into a deterministic part (V), which is a 
function of the observed factors (the product quality traits incorporated in the experiment), 
and a stochastic part (εin). The latter results from unobservable factors which affect choice, 
unobservable taste variations, measurement errors in the explanatory variables in function V 
and model specification errors. Because the researcher has no knowledge about εin
 
, these 
terms are treated as random, as well as the utility for each alternative.  
                                                          
10 Please note that these hypotheses do not relate to the hypotheses defined in the conceptual framework.  
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As introduced by McFadden (1974), the indirect utility function is assumed to be linear in the 
parameters, and as such, takes the form as in equation (2) for an individual n facing choice i: 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖′ 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖          (2) 
 
The deterministic part can be further decomposed into αin, which is the individual n’s intrinsic 
preference for choice i, xin the vector of attributes of alternative i in the choice set faced by n 
and βn the vector of choice parameters, which are the weights associated with the attributes 
xin
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖′ 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖′ 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗           (3) 
. Depending on the assumptions about the error term, different models can be derived. The 
most general (and restrictive) model, the Multinomial Logit model, assumes an identical and 
independently distributed (iid) Gumbel distributed error term (Train, 2003 in Liljenstolpe, 
2005), with the following choice probability (equation 3): 
 
As described by Liljenstolpe (2005), the conditional Multinomial Logit probability takes a 
closed form between 0 and 1, and the unconditional Multinomial Logit probability is derived 
by summing over all respondents and choices:  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) = ∑ ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (4) 
The dummy variable yin
 
 takes value 1 for the chosen alternative and 0 for the non-chosen 
alternatives. From the first order condition of the log-likelihood function, the model 
coefficients can be estimated.     
An extension to the Multinomial Logit model is the Nested Logit model, in which the 
assumption of iid and Independence for Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) is relaxed. In the Nested 
Logit model the alternatives are grouped into subsets, and the variance is allowed to differ 
across the subsets while the IIA assumption is maintained within the subsets (Shen, 2005). 
This model allows to test whether the respondent’s choice process is sequential, i.e. first based 
upon one attribute (e.g. organic or not in this study), and within this choice upon the 
remainder attributes. The assumption is that if the utility functions of two alternatives share a 
common set of missing attributes, all of which have a similar influence upon the utilities of 
these two alternatives, then the variance of the unobserved effects for each of those 
alternatives is likely to be similarly influenced, suggesting that such alternatives are situated 
in the same branch of a Nested Logit tree (Hensher et al., 2005). If the remainder alternative is 
influenced by a different set of ‘missing’ attributes, the variance in its unobserved effects will 
also differ, providing us with a measure for the appropriate tree structure. 
 
The Latent Class Logit (LCL) model is another extension. The underlying theory of the 
Latent Class model posits that individual behaviour depends on observable attributes and on 
latent heterogeneity that varies with factors that are unobserved by the analyst. In Latent Class 
models it is assumed that individuals are implicitly sorted into a set of Q classes. To which 
class a particular individual belongs is unknown to the analyst, whether known or not to that 
individual (Greene and Hensher, 2002). The central behavioural model is a logit model for 
discrete choice among Ji alternatives, by individual i observed in Ti
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∖𝑞𝑞 = 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 �𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ 𝛽𝛽𝑞𝑞�
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 �𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
′ 𝛽𝛽𝑞𝑞�
𝐽𝐽 𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=1           (5) 
 choice situations: 
The prior probability for class q for individual i Hiq
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 = 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 �𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖′ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞�∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 �𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖′ 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞�𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞=1           (6) 
, can be written as (Greene and Hensher, 
2002): 
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where zi
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∖𝑞𝑞𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞=1           (7)  is a set of observable characteristics determining class membership. The likelihood for individual i is then the expectation over classes of the class specific contributions: 
This model allows to test whether the different user groups perceive the presented attributes 
differently, without imposing that the sample is split a priori into subsets.    
 
3.2.2 Experimental setup 
A choice experiment with three alternative labels was presented to the participants in a 
consumer survey on organic vegetable consumption. This survey was conducted in Flanders, 
Belgium during Winter 2007. In total 1,200 questionnaires were distributed from which 553 
were returned and 529 were useful for statistical analysis (which corresponds to a valid 
response rate of 44%).  
 
To reach the group of heavy users of organic products, 600 of the 1,200 questionnaires were 
sent to randomly selected members of the Association for Ecological Life and Production 
style (VELT), of which 270 were returned. VELT-membership is a proxy of  greener 
consumption behaviour, and is intimately related to organic consumption. 
 
The remainder questionnaires were distributed to a sample representative for the Flemish 
consumer population through a convenience non random sampling procedure. The average 
age of the sampled consumers (46.6 years) was slightly older than the Flemish average (40.2 
years, NIS, 2005). All participants were involved in food purchasing decision-making. The 
sample was biased towards higher education (59.9% in the sample, versus 32% in the 
population (NIS, 2005). The sample is for the remainder of the socio-demographic 
characteristics representative for the Flemish population.   
 
The total sample was split into four user  groups, based upon the reported share of organic 
vegetables in the participant’s total vegetable purchases (Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1. Division of the total sample into user groups based upon organic share in total 
vegetable purchases 
 Organic share x (%) Percentage (frequency) 
Non user x=0 8.9 (47) 
Light user 0<x≤20 21.4 (113) 
Medium user 20<x≤80 47.1 (249) 
Heavy user x>80 22.7 (120) 
 
Carrots were selected as the carrier vegetable, due to their popularity, well known quality 
traits (such as a high β-carotene content) and availability both as raw or processed in the 
organic and conventional version.  The presented carrot labels mentioned the product price 
per kg, as well as health and environment related product traits and a label (organic, 
conventional A and conventional B). Due to the difficulty for consumers to attach (and retain) 
meaning to product attributes such as biodiversity, nitrate leaching or β-carotene content, we 
combined carrier symbols familiar to consumers (see Figure 3.1) with these attributes, such as 
a dung cart for nitrate losses or pictures of rare birds for signalling biodiversity.  
 
Chapter 3 Consumer interest in PIoS Part 1 
62 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Example of the visual representation of one of the 64 choice sets with the organic, the 
A and the B-label and their characteristics.  
An ‘opt out’-choice was not incorporated to avoid an ‘easy way out’ for consumers that are 
facing decision difficulty (Kontoleon and Yabe, 2003), although it has been recommended by 
some recent state of the art choice experiment design guidelines (Louvière et al., 2000 or 
Adamowicz and Boxall, 2001). Instead, we incorporated a fixed conventional B scenario, 
which reflects the cheapest option available in the market, with the least interesting product 
traits. From a theoretic point of view, this B scenario provides us with an anchor point given 
that, by their nature, utility estimates are estimates of differences in utility. A zero utility is 
associated with this B scenario, enabling us to interpret the utility estimates of the remainder 
alternatives and attribute levels relative to these of the fixed B scenario. Both price and other 
product attribute levels varied over the two remaining alternatives in each choice set. As can 
be seen in Table 3.2, four linearly related levels were assigned to each product attribute.  
 
Table 3.2. Attributes and attribute levels in the choice experiment 
Quality Trait ** Attribute Level 1* Level 2  Level 3  Level 4 
 - Price 1.00€ 1.25€ 1.50€ 1.75€ 
 + Label ORGANIC A B  
Environment - Nitrate leaching on 
the farm site 
Legal 
maximum 
¾ of legal 
maximum 
½ of legal 
maximum 
¼ of legal 
maximum 
Environment + Biodiversity on the 
farm site 
3 rare bird 
species 
2 rare bird 
species 
1 rare bird 
specie 
0 rare bird 
specie 
Health - Residue level (% of 
MRL) 
10 30 50 70 
Health + Vitamin content ½ RDI RDI 1,5 RDI 2 RDI 
*Level 1 is also the base scenario flagged as the B-label 
** Expected utility change when level increases 
MRL= Maximum Residue Limit; RDI = Recommended Daily Intake 
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For each of the two quality traits (health or environment), two attributes were included in the 
choice experiment, of which one triggers desirable (positive) expectations and the other 
undesirable (negative). The choice of the attributes (and their levels) was the result of careful 
deliberation between the choice experiment preconditions and objective scientific boundaries, 
the latter based upon an extensive literature review (Hoefkens et al., 2009 and Mondelaers et 
al., 2009).  
 
The first health attribute assesses consumers’ sensitivity to residues in carrots. To obtain 
realistic levels, we departed from the Cadmium levels currently measured in conventional and 
organic carrots (Figure 3.2). The maximum level corresponds to 70% of the Maximum 
Residue Limit (MRL), the minimum level to 10%.     
 
The second health related attribute, the β–carotene content, is desirable and relates to the 
nutritive value of carrots. β–carotene is the precursor of vitamin A. The Recommended Daily 
Intake (RDI), expressed in µg/day, is situated between 3,000 en 6,000 (IOM, 2001). The 
selected boundaries for the choice experiment were 2,000 and 8,000 µg carotene per kg 
carrots (or in case of a RDI of 4,000, ½ of the RDI to 2 times the RDI), which corresponds 
well with the real levels of β–carotene in carrots, whether conventional or organic (Figure 
3.3). 
 
             Min                 Max        MRL 
 
Figure 3.2. Cadmium levels in organic and 
conventional carrots (Hoefkens et al., 2009). 
The choice experiment boundaries are 
indicated as dotted lines and the Maximum 
Residue Limit (MRL) as a full line. 
                  Min  RDI      Max 
 
Figure 3.3. β–carotene levels in organic and 
conventional carrots (Hoefkens et al., 2009). 
The choice experiment boundaries are 
indicated as dotted lines and the 
Recommended Daily Intake (RDI) as a box. 
 
The first environment related attribute is the number of rare bird species on the farm, which is 
desirable and is a proxy for biodiversity on the farm. From the 40 Flemish bird species on the 
list of threatened species, 10 are bound to agricultural areas (Platteau et al., 2005), of which 
five decreased since 1990 with more than fifty percent. The lower boundary of this proxy was 
set to zero rare species on the farm, and the upper boundary to three rare species. 
 
As an undesirable environmental trait nitrate leaching on the farm site was selected, given the 
importance of the nitrate problem in agricultural areas in Flanders. As documented by 
Mondelaers et al. (2009), nitrate leaching levels on organic and conventional farms varied 
between 0 and 152 mg N/l, the latter being an outlier. The EU directive 1991 prescribes a 
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maximum nitrate leaching level of 50 mg N/l. The attribute levels were based upon this limit 
and varied from ¼ of this limit to the actual limit. 
 
The health and environment related traits described above, as well as the price attribute, 
varied in a similar way for the organic and the A-label, while the B-label attributes were fixed 
(see Table 3.2, level 1). The six year average prices for carrots in the retail outlets vary 
between 0.76€/kg for conventional carrots to 1.38€/kg for organic carrots (prices from 2001 to 
2006, GfK panel data, 2007), which represents a relative price difference of 80% and which 
corresponds well with the presented price range of 1 to 1.75€/kg in the choice experiment.  
The price attribute was introduced to be able to assess the willingness to pay (WTP) for 
different tested attributes.  
 
3.2.3 Other practical considerations 
A full factorial enumeration of possible combinations of the results into 42x4
 
 alternatives. With 
one alternative fixed (the B scenario), only two alternatives vary per choice set. Each of these 
carries a label (organic or A). The necessary degrees of freedom is 31 (1 + 5 attributes x 2 
alternatives x (4 levels - 1), Hensher et al., 2005), hence an orthogonal set of 32 profiles is 
sufficient. To avoid the random recombination of profiles into choice sets, we followed the 
procedure as documented by Louvière et al. (2000), and constructed an orthogonal set of 64 
profiles with 10 attributes and four levels per attribute. The first five attributes relate to the 
organic alternative, while the last five relate to the conventional A label. We opted for this 
procedure instead of using foldovers to guarantee orthogonality across and within alternatives. 
The orthogonality of the design ensures that the attributes presented to individuals are varied 
independently from one another (zero correlation). This property guarantees that the influence 
of changes in any of the presented attributes on respondents’ choices (or utility) can be 
measured independently. With the help of statistical software (SPSS) 64 profiles were 
constructed. The resulting sets were split into blocks of four choice sets per survey, to make 
the respondent’ choice task manageable. Each survey participant was asked which type of 
carrot he/she would prefer from each choice set, given the three alternatives’ characteristics, 
label and price and as such had to do four times the experiment.  
In this experiment we opted for an orthogonal design instead of more efficient designs, such 
as a D-optimal design, as the latter require a priori knowledge concerning the sign and 
magnitude of the taste parameters (see Bliemer and Rose, 2003). As Bliemer and Rose (2003) 
indicate, in cases where one has no information on the parameter estimates whatsoever, it is 
common practice to assume that the prior parameter estimates are all equal to zero. When 
only alternative-specific parameters are to be estimated, an orthogonal design will be the most 
efficient design, assuming that the parameter estimates are zero. Therefore, an orthogonal 
design will be a good design in a scenario when no prior information is available to the 
analyst. According to Louvière et al. (2000) and Bliemer and Rose (2003), required sample 
size can be calculated as:  
𝑁𝑁 ≥
1−𝑝𝑝
𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 2 �Φ−1 �1 − 12 𝛼𝛼��2         (8) 
with p the true choice proportion of the relevant population, a the level of allowable deviation 
in percentage, S the number of repetitions per respondent and the inverse cumulative 
distribution of a standard normal defined by the desired confidence level. If we assume equal 
proportions for each alternative (i.e. p=1/3), a desired precision a of 10% (i.e. 10% deviation 
around p allowed), a confidence level of 95% and S=4, the required sample size N is 192. The 
sample sizes in our study exceed this required size with N=266 for the VELT –group and 
N=256 for the non VELT-group.  
Part 1 Consumer interest in PIoS Chapter 3 
65 
 
 
A weighting variable was introduced to correct for disproportional sampling of certain choice 
sets. The weighting variable is defined as (Louvière, 2008): 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒  𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎  𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒  𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎  𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒  𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  𝑖𝑖         (9) 
 
3.3 Empirical findings 
3.3.1 Importance of label and quality traits: base model using MNL 
In the first analysis, the sample is restricted to the non-VELT members in order to provide an 
estimate for the overall Flemish population. The most simple model assumes generic β-
parameters for the different quality traits and a linear relation between the attribute levels. The 
average unobservable variation between the three alternatives can be captured by means of an 
alternative specific constant for the organic and the A label carrots. The results are reported in 
Table 3.3.   
 
The utility of the B label name is arbitrarily set to zero. The B label with its negative credence 
attributes receives a negative utility of -4.44. If we arbitrarily set the full B alternative to zero, 
the organic label with the same characteristics receives a positive utility score of 0.972. First, 
consumers on average reacted positively on the presence of a label. This signals that 
consumers attribute quality traits other than those mentioned in the experiment to the labelled 
carrots. However, unexpectedly, they are quite indifferent whether the label is ‘Organic’ or 
simply ‘A’. 
 
Table 3.3. Estimation of choice parameters β: generic model with linear attribute levels 
Attribute β-coefficient Standard error P[β≠0] WTP (€) 
Organic label  0.972 0.199 0.0000 0.54 
A label  0.856 0.201 0.0000 0.48 
Nitrate leaching -1.379 0.194 0.0000 0.08* 
Vitamin A  0.471 0.090 0.0000 0.03** 
Biodiversity  0.165 0.044 0.0002 0.01** 
Residue -2.150 0.234 0.0000 0.13* 
Price -1.791 0.187 0.0000  
B label*** 0.000    
* WTP for a 10% decrease in a negative trait; ** WTP for a 10% increase in a positive trait; ***arbitrary set to 0 
N=1024; LogL=-771,4; χ²(5)
 
 =262 
Second, the model confirms our prior expectations on desirable and undesirable quality traits. 
‘Nitrate leaching’ and ‘Presence of residues’ trigger negative consumer responses, while 
‘More biodiversity’ and ‘Vitamin A content’ are perceived as positive, and thus desirable. The 
price component is furthermore negative and significant, as can be expected. Third, these 
results indicate a perceived higher disutility for the negative quality traits compared to the 
positive. This finding confirms that consumers react more heavily to undesirable stimuli than 
to desirable stimuli (Verbeke, 2005), identified by Kahneman et al. (1990, 1991) as the 
endowment effect which explains why economic agents attach a higher value to potential 
losses than gains. 
 
The attributes themselves need to be taken into account as well, because there might be an 
imbalance (i.e. one attribute might be too dominant compared to the others). An increase in 
residue content from 50 to 70% of the MRL is considered four times less desirable than a 
decrease in vitamin A content with ½ of the RDI. Thus, consumers indeed seem to be much 
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more sensitive to attributes that relate to food safety risks than to nutritional benefits. Fourth, 
the first hypothesis that health related issues will trigger a stronger consumer response than 
environmental issues, can be confirmed when comparing the negative health attribute 
‘Residues’ with the negative environment attribute ‘Nitrate leaching’, or the positive trait 
‘Vitamin A’ with ‘Biodiversity’. However, the ‘Nitrate leaching’-attribute has a stronger 
influence than the positive health attribute ‘Vitamin A’-content. Apart from the endowment 
effect mentioned above, a plausible explanation is the fact that consumers probably correlate 
nitrate leaching with nitrate content in the carrot, which is again an undesirable food safety 
attribute. The nitrate leaching problem has also received considerable media attention in 
Flanders in recent years.  
 
3.3.2 Willingness to pay estimates 
The ratio of a variable of interest and the monetary variable will yield a monetary value for a 
change in the attribute level of the variable of interest, as far as the latter variable is 
statistically significant (Hensher et al., 2005). In our choice experiment the price attribute is 
highly significant, as well as the other attributes. WTP’s can thus be calculated for these 
attributes, using the formula: - βx/α  with βx being the taste parameter of the xth
 
 attribute (in 
‘utils’ per unit of attribute x) and α the taste parameter of the premium (in ‘utils’ per unit of 
premium).  
We start from a carrot price of 1€/kg for the B-labelled carrots, which corresponds well with 
the current price level in real markets. As reported in Table 3.3, the average extra WTP for a 
kg of carrots labelled ‘Organic’ or ‘A’ is 0.54€ and 0.48€, respectively, which means 50% 
extra. The question is now whether we may assume that the average price premium 
consumers are willing to pay for organic vegetables is 50% or whether we have to take  the 
‘A’-label price as a reference and conclude that there is no willingness to pay extra for 
organic carrots in our experiment. This will be explored in subsequent sections, but our 
findings support the hypothesis that organic vegetables are by a majority of respondents 
merely perceived as quality niche products. The WTP for a 10% reduction in residues (within 
the boundaries of the experiment) amounts to 0.125€, or 12.5% extra. For a 10% reduction in 
nitrate leaching, the average WTP is  8% extra. WTP’s for positive traits are considerably 
smaller, 0.03 and 0.01€ for a 10% increase in vitamin A content and biodiversity on the farm 
site, respectively. 
  
3.3.3 Relation between label and quality traits 
The previous model assumed linearity of the attribute levels and generic choice parameters. 
Wald tests for restrictions argue in favour of the first assumption. The estimation of a model 
with alternative specific choice parameters for the organic carrots yields a log likelihood of -
752, which is significantly better than the previous model, as confirmed by the log likelihood 
test (39.07 > 11.07 = 𝜒𝜒(5)2 ). This new model supposes a different response from consumers 
whether the quality trait is presented on an organic versus conventional package. The 
insignificant β–estimate for the organic label indicates that consumers, on average, choose 
organic carrots based upon the quality attributes and not on the label name (Table 3.4). It 
means that respondents did not take any additional attribute into account than those mentioned 
in the experiment, or, put differently, the positive attitude towards organic products is linked 
to the health and environment related quality traits of organic products. Thus, although the 
label itself does not trigger a positive utility score, it does so indirectly through better scores 
for the remaining attributes. The A-label on the contrary is significant and positive, thus it 
triggers higher quality expectations than the name B or organic, and these expectations relate 
to other attributes than those mentioned in the experiment. Interestingly, a difference in 
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biodiversity is not an issue when the conventional carrot is preferred, as can be seen from the 
insignificant β-estimate. 
 
Table 3.4. Estimation of choice parameters β: model with linear attribute levels and alternative 
specific β-parameters for the organic carrots 
Attribute β-coefficient Standard error P[β≠0] 
Organic label  -0.741 0.658 0.2601 
Org. Nitrate leaching -1.234 0.259 0.0000 
Org. Vitamin A   0.421 0.132 0.0015 
Org. Biodiversity   0.373 0.066 0.0000 
Org. Residue -1.384 0.317 0.0000 
Org. Price -1.927 0.270 0.0000 
A label   0.773 0.256 0.0026 
Nitrate leaching -1.697 0.275 0.0000 
Vitamin A   0.644 0.132 0.0000 
Biodiversity  -0.070 0.067 0.2941 
Residue -3.216 0.353 0.0000 
Price -2.097 0.268 0.0000 
B label*  0.000   
*arbitrary set to 0; N=1024; LogL=-751.90; χ²(10)
 
 = 310 
The organic carrots trigger less extreme reactions than the conventional (e.g. lower disutility 
for nitrate leaching but also lower utility for vitamin A). As such, two carrots with the same 
quality traits (e.g. the most positive attribute levels), one being organic, the other an A label 
carrot, yield similar utility scores (as also confirmed by the previous model).    
 
3.3.4 Purchase intention and frequency 
To explore the difference in preference structure between consumers who frequently buy 
organic and those who don’t, the full sample with the different user groups can be used. We 
build further on model 1, assuming generic (i.e. not alternative specific) parameters for the 
health and environmental quality traits and linearly related attribute levels.  
 
Table 3.5. Influence of purchase intention: β-parameters for non users versus users 
 Non User User 
Attribute β-coefficient s.e. P[β≠0] β-coefficient s.e. P[β≠0] 
Organic label  0.397 0.413 0.337  1.546 0.179 0.000 
A label  0.425 0.423 0.316  1.115 0.183 0.000 
Nitrate leaching -0.749 0.473 0.113 -1.397 0.148 0.000 
Vitamin A  0.340 0.230 0.139  0.462 0.066 0.000 
Biodiversity  0.140 0.116 0.228  0.239 0.033 0.000 
Residue -2.583 0.606 0.000 -2.463 0.177 0.000 
Price -2.999 0.485 0.000 -1.265 0.137 0.000 
B label*  0.000    0.000   
*arbitrary set to 0 
Model ‘non users’: N=188; LogL=-157,9; χ²(5)
Model ‘users’: N=1900; LogL=-1254,8; χ²
=73 
(5)
 
=466 
To test the hypothesis that purchase intention for organic vegetables is triggered by other 
traits than purchase frequency, we compare the model estimates of the non user group with 
those of the user group (Table 3.5). Findings indicate that the purchase intention of the non 
user group is mainly based on the quality traits price and food safety (residue content), while 
the decision process of the user group is more complex and also involves environmental traits 
and the label name. As expected, both the price and residue attribute trigger a strong negative 
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utility response. The non users are the only user group where the attribute ‘Residues’ is not 
the least preferred. The insignificance of the attributes in the non user model, except for 
residue and price,  might be partly due to the small group size (n=47). On the contrary, price 
and residue content are highly significant, so these are clearly the main decision variables in 
this group. 
 
The parameter estimates as depicted in Figure 3.4 reflect the preference of the light, medium 
and heavy user groups for the product attributes in the experiment.  
  
  
Figure 3.4. Choice parameters for the choice attributes per user group. White bars indicate estimates 
insignificant at the 5% level. Model ‘non users’: N=188; LogL=-157,9; χ²(5)=73; Model ‘light users’: 
N=452; LogL=-340,1; χ²(5)=117; Model ‘medium users’: N=980; LogL=-612.2; χ²(5)=277; Model ‘heavy 
users’: N=468; LogL=-250,2; χ²(5)=105 
For the light users, all attributes are significant, except the environmental attribute 
‘Biodiversity’. All estimates have the expected sign and the negative health and 
environmental traits have a higher utility compared to the positive characteristics. For this 
user group, the organic or A-label are equally important (as confirmed by the Wald test) and 
both trigger a positive utility. The medium users are the only user group taking all the 
attributes into consideration, including the biodiversity item. Compared to the non user and 
light user groups, the utility of the price attribute decreases further, while both the A and 
organic label gain importance. The label ‘Organic’ furthermore receives a significantly higher 
utility estimate than the A-label, as confirmed by the Wald test. The heavy user group finally 
is the only group where the price attribute is insignificant, i.e. within the price fork of 1€ to 
1.75€, the heavy user is price insensitive. The remainder of the attributes are in line with those 
of the medium user group, apart from the value attributed to the label name ‘Organic’, which 
is among heavy users twice as important as the A-label, indicating that heavy users choose in 
most cases the organic product irrespective of the other quality attributes.  
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3.4 Latent Class analysis 
A more advanced way of measuring parameter heterogeneity across individuals is the Latent 
Class model, in which the individual resides in a latent class, not revealed to the analyst 
(Greene, 2007). Estimates consist of the class specific parameters and for each subject a set of 
probabilities is defined over the classes. Although class membership is not observed, 
observable characteristics can be introduced that help to achieve class separation, such as 
organic user group in this particular study. The advantage of this approach compared to the 
above arbitrary division of the sample in subsamples is that all the information contained in 
the sample is used to estimate the class models instead of the limited information contained in 
the subsample. Table 3.6 shows the results for the Latent Class model in which the variable 
“organic user group” was used as the observable characteristic. The model with two classes is 
optimal, since the parameters of the models with more classes inflate rapidly. The likelihood 
of the model (-1318) is significantly better than the model without the latent classes (-1510), 
as confirmed by the likelihood ratio test.  
 
Table 3.6. Latent class estimation of choice parameters β: model with linear attribute levels and 
alternative specific β-parameters for the organic carrots 
 Latent class 1 Latent class 2 
Attribute β-coefficient Standard error P[β≠0] β-coefficient Standard error P[β≠0] 
Organic label  3.964 1.102 0.000 4.728 1.328 0.000 
Org. Nitrate leaching -1.591 0.207 0.000 -0.462 0.496 0.351 
Org. Vitamin A  0.551 0.102 0.000 -0.220 0.262 0.402 
Org. Biodiversity  0.299 0.501 0.000 0.185 0.115 0.107 
Org. Residue -2.262 0.254 0.000 -2.260 0.707 0.001 
Org. Price -0.848 0.211 0.000 -8.749 0.746 0.000 
A label  4.103 1.005 0.000 1.709 0.419 0.000 
Nitrate leaching -1.411 0.217 0.000 -0.264 0.502 0.600 
Vitamin A  0.455 0.100 0.000 0.623 0.253 0.014 
Biodiversity  0.219 0.051 0.000 -0.161 0.121 0.181 
Residue -3.057 0.276 0.000 -0.866 0.622 0.164 
Price -0.984 0.202 0.000 -7.123 0.706 0.000 
B label 0.000   0.000   
N=2088; LogL=-1318; χ²(16)
 
 = 383 
In the first class, which has 86% probability that a respondent resides in this class, all 
parameters are significant and in line with our previous estimates. The label name has become 
a more decisive characteristic, opposite to the price level whose importance has decreased 
compared to the model without latent classes. These results indicate that the members of this 
first class choose against the B scenario, regardless of the price difference. Both the A 
alternative and organic alternative have similar parameter estimates, so the respondents are 
rather indifferent between both.  
In the second class, with an average probability of 14%, the parameters for the majority of the 
credence attributes are insignificant. The organic label again receives a high and positive 
score, while the score of the A label is considerably lower. Furthermore, the price parameter 
is very negative in this group. This group can therefore be considered as very price sensitive 
consumers. Main decision variables for these consumers are thus price and presence of the 
organic label, the rest of the attributes are hardly relevant for them. Further analysis shows 
that this class is mainly composed of individuals that (at least once) chose the B alternative as 
their preferred alternative.  
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3.5 Heterogeneity between alternative choice patterns: the Nested Logit 
model 
How do consumers process the different labels? Do they first decide based upon the organic 
label name and then upon the remainder attributes (Figure 3.5 left), or do they first decide 
based upon the quality level and then upon the remainder attributes (Figure 3.5 in the middle), 
or do they simply process all quality attributes and the label name simultaneously (Figure 3.5 
on the right)? A Nested Logit model, which compares the variation in the two different 
branches of the models in Figure 3.5, allows for testing these alternative scenarios. 
Considering the tree model on the left, one could assume that consumers process both the A 
and B label in a similar way, which differs from the way they process the organic label. This 
yields one organic branch and one conventional decision branch. If both branches are 
statistically equal than the consumer processes all attributes simultaneously (right case). If the 
consumers focus on quality versus generic products, we obtain the tree structure in the centre 
of Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5. Nested Logit models for the choice experiment. Left: organic processed differently 
than conventional, Middle: quality products processed differently than generic product, Right: 
no prioritisation   
Both for the sample reflecting the Flemish consumer population and the sample of VELT 
members, Wald tests show that the variation in each of the branches is not statistically 
different (the inclusive values IV are similar), so the model on the right is the appropriate one 
for the full sample. Consumers thus generally process the information on the three alternatives 
in a similar way.  
 
However, the Latent Class model hinted that both groups process the labels differently. If we 
split the overall sample into two groups based upon highest class probability, we can test the 
nested models on the subsamples. Regrettably, the combination of Nested and Latent Class 
Logit models is not yet operationally developed, so we have to follow this procedure. For both 
classes the ‘quality versus generic’ model is the most appropriate (Figure 3.5 in the middle). 
The inclusive value (IV) for the generic branch is assumed fixed at 1, to enable testing of IV 
of the quality branch. For the members of latent class 1, the IV of the quality branch is not 
significantly different from zero, which indicates that we should consider two different 
models for this group, i.e. one model for the comparison of label A and Organic and one for 
the B label, as depicted in Figure 3.6. As the B label is almost completely ignored by this 
group, it can reasonably be assumed that the class 1 members only consider the A and 
Organic label. Hence, a Binary Logit model could be appropriate to describe this group.  
 
organic conventional 
organic A B 
generic quality 
B A org Organic A B 
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Figure 3.6. Decision model for members of latent class 1 
For the second latent class, the IV of the quality branch differs significantly from zero and 
from 1, which indicates that the nested model is the appropriate one. Members of this group 
thus intuitively cluster the A and Organic label versus the B label before deciding.    
 
3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Because the experiment’s attribute levels have been based upon real levels currently observed 
in the market place, our approach to compare the attributes one to another is appropriate. We 
do not wish to make any statement of the importance of these attributes versus other search 
and experience attributes such as taste, colour, shape and smell. To test the latter, the 
experimental design should be different.   
Our first hypothesis, ‘health traits are more important during the buying decision than 
environmental quality traits’, could not be fully confirmed, given the relatively high score for 
the attribute ‘nitrate leaching on the farm site’. Instead we noted that undesirable traits trigger 
a stronger response than desirable traits. Within these negative or positive response classes, 
the health related variables score ‘better’ than environment related variables. This might argue 
for a decision tree in which the first trade off is made in favour of ‘avoiding an undesirable 
outcome’ and the second in favour of the ‘personal health benefit compared to the 
environmental benefit’. The food safety related ‘residue’-item yields the heaviest consumer 
reaction. This can be reasonably explained by the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), which argues that consumers prefer avoiding risks to capturing gains.  
Our second hypothesis, ‘the organic label plays a significant role in consumers’ choice for 
organic products’, can only partly be confirmed. Consumers do prefer organic products over 
B-labelled products, but not over A-labelled products, which argues for the consideration that 
most consumers classify organic products among other ‘quality niche products’. However, in 
response to hypothesis 3, ‘organic farming is perceived as healthier and more environmentally 
friendly than its conventional counterpart’, consumers define the quality traits differently 
between both the organic and the A-label. Organic and the A-labelled carrots in the 
experiment with the same health and environmental characteristics obtain a similar total 
utility score, while the individual choice parameter scores for the health and environmental 
attributes are higher for the organic carrot variant. This means that the respondents relate the 
quality of organic vegetables to the attributes mentioned in the experiment, while the A-label 
quality traits are mainly absorbed in the positive A label specific constant, and thus may cover 
other attributes not mentioned in the experiment.  
The fourth hypothesis, which states that purchase intention is primarily based upon quality 
traits, can be confirmed. The attributes of influence for those who do not buy organic are 
quality 
A org 
generic quality 
Model 1: 
Model 2: 
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restricted to food safety and price, while those who buy organic also attach value to the label 
name and the environmental attributes.                     
The fifth hypothesis explores whether in our experiment buying frequency and the presence of 
environmental and health traits are correlated. Apart from the insignificant biodiversity proxy 
in the case of light users, this does not seem to be the case. However, over the different user 
groups, two other, albeit opposite, trends can be detected. The first relates to price, which 
shows a decreasing importance from non to heavy users. This confirms the finding of other 
studies (O’Donovan and Mc Carthy, 2002, Bonti-Ankomah and Yiridoe, 2006) that the 
perceived price difference is the most important barrier for new users to buy organic or for 
light users to increase their purchase of organic foods. Among heavy users, the price is not an 
issue, at least within the experiment’s price range. The second trend relates to the (organic) 
label value, which increases from non to heavy users, indicating that when the buying 
frequency of organic vegetables increases, more unobserved preference attributes (which 
could relate to taste or appearance) are associated with the organic label.    
The more advanced Latent Class and Nested Logit model confirm the importance of the price 
when purchasing food. The group of consumers which is extremely price sensitive, associates 
a higher utility with the organic label compared to the A-label.  This suggests that these 
consumers are aware of the specialty character of organic vegetables. However, owing to the 
high perceived price premium, they favour non organic products. Presence of residues in the 
organic carrots is not appreciated, probably because this is against the ‘organic philosophy’. 
The large group of less price sensitive consumers on their turn processes both the A and 
organic label in a similar way, i.e. all attributes are relatively equally important. The organic 
quality traits receive slightly better scores, indicating that these traits are intrinsically 
associated more with the organic carrots. The Nested Logit model shows that this group 
hardly considers the B-label.  
We can conclude that there is differential consumer sensitivity for the type and quality of 
credence attributes and that the organic label is associated more with health and environment 
related quality traits. To maintain (and reinforce) this perception among consumers and 
organic product positioning, it is recommended to give this perception additional scientific 
underpinning. 
 
The above conclusions hold for the PIoS-case of organic farming. In this dissertation we 
discuss two cases of PIoS, organic farming and Flandria, which follows the principles of 
integrated farming. Given that the environmental measures in the organic standard surpass 
those of the Flandria-standard, it is interesting to know whether the obtained results for 
organic farming also apply for more generic standards such as Flandria. The question we pose 
ourselves here is whether a certification scheme, such as Flandria, with a less clear 
positioning on ecological themes, is still perceived as an ecological standard (the organic label 
in our experiment) or merely as a quality standard (the A-label in our experiment).  To answer 
this question, we can refer to Verbeke et al. (2008). In this research the consumer attitude and 
behaviour towards Flandria labelled tomatoes after 10 years of Flandria labelling was 
investigated. Details on the set up of this research can be found in the paper. One interesting 
finding of the paper, which is also relevant for chapter 2, is that approximately one third of the 
respondents were unfamiliar with the Flandria label, even after 10 years of existence and 
advertisement campaigns. Of the aware respondents, approximately one third buys the 
Flandria labelled tomatoes on a regular basis. Buyers of the Flandria-labelled tomatoes have a 
more positive attitude towards the tomatoes compared to the aware non buyers. Main 
associations relate to ‘Belgian origin’ (probably due to the name), the perceived ‘better 
quality and taste’ and the ‘stricter production control’. The ‘use of integrated pest 
management practises’ is less known both by buyers and non buyers. Both the buyers and non 
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buyers do not associate ‘absence of pesticides’ and ‘organic farming’ with Flandria tomatoes. 
The article also investigated potential motivations for unaware and aware non buyers to buy 
Flandria-tomatoes in the future. For both groups, the most important motivation would be ‘if 
no other tomatoes were available’, followed closely by ‘if more information was provided’, ‘if 
proven to be healthier’ and ‘if more environmentally friendly’. The article concludes that the 
Flandria-label has become quite standard and little differentiated. If we compare this with the 
findings in this chapter, Flandria-labelled tomatoes seem to reside under the A-mark 
tomatoes, with a positioning based upon origin and overall quality perception instead of on 
environmental practices. As discussed in Verbeke (2005), the provision of ever more and too 
detailed information entails a risk of information overload, resulting in consumer indifference 
or loss of confidence. Verbeke (2005) proposes segmentation and targeted information 
provision as potential solutions to market failure from information asymmetry. As also 
confirmed by the focus groups, see Chapter 2, Flandria is mainly perceived as a label of origin 
and quality. When Flandria would seek a positioning based upon origin, quality, taste and 
environmental friendliness, this would result into information overkill for the consumer. 
Bearing this in mind, the label promoters chose to use the integrated farming efforts 
strategically as a support for the general quality perception. Simultaneously, by implementing 
integrated farming practises, the positioning of more environmentally oriented labels such as 
organic farming can be more easily countered. Given our finding that health related quality 
attributes score better than environment related attributes, this choice seems indeed successful 
when the label is not targeting a niche.  
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Chapter 4. Retail interest in PIoS 
 
 
This chapter is an adapted version of Aertsens, J., Mondelaers, K. and Van Huylenbroeck, G. 
(2009). Differences in retail strategies for marketing organic products. British Food Journal, 
111 (2),138 – 54. 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses why PIoS are of more strategic importance for some retailers and less 
for others. A retailer (potentially) engages in PIoS when the PIoS-products are of strategic 
importance for this retailer.    
 
In this chapter, the case of organic farming products is used as example of PIoS. Main growth 
in organic production occurred only in the 1990s, following a number of food scares in the 
conventional sector. In the last decade organic markets in the world and in Europe have 
grown strongly (Hamm and Gronefeld, 2004). Sahota (2007) reports a growth of the global 
organic food and drink market revenue of 43% between 2002 and 2005. The European 
organic market comprises over half of global revenues and its growth has been estimated at 10 
to 15% in 2005 (Richter and Padel, 2007). Different sources expect that in the next few years 
global growth rates will be 15% (Agriholland, 2007) to 20% (Organic Monitor, 2006). Thus, 
the organic market is the fastest growing sector of the food industry and exceptionally high 
market growth rates are leading to undersupply in various regions (Organic Monitor, 2007).  
 
As consumers become more sophisticated in their consumer behaviour towards organic foods, 
companies are focusing on supply chain management to ensure traceability, high quality, 
sufficient supply volumes and supply continuity. Because assuring supply becomes a major 
concern, a number of European companies have started to invest in developing countries to 
lock-in supply (Organic Monitor, 2006). 
 
While supermarket chains dominate the sales of organic vegetables and fruit in Europe with a 
market share of 48% (Organic Monitor, 2005) experts rank them as the most important sales 
channel for future organic food market development both in urban and rural areas (Padel and 
Midmore, 2005). However, strong differences exist between European retailer groups with 
respect to marketing organic products (Richter and Hempfling, 2002).  
 
In this chapter we assess these differences more deeply, based on an in depth analysis of the 
strategies of the three largest Belgian retailers selling organic products. We explain why the 
strategies differ markedly even though the general characteristics of the retailers seem to be 
similar. Both the marketing mix and the organisation of the supply chain are considered. The 
general findings are relevant to other countries and non organic premium products. 
 
In the next sections the theoretical framework and the methodology are explained. We 
formulate several hypothesis based on a review of the literature. This is followed by a 
description of the organic market structure in Belgium. Next, we focus on the overall 
characteristics and strategies of the three retailers studied. Then, the overall strategy is related 
to the strategy in marketing organic products in general and organic beef in particular. In the 
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following discussion we come back to the hypotheses and use the empirical findings to 
discuss them. The paper ends with a general conclusion. 
 
4.2 Theoretical framework 
We first discuss the importance of strategic products to retailers and then explain why 
products from PIoS might be of strategic importance for certain retailers. Subsequently we 
discuss the additional considerations retailers need to make when adopting PIoS as strategic 
products. 
 
When it comes to tools to put certain products in the market, Lazer (1961) argues that retailers 
can use their retailing mix in both the commercial and operational part. The commercial part 
aims at increasing effectiveness by adjusting the Product mix, the Price mix, the Presentation 
and the Promotion mix. The operational part mainly aims at increasing the efficiency through 
an adequate Place mix, Physical distribution mix and Personnel mix (Brown et al., 2005). 
Jointly these concepts are better known as the seven retail P’s. Further in the paper we 
describe important differences between retailers in the positioning of organic products using 
their retailing mix. We also refer to Mickwitz (1959) who argues that in the different phases 
of the Product Life Cycle, a different implementation of the marketing mix is optimal.  
     
Chen et al. (2006) suggest that there exist strategic product categories that are more important 
than others in consumers' store choice decisions. Marketing research also suggests that in-
store stimuli such as display and atmosphere have a great influence on consumer buying 
behaviour and may encourage sales by maximizing impulse buying and cross-selling 
(Donovan and Rossiter, 1982, Kotler, 1974, Corstjens and Doyle, 1981). For example, a 
factorial experiment revealed that an in-store display of an item creates excitement and 
increases the average amount purchased (Chevalier, 1975). The effect of one category on the 
profits of other categories in the store is particularly important in the calculus of marketing 
decision making. Retailers have to pay extra attention for these strategic product categories 
(Chen et al., 1999). The question is then what makes some products of strategic importance to 
retailers? Strategic products attract (new) customers to the retailer. In order to identify 
strategic products, according to Abell (1980), retailers need to answer the following related 
questions: “who are our main customers?” and “what products and services do they want?”. 
Retailers can answer to these in three steps: 1) Segmentation of the customers based on their 
preferences; 2) Targeting or choosing the most interesting customer segments; 3) Positioning: 
developing a marketing mix to reach these segments. For this positioning which can be seen 
as a form of differentiation, the retailer should develop a product offer, that will be regarded 
as most desirable by the customers in the targeted market segment (Sanchez and Heene, 
2004). When different retailers target different customer segments, their optimal product mix 
should be different. We can than argue that products that especially attract targeted customers 
are of strategic importance to retailers. The attraction can come both from functional value as 
from underlining the image of the retailer in aspects that are important to the targeted 
customers. It is interesting to combine the concept of “strategic” product lines with the 
framework of Morschett et al. (2006) which is based on Porter (1985). They argue that two 
distinctive types of competitive strategies exist: the cost leadership and the differentiation 
strategies. Strategic products may play a fundamental part in a retailer’s differentiation 
strategy. Our question is then whether commodities from PIoS can be such strategic products? 
 
The potential retailer interest in PIoS can be related to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
PIoS and CSR share a lot of similarities, as explained in chapter 1. The EU definition of CSR 
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is (COM, 2001): “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns 
in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary 
basis.” While CSR mainly refers to intra firm processes, PIoS often refer to inter firm 
arrangements, and more specifically to hybrids. Hybrids are organisational structures where 
multiple actors cooperate and contract together, while still remaining competitors. The 
principles of intra firm strategic CSR outlined by Burke and Logsdon (1996) can be 
extrapolated to PIoS. Burke and Logsdon (1996) describe how CSR can actually create value 
for the firm, when it is applied strategically. ‘Strategic CSR’ yields substantial business-
related benefits to the firm, in particular by supporting core business activities and therefore 
contributing to the firm’s effectiveness in accomplishing its mission. Burke and Logsdon 
identify five dimensions of corporate strategy which relate CSR to value creation by the firm. 
‘Centrality’, as a first dimension, is a measure of the closeness of fit between a CSR policy 
and the firm’s mission and objectives. ‘Visibility’ is the extent to which social activities may 
be observed by the firm’s stakeholders. In the context of CSR, ‘Appropriability (or 
specificity)’ may be defined as the ability of the firm to extract economic benefits from a 
social project. The fourth dimension, ‘Voluntarism’, refers to the sense in which social 
activities are undertaken freely, because firms want to, rather than as a result of legal 
constraints or fiscal incentives. The final dimension, ‘Proactivity’, reflects the degree to which 
behaviour is planned in anticipation of emerging economic, technological, social or political 
trends. So, in order to be of interest for a retailer, PIoS should contribute to these five 
dimensions of strategic CSR.  
 
Not every retailer has the same CSR strategy. Tulder et al. (2009), in their analysis of CSR 
business models in the retail industry, identified four approaches to CSR. First, the ‘inactive 
approach’ reflects the classical notion of Friedman that the only responsibility companies 
(can) have is to generate profits. This is a fundamentally inward-looking (inside-in) business 
perspective, aimed at efficiency and competitiveness in the immediate market environment. 
The motivation for CSR is primarily utilitarian (Swanson, 1995), derived from so-called 
'consequential ethics' where the focus is on the end result, rather than the means by which it is 
achieved. In this goal-oriented approach, CSR is aimed at profit and sales maximisation, 
return on investment and sales. A slight variation on the inactive attitude is the ‘re-active 
approach’, which shares the focus on efficiency but with particular attention to not making 
any mistakes. This requires an outside-in orientation where entrepreneurs monitor their 
environment and manage their primary stakeholders so as to keep mounting issues in check 
without otherwise allowing it to give rise to fundamental changes in the business philosophy 
and primary production processes. Entrepreneurs are socially responsive and respond 
specifically to actions of external actors that could damage their reputation. Third, an ‘active 
approach’ to CSR represents the most 'ethical' entrepreneurial orientation. Entrepreneurs who 
pursue this approach are explicitly inspired by ethical values and virtues (or 'positive duties') 
on the basis of which company objectives are formulated. These objectives are subsequently 
realised in a socially responsible manner regardless of actual or potential social pressures by 
stakeholders. Such entrepreneurs are strongly outward-oriented (inside-out) and they display a 
certain 'missionary urge' which sometimes makes them heroes to NGOs but often an 
annoyance to 'true' entrepreneurs. Finally, one can speak of a ‘pro-active approach’ if an 
entrepreneur undertakes activities aimed at external stakeholders right at the beginning of an 
issue's life cycle. Effective CSR is characterised not only by proactive business practices, but 
also by interactive business practices, where an 'inside-out' and an 'outside-in' orientation 
complement each other.  
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So, strategic CSR is of differential importance for retailers. From section 1 we know that 
strategic products are of interest for retailers pursuing a differentiation strategy. When the 
differentiation strategy contains elements of CSR, PIoS products can become strategic 
products. We explained that PIoS products should contribute to the five dimensions of 
strategic CSR. But, as PIoS products are external to the retailer, some additional 
considerations and efforts are required before PIoS are adopted by retailers. Mainville et al. 
(2005) identified the key factors influencing the adoption of private certification standards by 
retailers (see Table 4.1). The identified factors can also be related to the decision of a retailer 
to engage in PIoS. 
 
Table 4.1. Factors influencing the retailer’s decision to adopt PIoS 
General conditioning factors Benefit/cost effect Retailer characteristics 
• Strategic objective of PIoS 
• Institutional context 
• Product and market  
       characteristics 
• Output price differentials 
• Input price differentials 
• Transaction cost differentials 
• Product requirements 
• Importance of product in sales 
• Scale of operations 
• Market power of firm 
• Reputation and brand capital 
Source: adapted from Mainville et al. (2005) 
 
Mainville distinguishes between general conditioning factors, benefit/cost effects and 
firm/organisation characteristics. As discussed before, standards can have standardizing, risk 
reducing and differentiating functions. While the main strategic objective of PIoS is their 
differentiating function, the risk reducing and standardizing functions are also of concern for 
retailers (see chapter 7). The exogenous institutional context relates to the formal (legislation, 
such as due diligence) and informal rules (social norms) in which the retailer and the PIoS 
operate, while the endogenous institutional context relates to the institutions and governance 
structures put in place to coordinate the transaction between PIoS-producer and retailer. 
Product and market characteristics refer to the necessity to adapt and coordinate the supply 
chain given that PIoS-products have certain specific (credence) attributes. Output price 
differentials refer to the potential premium price for PIoS-products at consumer level, given 
that these are strategic products. Input price differentials depend on the bargaining power 
between PIoS-producer and retailer, as well as on the difference with non-PIoS-products. 
Transaction cost differentials relate to the endogenous institutional arrangements set in place 
to organize the PIoS-supply chain and to signal the PIoS to the end consumer. With respect to 
retail specific characteristics, Mainville identifies a relation between a retailers’s non 
mainstream product requirements and the decision to engage in private certification, which 
can be linked to the appropriability-dimension of CSR discussed above. Whether the PIoS-
product is a central product to the revenue of the retailer can be associated with the 
‘centrality’ dimension of strategic CSR. Further, the larger the scale of operations, the more 
the fixed costs associated with strategic products can be distributed over other products. 
Bargaining power over suppliers can help to enforce PIoS-standards advantageous to retailer. 
Finally, when a retailer has a certain reputation and brand capital, PIoS can be more 
important, as discussed above. This also relates to the visibility-dimension of strategic CSR.  
 
Richter and Hempfling (2002) who studied strategies of retailers for marketing organic 
products in eleven European countries found that these may differ importantly. They 
identified three main strategies. First, a “maximum strategy”, which involves: (i) a large range 
of more than 400 different organic products at the points of sales, (ii) making organic 
products a significant part of the company’s advertising and promotional campaigns, (iii) 
assuring the quality of the products. Second, a “basic strategy” involving a range of 50 to 250 
organic products. Third, a “minimum strategy” involving a range of no more than 50, mostly 
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dry, organic products. Richter and Hempfling (2002) also categorized retailers as “leaders” or 
“adapters”. Leaders follow a maximum strategy and want to be the regional market leader in 
organic products. Adapters apply a basic or minimum strategy. Adapters compose their 
organic product inventory according current trends in demand or as a reaction to the strategies 
of their main competitors. They sell organic products, but without strong active engagement 
and effort.  
 
Could organic products have strategic importance and if so what makes them special for 
consumers? Several authors examined the factors that influence consumers to choose organic 
rather than conventional food (Midmore et al., 2005, Zanoli and Naspetti, 2002, Zanoli, 
2004).  
Both private use values such as health, taste and freshness, and public use values such as 
environmental conservation and animal welfare play an important role (Oughton and Ritson, 
2007, Krystallis and Chryssohoidis, 2005, Yiridoe et al., 2005, Baltussen et al., 2006). Codron 
et al (2006) show that recently, ethical, health and environmental values become increasingly 
more important for consumers. Wirthgen (2005) also indicates that marketing on “the regional 
origin” can be a successful strategy for product differentiation. Thus as consumers perceive 
that organic products score very well on these points, some retailers may develop organic, fair 
trade and sustainable products strongly to enforce their image as social responsible retailer. 
De Ferran and Grunert (2007),  Hughes (2005) , Jones et al. (2005) show that these values are 
indeed taken up by some retailers, e.g. as part of their corporate social responsibility policy.  
 
“Organic” as an emerging market. When retailers develop a strategy for marketing organic 
products it is important to take into account that this is still an emerging, innovative market. 
Ansoff (1957) and Danneels (2002) argue that the introduction of new products in new 
markets usually requires special efforts and thus demands a lot from the retailers’ resources. 
Danneels (2002) identifies two types of firm competences that may be required for product 
innovation: (1) new technological competences, and (2) new customer competences. For the 
emerging organic market both competences have to be developed. Danneels (2002) indicates 
this situation as “pure exploration”. This means that the choice for a “maximum strategy” for 
promoting “organics” demands a lot of resources that not all retailers can or want to provide. 
For some it may be more interesting to adopt a “second mover strategy” in order to limit costs 
or resources (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998).  
 
These combined elements from the literature result in the following propositions, which we 
will return to after the presentation of the empirical findings.  
 
Proposition 1: Organic products may be a strategic product category for some retailers.  
 
Proposition 2: The (perceived) characteristics of organic products have strategic importance 
for retailers that want to create an image with the same values. 
 
Proposition 3: In order to favour strategic products, retailers may not only use the commercial 
but also the operational factors of the retail mix.  
 
Proposition 4: Due to the characteristics of the organic market as an innovative, emerging 
market, there may be certain first mover advantages.   
 
Proposition 5: Investments by retailers in products which have strategic importance for them, 
will pay off indirectly.   
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Proposition 6: For some retailers organic products have no special strategic importance. 
 
Proposition 7: For emerging product markets, some retailers may benefit more from a second 
mover strategy. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
Data for our analyses are combined from different projects studying the organisation and 
development of the organic sector in Belgium, between February 2003 and the end of 2007. 
Information concerning the strategies of the retailers was collected through interviews with at 
least five staff members at each of the retailers. The contacted staff members belonged to 
different departments (Purchase, Quality and Merchandising, Marketing) and were involved 
in different product categories (e.g. organic beef and organic vegetables). Also a point of sales 
director of the retailer group has been interviewed. These data were combined with our own 
observations at the points of sale and a review of press communications and relevant reports. 
GfK-household panel data, recording all purchases of 3000 Belgian households, were used to 
compare the importance of different sales channels. A postal survey with 529 respondents and 
a response rate of 44% was used to gain insight in the behaviour and perception of Belgian 
consumers towards organic products. 
 
4.4 Characteristics of the organic market in Belgium 
Both Richter (2002) and Hamm and Gronefeld (2004) consider the Belgian organic market as 
a growth market. However after the boosting effect of the major food crises in 1999 (dioxin) 
and 2001 (BSE),  total consumer expenditures on organic food have dropped again by 28% 
between 2001 and 2005 (Stockemer and Van Raemdonck, 2005). With a total sales turnover 
of 201 million euro for organic fresh products and a share of 1.5 percent of total fresh food 
expenditures in 2005 the market for organic fresh food remains marginal in Belgium (VLAM, 
2006).  In 2007 total turn over amounted to 283 million euro, which indicates a growth of 
9,95% compared to 2006 (Tas, 2008).   
 
Table 4.2. Market share, growth rate of share and ratio organic versus conventional share for 
different sales channels 
 Market share (%) Average growth rate (% 
points)
1 Organic vs. conventional share 
(%)2  3 2001 2005 
Supermarket 49 60 + 5,3    90 
Specialized shop 32 20 - 10,5    90 
Other 19 4 20 + 2,9  190 
1. based upon expenditure per capita (VLAM, 2006); (Baecke et al., 2002) 
2. average growth of market share yearly, 2001 base year 
3. data for vegetable products (Mondelaers and Van Huylenbroeck, 2005) 
4. Other: markets, on farm sales, box schemes and others 
 
In the early 1990s, specialised shops were the dominant sales channel for organic products in 
Belgium. But, as indicated in Table 4.2, their share has decreased significantly and 
continuously, predominantly in favour of supermarkets. We can also conclude from Table 4.2 
that alternative channels, such as markets and on farm sales capture a higher share of the 
organic product market compared to their conventional counterparts.  The explanation is that 
organic has a connotation of “alternative” that matches well with the alternative channels both 
in the view of buyers and sellers.  
5.  
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4.5 Main characteristics and strategy of the retailers 
In order to respect confidentiality we refer to the three main Belgian retailers of organic food 
as R1, R2, and R3.  We remark that the third retailer has also three supermarkets where only 
organic products are sold: we refer to these as R3-bio. Further there are also retailers in 
Belgium, e.g., some hard discounters, who so far do not sell (fresh) organic products.  
 
Table 4.3 presents the main characteristics of the retailer groups investigated. The total 
number of super- and hypermarkets they operate in Belgium varies between 125 and 170.  
One noteworthy difference is that R2 has also an important number of hypermarkets (>2500 
m² or 27.000 square feet), whereas R1 and R3 only have supermarkets (< 2500 m²). Another 
distinction for R2 is its more important section of non-food articles, contrary to R1 and R3, 
which only offer these products to a limited extent.   
 
Table 4.3.  General characteristics of the retailers, overview 
 R1 R2 R3  R3-bio 
hyper (F1 ) and/or super (F2)  F2 F1+ F2 F2  F2 
Specialisation Food Food+ Non Food Food  Food 
# points of sales (F1+ F2) 2004 125 F1: 56    + F2: 78 170  3 
average surface of PoS (m2 1400 ) F1: 4000; F2: 1700  1400  670 
turnover 2003 (billion EUR) 3,7 4,6 3,6   ~ 0,01 
% of total sales volume for F1+ F2 20% 31% 19%   ~0,05% 
PoS: Point of Sales 
sources: interviews, press, yearly firm reports. (*) F1: >2500 m2;  F2: 650-2500m2
 
;        
In Table 4.4, below, we summarise some characteristics from the retailing mix that indicate 
how the different groups position themselves in the market.  
 
The main strategy of R1 is a market specialisation strategy or in this case a differentiation 
strategy (Sans, 2003). As indicated in R1’s mission statement, their key focus is delivering 
superior value and gaining a leading position in mature and emerging food segments. R1 
particularly targets consumers searching for high quality, convenience and healthy products. 
This is implemented by developing strong local chains and maintaining high social, 
environmental and ethical standards. R1 also provides a large selection of high quality food 
products in a very pleasant shopping environment. Special attention is given to several 
“emerging” product segments, such as organic products, fair trade and convenience food 
(Belga Press Release, 4th
 
 of January 2007). To maintain their quality image and to strengthen 
consumer loyalty, R1 attaches an extra label for quality control and traceability to these 
emerging product lines. R1 tries to be the market leader in these “niches” by being the first in 
offering the products. The prices of R1’s products are however on average 19% higher than 
the ones offered by R3. The price difference amounts to 55 percent when basic unbranded 
products are compared (Labarre and Starquit, 2005).  
The overall strategy of R2 is different. R2 aims for full market coverage by offering food and 
non-food, branded and unbranded products in both high and low price categories. Instead of 
targeting specific consumer segments, R2 tries to attract the total population of consumers. R2 
hereby challenges both R1 and R3. At the points of sale they opt for a pleasant shopping 
environment. The number of retail staff available for assisting clients is however smaller 
when compared to R1 (especially when expressed per m2 of sales area). Although R2 claims 
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to offer the lowest price for some products, on average their prices are intermediate between 
R1 and R3: +9% with respect to R3 (Labarre and Starquit, 2005).  
 
In its turn the overall strategy of R3 is different. R3 focuses especially on an efficient 
“operational mix” or in other words on a low cost logistic. This strategy is visible at the points 
of sale that resemble a warehouse. The points of sale are not nicely decorated, but aim at a 
practical handling when supplying the racks and during shopping. R3 specifically targets 
consumers that want to buy food at the best quality/price ratio. R3’s unique selling 
proposition is based upon the lowest price in the region both for national brands, which 
account for 70% of their product range, and “store brand” products. 
 
Table 4.4.  Strategy of the retailers, overview 
MARKETING MIX                      R1 R2 R3  R3-bio 
food prices (strategy) High medium-low lowest   low or medium 
assortment of food very large large large  large 
assortment of non-food Medium F1:very large; F2:  large medium  small 
quality  +++ ++ +++  +++ 
shopping atmosphere   very pleasant (very) pleasant basic / ok  pleasant 
service, # servants in shop ++ + ++   ++ 
source: press releases + own observations 
 
In Table 4.5 the price premiums for national brands, unbranded basic (‘white’) products and 
organic products of R1 and R2 are compared to R3’s. The data clearly show that R3 has the 
lowest price for all products.  
 
Table 4.5. Price premium of R1 and R2 compared to R3  
 National brands Basic products1 Organic products2 
R1 
3 
+10% +55% +19% 
R2   +6%   +3% +29% 
source: (Labarre and Starquit, 2005): 683 stores visited, 141 national brand products in the basket 
source: (Labarre and Starquit, 2005): 683 stores visited, 73 basic products (‘white products’) 
source: (Jooken and Niclaes, 2002): 86 stores visited, 41 products in the basket 
 
4.6 Retailers and their marketing strategy for organic products 
In this section we compare the marketing strategies of the three retailer groups. The main 
characteristics are summarised in Table 4.6 below. 
 
R1 makes a real effort in selling organic products, using the different elements of the 
marketing mix. In Belgium, R1 was the first to offer organic products, starting in 1985 with 
organic bread and some other basic products. Concerning the organic product mix, R1 excels 
at product range level, with 650 product references in the organic version or 4% of their total 
product range compared to 236 for R2 and 312 for R3. R1’s product range covers all the main 
food product classes. Table 4.5 indicates that R1 comparatively takes a lower profit margin on 
organic products. Where for the basic products R1’s price is on average 55% higher than 
R3’s, for organic products the price is only 19% higher than R3’s. And where R1 has higher 
prices than R2 for the conventional national brands and basic products its prices are about 
10% lower for the organic products. With respect to the presentation, R1 places its organic 
products in positions which are highly visible, attracting attention towards them by 
systematically using green signalling flags marked with “bio”. Promotion is also emphasized 
by advertising the offer of organic products in their weekly ‘flash’-magazine and the 
organization of an ‘organic products’ week. Due to this combined approach R1 has increased 
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its share of the total sales of organic products in super- and hypermarkets in Belgium to 50%, 
though its share of overall super- and hypermarket sales is only 20%. R1 has attained this 
relatively high market share, even while the average price of its organic products is 19 percent 
higher than R3’s.  
  
Table 4.6.  Strategy of the retailers, when supplying organic products in general 
  R1 R2 R3  R3-bio 
assortment, or # org. products in 
2001 600 236 312  7000 
org. fresh meat, cheese available available not available  available 
org. vegetables, fruit, available available available  available 
org. dairy, bread, juice, dried 
products available available available  available 
retailers own org. mark and label yes yes yes  yes 
turn over organic (mio EUR) ~80 ~30 ~55  ~10  
share of total organic sales by 
supermarkets (%) ~50% ~20% ~30%    
organics as part of total turn-over  ~ 2,2% ~ 0,7% ~1,5%  100% 
placement of org. products   good not best moderate good  only organic 
flags / signalling   very visible flags less visible visible stickers  only organic 
prices of organic products   119    (+19%) 129  (+29%) 100 (=ref.)  112 (+12%) 
Quality of the org. Vegetables high  (cat.1) medium (cat. 2) high  (cat.1)  high  (cat.1) 
year of introduction of org. 
products 1985 1996 1991  
2001 = 
opening 
Sources: collected information and own observations 
 
R2’s strategy is very different when it comes to selling organic products. R2 makes no special 
efforts to promote them. R2’s organic product range consists of only 236 products, which is 
about 2.6% of their total product range. Organic products constitute less than one percent of 
their total turnover and organic sales have declined during the last two years. Whilst prices for 
basic products at R2 are on average 3% higher than at R3, prices for organic products are 29% 
higher than at R3. And where prices for the basic products are about one third lower than at 
R1 the prices of organic products are about 10% higher. With respect to the presentation, 
organic products are not placed at more visible spots in their stores. Flags are not used 
systematically to indicate the placement of organic products. Sometimes the careless product 
placement on the shelves makes the organic label invisible. These observations indicate the 
lack of knowledge and/or attention of the employees at the point of sales concerning organic 
products. When it comes to the sales of organic vegetables, where R1 and R3 always provide 
vegetables of high quality, (Class 1), R2 provides lower quality (Class 2).  
  
R3’s strategy for organic products is part of the sustainable “Green Line” product policy. This 
policy emphasizes their willingness to promote environmentally friendly production and 
distribution. Starting from R3’s basic concept that no superfluous costs may be made, the 
policy is translated as “investments in environmental friendliness take place if they pay back”. 
R3 is creative in developing this concept by limiting transport miles, recycling, cost efficient 
and ecological packaging, use of wind energy, and other similar measures. Of the 312 organic 
products in R3’s assortment, more than 190 are private label products. Organic food generates 
2% of their turnover and the growth rate is 5% higher than for other products. The organic 
products are presented in highly visible places in store. As other “Green Line” products they 
are easily recognisable by a green price sticker on the shelves, while most products have 
white stickers and red stickers are used to indicate the cheapest products. An effort is made to 
promote “organic”. R3 has a history of offering both basic and high quality products. In the 
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last ten years many of its high quality products have been replaced by organic quality 
products. 
 
R3 not only challenges the organic leadership role of R1 in its conventional stores, it also 
targets the organic heavy users in specialised shops: R3-bio. Up to the end of 2007 the 
number of specialised organic shops remains limited to three, but according to the chief 
manager of R3-bio the aim is to open up to 15 of these shops in the following years in order to 
have one in every city in Flanders. Given the rise in sales of organic products at these points 
of sale with 25% in 2004, the strategy seems successful (De Standaard, 2005). All food 
products in these shops are organic. The organic range of 7000 products is much deeper and 
wider compared to specialised shops or other supermarkets which enables customers to buy 
all the products on their shopping list in the organic version while choosing between a variety 
of alternatives. Some non-food products that give special attention to ecology are also for 
sale. These stores are still less profitable compared to the traditional points of sale of R3. But 
it is likely that when more of these shops open more profits will be made through economies 
of scale. The staff at R3-bio’s points of sale is well informed about the meaning of organic 
products. A qualified herbalist is present in every R3-bio store.  
 
4.7 Retailers and their engagement in marketing organic beef  
In this section we compare the marketing of organic beef by the three retailer groups. This is 
summarised in Table 4.7 below. 
 
 
Table 4.7. Characteristics of retailers when supplying organic beef 
 R1 R2 R3  R3-bio 
sales volume (kg per week), 2004 5800 1300 0  245 
% of total sales in F1+ F2,  2004 72% 16% 0  3% 
start of supply of organic beef 1997 1997    2001 
role in chain organisation important role outsourced to transformer    Moderate 
effort in chain organisation high low    Moderate 
agreement on future producer price fixed market dependent      
price paid to producers 
very high (120 = 
+20%) moderate (100)      
consumer prices 105 => (+5%) 100      
risk in case of low demand  for producers for producers      
country of origin Belgium Belgium    Belgium  
Source: own research 
 
R1 allocates relatively a large amount of resources to the marketing of organic beef and does 
this both in the commercial and operational part of its retail mix. One aspect of this is R1’s 
active role in organising the supply chain. Already in 1997, before the dioxin and BSE food 
scares, R1 made an agreement with a cooperative of organic beef producers to provide high 
quality meat. By paying a very good price to the producers (see table 4.7) and cooperating for 
about 10 years, an important degree of trust has been created among these producers. This 
commitment helped to convince the producers to make important, sometimes “irreversible”, 
investments in quality aspects that go beyond the requirements defined in the organic 
regulation. For example only animals from two specific breeds are allowed (Aertsens and Van 
Huylenbroeck, 2004). These measures explain why consumer prices of organic beef are 5% 
higher than at R2. When taking account of all R1’s efforts, the price charged to the consumers 
can be considered relatively low. R1 also promoted organic beef by emphasising its direct 
contact with the local producers’ cooperative when advertising organic beef, thus appealing to 
consumers who attach more and more importance to food safety, traceability, origin and 
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authenticity (Jones et al., 2001). By all these efforts, R1 succeeded in gaining a share of 72% 
in the turn-over of the organic beef sold by the super/hypermarkets in Belgium. This 
percentage is even higher than the 50% of the overall organic products mentioned before. 
 
R2 invests little effort and less money in organising the supply of organic beef. In practice it 
has outsourced the organisation of the supply to a processor who also collects the animals 
from the organic farmers. The price paid to the producers of R2 is about 20% lower than R1’s. 
Though the consumer price is 5% lower than at R1’s, the sold volume of organic beef is less 
than a quarter of R1’s volume, due to a lack of promotional and other efforts. 
 
As indicated above R3 does not supply fresh organic meat in its normal supermarkets. 
However it does so in its three exclusive organic supermarkets (R3-bio). This is due to several 
factors: First, R3 has a well organised high quality conventional butchery at all of its points of 
sale.  These butcheries are an asset in attracting clients. According to the “organic reference 
standard” it is necessary to strictly separate between conventional and organic products. 
Therefore offering organic meat in this butchery is not allowed. Secondly, offering pre-
packed organic meat is not considered a good option as the management argues that the 
conventional meat supplied is already of very high quality, and that it may have an 
antagonistic effect to offer a more expensive organic meat. Third, R3 argues that as it has 
three supermarkets selling only organic products (R3-bio) it does not make sense to offer all 
organic products also in the conventional supermarkets. They refer to this as avoiding 
“cannibalism”. 
 
4.8 Discussion 
In this section we match our empirical findings to the hypotheses that we formulated at the 
end of the theoretical framework. Our approach is more qualitative. Future research may test 
some of our hypotheses using a more quantitative approach.   
 
Proposition 1: Organic products may be a strategic product category for some retailers.  
 
For R1, the allocation of resources to the marketing of organic products strongly indicates the 
strategic importance of organic products for R1. Further R1 wants to differentiate itself from 
other retailers and to enforce its leading position as a quality distribution chain (Sans, 2003). 
In an interview, a representative of R1 confirmed this view: “The nice shopping environment 
and the large selection of high quality and differentiated products is attracting consumers who 
are willing to pay more for a better quality”.  
 
R1 specifically targets consumers that are not primarily price oriented. High income families 
form an important part of their loyal customers. Studies for Belgium (Stockemer and Van 
Raemdonck, 2005) and for Europe (Zanoli, 2004) point out that there is a positive relation 
between higher income and higher consumption of organic food. Furthermore, organic 
buyers, on average, have higher purchasing power, and they spend up to 4% more on Fast 
Moving Consumer Goods compared to an average Belgian household (Stockemer and Van 
Raemdonck, 2005). For R1 this makes that they are a segment that they want to attract to their 
points of sales.  
 
The organic farming CSR-strategy itself can be termed ‘active’. This is the most 'ethical' 
entrepreneurial orientation, as the underlying principles are inspired by ethical values and 
social pressure is neglected. The strategy of R1 with respect to organic products can be 
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termed ‘pro-active’, as R1 was early engaged in the organic products’ life cycle. The strategy 
of R3 with respect to organic products shares some ‘pro-active’ elements as well as ‘inactive’ 
elements, as the strategy is mainly inspired by (cost-) efficiency improvement, which makes 
the motivation primarily utilitarian. R2’s  organic product strategy can be termed ‘re-active’, 
as it is used as a means to avoid negative reputational effects due to absence of these products.   
 
Organic farming products as PIoS contribute to the different dimensions of the CSR strategy 
of retailer R1 (and R3 to some extend). First of all, the principles underlying organic farming 
are also ‘central’ to the strategic objectives outlined in the mission statement of R1. Organic 
farming products are furthermore important in making the CSR strategy of R1 (and R3) 
‘visible’. This visibility is further pronounced by additional signalling of organic products via 
packaging and in store advertisement. The ‘appropriability’, or the possibility to extract 
economic benefits from organic products as part of the CSR strategy, mainly relates to the 
signalling function of organic products (see next Proposition also). These products help R1 
(and R3) in targeting the desired consumer segments. Furthermore, organic farming is a 
strong example of ‘voluntarism’, another dimension of strategic CSR. Organic producers 
voluntarily apply more environmentally friendly production principles. ‘Pro-activity’, as a 
final dimension, can also be related to R1’s strategy, as explained above. R1 engaged very 
early in the organic market, while organic farming itself is a pioneer in environmentally 
friendly and socially sound production.   
 
Proposition 2: The (perceived) characteristics of organic products have strategic 
importance for retailers that want to create an image with the same values.  
 
This proposition investigates the ‘centrality’-dimension of organic products to the retailer’s 
strategy, as explained above.  Before, we learned that R1 particularly targets customers 
searching for high quality, healthiness, new and artisanal food products. These characteristics 
match very well with what consumers perceive to be properties from organic products.  
 
It became clear that the perceived environmental friendliness of organic products fits very 
well in R3’s sustainable “Greenline” strategy. This helps to explain why “organic products” 
are important for R3. 
 
Proposition 3: In order to favour strategic products, retailers may not only use the 
commercial but also the operational factors of the retail mix. 
 
The empirical data clearly revealed that R1 invested not only many resources from the 
commercial (Product quality and assortment, Price, Presentation, Promotion) but also from 
the operational mix in promoting the organic product segment. Especially its operational 
efforts in organising the organic beef chain highlighted this. When applying Mainville’s 
framework, main reasons are the importance of the organic products in the total sales, 
certainly in comparison to R2, and the fact that organic products are non mainstream 
products. As outlined in the organic principles, organic products need to be treated separately 
from conventional products, requiring organisation of a specific supply chain.  
 
In contrast it became obvious that R2 did put very little effort in these different factors to 
promote organic products.  
 
Proposition 4: Due to the characteristics of the organic market as an innovative, 
emerging market, there may be certain first mover advantages.   
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Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) indicate that first mover advantages may find their origin 
in three factors: (i) gaining technology leadership, (ii) gaining control of resources and (iii) 
binding customers to the firm. Considering the commercialisation of organic (beef) products 
by R1 mainly the second and third factors are relevant. Through its strategy R1 is “gaining 
control of the resources”. In the organic sector the number of supplier organisations is still 
very limited (especially in Belgium). As indicated in Table 4.7,  R1 ‘controls’ 72% of the total 
organic meat volume through their vertical alliances, leaving only limited options for the 
other retailers. This is similar for other organic segments, e.g vegetables. The approach of R1 
in striving for sustainable exclusive relationships with high quality suppliers, makes them gain 
control over local resources that their competitors will not be able to copy. Several papers, 
e.g. Bernués et al. (2003), find that consumers of (organic) meat or organic products in 
general prefer the products to be produced in their home country. Through its strategy R1 is 
also “binding customers”. Being the first and leading firm to sell organic products thus 
results in first mover advantages.  
 
In this context it is interesting to apply Mickwitz’ (1959) findings to R1’s strategy of 
marketing organic beef. Mickwitz found that in succeeding phases of the Product Life Cycle, 
different marketing mix instruments become more efficient. Also, more investments are 
needed in the early phases (introduction, growth, maturity) and more gains will occur in the 
later phases (saturation, decline). Following Mickwitz, during the introductory phase of the 
Product Life Cycle, R1 has especially focussed on providing high quality organic beef by 
specifying process criteria to its suppliers. The high prices R1 pays to organic beef producers 
are not charged completely to the consumers. R1 in the past ten years applied a market 
penetration strategy (and certainly not a skimming strategy). In the second or growth phase, 
again following Mickwitz, the retailer started to invest more in promoting organic beef as the 
growth of organic beef consumption was stagnating. The investments of R1 in marketing 
organic beef have certainly paid off in terms of market share. Although R1’s investments in 
developing the supply of organic beef are not covered by the consumer price of organic beef 
in the short run, following Mickwitz theory, they will most probably be covered in the long 
run.  
 
Proposition 5: Investments by retailers in products which have strategic importance for 
them, will pay off indirectly.  
 
The chief organic beef buyer at R1 claimed: “We are rather making losses than profits, when 
commercialising organic beef. But it is an investment in the future”. Investments in the 
overall quality of the supply of organic (beef) products as a strategic product will underline 
the quality image of R1 positively. This may attract (new) customers that buy other products 
and help to recover these investments faster. 
 
This proposition has the important consequence that retailers should pay (more) attention to 
effects of some product categories on others. Now, a lot of retailers have purchase and sales 
managers that are responsible for strictly delimited categories, this organisational structure 
may hamper the development and promotion of strategic products, like organic products.    
 
Proposition 6: For some retailers organic products have no special strategic importance. 
 
From our empirical part it became clear that for R2 “organic products” have much less 
importance than for R1. Richter and Hempfling (2002) would describe R2’s strategy as a 
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“basic” or “adapting” strategy. For R2 organic products have no special significance. The 
provision of a limited range of organic products is mainly targeted as a defence against R1 
which might be successful in attracting and holding new customers from R2.  
 
We noticed a strong positive correlation with the consumer segments that are targeted. Where 
R1 targets especially high income consumers, R2 targets all segments. Further in the retailer 
spectrum there are hard discounters in Belgium that do not offer (fresh) organic products at 
all.  
 
Proposition 7: For emerging product markets, some retailers may benefit more from a 
second mover strategy. 
 
R2’s and R3’s basic strategy make sense because of “second mover advantages”. As adapters 
or second movers they can reduce their costs and avoid some first mover risks. R1, as the 
first-mover firm incurs higher costs partly by having to learn competences partly in educating 
its customers about organic (beef) products, but mainly by developing and adapting the 
supply chain and the standards underlying PIoS, in order to meet the quality standards of R1.   
As the learning experience is to some extent spread among all producers, R2 and R3 on this 
point benefit from this learning experience and incur much lower costs. Also by applying a 
“wait and see” policy they do not run the risk of investing in a market that might prove 
unbeneficial.  
 
4.9 Conclusion   
We noticed that different retailer groups which at first sight have similar characteristics, can 
have very different strategies for marketing organic products. For some retailers, organic 
products are of strategic importance, as part of a differentiation strategy. This is due to their 
perceived values, such as environmental friendliness, social responsibility and high quality. 
The merit of strategic products in this sense are not in generating a lot of sales but in their 
possibility to improve the retailers image and thus attract extra customers who will also buy 
additional products at the store. Some retailers are willing to take very low margins and to 
invest many resources in all seven (commercial and operational) factors of the retailing mix in 
order to put these strategic products in the spot light. When the products, as is the case for 
organic products, are part of an emerging market, the development of both new technological 
and customer competences may be necessary. This demands huge investments and time but 
may result in first mover advantages by binding both suppliers and clients to the retailer. 
Other retailer groups for whom organic products are not of strategic importance, can benefit 
more from a second mover strategy. They offer only a basic assortment and thus limit the risk 
of investing a lot in an emerging market that might turn out to have a limited future. However 
when the emerging market would turn out to have a bright future, the “adapters” will invest 
later and then benefit from the learning experience that has already been developed in the 
sector. Our results also hold for other product types in emerging markets that for some retailer 
groups have strategic importance such as fair trade products, regional high quality products, 
convenience products.  
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PART 2: Performance of PIoS 
As explained in chapter 2, private certification schemes are perceived by market and public 
actors as promising tools to realize sustainable growth, as they are market driven and have a 
voluntary nature. Chapter 3 and 4 confirm that also consumers and retailers are interested in 
these tools.  
From chapter 3 we learn that different types of consumers attach a different value to 
environmental attributes. For some these attributes are irrelevant, while others are willing to 
pay premium prices for it. The differential interest of consumers in PIoS can be explained in 
two ways: 
1. Some consumers are more susceptible to environmental issues compared to others; 
2. Some attach more credibility to the environmental claim made compared to others.  
With respect to point 1, chapter 3 indicates that we can draw a clear parallel between 
environmental quality attributes and other quality attributes of food products. Both add extra 
value to the product and for both an extra price is charged. But there is also an important 
difference. As opposed to other quality attributes, environmental quality attributes face the 
consumer with the consumer-citizen paradox, as shown in figure II.1 below. As private utility 
maximizers, consumers would like to enjoy the environmental service while not paying for it. 
When every consumer would exhibit this free rider behaviour, no public goods are 
internalized and the citizen foregoes utility (i.e. the tragedy of the commons). The trade-off 
between consumer and citizen is person dependent. This creates the possibility for private 
actors to target these differential consumer interests. As a result, many types of PIoS can be 
designed that target specific consumer segments. 
 
Figure II.1. Relation between consumer utility and citizen utility and desired level of 
environmental claim 
The second point, the consumer’s perception of the credibility of the claim, depends, apart 
from the consumer, on the actual validity of the claim and the way the claim is 
communicated. The link between the environmental benefit and the product is often very 
weak. It is not by eating one CO2-neutral food product that global warming is resolved. 
Moreover, it is not because one consumer eats CO2
 
-neutral food that the environmental effect 
is reached. From the previous chapters we can derive that the stronger the environmental 
claim, ceteris paribus, the more costs need to be made to make this claim legitimate. Two 
opposing demand side effects result from this. First, a strong claim will be better understood, 
given the multitude of claims made in the market. Second, in a competitive market the extra 
costs need to be recuperated by adding a price premium. As such the consumer faces a trade-
off between credibility of the environmental claim and price premium.           
Price 
Environmental claim 
utility 
citizen 
consumer 
Desired level 
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In chapter 4 we explained why firms proactively engage in CSR and PIoS. A nice summary of 
how CSR, and by extension PIoS, can be used strategically is given by Husted and Allen 
(2007), as depicted in Table II.1. They compare traditional CSR with a traditional firm 
strategy and strategic CSR. Husted and Allen (2007) build further on the framework of Burke 
and Logsdon (1996), who identify five dimensions of corporate strategy which relate CSR to 
value creation by the firm11
 
. Similar to consumers’ perception of traditional food quality 
attributes versus environmental quality attributes, strategic CSR shares some common and 
opposing features to a traditional innovation strategy. For some retailers strategic CSR 
corresponds better with their traditional innovation strategy compared to others. The five 
dimensions are informative in this sense, as shown in Table II.1.   
Table II.1. A Comparison of Traditional CSR, Strategic CSR, and Traditional Strategy (Husted 
and Allen, 2007) 
Strategic 
dimensions 
Different Approaches to CSR and Strategy 
Traditional CSR Traditional strategy Strategic CSR 
Visibility Irrelevant: Doing good is its  
own reward - and is 
profitable in the long run 
Build customer awareness 
of product and brand 
Building customer and  
stakeholder awareness of  
product with CSR value added 
Appropriability Irrelevant: Doing good is its  
own reward - and profitable  
in the long run 
Manage supplier, 
customer, and competitor 
relations to capture value 
added for firm 
Manage stakeholder relations  
to capture value added for  
the firm 
Voluntarism Participate in social action  
beyond that demanded by 
the firm’s interests and the 
law 
Firm innovation based on  
ability to learn: non -  
deterministic behavior 
Participate in social action  
beyond that demanded by  
law 
Centrality Irrelevant: Doing good is 
tied to social need and not to 
core business mission 
Create value via product/  
service innovation 
Create value via product/  
service innovation linked to  
social issues 
Proactivity Anticipate changes in social  
Issues 
First-mover advantage Anticipate changes in social  
issues that present market 
opportunities 
 
With this is mind, we can now move to the first set of core research questions in this 
dissertation. Part 2 concentrates on the actual performance of PIoS compared to the spot 
market benchmark.  
 
As explained above, the consumers’ interest in PIoS depends, amongst other things, on the 
credibility of the environmental claim. Therefore, our first main research question RQ1 
investigates the ecological performance of PIoS. Chapter 5 addresses this question by 
focusing on the environmental effectiveness of PIoS. In Figure II.2 this corresponds to 
measuring the difference between EnvPPIoS and EnvPmarket
 
.  
Above, we also indicated that private actors engage in these systems because of strategic 
reasons. Central to the adoption of the PIoS strategy is the appropriability, i.e. the ability of 
the firms to extract economic benefits from the PIoS strategy. In a second main research 
question RQ2, addressed in chapter 6, we want to investigate the economic performance of 
farms participating in PIoS. As a measure for economic efficiency we introduce and adapt the 
sustainable value method. In Figure II.2 this corresponds to measuring the difference between 
point A and C for the PIoS versus point D and C for the conventional market.        
    
                                                          
11 For an explanation of these five dimensions, see chapter 4 Theoretical framework  
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   Figuur II.2. Research questions in Part 2 
Chapter 4 highlighted the retailer interest in these farm certification schemes. In the 
introduction we explained that PIoS often refer to inter firm arrangements, and more 
specifically to hybrids, which are organisational structures in which multiple actors cooperate 
and contract together, while still remaining competitors. Typical for the latter is the potential 
to exhibit market power and to influence the distribution of gains and costs. Therefore, in a 
third main research question RQ3 we want to investigate the (internal12
 
) social performance 
of these hybrid PIoS, by qualitatively explaining the effects of the evolution towards a single 
retail driven PIoS system. In Figure II.2 point J reflects equity among chain members as 
currently encountered in the market. Point I and H reflect positive, resp. negative deviations 
from this equity level within PIoS.    
                                                          
12 i.e. within the value chain 
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Chapter 5. Ecological performance - environmental effectiveness of 
PIoS 
 
 
This chapter is based upon: Mondelaers, K., Aertsens, J. and Van Huylenbroeck, G. (2009). A 
meta-analysis of the differences in environmental impacts between organic and conventional 
farming. British Food Journal, 111(10), 1098-1119. 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter 5, the environmental effectiveness of PIoS is compared with the market 
alternative. This chapter thus wants to test hypothesis 1 defined in the conceptual framework: 
 
Firms participating in Private Institutions of Sustainability contribute more to ecosystem 
sustainability than firms who do not 
 
The organic farming system is used as proxy for the PIoS, as the private actors involved in it 
voluntary follow more restrictive rules, while the conventional farming system represents the 
market regulated by public institutions. Environmental effectiveness13
  
 is restricted to the 
measurement of the physical impact of agricultural practices on the environment.  
The influence of conventional agricultural production on ecosystems has been widely 
documented (see for example the journal Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment). In 
Europe, especially since the 1950s, increase in use of external input factors, e.g. fertilizers and 
pesticides, has resulted into significant increases in productivity, but simultaneously in a 
higher environmental pressure.  Organic agriculture tries to respond to this challenge by 
limiting the use of external inputs and integrating several practices which are considered more 
environment friendly. The organic production system strives at a minimal disruption of the 
natural equilibrium, and at the same time, high-quality food production by banning residues 
harmful for human and animal health. Therefore the use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and 
genetically modified organisms are prohibited.  The organic principles of regulation also 
stimulate processes of recycling, closed loop systems, and the use of production techniques 
which allow domestic animals to exhibit species specific behavior. For countries in the EU the 
regulation is stipulated in EEC regulation 2092/91 and subsequent.  In recent years a lot of 
research has investigated whether the application of the organic farming principles indeed 
results in differences with respect to environmental pressure. In this article this literature is 
reviewed and statistically meta-analyzed for possible differences in the impact of organic and 
conventional farming on nitrate and phosphorous leaching, biodiversity, organic soil content 
and greenhouse gas emissions. The article is constructed as follows: first a theoretical 
framework is given, next the applied methodology is introduced, followed by the results and a 
discussion.   
 
                                                          
13 Environmental effectiveness is not synonymous to the degree of internalization of external costs, as the latter 
term introduces an economic notion. 
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5.2 Theoretical framework 
The relation between the agricultural system and the environment is complex. Different 
analytical frameworks have been constructed to simplify the description and measurement of  
this relation. The Principles > Criteria > Indicators (PCI) framework (Peeters et al., 2005) for 
example departs from hierarchical levels to facilitate the definition of indicators enabling the 
evaluation of the sustainability of agriculture. Another possibility is the transition framework 
(Meul et al., 2007), in which sustainable development is considered as a complex long term 
process of change, defining  different actions to translate theoretical concepts into practical 
measures. These actions are in succeeding order: vision development, strategy definition, 
action and progress monitoring. In this study, we opted for a third possibility, the Driver- 
State-Response (DSR) framework developed by the OECD (1993) for policy analysis of the 
state of the environment.  
 
The Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response (DPSIR) framework, applied by the European 
Environmental Agency (EEA, 1999), directly results from this framework. As explained by 
Platteau et al. (2005), the DPSIR-frame shows the cause-effect relation of agricultural activity 
on the environment. A certain societal activity, in our case agriculture, is the ‘driving force’ 
disturbing the environment. Because agriculture makes use of the environment, it exercises a 
certain ‘pressure’ on the environment. Due to this pressure, the environment is characterized 
by a certain ‘state’, which, on its turn can influence (‘impact’) the wellbeing of men, the 
ecosystem or the economy.  Finally, undesired levels of drivers, pressures, states or impacts 
might trigger a ‘response’ from the society.  At each of these levels, indicators are defined. 
The DSR and DPSIR framework have been applied a multifold times for the analysis of 
agricultural systems, for example by COM (2000), Verhaegen et al. (2003), Wustenberghs et 
al. (2005), Platteau et al. (2006) and Van Steertegem et al. (2006). Also for the specific 
comparison of organic and conventional farming it has been a well used guiding tool, with 
most important studies by the Bichel Committee (1998), Stolze et al. (1999) and Hansen et al. 
(2001).   
 
Table 5.1 below summarizes different indicators that can be linked to the DSR-framework.. 
As explained in chapter 1, the ecosystem is simultaneously a source of resources for 
agricultural production, a sink of wastes from agricultural production and a provider of 
essential services to agriculture. Table 3.1 also shows the environmental function that can be 
associated with each indicator. In the table it is also indicated what type of ecological cost is 
created due to the agricultural production. A distinction is made between scarce resource 
consumption, creation of positive and negative externalities.  
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Table 5.1. Indicators for the comparison of the organic and conventional system 
DSR Framework Indicator category Indicator Economic valuation Environment 
function 
DRIVING FORCE 
D1 Farm input and 
output 
Nutrient use Resource consumption Source/sink 
D2 Energy use  Resource consumption Source/sink 
D3  Water use  Resource consumption Source/sink 
D4  Pesticide use Resource consumption Source/sink 
D5  Land use Resource consumption Source/sink 
STATE 
Predecessing driver     
D1, D4, D5 Ecosystem Floral diversity Positive externalities Source/Service 
D1, D4, D5  Faunal diversity Positive externalities Source/Service 
D1, D4, D5  Habitat diversity Positive externalities Source/Service 
D1, D4, D5  Landscape Positive externalities Source/Service 
 Natural resources    
D1 – D5  Soil Land use efficiency Resource consumption Source/Sink 
D1  Organic matter Resource consumption Source/Sink 
D1, D4  Biological activity  Source/Sink 
D1, D2, D5  Structure  Source/Sink 
D1, D3, D5  Erosion Negative externalities Sink 
D1 Ground and surface 
water 
Nitrate leaching Negative externalities Sink 
D1 Phosphorous leaching Negative externalities Sink 
D4  Pesticides Negative externalities Sink 
D1 Climate and air NH Negative externalities 4 Sink 
D1, D2 CO Negative externalities 2 Sink/Source 
D1, D2   N2 Negative externalities O Sink 
D1, D2   CH Negative externalities 4 Sink 
D4  Pesticides Negative externalities Sink 
D2  Energy Non renewable energy    
D1  Phosphorous   
 Health and welfare    
D1 – D5  Animal health and 
welfare 
Husbandry Positive externalities Sink 
D1 – D5 Nutrition Positive externalities Sink 
D1 – D5 Health Positive externalities Sink 
D4 Quality of produced 
food 
Pesticide residues Negative externalities Sink 
D1 Nitrate Negative externalities Sink 
D1, D4 Mycotoxins Negative externalities Sink 
D1, D4 Heavy metals Negative externalities Sink 
D1 – D5   Desirable substances Positive externalities Sink 
RESPONSE   Positive externalities Sink 
 Consumer reaction, Agrofood chain, Farmer behavior, Government policies 
Sources: adapted from Hansen et al., 2001, Stolze et al., 1999, TAPAS, 2003, OECD, 1999, Bichel Committee, 
1998 
5.3 Methodology 
As indicated, this paper aims at synthesizing current scientific findings regarding the 
differences in environmental state of the organic and conventional farming system. A 
technique particularly suited to do so is meta-analysis, which is according to Hedges and 
Olkin (1985) the quantitative synthesis, analysis and summary of a collection of studies.  As 
Arnqvist and Wooster (1995) explain, meta-analysis refers to a specific set of statistical 
quantitative methods that are designed to compare and synthesize the results of multiple 
studies. In many ways, the procedures involved are analogous to those of standard statistical 
methods, but the units of analysis are the results of independent studies rather than the 
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independent responses of individual subjects. Current meta-analysis offers formal methods for 
most types of statistical inference from a set of studies. Meta-analysis allows the following 
questions to be addressed: (1) What is the combined magnitude of the effect under study? (2) 
Is this overall effect significantly different from zero? (3) Do any characteristics of the studies 
influence the magnitude of the observed effect? 
 
Arnqvist and Wooster (1995) outline the procedure to be followed. (1) all studies addressing a 
common question or hypothesis are collected. (2)  data or test statistics from these studies are 
transformed into a ‘common unit’, called ‘effect size’. Common measures of effect size are 
the standardized difference between means of experimental and control groups or the Pearson 
product moment correlation coefficient. (3) these effect sizes are combined into a common 
estimate of the magnitude of the effect. (4) based upon the variation in effect size results, the 
significance level of the overall effect size found in (3) is computed. (5) the statistical 
homogeneity of the effect sizes is calculated. This is conducted to determine whether all 
studies appear to share a common effect size or not. Finally, (6) the studies used in the meta-
analysis are grouped according to various characteristics of the single studies, and the effect 
sizes between these groups of studies are statistically compared and analysed. 
 
 In case it is impossible to estimate the standard deviations of the mean for organic and 
conventional agriculture, and thus impossible to conduct a meta-analysis, the Sign-test (Abdi, 
2007), an alternative (less powerful) method can be applied. This binomial test allows to test 
whether the frequency of studies with a higher (or lower) value for organic farming 
significantly differs from the frequency that is found by chance. 
 
Depending on the desired outcome, different output variables can be chosen in meta-analysis. 
In our case, the response ratio (R) , see formula (1), or the ratio between some measured 
quantity in the experimental (organic) and control (conventional) group,  is an interesting 
measure for the size of the ‘experimental’ effect (which is the difference between the organic 
and conventional data point). This R-value estimates the proportionate change that results 
from an experimental manipulation (Hedges et a., 1999), here the organic farming practices. 
Hedges et al. (1999) argue to use of the natural log (Li
C
E
X
XR =
), see also formula (1), because this 
value linearises the metric, treating deviations in the numerator the same as deviations in the 
denominator and resulting in a much more normal sampling distribution of the Log response 
ratio in small samples.  
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 is approximately normally 
distributed with mean the real log response ratio and variance given in formula 2.   
         (2) 
With  SD = standard deviation of the experimental resp. control group 
 n = number of observations in the experimental resp. control group 
 
According to Hedges et al. (1999), there are two components of variance in the sample log 
response ratios. One component is due to sampling variation in the estimate for each 
experiment, the other is due to between experiment variation. Between experimental variation 
quantifies the degree of true (nonsampling) variation in results across experiments.  The 
statistic Q can be used to test the statistical significance of this second variance component. 
When this between experiment variance component is significant, the metric denotes a 
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random effect (contrary to a fixed effect), meaning a combination of studies that differ from 
each other. In that case, caution with the interpretation of the study results is necessary, as 
well as a correction of the weighting factors (see Hardy and Thompson, 1998). 
 
For our study we based ourselves on literature references fulfilling the following three 
criteria: 1) peer reviewed; 2) studies from 1992 owards (year of EEC regulation 2092/91); and 
3) (semi) paired samples, this means that  organic and conventional data are compared within 
the same study.  Weighting of the references is based upon the possibility of deriving  the 
standard error (s.e.) from the references. Hereby, three cases are distinguished: 1) the s.e. is 
reported in the study, hence the data point can enter the meta-analysis; 2) the s.e. is not 
reported, but multiple data points are available in the study , enabling the calculation of a 
standard deviation based upon the available data which can be entered in the meta-analysis 
data base; and 3) no s.e. is reported, only a single observation is available. The latter data 
point has not been retained for the meta-analysis, but  is only used in the sign-test.  
 
5.4 Results and discussion 
To assess the difference in environmental pressure between organic and conventional 
agriculture we investigated the following indicators of the environmental state: land use 
efficiency, organic matter  content, nitrate and phosphorous leaching, biodiversity and 
greenhouse gas emissions. Where relevant and possible, the  differences found are linked to 
differences in driving forces (management practices) between organic and conventional 
farming.  
 
In table 5.2 the analysed references are organized per investigated indicator. Table 5.2 
furthermore contains studies that are of interest for the topic under study but did not meet our 
criteria for meta-analysis indicated above.   
 
5.4.1 Land use efficiency 
Land use is an important indicator for natural resource consumption.  The land use efficiency 
indicator is informative because land (especially in densely populated regions) is a scarce 
good and agriculture has to compete for it with other users (housing, industry, nature 
reserves). Therefore, policy makers can take differences in land use efficiency into account 
when they assess environmental impacts expressed per unit area.  Some ecologists do contest 
this approach as they have a more ecocentric rather than a anthropocentric view on ecological 
problems, partly ignoring that total consumption and production in the end determine the 
pressure on the ecosystem. For more local problems, such as , e.g. nitrate leaching, the 
leaching per unit area is most informative, however for more global problems, e.g. greenhouse 
gas emissions, the pollution per kg food product is more informative.  
 
Table 5.3 summarizes the results of the meta-analysis for land use efficiency. Following 
references were retained: Korsaeth and Eltun (2000), Kirchmann and Bergstrom (2001), 
Knudsen et al. (2006), Hansen et al. (2000), Sileika end Guzys (2003), Haas (2002), 
Torstensson et al. (2006), Taube et al. (2005), Mader et al. (2002), Poudel et al. (2002) and 
Eltun (1995). Based upon the general results of 10 studies of organic farming in developed 
countries, a random effect ratio of 0,83 is found, or in other words a land use efficiency of 
83% for organic farming compared with conventional farming. 
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Table 5.2. References used in the meta-analysis. First screening indicates all references that are 
of interest for the topic. References used in the meta-analysis are listed afterwards 
Nitrate leaching 
First screening Biro et al. (2005), Condron et al. (2000), De Neve et al. (2003), Eltun (1995), Haas et al. 
(2002), Hansen et al. (2000), Kirchmann and Bergstrom (2001), Knudsen et al. (2006), 
Korsaeth and Eltun (2000), Kristensen et al. (1994), Ostergaard et al. (1995), Pacini et al. 
(2003), Pimentel et al. (2005), Sileika and Guzys (2003), Stopes et al. (2002), Syvasalo et 
al. (2006), Torstensson et al. (2006), Ulen (1999) 
Kg/ha Eltun (1995), Condron et al. (2000), De Neve et al. (2003), Biro et al. (2005), Syvasalo et 
al. (2006), Sileika and Guzys (2003), Haas (2002), Torstensson et al. (2006), Korsaeth 
and Eltun (2000), Hansen et al. (2000), Stopes et al. (2002), Knudsen et al. (2006), 
Pimentel et al. (2005), Pacini et al. (2003) 
Comparison per ha 
and per kg 
De Neve et al. (2003),  Sileika and Guzys (2003), Haas (2002), Torstensson et al. (2006), 
Korsaeth and Eltun (2000), Hansen et al. (2000) 
Simulation Condron et al. (2000), De Neve et al. (2003), Knudsen et al. (2006), Hansen et al. (2000) 
Lysimeters / 
drainage pipes 
Eltun (1995), Biro et al. (2005), Syvasalo et al. (2006), Sileika and Guzys (2003), Haas 
(2002), Torstensson et al. (2006), Korsaeth and Eltun (2000), Stopes et al. (2002) 
Arable farming Eltun (1995), Biro et al. (2005), Sileika and Guzys (2003),  Torstensson et al. (2006), 
Hansen et al. (2000),  Knudsen et al. (2006), Haas (2002) 
Mixed farming Eltun (1995),  De Neve et al. (2003), Syvasalo et al. (2006),  Hansen et al. (2000), Stopes 
et al. (2002), Condron et al. (2000) 
Land use 
First screening Eltun (1995), Haas et al. (2002), Hansen et al. (2000), Kirchmann and Bergstrom (2001), 
Knudsen et al. (2006), Korsaeth and Eltun (2000), Mader et al. (2002), Poudel et al. 
(2002), Sileika and Guzys (2003), Taube et al. (2005), Tostensson et al. (2006) 
Full rotation Korsaeth and Eltun (2000), Kirchmann and Bergstrom (2001), Eltun (1995), Sileika and 
Guzys (2003) 
Cereals Knudsen et al. (2006), Hansen et al. (2000),  Torstensson et al. (2006),  Mader et al. 
(2002), Poudel et al. (2002) 
Organic matter  
First screening Bakken et al. (2006), Clark et al. (1998), Flieβbach et al. (2007), Foereid et al. (2004), 
Girvan et al. (2003), Gosling and Shepherd (2005), Nguyen et al. (1995), Pulleman et al. 
(2003), Herencia et al. (2008), Stalenga and Kawalec (2008), Stolze et al. (2000)  
In meta-analysis Gosling and Shepherd (2005), Nguyen et al. (1995), Girvan et al. (2003), Fliebach et al. 
(2007), Stolze et al. (2000), Clark et al. (1998), Pulleman et al. (2003) 
Phosphorous leaching 
First screening WUR (2007a, 2007b),  Torstensson et al. (2006), Ekholm et al. (2005), Nguyen et al. 
(1995), Marinari et al. (2006), Clark et al. (1998), Bengtsson et al. (2003), Haas et al. 
(2001), Langmeier (2002), Condron et al. (2000), Fagerberg et al. (1996), Gosling and 
Shepherd (2005), Gustafson et al. (2003), Liebig and Doran (1999), Loes and Ogaard 
(2001), Oberson et al (1993), Reganold et al. (1993), Sileika and Guzys (2003), 
Steinshamn et al. (2004), van Diepeningen et al. (2006), Watson et al. (2002)  
P in WUR (2007a, 2007b),  Torstensson et al. (2006), Ekholm et al. (2005), Nguyen et al. 
(1995), Marinari et al. (2006), Clark et al. (1998), Bengtsson et al. (2003), Haas et al. 
(2001), Langmeier (2002) 
P out WUR (2007a, 2007b),  Torstensson et al. (2006), Ekholm et al. (2005), Nguyen et al. 
(1995), Marinari et al. (2006), Clark et al. (1998), Bengtsson et al. (2003), Haas et al. 
(2001), Langmeier (2002) 
P balance WUR (2007a, 2007b),  Torstensson et al. (2006), Ekholm et al. (2005), Nguyen et al. 
(1995), Marinari et al. (2006), Clark et al. (1998), Bengtsson et al. (2003), Haas et al. 
(2001), Langmeier (2002) 
Greenhouse gases 
First screening Casey and Holden (2006), Dalgaard et al. (2006), de Boer (2003), Flessa et al. (2002), 
Haas et al. (2001), Kaltsas et al. (2007), Meisterling et al. (2009), Olesen et al. (2006), 
Petersen et al. (2006), Syvasalo et al. (2006), Stalenga and Kawalec (2008), Woor et al. 
(2006) 
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Per hectare Haas et al. (2001), Dalgaard et al. (2006), Olesen et al. (2006), Casey and Holden (2006), 
Kaltsas et al. (2007) 
Per Life Weight Dalgaard et al. (2006), Olesen et al. (2006), Petersen et al. (2006), Syvasalo et al. (2006) 
 
For cereal crops, the random effect indicates a land use efficiency of 81% for organic farming 
compared to conventional. When only those studies are combined that report data for a full 
rotation, organic land use efficiency is approximately 20% lower than conventional. This 
latter case is a fixed effect, thus the heterogeneity in the set of studies is no longer significant. 
 
Table 5.3. Land use efficiency differences between organic and conventional farming expressed 
as Response ratio (i.e. ratio of organic and conventional output per hectare)   
 Land use 
efficiency 
N n No 
weighting 
Fixed 
effect 
Q  Random 
effect 
CI 
All sources 10 70 0,814 0,841 27,1* (24,99) 0,827 0,76 – 0,90 
Per rotation 4 47 0,802 0,806 8,6 (12,59) / 0,69 – 0,89 
Cereal crops 5 64 0,777 0,828 11,4* (11,07) 0,809 0,70 – 0,93 
( ) = χ²df-1
* Between study variability significant 
, α= 0,05; N=number of studies; n=number of paired observations; CI = confidence interval 
 
A recent extensive American meta-analysis by Badgley et al. (2007) collected return ratios 
from 138 different sources. They report an average organic / conventional yield ratio of 91% 
for developed countries for all crops, which is thus higher than our estimate. They 
furthermore calculated an average organic / subsistence farming ratio of 174% for developing 
countries. Based upon their calculations, organic farming would be able to  feed the world 
without bringing extra farmland into use. Rosegrant et al. (2006) tested different conversion 
scenarios on world scale level. In case of converting 50% of the European and North 
American agriculture to certified high input organic agriculture, world production would 
decrease and prices increase (with approximately 10%) according to their calculations, which 
may eventually result in a slight increase in malnourished children in developing countries 
(0,3 to 0,7%). When converting half of the production in sub-Saharan Africa to non certified 
low input organic farming world production would slightly increase (due to the current large 
share of subsistence farming) and world prices hardly decrease (1 to 2%, given the limited 
share of Africa in world market production). Because Africa’s world market dependency 
decreases in this scenario, the number of malnourished children will decrease (with 0,8 to 
1%). Of course such scenarios are highly dependent on the assumptions behind it such as e.g. 
comparing an semi optimised system with a non-optimised system.   
 
5.4.2 Organic matter content in the soil 
A second environmental state indicator related to resource use is organic matter depletion in 
the soil. In the European Thematic Strategy for the protection of the soil, soil organic matter 
content is defined as the key indicator for soil quality because an optimal level of organic 
matter signifies a good agricultural and environmental soil condition, characterized by 
reduced erosion, high buffering and filtering capacity and a rich habitat for living organisms 
(COM, 2002). Stoate et al. (2001) warn for reduced water retention in dry zones and reduced 
drainage in wet zones when there is a loss of organic matter. Mullier et al. (2006) for example 
report for Belgium that in the last 20 years the number of parcels with organic matter content 
below the optimal zone has increased significantly (from 23 to 50% of the arable land, Mulier 
et al., 2006). Organic matter content is also important for the CO2
 
 sequestration (Platteau et 
al., 2005), given that on average 50 to 58% of organic matter is carbon. 
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A number of studies don’t find convincing evidence for a difference in organic matter content 
between organic and conventional parcels (Nguyen et al., 1995 for the arable phase; Friedel, 
2000; Girvan et al., 2003; Gosling and Shepherd, 2002 and 2005; Bakken et al., 2006 and 
Cuvardic et al., 2006). A series of other studies (Condron et al., 2000; Fliessbach and Mäder, 
2000; Fliessbach et al., in press; Mäder et al., 2002; Foereid and Hogh-Jensen, 2004; Hansen 
et al., 2001; Stolze et al., 2000; Marriott and Wander, 2006; Shepherd et al., 2002; 
Armstrong-Brown et al., 1995; Clark et al., 1998; Raupp et al., 1995; Loes and Ogaard, 1997, 
Liebig and Doran, 1999, Wander et al. 1994, Stalenga and Kawalec, 2008, Herencia et al., 
2008 and Pulleman et al., 2003 ) report a difference in favour of the organic management 
practices. A number of these studies can usefully be combined into a meta-analysis (Table 
5.4). Main reasons for non compliance of a number of studies were the absence of a standard 
deviation, no peer review, no paired comparison, organic matter content monitored during 
conversion, study dating before 1992 or use of a different technique. Given that organic 
matter content is mainly expressed as a percentage, the fixed effect value reported in table 3 
indicates that the organic matter content on organically managed fields on average exceeds 
the conventional value with 6,4 percent points.  As the 95%- confidence interval shows (the 
ratio is not encompassing 1), organic matter content on organic plots is significantly higher 
than on conventional plots. When also accounting for the studies of Pulleman et al. (2003) and 
Herencia et al. (2008), in which very high and significant differences in organic matter are 
reported, a random effect of 1,12 is found, with CI between 1,052 and 1,189. Herencia et al. 
(2008) report very low organic matter contents prior to the experiment, which might explain 
the drastic changes in organic matter afterwards.  
 
Table 5.4. Differences in organic matter content between organic and conventional farming 
expressed as Response ratio (i.e. ratio of organic and conventional organic matter content)   
 Organic matter 
content 
N n No 
weighting 
Fixed 
effect 
Q  Random 
effect 
CI 
Organic (%) / 
Conventional (%) 
7 77 1,058 1,064 15,77 (16,9) / 1,046  – 
1,081 
Organic (%) / 
Conventional (%) 
9 103 1,128 1,091 152,71 (19,7) 1,118 1,052  – 
1,189 
( ) = χ²df-1
* Between study variability not significant 
, α= 0,05; N=number of studies; n=number of paired observations; CI = confidence interval 
 
As main reasons (drivers) for the decrease in organic matter content in conventional 
agriculture, Platteau et al. (2005) and Mulier et al. (2006) refer to: the increase of the plough 
depth; the lower input of stable organic matter by means of organic manure and soil 
improvers; the decrease of the practice incorporating crop residues during ploughing; the 
increase of conversion of grassland into arable land; more stringent manure application rules 
and even a higher mineralization rate due to climate change.  Hodges (1991, in Shepherd et 
al., 2002) identifies following practices that may explain the better performance of organic 
farms: mixed farming systems and crop rotation; recycling of manure; use of green manure 
and the addition of organic manure. Hansen et al. (2001) attribute the better score of organic 
farming to the more generalised use of capture crops, the recycling of crop residues, the use of 
organic instead of synthetic fertilizers and relatively more permanent pastures.  
 
5.4.3 Nitrate leaching 
Nitrate leaching is one of the main negative externalities of intensive agricultural production. 
There seems a positive correlation between the increase in productivity and the increase in 
nitrate leaching (Kirchmann and Bergstrom, 2001). The EU introduced regulation which aims 
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to protect water bodies against pollution induced by nitrates from agricultural sources. Even 
today, a considerable part of  European regions have difficulties to comply. Platteau et al. 
(2005) report that  nitrate concentrations in surface water in Flemish agricultural zones exceed 
in 40% of the measurement points the limit of 50 mg NO3-
 
/l water imposed by Europe 
(Nitrate Directive, EC 1991 and Drinking Water Directive, EC 1980). Several authors have 
studied potential nitrate leaching differences between organic and conventional farming. 
Table 3 summarizes the response ratios derived from these studies. When taking all studies 
referred to into account (see Annex 1), an average random effects log response ratio of -0,387 
(or a response ratio of 0,677) is found. The leaching is significantly lower for organic 
farming, which is indicated by the confidence interval (ratio not containing 1). The high level 
of heterogeneity between studies (hence the random effect) probably originates from 
differences in soil types (from sand to clay), region (12 different countries), farming type, 
research method and the time of measurement. These results should therefore be interpreted 
with caution. When the studies are grouped based upon farming type or research method, the 
heterogeneity remains, except for the 4 simulation studies (see Table 5.5 also).  
Table 5.5. Differences in nitrate leaching between organic and conventional farming expressed 
as Response ratio (i.e. ratio of organic and conventional nitrate leaching)   
 Nitrate leaching N n No 
weighting 
Fixed 
effect 
Q  Random 
effect 
CI 
General (kg/ha)  14 116 0.703 0.745 76,7* (36,6) 0,679 0,53 – 0,87 
Arable (kg/ha) 7 76 0,618 0,839 24,1* (16,9) 0,652 0,46 – 0,92 
Mixed (kg/ha) 6 42 0,795 0,816 33,3* (18,3) 0,695 0,45 – 1,08 
Field measure (kg/ha)  8 82 0,740 0,717 53,1* (27,6) 0,690 0,50 – 0,96 
Simulation (kg/ha) 4 28 0,576 0,850 9,00 (12,6) / 0,50 – 1,45 
( ) = χ²df-1
Field measure = drainage pipes/porous cups/lysimeters 
, α= 0,05; N=number of studies; n=number of paired observations; CI = confidence interval 
* Between study variability significant 
The calculations for mixed farming, with animal and plant production on the same farm, show 
a wide confidence interval encompassing 1, thus for this farm type we cannot conclude that 
organic farming performs significantly better. The same conclusion holds for the simulation 
studies, which is interesting given that the calculations show a fixed homogeneous effect. 
Two of the four simulation studies are conducted by the same research group, which might 
explain the homogeneity. Three studies expressing nitrate leaching in mg/l also find evidence 
in favor of organic farming (Korsaeth et al., 2000; Haas et al., 2001 and Torstensson et al., 
2006). 
 
Besides studying the response ratio, which is a relative measure, it is interesting to look at the 
absolute value of leaching in both systems and compare it with the EC’s target value of 50 mg 
NO3-/l. Based on 12 studies the weighted average leaching of nitrate is 8,93 kg/ha for organic 
farming and 20,85 kg/ha for conventional farming. Whether this results in a nitrate 
concentration in surface waters above the EC threshold is amongst others function of soil 
type, precipitation and temperature (Wachendorf et al., 2004). For the Netherlands and 
Flanders for example, which are two regions with high levels of nitrate leaching, the EC 
threshold limit is not exceeded when leaching is lower than 34 kg NO3-N ha-1 year-1
 
 (Hack-
ten Broeke, 2000).  Nitrate is a typical local environmental problem, thus measurement in kg 
per hectare at farm level or mg/l in the river system is appropriate.  
In this section’s introduction we mentioned the possible link between productivity increase 
and nitrate leaching. Combining the 6 different studies that also report yields, we again find a 
significantly smaller nitrate leaching per hectare for organic farming (see Table 5.6). 
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However, expressed per kg product, the average fixed effect is nearly equal and from the 
confidence interval we cannot conclude that there is a significant difference. It means that on 
the basis of this limited set of studies we may conclude that both organic and conventional 
systems seem to be equally efficient in the creation of agricultural product per unit of nitrate 
leaching.    
The main drivers behind the higher nitrate leaching in conventional farming are the larger 
amounts of fertilizer application, lower use of green cover crops, lower C to N ratio and a 
higher stocking density per ha.     
 
Table 5.6. Ratio of organic and conventional nitrate leaching per hectare and per kg product   
 Nitrate leaching N n No 
weighting 
Fixed 
effect 
Q  Random 
effect 
CI 
General (kg/ha)  6 59 0,612 0,670 9,62 (15,50) / 0,51 – 0,88 
General (kg/kg product) 6 59 0,950 0,953 12,89 (15,50) / 0,56 – 1,62 
( ) = χ²df-1
Between study variability not significant 
, α= 0,05; N=number of studies; n=number of paired observations; CI = confidence interval 
 
5.4.4 Phosphorous leaching 
Due to the low mobility of phosphorous (P) in the soil, in most circumstances, the important 
sources of P loss are erosion and drainage (Sharpley and Menzel, 1987, Finck, 1992, Edwards 
and Withers, 1998). However, in some regions with high historical levels of P, sandy soils and 
a flat topography, P leaching might also be an important source of loss (Van de Bossche et al., 
2005). Excess levels of soil P are linked with eutrophication of ground and surface waters.  
We could only find a limited number of studies (Sileika and Guzys, 2003; Torstensson et al., 
2006 and Ekholm et al., 2005) that directly report differences in P leaching (in kg/ha) between 
organic and conventional farming. The first two studies are long term field trials with 
drainage pipes, the latter a simulation study. The three studies are inconclusive whether 
organic or conventional farming performs better (random effects and wide confidence interval 
containing the value 1). The reported levels of leaching are also rather small, thus the relative 
measure is in this case disinformative. Torstensson et al. (2006) and Sileika and Guzys (2003) 
find a difference of 0,03kg/ha and 0,04 kg/ha respectively, in favor of conventional farming.  
Edwards & Withers (1998) concluded that the loss of P from agricultural land is controlled by 
factors that are independent of the annual P surplus. Both Clark et al. (1998) and Djodjic et al. 
(2005) found a positive correlation between P balance and P leaching. Loes and Ogaard 
(2001) and Hansen et al. (2001) used the P balance as an indicator for P availability. Van de 
Bossche et al. (2005) used available P as a proxy for P leaching, by calculating the soil P 
saturation (Psat), i.e. the ratio between the amount of P in the soil and the P absorption 
capacity of the soil. According to VLM (1997), regions with P leaching risk have a P 
saturation between 30 to 40%, while P saturated soils have a value above 40%. Van de 
Bossche et al. (2005) found a Psat of 37% for organic parcels, which was slightly below the 
average for the East-Flemish region where the study was conducted (Psat of 39%). The study 
contained a high share of organic horticulture sites, which receive an above average P input 
and also, some farms only recently converted to organic farming.  The study of Goulding et 
al. (2000) reports an Olsen P index of 0 or 1, which is a P deficit for most crops, for 39% of 
organically managed soils versus 15% for conventionally managed soils in the UK. Haraldsen 
et al. (2000, Norway) also noticed a decline in available P after conversion to organic 
farming. Similarly, Oberson et al. (1993) showed significantly  lower levels of available P in 
organic compared to conventional farming systems. Loes and Ogaard (2001) came to the 
same conclusion during a long term field trial on 5 organic farms. They also showed that the P 
loss in the top layer could be approximated by use of P balances.     
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Given the restricted number of studies directly measuring P leaching, we will also use the P 
balance (i.e. P output – P input)  as a proxy. Because this balance might be negative, the log 
response ratio cannot be calculated. We will therefore use the Hedge’s g, which is the 
weighted mean of the standardized difference between the control and experimental group 
(see Hedges and Olsin, 1985 or Van Zandt, 1998). Both for the P input and the P balance, the 
measure seems to indicate a lower measure for organic farms, but the confidence intervals are 
too wide to conclude for a significant difference. The fixed effect for P output indicates a 
significantly smaller P output for organic farms.   
   
Table 5.7. Ratio of organic and conventional phosphorous input and output per hectare and 
Hedge’s g for the P balance 
 Phosphorous leaching N n No 
weighting 
Fixed 
effect 
Q  Random 
effect 
CI 
P input (response ratio)  12 66 0,882 0,980 79,6* (7,81) 0,704 0,46 – 1,07 
P output (response ratio) 9 62 0,773 0,805 13,7 (15,50) / 0,70 – 0,92 
P balance (Hedge’s g) 8 78 / -2,311 1,0 (18,30) / -4,93 – 0,30 
( ) = χ²df-1
* Between study variability significant 
, α= 0,05; N=number of studies; n=number of paired observations; CI = confidence interval 
 
The different sources of evidence reported here, although inconclusive, seem to indicate a 
tendency towards lower P leaching levels on organic farms. The most important driver is the 
lower fertilizer application in organic farming.   
 
5.4.5 Greenhouse gas emission 
The emission of greenhouse gases during production is another negative externality, described 
into detail in recent documents of IPCC (2007). The Stern Review (2006) adds a more 
economic focus to the discussion. The three most important greenhouse gases are carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Each of these gases contributes 
differently to climate change (1 ton N2O = 310 ton CO2–equivalents and 1 ton CH4 = 21 ton 
CO2–equivalents). According to IPCC (2007), agriculture’s share in greenhouse gas 
emissions is approximately 13,5%.  These emissions mainly originate from methane 
fermentation during animal digestion and slurry depots; from nitrous oxide production during 
biological processes in the soil; from the combustion of fossil fuels (CO2 and N2O emission) 
and CO2
 
 emission due to reduction of the soil organic matter content (see previous 
paragraph).  
Dalgaard et al. (2001, Denmark) concluded that conventional farming realizes the highest 
energy production, while organic farming has the highest energy efficiency. In another 
publication (Dalgaard et al., 2006) they found a higher emission per unit area for conventional 
farming. Wood et al. (2006, Australia) concluded based upon a Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) 
that direct energy use, energy related emissions and greenhouse gas emissions are higher for 
the organic sample, but indirect contributions are much lower, resulting in an overall 
substantially higher impact of conventional farming. Leifeld and Fuhrer (2005, Switzerland) 
link the decrease of agricultural emissions in Switzerland to the increased conversion towards 
integrated and organic farming. The results of Flessa et al. (2002) indicate that conversion to 
organic farming reduces the emission per hectare, and a status quo for the emissions per unit 
product. Olesen et al. (2006) found a lower emission per hectare for organic farms, using a 
simulation model.  Casey and Holden (2006, Ireland) concluded based upon their LCA of 
conventional and organic farms that the evolution towards more extensive systems results into 
Chapter 5 Ecological performance - environmental effectiveness  of PIoS Part 2 
102 
 
lower emissions per unit product and simultaneously decreases production. Lotter (2003, 
USA) in his review of organic agriculture in the USA poses that greenhouse gas emissions are 
lower in organic farming.  Syvasalo et al. (2006), who compared N2O and CH4 emissions per 
hectare on organically and conventionally managed parcels, could not find a difference 
between both systems. De Boer (2003) compared the emission per liter milk calculated in 
different LCA studies with own data, and warned for the difficulty to compare LCA’s given 
the lack of international standardization. He furthermore remarks that, due to the higher 
methane production per liter in organic farming, a reduction of the emission compared to 
conventional farming can only be reached by drastically decreasing carbon dioxide and 
nitrous oxide emissions. Haas et al. (2001, Germany) found in their LCA per hectare a higher 
greenhouse gas emission potential for conventional farming, while expressed per ton milk 
emissions were equal. In the LCA of Cederberg and Mattson (2000, Sweden) emissions per 
liter were higher in the conventional system. In a recent Dutch report (Bos et al., 2007) 
greenhouse gas emissions were simulated with model farms. For dairy farms, they found a 
lower emission for organic farming both per hectare and per liter milk. For arable farming, 
with soil type being determinative, emissions are lower per unit area but higher per unit 
product. Gomiero et al. (2008) also focus on the issue of CO2-emissions in their comparison 
of organic and conventional farming. As they mainly cite Stölze et al., 2000, they report 
higher CO2-emissions in conventional farming when expressed per hectare, while per 
production unit there is a mixed effect. Stalenga and Kawalec (2008) compared the 
greenhouse gases emission (N2O and CH4) per hectare of 20 organic farms in a Polish region 
with the average conventional emission for that region. They found lower CH4 emissions 
(14% lower) and much lower N2
 
O emissions (only one third of conventional emissions). 
Finally, Meisterling et al. (2009) calculated the Global Warming Potential (GWP) expressed 
as g CO2-equivalents per kg of bread for a conventional and an organic product life cycle. In 
their streamlined LCA, the GWP impact of producing 0,67 kg of conventional wheat flour 
(for a 1 kg bread loaf), not including product transport, is 190 g CO2-eq, while the GWP of 
producing the wheat organically is 160 g CO2-eq.    
Summarizing, over the different studies, organic farming seems to score equal or better when 
emissions are expressed per unit area. Per unit product no general direction is noticeable. In 
Table 5.8, the results of a limited meta-analysis are reported, as many studies only report 
single values and no standard deviation. These results indicate a better score for organic 
farming when expressed per unit area, and no difference when an output measure is used, 
which supports the qualitative conclusions.   
 
Table 5.8. Ratio of organic and conventional greenhouse gas emission per hectare and per unit 
product 
 Response ratio  N n No 
weighting 
Fixed 
effect 
Q  Random 
effect 
CI 
Greenhouse gas (per ha) 5 112 0,608 0,572 42,5* (21.03) 0,571 0,47 – 0,69 
Greenhouse gas (per kg) 2 53 0,899 0,930 3,6 (16,9) / 0,76 – 1,13 
Methane (per ha) 3 21 0,600 0,662 0,3 (5,99) / 0,45 – 0,97 
Nitrous oxide (per ha) 4 31 0,860 0,624 18,5* (14,07) 0,610 0,48 – 0,78 
( ) = χ²df-1
* Between study variability significant 
, α= 0,05; N=number of studies; n=number of paired observations; CI = confidence interval 
 
What drives the different scores between both farming systems? Organic animal farming has a 
lower animal stocking rate per hectare, but a higher use of roughage feed per cow, which will 
influence differences in methane emission. The higher concentrate use in conventional 
farming increases the carbon dioxide emission. Given the prohibition of chemical fertilizers 
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and pesticides in organic farming, greenhouse gases generated during production of these 
inputs remain absent. More fuel combustion during mechanical weeding counterweights this 
effect. In the study of Casey and Holden (2006) regression analysis was used to  show the 
relation between driving factors and emission. They showed a positive correlation between 
total greenhouse gas emissions per unit area and the feed concentrate dose, the stocking rate 
and the amount of synthetic fertilizers applied.  The latter two also increase the emission per 
unit life weight. They furthermore showed a very clear correlation between the emission per 
hectare per year and the production (number of kg produced per hectare per year).  
  
5.4.6 Biodiversity 
For a definition of biodiversity we refer to UN (1992). More biodiversity positively influences 
the natural buffering function of agrarian areas, which involves recycling of nutrients, control 
of local micro climate, regulation of local hydrological processes, regulation of undesired 
organisms, detoxification of noxious chemicals and genetic material for crop improvement 
(Harlan, 1975 and Altieri, 1994). When studying agriculture and biodiversity it is important to 
distinguish between agro-biodiversity (breeds used by the farmers) and natural biodiversity 
(wild life) still present up and around the fields. Both aspects are interesting.  
 
Concerning agro-biodiversity a report from FAO (1998) mentions that centuries of human and 
natural selection have resulted in thousands of genetically diverse breeds within the major 
livestock species. These breeds are carefully selected to fit a wide range of environmental 
conditions, tasks and human needs and forms a rich genetic legacy. Domestic animal 
diversity, represented by this wide range of breeds, is essential to sustain and enhance the 
productivity of agriculture. No major livestock or poultry species is in danger of extinction, 
but numerous breeds within those species are declining in population and size, and many have 
already disappeared. In Europe, half of all breeds of domestic animals that existed 100 years 
ago have become extinct, and 43 percent of the remaining breeds are endangered (FAO, 
1992). The 1995 edition of FAO's "World Watch List for Domestic Animal Diversity" 
includes data on 3,882 breeds for 28 domestic species. It concludes that globally 30% of 
breeds are classified as endangered and critical. Due to the specific characteristics of the 
organic farming system, other breeds may yield better results and thus organic farming may 
contribute to the preservation of a wider range of breeds. When we take Belgium as an 
example, in conventional cattle breeding, the Belgian white blue has become more popular 
(33% in 1985 versus 51% in 2000, NIS), while in organic agriculture the main breeds are 
Limousin (70%) and Blonde d’Acquitaine (25%), due to the ban on systematic Caesareans. 
The Belgian Red, on the FAO list of threatened bovine species (FAO, 2000) has in the mean 
time declined from 6% in 1985 to 1% in 2000 (TAPAS, 2002). A similar reasoning can be 
made for plant species used in the agricultural system.  
   
Concerning the impact of agriculture on the natural biodiversity we give an example from 
Flanders (Belgium) (Nara, 2005; Platteau et al., 2005 and Dumortier et al., 2003). In the past 
12 years , 10 out of 20 bird species specific for the agricultural biotope have disappeared or 
seriously declined, while only 6 made progress. Since 1900, the number of butterfly species 
has decreased with 25%, while a further 50% is threatened. Only a very small share of wild 
plants bound to agricultural land, are found on intensively managed parcels, and none of these 
species is threatened.   
 
The last few years, four major reviews have focused on the question whether there is a 
difference in biodiversity contribution between organic and conventional farming. In the 
review of Soil Association (2000), 9 studies were intensively revised and 14 were 
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summarized. Based upon these, the authors concluded a higher abundance of wild and rare 
plants, more arthropods, harmless butterflies and spiders and more birds up and around the 
field. With respect to species richness, they found more wild and rare plant species and more 
spider species. The most high profile review on this topic is from Hole et al. (2005). They 
screened 76 studies and report a clear positive effect of the organic management practices on 
biodiversity. Over the different taxons, they found 66 cases where organic agriculture had a 
positive effect, against 8 with a negative and 25 with a mixed or no effect.  The review of 
Stockdale et al. (2006) focuses on which management practices influence which species.  
A full meta-analysis is conducted by Bengtsson et al. (2005). They calculated the Hedge’s g 
and response ratio for 63 paired studies in total. Their main conclusions are generally a 
positive effect of organic farming on species richness, with on average 30% more species 
compared to conventional fields,  and a positive effect on abundance within species (on 
average 50% higher). They clearly warn for significant heterogeneity between studies, with 
for example 16% of the studies indicating a negative effect of organic farming on species 
richness. 
 
Hole et al. (2005) extensively described the possible influence of management practices 
(drivers) on biodiversity. They identify three broad practices that are strongly associated with 
organic farming as being of particular benefit to farmland biodiversity in general: (1) 
Prohibition/reduced use of chemical pesticides and inorganic fertilizers; (2)  sympathetic 
management of non-crop habitats and field margins; and (3) preservation of mixed farming. 
Some recent studies add to the understanding of potential differences in biodiversity impact. 
Belfrage et al. (2006) also find higher numbers of both bird diversity and bird abundance on 
the organic farms than on the conventional farms. They however remark that the largest 
difference in bird abundance and diversity was found when comparing small and large farms, 
with high values correlated to small farms. Clough et al. (2007) and Gabriel and Tscharntke 
(2007) show that the type of management (organic or conventional) might cause considerable 
shifts in species community structure. 
 
5.5 Environmental sustainability of other certification schemes 
To allow us to generalize our findings over other PIoS, we also report here the assessment of 
the environmental sustainability of other farm certification initiatives in the Belgian fresh 
fruit and vegetable sector. The assessment is based on an in-depth analysis of the guidelines 
prescribed by different certification schemes. The research was performed by the 
Departement of Phytopharmacy, University of Ghent, in close cooperation with the author. 
The developed method for environmental sustainability analysis is based on an approach 
already applied in France (Girardin and Sardet, 2002). It is a multicriteria (MC) procedure in 
which experts score each of the relevant certification book rules (as currently encountered in 
the market place) for their marginal contribution to different environmental sustainability 
pillars. 
 
5.5.1 Applied methodology 
The methodology consists of three phases (Figure 5.1). In a first step the different aspects of 
environmental sustainability are defined. Environmental as well as human health aspects were 
incorporated. Following aspects were taken into consideration: (1) air quality, (2) climate 
conservation, (3) biodiversity and landscape, (4) water quality, (5) soil fertility, (6) pest 
pressure reduction, (7) scarce resource use, (8) waste reduction and management, (9) noise 
quantity reduction, (10) food safety and (11) worker safety. This list of selected sustainability 
items is not exhaustive, but based on an extensive literature review of the available scientific 
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literature (Doom, R., 2001; Girardin and Sardet, 2002; Melo and Wolf, 2005; de Snoo and 
van de Ven, 1999). For each of these aspects a checklist was compiled. All the certification 
book rules that were thought to have an impact on the sustainability aspect under study were 
taken up in the list.  
 
In a second phase these checklists were submitted to experts in the different disciplines of 
environmental sustainability. The experts were asked to rank the prescription rules in 
descending order of importance, starting with the rule that has the lowest positive impact on 
the sustainability item under study. On the basis of the rankings made by the experts, weights 
could be attributed to all of the rules mentioned in the checklists by using the revised Simos 
methodology (SRF) (Simos, 1990a, 1990b; Figueira and Roy, 2002).  
 
In a third phase the weights of the rules were multiplied with a factor which reflects the 
mandatory level of the rule. The mandatory level of a particular rule is determined by a code 
that is attributed to each rule by most certification schemes. Three codes are distinguished. 
First of all there are ‘Major Musts’. These criteria have to be followed at all times. Secondly, 
criteria can be classified as ‘Minor Musts’. This implies that a certain percentage of all those 
criteria have to be followed by the farmers. This percentage differs according to the 
certification scheme studied. Finally there are the ‘Recommendations’, which are not 
obligatory. Subsequently a total score for each environmental sustainability item was 
calculated by adding the individual criterion scores. In a last step the total environmental 
sustainability scores were determined by multiplying the theme-sustainability scores with 
weights attributed by experts corresponding to the respective themes of environmental 
sustainability (also determined by means of the revised Simos procedure). On the basis of the 
calculated environmental sustainability scores for the specific certification books, one can 
pass judgements on the contribution of a particular certification book to environmental 
sustainability and its pillars. Next, the ecological sustainability of the selected labels and 
certification schemes is compared and assessed by means of determining the distance to a so 
called ideal point and anti-ideal point. The ideal point is represented by an ideal certification 
book composed of the best rules of the specifications of the selected standards. This ideal 
point represents the solution where all objectives achieve their optimum value and implicates 
a score of 100 for each environmental sustainability aspect. The label or certification scheme 
contributing the most to environmental sustainability has the lowest distance to the ideal 
point. On the other hand, the anit-ideal point has a score of zero and corresponds to following 
the legal requirements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Overview of the technical-scientific analysis method 
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5.5.2 Results of MC-analysis 
For an overview of the different labels and certificates studied, we refer to Van Huylenbroeck 
et al. (2007). As an example we give the results for the Fruitnet14
 
 certification in Figure 5.2. 
The full line reflects the scores of the ideal standard, while the dotted line represents the 
scores for the Fruitnet label. The further the dotted line is from the centre of the graph, the 
better the scores. The greater the distance between the dotted and the full line, the higher the 
scope for improvements. Figure 5.2 also shows the contribution of each item to the overall 
concept of environmental sustainability. The further the full line is from the centre of the 
graph, the more important the item is. Water quality is considered the most important, noise 
quantity reduction the least important with respect to environmental sustainability. The results 
clearly indicate possible further ways to develop the standard.  
 
Figure 5.2. The environmental performance of the Fruitnet label 
In Table 5.9 the results of the other analysed certification schemes are summarized. The 
scores on the different sustainability items reflect the importance given by the different 
certification schemes to these aspects. The Fruitnet standard e.g. imposes stringent 
specifications regarding pest pressure reduction. This can easily be explained since the main 
goal of integrated farming is to reduce the quantities of pesticides applied. IPM farmers only 
intervene when really necessary, relying on analytic and diagnostic procedures before using 
agrochemicals. Observation systems for pest scouting are used to detect the presence of pests, 
and more specifically to determine the extent of their population.  
 
In general, Fruitnet scores also well on other aspects, indicating a rather balanced and 
comprehensive certification book. This is e.g. not the case with GlobalGAP that scores high 
on food safety and workers’ safety but scores low on e.g. climate conservation and landscape. 
Also Biogarantie (organic label) scores high on nature protection criteria but has only few 
rules with respect to noise quantity reduction, food safety and workers’ safety.  
                                                          
14 In 1990 the member producers of GAWI (Group of tree cultivators applying the integrated techniques in the 
Walloon Region) created the FRUITNET specifications (asbl GAWI, 2007). These specifications contain all the 
guidelines of the IOBC (International Organization for Biological and Integrated Control of Noxious Animals 
and Plants) for the integrated production of pip fruit, completed with additional guidelines relating to 
environmental and biological control measures (e.g. nesting boxes, hedges, introduction of auxiliaries, 
introduction of natural enemies, etc.). Moreover, the Fruitnet system guarantees traceability from producer to the 
point of sale. In addition to the internal control by Gawi Fruitnet asbl, external control is applied by independent 
accredited control bodies. Fruit origin and quality control measures are emphasised. Besides, growers producing 
according to Fruitnet must comply with the EurepGAP specifications since 2003 (FRUITNET, 2007). 
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This analysis thus helps to reveal which aspects are well developed and underdeveloped in a 
certification initiative. 
 
Table 5.9. Overview of the scores of the analysed certification schemes on the different 
environmental and human health sustainability aspects 
Sustainability 
aspect 
Labels 
Bio-
garantie 
Charte 
Perfect 
Global 
GAP 
Flan-
dria 
Flandria 
GAP 
Integrated 
Pitfruit 
Fruit
net 
Terra 
Nostra 
air quality 55.6 62.4 45.4 49.0 56.0 54.7 61.5 32.3 
climate conservation 51.5 63.7 27.9 29.0 40.4 40.2 50.4 38.3 
soil fertility 48.7 45.9 33.5 25.7 46.1 25.7 44.5 39.1 
pest pressure reduction 63.7 53.6 55.2 38.6 60.2 62.7 67.7 46.7 
water quality 52.7 56.7 44.3 35.0 54.1 36.9 56.0 32.1 
biodiversity 59.8 42.7 38.5 29.5 41.5 41.1 59.3 20.7 
landscape 43.2 38.6 21.5 12.3 23.0 43.9 64.4 14.3 
waste reduction  61.7 65.3 25.3 6.7 27.5 20.0 60.9 0.0 
scarce resource spillage 37.1 55.0 29.2 23.9 48.4 27.8 41.5 28.2 
noise quantity reduction 28.0 57.5 36.9 40.1 61.1 11.6 41.1 20.0 
food safety 42.7 71.0 52.6 42.5 55.5 40.0 54.1 40.6 
worker safety 31.0 57.3 61.0 32.6 59.7 33.3 59.9 18.3 
 
As we can see from Table 5.9, all certification schemes contribute positively to sustainability 
aspects compared to the legally required minimum (which corresponds to a zero score). For 
waste reduction the certification scheme Terra Nostra does not take supralegal measures, and 
Flandria only to a limited extend. Overall, a very good score is found for Fruitnet, Biogarantie 
(which is the organic label) and FlandriaGAP.  
 
5.6 Discussion and conclusion 
The main hypothesis to test in this chapter was whether firms participating in Private 
Institutions of Sustainability contribute more to ecosystem sustainability than firms who do 
not. Testing is done with a meta-analysis of differences in environmental state between the 
conventional farming system and the organic system, and – for extrapolation to other private 
certification schemes - with a multicriteria-analysis of certification rules of eight private farm 
certification schemes.  
 
The meta-analysis resulted in the following evidence in favour of the hypothesis. Soils in 
organic farming systems have on average a higher content of organic matter which is 
important for a good agricultural and environmental soil condition, characterized by reduced 
erosion, high buffering and filtering capacity and a rich habitat for living organisms. We can 
also conclude that organic farming contributes positively to agro-biodiversity (breeds used by 
the farmers) and natural biodiversity (wild life). Concerning the impact of the organic farming 
system on nitrate and phosphorous leaching and greenhouse gas emissions the result of our 
analysis is not that straightforward. When expressed per production area organic farming 
scores better than conventional farming. However, given the lower land use efficiency of 
organic farming in developed countries, this positive effect expressed per unit product is less 
pronounced or not present at all. For the selected environmental effects a significant 
difference per hectare mainly originates from a difference in input intensity (less fertilizer use, 
lower animal density, no chemical inputs). None of the differences in environmental effects 
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can be attributed to a standalone management practice, it is the combined effect of several 
modifications to the conventional practices that results into the lower environmental pressure 
per area of production. 
 
The multicriteria assessment of the other certification schemes shows that all initiatives 
contribute positively to environmental sustainability compared to the legally required 
minimum. The analysis also shows the difference in sustainability focus of the analysed 
schemes. Some schemes, such as GlobalGAP and Terra Nostra only take limited 
engagements, while other schemes, such as Fruitnet, Biogarantie and FlandriaGAP, are more 
restrictive. The environmental efforts of the latter schemes are communicated towards the end 
consumers by means of labels on the packaging. 
 
One important difference between the meta-analysis and the multicriteria analysis is that the 
meta-analysis measures the real contribution towards environmental sustainability by 
analyzing differences in environmental state of farms participating in a PIoS and farms who 
do not, while the multicriteria analysis only measures the potential contribution of the 
certification rules to environmental sustainability, according to experts. When the certification 
book rules are not followed by the farmers, due to the absence of a complementary farm 
advice and monitoring and control system, the actual contribution to environmental 
sustainability can differ significantly.     
 
The meta-analysis also reports a high level of heterogeneity among studies. The importance of 
local aspects, such as soil type, climate, altitude and legislation, becomes evident and 
advocates for caution with generalizing. This also urges us to nuance the findings of the 
multicriteria-analysis, as differences in local conditions are not accounted for in this analysis. 
Quoting Rigby and Cáceres (2001), “the notion of sustainability is such a site-specific, 
individualistic, dynamic concept, that arguing that one particular set of codified production 
practices are its practical expression seems incorrect and likely to attract unnecessary 
criticism. In this sense, the sustainability concept may be viewed similarly to appropriate 
technology, in that the appropriateness of particular technologies will also vary temporally 
and spatially”. So, from a sustainability perspective, the management practices and rules of 
prescription should have been devised as such that production is optimized while minimizing 
local environmental impacts. For that it is necessary to monitor how the management 
practices influence local conditions, by means of site and situation specific indicators, as 
heterogeneity both in the physical, social and market environment ask for locally adapted 
rules. This focus on the relation between rules of prescription and site specific impact is 
currently lacking both in the organic and conventional system, which may explain the huge 
variation found between the studies. Organic standards are almost alike in different regions, to 
ensure that products labeled ‘organic’ are produced under the same conditions. This 
standardization is necessary to allow trade across the globe. As described in chapter 7, the 
move towards globalized meta-certification systems makes certification rules less locally 
adapted.  
 
Another discussion point relates to the land use efficiency issue. As argued by Glendining et 
al. (2009), extensification of farming, which is thought to favour non-food ecosystem 
services, requires more land to produce the same amount of food. The loss of ecosystem 
services hitherto provided by natural land brought into production is greater than that which 
can be provided by land now under extensive farming. This loss of ecosystem service is large 
in comparison to the benefit of a reduction in emission of nutrients and pesticides. Rigby and 
Cáceres (2001) also take up the issue of productivity in relation to sustainability. They warn 
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for simply equating sustainable agriculture with low-yield farming, as the issue of providing 
food and fibre for the (growing) non-agricultural population also needs to be addressed. For 
the question whether to focus on indicators expressed per unit area or per unit product, the 
systemic level is of importance. The former inform us whether the sustainability of the local 
ecosystem is under threat, which is important from an environmental perspective. The latter, 
as they measure eco-efficiencies, explain which system creates most output per environmental 
burden, which is also very relevant from a social perspective, given the need for food security. 
The indicators expressed per hectare indicate that conventional farming is potentially more 
harmful for local ecosystem sustainability. The case of nitrate leaching is in this sense 
informing, as this is typically a local problem. To know whether ecosystem sustainability is 
really endangered, the indicator scores should be compared with absolute local sustainability 
thresholds. The indicators expressed per unit product show no significant difference between 
conventional and organic production. To know which system to choose, we have to consider 
whether it is better to use more land for extensive production or less land in an intensive way. 
The choice may be different in different regions, and also depends on increasing pressure 
from both non agricultural human activities, non food agricultural production and nature. 
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Chapter 6. Economic performance - sustainable value creation by 
PIoS 
 
 
This chapter is based upon the paper: Mondelaers, K, Lauwers, L. and Van Huylenbroeck, G. 
Sustainable value creation by Private Institutions of Sustainability. Submitted to Ecological 
Economics 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The former chapter explains differences in environmental effectiveness (and efficiency) 
between organic farming as a PIoS and conventional farming, based upon different 
disaggregated indicators. It is however impossible to say whether organic farming, as example 
for the private institution of sustainability, is on an aggregated level the most efficient way to 
attain sustainability. In this chapter 6, the economic performance of organic farming is 
measured and compared with the market alternative. This chapter thus wants to test 
hypothesis 2: 
 
Firms participating in Private Institutions of Sustainability create more ‘sustainable value’ 
than firms who do not 
 
The organic farming system is again used as proxy for the PIoS, as the private actors involved 
in it voluntary follow more restrictive rules, while the conventional farming system represents 
the market regulated by public institutions. Economic performance is measured as 
‘sustainable value’.  
  
The Sustainable Value (SV) method, as developed by Figge and Hahn (Figge and Hahn, 2004, 
Figge and Hahn, 2005, Hahn et al., 2007) offers an interesting starting point for analyzing and 
comparing the overall sustainability performance of firms or systems, especially because it 
offers a value oriented perspective. The method compares the value created by a firm with the 
opportunity costs of the employed resources, and thus focuses on the allocation of resources 
between users. A firm’s output is compared with the output of an appropriately chosen 
benchmark. At the input side, environmental and social impacts are also accounted for. The 
sustainable value method is based on the concept of eco-efficiency and it can also take social 
impacts into account. Important is that the method is not burden but value oriented. A burden 
oriented approach focuses on minimal resource use or environmental and social impact, which 
corresponds to the denominator in an eco-efficiency measurement, while this value based 
method aims at maximizing the output for a given resource use, which is the nominator of 
eco-efficiency. Van Passel (2007) made a first attempt to apply the method in the agricultural 
sector, by studying the sustainability performance of Flemish dairy farms. To analyze 
differences in SV scores between organic farming, considered in this chapter as the PIoS 
under study, and conventional farming, we introduce the original Figge and Hahn SV 
calculation method in paragraph two. In paragraph three we integrate our own comments as 
well as the comments formulated by Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009) on the 
appropriateness of the benchmark choice. In a fourth paragraph we introduce the specification 
for the production function of the conventional system on the one hand and the PIoS on the 
other hand. Paragraph five and six then focuses the chosen capital forms and on the data. In 
paragraph seven the results are presented, while paragraph eight concludes.   
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6.2 Sustainable value  
For a detailed description of the sustainability concepts on which the SV method is based, we 
refer to Figge and Hahn (2004, 2005). In essence, it builds upon the constant capital rule (see 
f.e. Constanza and Daly, 1992), stating that development can be called sustainable, if it 
ensures constant capital stocks or at least constant capital services over time. The different 
capital forms that can be distinguished are man-made capital (such as produced goods), 
human capital (such as knowledge and skills), natural capital (such as natural resources), and 
social capital (Figge and Hahn, 2004). The logic of SV does not allow any additional 
environmental or social impact, therefore the macro level environmental or social capital is 
unchanged. SV is, therefore, based on the paradigm of strong sustainability (Figge and Hahn, 
2004).  
 
We will first introduce the main building blocks of the SV method (and the associated 
formulas): the value spread, the value contribution, the sustainable value and the return to cost 
ratio. As shown in formula A, the value spread (VS) reflects how much more efficiently a 
form of capital is being used in comparison to a benchmark (Figge and Hahn, 2005),.   
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = �𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 ,𝑖𝑖�          (1) 
with y = output or value added of a firm, yb
with xi = use of the capital form i by a firm, x
 of the benchmark 
b,i
 
 by the benchmark  
The value contribution (VC) than allows calculating how much value the firm has created by 
using this capital form more productively than a benchmark (formula 2): 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖             (2) 
 
The sustainable value, i.e. the value created by a productive use of all forms of capital (Figge 
and Hahn, 2005), on its turn sums over the different resources and corrects for the number of 
resources used (formula 3): 
𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉 = 1
𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1            (3) 
 
The Return to Cost ratio (RtoC) is than the ratio of the value created by a firm versus the total 
opportunity cost of a firm’s capital base and can be expressed as (formula 4): 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 = 𝑦𝑦
𝑦𝑦−𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉
            (4) 
 
Clearly, the outcome of the calculation is highly dependent on the benchmark choice and the 
forms of capital that are incorporated (as well as their measurement unit, whether physical or 
monetary). We can distinguish between average and best performance benchmarks, data 
driven and normative benchmarks (see Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen, 2009). Figge and Hahn 
propose the market as  average benchmark, as the market is free of unsystematic risk and thus 
offers the best available alternative under risk. One of the most appealing aspects of the 
sustainable value method is the simplicity with which the sustainability score can be 
calculated. As always, this comes at a cost. Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009) showed that 
the SV formula is mathematically a special case of the output difference of a particular firm 
and a benchmark, for which a linear production function is assumed with fixed coefficients. 
Formula 5 expresses the general case, formulas 6 and 7 the restriction imposed by Figge and 
Hahn. 
𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉 = 𝑦𝑦 − 𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)           (5) 
𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓=1 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓            (6) 
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𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓 = 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 ,𝑓𝑓             (7) 
with R the number of resources 
 
6.3 Redefining the opportunity cost 
According to Figge and Hahn (2004), the sustainable value method is based upon the notion 
of opportunity costs. The method shows how much more value is created because a company 
is more efficient than a benchmark and because the resources are allocated to the company 
and not to benchmark companies. Figge and Hahn (2004) define an average benchmark based 
upon the aggregate of individual firm resource and output data. Further in the text we show 
how this benchmark is constructed. Figge and Hahn (2004) make several restrictive 
assumptions for their definition of the opportunity costs in the multiple resource multiple 
output case, as is documented by Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009). In this section we 
document three reservations with respect to the Figge and Hahn benchmark definition. The 
first relates to the linearity of the benchmark function, the second and the third to the 
coefficients of this linear function. These coefficients are an aggregation of individual firm 
level average productivity coefficients. Both the aggregation process itself and the use of 
average productivity coefficients are question of debate.  
 
In line with Figge and Hahn (2009), we argue that the idea of a market-based opportunity cost 
instead of firm specific opportunity costs, is interesting, given that the market is free of 
unsystematic risk, and can thus be considered as the best available alternative when an 
investor (such as a policy maker) is risk averse.  
 
Figge and Hahn, however, consider the market as a black box in which only the ins and outs 
are relevant. We argue here that to obtain the right opportunity costs, insight is needed in this 
black box. The market is composed of a series of atomized subentities (the farms), with a 
specific structure and interactions between these subentities. One cannot impose another 
structure to this market than the one that is found in reality.   
 
Opportunity cost is defined as the value of the best alternative foregone. In the spirit of SV the 
market price should reflect the market return on capital (Figge and Hahn, 2009 p4). This 
market return is however realised with a set of capital forms, not with a single capital form. 
The correct opportunity cost measure for a resource x1 in that case is the productivity of the 
benchmark for x1
 
, conditional upon the availability of the other resources required for the 
production process. This calls for the use of a production function, to enable us to take into 
account this conditionality. So, instead of working with average productivities, as Figge and 
Hahn suggest, we propose to work with the individual firms’ production functions to 
construct an aggregate opportunity cost. It is very well possible that a firm has a high average 
product for a particular resource, but a marginal product of zero. Adding extra resources to 
this firm does not increase production. Average product than gives the wrong signal.  
As shown by Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009), the production function15
                                                          
15 Note that the production function is not strictly limited to economic resources, also social and ecological 
resources can be incorporated. 
 of a firm can be 
approximated by the first order Taylor series. In the spirit of SV, we can compare the output 
that a firm i creates with its resource bundle with the output that the benchmark would create, 
applying the concept of marginal productivity for each resource. Note that the formula below 
coincides with Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009) formula 6: 
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𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗=𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1           (8) 
with SVi = sustainable value of firm i; yi = output of firm i;  𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙⁄  = marginal product of the benchmark for 
resource xj; xji = amount of xj
 
 used by firm i. 
Assume that the industry is composed of 2 firms A and B, with firm A producing ya with 
resource x1a and x2a. Similarly, firm B produces yb with the same resource x1b and x2b
𝑦𝑦∗ = 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚 + 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 = �� 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚� 𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚 + � 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚� 𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚� + �� 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙� 𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙 + � 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚2𝑙𝑙� 𝑚𝑚2𝑙𝑙�     (9) 
. 
Introducing the Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen first order Taylor approximation of the 
production function and aggregating over the two firms, the total benchmark output looks 
like: 
 
Figge and Hahn assume for the benchmark the same, fixed opportunity cost per resource type 
for all firms, as is shown mathematically below. The total benchmark output is according to 
Figge and Hahn: 
𝑦𝑦∗ = 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚 + 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 = 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚+𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙2(𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙) (𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚 + 𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙) + 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚+𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙2(𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚2𝑙𝑙) (𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚 + 𝑚𝑚2𝑙𝑙)     (10) 
𝑦𝑦∗ = 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚+𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙2(𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚 + 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚+𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙2(𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙 + 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚+𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙2(𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚2𝑙𝑙) 𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚 + 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚+𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙2(𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚2𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚2𝑙𝑙     (11) 
𝑦𝑦∗
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
∗ = 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚+𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙2(𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙) and   𝑦𝑦∗𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙∗ = 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚+𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙2(𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚2𝑙𝑙)        (12) 
Thus, according to Figge and Hahn, opportunity costs of all firms for a resource x1 are the 
same and equal 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚+𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙2(𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙), which is the Figge and Hahn benchmark productivity for x1. In 
their aggregation process, Figge and Hahn set 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚
𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚 = 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚 , i.e. the marginal product of a firm A 
equals its average product. To complete the aggregation process, they (knowingly or not) 
impose a weighting for these average products based upon a firm’s share in total industry 
resource use. In the Figge and Hahn calculus, this weighting mechanism in fact acts as the 
reallocation mechanism of resources over firms. When a firm A uses a share 𝑠𝑠1𝑚𝑚 = 𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚∑ 𝑚𝑚1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  of 
total resource x1, its’ weight in the aggregated average product for x1 is s1a. Put differently, 
firm A will receive a share of s1a of a firm i’s resource x1 when the resource bundle of this 
firm i is reallocated to the benchmark.  For resource x1
𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙 � 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚� + 𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙 � 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙� = 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚+𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚1𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚1𝑙𝑙         (13) 
 in our 2 firm example the Figge and 
Hahn average benchmark productivity becomes: 
 
When two different resources x1 and x2
 
 are in use Figge and Hahn simply divide this 
aggregated average product by two, to avoid double counting.  
As argued by Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009), even the production function based upon 
marginal products is a linear approximation of the true production function. This linear 
production function does not take the interdependency of resources into account to create 
(also interdependent) outputs.  
 
Constructing aggregate production functions from firm production functions is heavily 
contested in the literature (see f.e. Felipe and Fisher, 2003 for a nice overview)16
                                                          
16 To quote Solow: I have never thought of the macroeconomic production function as a rigorous justifiable 
concept. In my mind, it is either an illuminating parable, or else a mere device for handling data, to be used so 
long as it gives good empirical results, and to be abandoned as soon as it doesn’t, or as soon as something better 
comes along (Solow 1966, 1259-1260). 
. We 
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therefore argue, as Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009) do, to work with the firm level 
production functions, to avoid the linearity restriction and the lack of resource 
interdependency. On the other hand, we support the idea of F&H that an investor’s alternative 
to a given firm is the market. Therefore we propose to construct the market as benchmark as 
the sum of the individual firms with their specific production functions. Our proposed SV 
formula becomes: 
𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘�𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 �𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1           (14) 
with SVi=sustainable value of firm i; yi=output of firm i; n= number of firms in the industry; wk= weight of firm 
k in the benchmark; fk(xij)= firm k’s production function; j=index for resource j; xij
 
=the amount of resource j 
consumed by firm i. 
Different definitions of the weighting vector wk will define a different benchmark and 
different opportunity costs for firm i. Based upon this weighting vector, we can propose 
alternative benchmark definitions that do take the market structure into account. Weighting 
vector wk 
1. w
can be:  
k=1 for the firm’s peer on the frontier, this is the best alternative available from a 
micro-economic perspective, and wk
2. w
=0 for the remainder firms. As such we find the 
Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009) proposal; 
k
3. 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 = 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1⁄ . Resource j specific weight is based upon a firm’s share in total 
resource j consumption. This is the weight also used by Figge and Hahn; 
=1/n. All firms in the market contribute evenly to the benchmark. This also means 
that all firms receive an equal share of firm i’s resource bundle;  
4. 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 = �𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦 𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗⁄ �∑ �𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦 𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗⁄ �𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1 . Resource j specific weight based upon the firms’ relative 
marginal products, as this reflects a firm’s willingness to pay for an extra unit of 
resource j;  
5. any other socio-economic and ecologic sound option. 
 
6.3.1 Option 1: benchmark is the firm’s peer on the frontier  
The opportunity cost of the firm is determined by the peer firm located on the frontier, as this 
is the best available alternative for this firm in the market. This approach is proposed by 
Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009). A firm’s peer is determined by a radial expansion of the 
output until the frontier is met. The total opportunity cost for the firm is the output generated 
by the peer with the resources of this firm. This approach is appealing as we do not have to 
scale up from the firm to the market level, and we therefore not have to make any related 
assumptions. It however foregoes the possibility to invest different resources in different firms 
in the market. It also results into firm specific benchmarks instead of a single market level 
benchmark, which is conceptually different from the idea of Figge and Hahn. 
 
6.3.2 Option 2: the benchmark is an average of all firms in the industry 
All firms contribute evenly to the aggregate benchmark, i.e. the resources of firm i are spread 
evenly across all firms in the industry. For each firm k the production function is taken into 
account. The total extra output generated by the market is then compared with the output of 
the firm. This approach assumes that the probability of each firm to receive the resources is 
equal. The logic of this approach is that, as the market is characterized by all kinds of 
(efficient and inefficient) firms, this should be reflected in the distribution of the resources 
over the firms.  
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6.3.3 Option 3. benchmark are all firms, weighting based upon resource use 
Figge and Hahn’s idea behind this weighting vector is that a firm k contributes to the 
aggregate average product of a resource based upon its share in total industry consumption of 
this resource. As argued above, the production function should be taken into account, and the 
simplistic aggregation procedure based upon average products abandoned. For the rest this 
weighting vector can be applied as it is reasonable to assume that the shares of firms in 
consumption of a resource remain constant, as to reflect the current market conditions. 
 
6.3.4 Option 4. benchmark are all firms, weighting based upon marginal 
products 
Another plausible option would be that when the firm’s resources are redistributed in the 
market, the firms acquire resources according to their relative marginal products for each of 
the resources. The marginal products reflect the firms’ willingness to pay for the resource. If a 
firm’s marginal product is high, it has a high incentive to acquire an extra unit of the limiting 
resource, while a firm with lower marginal product has a lower incentive to acquire the 
resource. The marginal products are thus used as weighting mechanisms.  
 
Opposite to option 1, options 2, 3 and 4 assume fixed (aggregate) opportunity costs for all 
evaluated firms, i.e. each firm i is always compared against a fixed benchmark, only the 
resource allocation across firms is different. The result is that the benchmark is comparable to 
Figge and Hahn’s benchmark, but with different opportunity costs.  
 
Another consequence of a benchmark based upon the production functions of individual firms 
instead of an aggregated function is the possibility to aggregate firms with different 
production technologies in the single overall benchmark.  
 
For the benchmarks defined above, the constant capital rule (see Paragraph 2) still applies, as 
the resources are only reallocated across firms. No resources are destroyed or created, only 
value is. 
 
6.4 Specifying the production function 
As identified by Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009), the sustainable value formula of Figge 
and Hahn (2004) is a special case of a production function in which the difference with a 
benchmark is interpreted as the sustainable value: 
𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) =  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖)         (15) 
with OC(xi)=opportunity cost of using resource x
After rearranging, there  is a clear link between formula 1 and efficiency analysis, as can be 
seen from formula 2, in which u
i 
i resembles the inefficiency term, f(.) is the production 
function; yi is the output and vi
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖           (16)  is the random noise term. 
The opportunity cost OC in formula 15 indicates the weight of a given resource at a 
benchmark level in attaining a certain output level. The choice of the benchmark level is in 
this respect crucial, as discussed before. We will test the different benchmarks further in the 
text. In determining the underlying production frontier, one can distinguish between 
parametric and non parametric production function approaches. In the latter case, the 
production function is not subject to a specific functional form, although no correction is 
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made for outliers when defining the benchmark. The parametric benchmarks do take noise 
into consideration, but they impose a restrictive functional form. The stochastic frontier 
models attribute the difference between the benchmark and a particular firm partly to random 
noise and partly to inefficiency.  
 
Typical for organic farming in general (and consequently of our FADN based data set) is the 
low number of organic farms compared to conventional farms. As a consequence the number 
of observations for organic farms in our sample is restricted, which complicates statistical 
analysis. Therefore we opt for a non parametric production technology approach, as it is not 
so sensitive to small sample problems17
 
. In chapter 10 non parametric production functions 
are also used, which makes comparison between chapters more straightforward.  
When a non parametric production model is used, the according piecewise linear production 
technology is formulated as (based upon Lee et al., 2002): 
𝑇𝑇(𝑚𝑚) = �(𝑦𝑦):𝑦𝑦 ≤ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌, 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌, 𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 ≤ 1, 𝑌𝑌 ∈ ℛ+𝑖𝑖 �       (17) 
Following model then reveals the firm level output oriented inefficiency θi
𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖                       (18)      :      
s.t. ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  for each k              ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖            
      𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 ≤ 1      𝑌𝑌,𝜃𝜃 ≥ 0 
with i= firm index, k=also firm index, θ l=firm distance parameter, λ=weight of peer, y=output, x=input, eT
 
= 
matrix of 1’s  
When the benchmark is the firm’s peer on the production frontier this model directly reveals 
the opportunity cost for the resource use of a firm i. The associated SV measure can be easily 
obtained as: 
𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖                (19) 
 
The remainder benchmarks are a composite of all firms in the industry. For each firm the 
production function is taken into account. To obtain the opportunity costs, the following 
procedure is applied: the resources of a firm i of which we want to calculate the SVi, are 
divided across all the firms in the industry (including firm i) based upon the weighting vector 
wk defined in paragraph 3. Each firm in the sample now has a new resource vector xnew. The 
associated new output ynew for each firm is calculated with the help of an inverse DEA, which 
is based upon fixing the efficiency level θi
𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤 ,𝑖𝑖                          (20)  to the one obtained above (Wei et al., 2000, Yan et al., 2002): 
s.t. ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤 ,𝑖𝑖  for each k              ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤 ,𝑖𝑖            
      𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 ≤ 1      𝑌𝑌 ≥ 0 
with i= firm index, k=also firm index, θ l=firm distance parameter obtained prior, λ=weight of peer, ynew=new 
output, xnew=new input, eT
 
= matrix of 1’s   
By subtracting for each firm the initial firm output from the new output and summing over all 
firms, the additional market output generated with firm i’s resource vector is obtained. 
Comparing this with the output generated by firm i, yields the SVi
 
.  
                                                          
17 with the exception that most firms will end up with an efficiency score of 1 
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To make the comparison between the organic and conventional farming system, we will 
calculate the revenue weighted overall SV score per farming system. This revenue weighting 
is applied to accommodate for size differences across firms, in the same spirit as Fare and 
Zelenyuk (2003) for industry technical inefficiency. The (organic or conventional) revenue 
weighted system sustainable value than equals: 
𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖���� = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖    with 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1          (21) 
with 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖���� = farming system weighted SV score; Si=revenue weight; yi
 
=firm i revenue 
The above measure is calculated separately for the organic and conventional system. It can be 
tested whether the two obtained average scores differ statistically. To allow comparison 
between systems with different size classes, a relative measure is more informative. Such a 
relative measure can be constructed in analogy with the RtoC (return to cost, see formula) 
ratio of Figge and Hahn (2004), and called the revenue weighted system sustainable 
efficiency: 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖������� = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖−𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖          (22) 
An interesting feature of the original Figge and Hahn sustainable value methodology is the 
decomposition of the SV score into value contributions (VC’s) from the different capital 
forms. A positive VC score indicates that this capital forms contributes to a firm’s sustainable 
value creation, while a negative score indicates the opposite. This decomposition is 
straightforward when Figge and Hahn’s restrictive assumptions with respect to the benchmark 
are made (see earlier). As we relax these assumptions in this paper, restoring this feature18
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚1,𝑖𝑖 = � 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚1,𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚1,𝑖𝑖�         (23) 
 
asks some elaboration. Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009) show how the production function 
can be approximated by a first order Taylor series in which the marginal products are 
multiplied with the resource consumption. A comparison between firm i’s marginal product 
for resource x and the weighted marginal product of the benchmark yields a good 
approximation of the value spread (see formula 1) of firm i for x. We can call the latter term 
the marginal value contribution of x to firm i’s SV: 
This marginal value contribution shows how much more (or less) value is created when an 
additional unit of resource is invested in the firm instead of in the market. To obtain the 
(organic or conventional) system value contribution, an aggregation procedure is required, 
which can also be based upon a return based weight Si
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚1𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎�������� = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖=1 �𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚1,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �       (24) 
. For the organic system for example 
the system’s marginal value contribution becomes:  
 
6.5 Capital forms  
Closely related to the question of how sustainability issues can be linked to farm level 
activities19
1) SV = SV(w|y, x) or  
, is the question of what is considered as a resource and what as an output. The 
issue of ‘endogeneity’ is imminent, because outputs can (partially) loop back to become 
resources. Several authors (see Tyteca, 1996 f.e.) have focused on this issue. In essence, we 
have three broad options, depending on our preferred focus:   
2) SV = SV(y, w|x) or 
                                                          
18 from a benchmark which takes the production functions of each firm into account 
19 see chapter 4 also 
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3) SV = SV (y|w,x) 
with w = vector of peculiar outputs (f.e. undesirable output of waste); y = vector of desirable outputs; x = vector 
of resources  
For option 1 the focus is on the peculiar outputs, which is only partially reconcilable with 
SV’s underlying idea of economic value maximization (Figge and Hahn, 2005). However, it 
can be useful in a particular SV analysis focusing on these peculiar outputs. As indicated by 
Figge and Hahn (2005), values other than the economic notion of value can also enter the SV 
calculation. Option 2 considers all wanted and ‘unwanted’ outputs as outputs, which is 
theoretically appealing but not straightforward because some outputs are difficult to monetize. 
Furthermore, the term ‘value created’ should then be redefined. Option 3 considers the 
peculiar outputs as resources, following the idea that these are necessary (to some extent) to 
produce the wanted output and that they are also a limiting factor for the production of the 
wanted output. In this paper we apply the latter approach. 
 
Resources (here synonymous to capital forms) can be expressed in physical or monetary 
terms. This leads us to the question whether the market price is a good reflection of the ‘true’ 
price of a scarce resource or an environmental or social impact (micro-allocation20
 
: see 
Constanza and Daly, 1992). There is currently quite some discussion on how value should be 
approached in a sustainability assessment, because the time horizon is beyond a human life 
span and because value as a measure for wellbeing extends the economic term exchange-
value. As indicated by Stahel (2005) and others, increased production of exchange-values 
does not necessarily mean an equal increase in human wealth. There is a huge area of 
ecological goods and services whose use-values are not reflected in their market prices, which 
generates all kinds of market inefficiencies if the market is left to its own devices (Stahel, 
2005). This is partly due to the fact that natural capital has simply been taken as a free gift by 
the economic agents. Stahel following Marx (1967) rightly indicates that value is an 
emergent, context dependent, relational property. Different social, cultural and environmental 
contexts can radically alter the use value of given goods. Some farm related examples are 
water scarcity in Spain versus flooding in the Netherlands or manure excess in Flanders 
versus shortage in the developing countries. Stahel also critiques the present day cost analysis 
methodologies that only try to complement the classical price formation framework (based 
upon the intersection between a production function and a demand curve), by expanding the 
production function in order to include hidden social and ecological costs which were not 
accurately reflected by standard economics. He warns for the current use of internally 
generated price signs which are blind to the needs of the larger social and ecological systems 
on which the economic subsystem depends. The SV method exhibits this hidden danger as 
well.  SVA is on the other hand a relative measure of sustainability. Up to now, for the 
application of the SV method as an interfirm comparison method, the economic exchange-
values have been used. For the resources the physical amount is used as it is for some 
resources uncertain to what extend the market price reflects the real ‘value’ of the resource, 
while for other resources there is no market price.  
                                                          
20 Constanza and Daly (1992) distinguish between macro- and micro-allocation, the former concerns the 
valuation of natural capital when matter-energy is allocated across the boundary separating the economic 
subsystem from the ecosystem, while the latter concerns the allocation among competing uses of matter-energy 
that has already entered the economic subsystem. The cost and benefit functions relevant to the micro-allocation 
problem are those of individuals bent on maximizing their own private utility, while the cost and benefit 
functions of macro-allocation are at the level of social preferences, which are not captured in micro-allocation 
market prices. 
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The first element at the ‘resource’-side is human (and knowledge) capital, which is vested in 
both labourers and farm managers and constitutes of experience and skills gathered through 
education and life.  
According to Beeton (2006), social capital is a measure of community intangibles such as 
networks, cultural pursuits, trust, linkages, and commitment to local well-being and shared 
values. It is immediately clear that these issues are hardly measurable.  
Natural (or environmental) capital is often a public or common good associated with a place 
or part of a complex legally evolved web in which components are owned in the form of 
bundles of rights (Beeton, 2006). Natural capital can be related to land, air, water, biodiversity 
and energy. The environment simultaneously fulfils the function of source (nutrients), sink 
(waste) and service (landscape) for agricultural production. With respect to land, the area used 
and the soil alterations are of concern. Below and above certain thresholds, this soil condition 
might be irreversible damaged. The challenge is first of all to determine this optimal range of 
soil parameters for each type of soil and place and second to find out whether and to what 
extend the thresholds are surpassed on these particular spots. Water is another natural capital 
stock. Both the quality of water and water use can be influenced by the farming practices. For 
plant production, water quality is mainly influenced by fertilizer (nitrogen and phosphorous) 
and pesticide application. For animal production the water used for cleaning and rinsing of the 
stables also ends up, via the manure, on the field. If we think about the influence of 
agriculture on the atmosphere (as a sink), we mainly think about methane, ammonia and 
carbon dioxide emissions. The first two are strongly associated with animal production, the 
latter with the use of fossil fuels for energy. At the farm level we can distinguish between 
direct and indirect energy consumption, with the latter referring to energy consumed during 
the production of the agricultural inputs. Nature is furthermore both a source and a sink for 
biodiversity. A distinction can be made between genetic, species and ecosystem biodiversity 
(OECD, 2008). A second distinction can be made between wild and ‘cultivated’ biodiversity. 
Finally, manmade capital can be subdivided into financial and physical capital. The latter can 
be further decomposed into fixed and variable capital sources. Fixed capital refers to the 
machinery and buildings up and around the farm, while variable capital are inputs such as 
seeds, animals, feed, fertilizers, pesticides and labour.    
 
6.6 Data set properties 
The method derived in the earlier paragraphs is applied on a Belgian FADN data sample of 
dairy farms, derived from the EU FADN data. Finding the appropriate proxies for the above 
capital forms from EU FADN is not straightforward. As EU FADN is used for accounting 
purposes, natural and especially social capital cannot be deducted easily. We assume here that 
differences in natural and social capital between the conventional and organic system are 
captured in the augmented price for organic milk. For a detailed description of the variables 
and the calculated indicators available in the EU FADN data set, we refer to the EC 
documents RI/CC 882 and RI/CC 1256. Main classification of farms in EU FADN is based 
upon farm type, economic size and region. In this paper, data for specialised dairy farms in 
2004 is used. Data for years 2000 to 2003 is used to describe the production technology and 
potential differences between organic and conventional farming, as we dispose of an 
unbalanced panel for these years. In table 6.1 some sample characteristics for the year 2004 
are presented.   
 
For this study we select the resources that most directly influence the milk production: 
concentrates (in ton), forage crops (in ha), labor use (in 100 hours), farm capital use (in 100€) 
and dairy cows (number). Physical output is measured as total milk production (in 1000 l). 
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This physical outcome was then multiplied with the market price off farm for conventional 
and organic milk. Differences in subsidies are not accounted for. As such a uniform output 
(revenue) measure for both systems is obtained. Some data conversions were necessary to 
construct these physical inputs from the costs reported in FADN. A stochastic frontier 
analysis revealed that these variables influence total milk production. Prices were obtained 
from EU FADN or from KWIN (2007).      
 
Table 6.1. Descriptives of dataset specialised dairy farms, 2004 
 Total Conventional farms Organic farms 
sample size 271 258  13  
 Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. 
Milk output/cow 5931 1620 5936 1647 5815 989 
labor input (h/year) 3432 195 3405 1655 3982 2332 
Livestock Units 52.4 20.9 52.5 20.9 50.0 21.8 
farm capital (in 1000€) 19.59 1 13.93 19.64 14.02 18.62 12.64 
Fodder (ha) 47.48 24.08 46.59 22.85 65.34 38.76 
Concentrate (ton) 194.8 137.4 197.6 138.8 139.1 94.0 
1
 
depreciated 
The above numbers indicate a more labour intensive organic production, with less concentrate 
and a higher fodder use, and slightly less livestock units. Production per livestock unit is also 
lower.  
 
Organic resources can be easily reallocated to conventional farms to create value there. Due to 
the restrictions in the cahier the charge, some conventional resources can only be employed to 
a limited extend in organic farming, while others are fully prohibited. Furthermore, some 
seemingly similar resources, f.e. organic and conventional fodder, are not the same, as the 
organic resource is produced according to the organic standards. As part of the organic inputs 
are allowed to be from conventional production, the reallocation of conventional resources 
over organic farms will not be problematic. 
 
6.7 Results  
6.7.1 (Dis)similarity of production function 
As the PIoS system and the conventional system follow different production principles, this 
will result into a potentially different production technology. To test this for our sample, the 
production frontiers of both systems should be estimated and compared, which is most 
straightforward in a parametric setting. Apart from our sample discussed above, we dispose of 
an unbalanced panel of 14 organic farms with 44 observations over 4 years (2000-2003) and 
1168 observations for the conventional panel. Due to wrong skewness, a Cobb Douglas 
frontier cannot be estimated for the organic panel, only a cross section is estimable21
 
. 
Therefore we only report the results here for expository reasons. A time component is added 
to account for variability in years. As can be seen in Table 6.2, the production function differs 
between conventional and organic farming. In organic farming the number of cows is more 
determining, as well as the concentrate gift. Fodder, expressed in hectare, is more important in 
conventional farming.         
                                                          
21 We acknowledge that, to avoid variation in a specific year, an average of the different years could have been 
taken. We however abandoned this as the panel data are unbalanced. We belief that the same conclusions hold 
when the data are averaged  over the years 
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Figure 6.1 below captures graphically how the organic and conventional production frontiers 
potentially share some common and some unique characteristics and that a metafrontier can 
be constructed that envelops both frontiers. Recall that Y is expressed in monetary units22
 
. In 
this paper we will follow this approach by estimating a non parametric metafrontier. This is 
intuitively appealing as some ‘organic like’ conventional farms might act as peers for organic 
farms and vice versa. Of the 13 organic farms in our sample, 8 are located on the frontier. All 
estimations in the following sections are based upon this meta-frontier of organic and 
conventional farms jointly.   
Table 6.2. Production frontier for organic and conventional system (2000 – 2003) 
 All Conventional Organic 
Sample size 1212 1168 44 
LogL 44.32 38.72 29.43 
 Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. 
Constant 7.042 0.134 7.012 0.142 7.616 0.046 
Farm capital 0.134 0.103 0.134 0.104 0.064 0.006 
Cows 0.592 0.023 0.593 0.023 0.738 0.013 
Fodder 0.195 0.018 0.201 0.020 0.029 0.008 
Concentrate 0.045 0.012 0.040 0.014 0.096 0.006 
Labour 0.008* 0.011 0.007* 0.011 0.096 0.002 
T1 -0.013* 0.016 -0.012* 0.016 0.026 0.002 
T2 -0.036* 0.015 -0.035 0.015 -0.067 0.001 
T3 -0.009* 0.016 -0.007* 0.016 -0.028 0.006 
* insignificant at 5% level 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Metafrontier organic and conventional farming 
 
 
6.7.2 Alternative benchmark definitions 
In this section we document the results for the alternative benchmark definitions. In a similar 
way as Fare and Zelenyuk (2003) aggregate firm inefficiencies to obtain an estimate for the 
overall industry inefficiency, we aggregate the firm SV-scores for each farming system, 
organic or conventional. Table 6.3 reports the SV estimates for each system given the 
different benchmark definitions. The results of table 6.3 are discussed in the following 
sections.  
 
Table 6.4 shows the rank correlation between the benchmarks. This rank correlation is low, 
indicating that the different definitions of the benchmarks influence the ranking of the firms 
significantly. This result urges for the proper motivation why a certain benchmark type is 
chosen. 
                                                          
22 When output is expressed in liter milk, the conventional production frontier logically envelops the organic, as 
organic farming principles are more restrictive.  
X1/Y 
X2/Y 
Conventional frontier 
Organic frontier Metafrontier 
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Table 6.3. SV estimates for organic and conventional farming based upon different weighting 
vectors 
 Conventional (€) Organic (€) 
Weight Min Max Avg Min Max Avg 
Peer only -138700 0 -18500 -27400 0 -7500 
Share in x -86554 66773 10824 -8018 52540 23340 
Marginal product -48954 -6231 -19601 -34293 -5426 -19315 
 
Table 6.4. Rank correlation between benchmarks 
  Share in x Peer only 
Share in x 1  
Peer only  0.537 (0.000) 1 
Marginal product 0.032 (0.591) 0.383 (0.000) 
( )=significance (two tailed) 
 
Figure 6.2 shows graphically that the resource reallocation towards the benchmark differs 
completely depending on the chosen benchmark type. The figure shows a simple example of 4 
firms applying a linear production technology. When the ‘Peer only’ weighting scheme is 
applied, all resources are reallocated to the best alternative for the firm in the industry (in casu 
firm B). The ‘Share in x’ weighting scheme divides firm A’s resource x over all the firms in 
the industry based upon their relative share in current resource consumption. The ‘Marginal 
product’ scheme on its turn uses the relative marginal product as weight for the redistribution.   
 
Figure 6.2. Reallocation of firm A’s resource x over the different firms A, B, C, D in the industry 
based upon the alternative weighting schemes. 
Firm A B C D 
(x; y)-vector (1; 0.5) (1;1) (2;2) (2;1) 
Peer only - 1 - - 
Share in x 1/6 1/6 1/3 1/3 
Marginal product 1/6 1/3 1/3 1/6 
Weight ‘Share in x’=x/∑x 
Weight ‘Marginal product’=∂y/∂x/∑∂y/∂x 
 
 
6.7.2.1 Benchmark is peer on the frontier  
When the firm is projected towards its radial peer on the frontier, the SV indicates how much 
output (in €) the investor (the society, the policy maker) has missed by allocating resources to 
this particular firm and not to the benchmark peer. In the conventional system, on average23 
18500€ is foregone, while in the organic system this is only 7500€. An independent sample T 
test shows that both means differ significantly (P=0.028, equal variances can be assumed). 
The reason for the difference can of course be due to size differences. When we express the 
SV in relative indices, by means of  the return weighted system sustainable efficiency (see 
formula 22), the organic system scores an average of 0.946 versus 0.855 for the conventional 
system. Part of the high efficiency score of organic farming is probably due to differences in 
production function24
 
. Another determining issue is the price difference per litre organic or 
conventional milk.  
Table 6.5 shows the marginal value contributions for the organic and the conventional system. 
In the ‘Peer only’ setting, a smaller negative VC is better. For the organic system, the number 
of cows is the main contributor to the negative SV. An investment of 1 additional cow in the 
                                                          
23 output weighted 
24 Note that the same meta-frontier is used as benchmark, as explained earlier 
1 
2 1 
2 
x 
y ∂y/∂x =1 
∂y/∂x =0.5 
A 
B 
C 
D 
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organic system instead of investing it in the best peers available generates an average negative 
value of 178€. However, when the same cow is invested in the conventional system, 211€ is 
foregone. In the conventional system, the other capital forms contribute more to the negative 
SV compared to the organic system. Organic farms seem to be very efficient in their use of 
fodder, as only 0.14€ is foregone per extra hectare of fodder crops. In the conventional system 
80,5€ is missed per extra hectare.       
 
Table 6.5. Organic and conventional marginal value contributions for the different capital forms 
Capital form Organic Conventional 
Capital (€/€) -2.42 -23.39 
Concentrate (€/ton) -9.65 -18.35 
Fodder (€/ha) -0.14 -80.52 
Cows (€/cow) -178.00 -211.24 
Labour (€/h) -0.25 -0.50 
    
6.7.2.2 Benchmark composed of all firms, weighting based upon resource use 
This benchmark bears most resemblance to the Figge and Hahn benchmark. Each firm in the 
industry receives a share of firm i’s resource according to its share in total use of that 
resource. As such the actual structure of the industry is mimicked.  
 
The results in Table 6.3 indicate that both systems on average create positive value when the 
resources are invested in the individual firms rather than in the market as a whole. For the 
whole industry, the return weighted average sustainable value is 11503€, which indicates that 
keeping the current industry constellation instead of reinvesting the firms resources over the 
firms in the industry creates sustainable value. When we compare the conventional and 
organic sustainable value to this weighted average, we see that the conventional system 
underperforms (-679€) while the organic system outperforms the industry average (+11837€).  
 
Table 6.6. Organic and conventional marginal value contributions for the different capital forms 
 Marginal value contribution Marginal product 
Capital form Conventional Organic All 
Capital (€/€) 2.01 -35.40 107.95 
Concentrate (€/ton) 0.70 -12.31 88.03 
Fodder (€/ha) 22.25 -391.18 424.01 
Cows (€/cow) -33.33 586.01 1120.71 
Labour (€/h) 0.33 -5.88 8.81 
   
Table 6.6 shows the return weighted marginal value contributions for both the organic and 
conventional system. The return weighted marginal product of all firms is also reported. 
These figures indicate that most value is created when we invest additional units of labour, 
capital, concentrate and especially fodder into the conventional farms, while an additional 
dairy livestock unit generates considerably more value in the organic system. As already seen 
before, fodder is used very efficiently in the organic system, hence the marginal product for 
fodder is low in the organic system, which explains the negative value contribution.      
 
6.7.2.3 Benchmark composed of all firms, weighting based upon marginal product 
The idea behind this benchmark is that, as the market is characterized by competition, the 
resources are allocated to the firms with the highest willingness to pay. The willingness to pay 
for a resource is the firm’s marginal product for that resource. Based upon these, a weighting 
vector can be constructed that reallocates a firm’s resources over the market. Table 6.3 reports 
the sustainable values. Average sustainable values are now almost equal for the organic and 
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conventional system. Also note that all values are negative, i.e. even the best firm in class is 
unable to generate more value than the market when the resources are invested there where 
they generate most value. This is due to the fact that even firms which are located on the 
production frontier have low marginal products for some resources.  
 
Table 6.7. Organic and conventional marginal value contributions for the different capital 
forms, benchmark composed of all farms, weighting based upon marginal product 
 Marginal value contribution 
Capital form Conventional Organic All 
Capital (€/€) -4,01 -4,65 -4,04 
Concentrate (€/ton) -335.50 -356.16 -336.61 
Fodder (€/ha) -699.50 -1201.72 -726.53 
Cows (€/cow) -372.23 249.59 -338.76 
Labour (€/h) -149.31 -156.17 -149.68 
 
Table 6.7 reports the return weighted average marginal value contributions for the organic and 
the conventional system, given the benchmark based upon marginal product. If an extra euro 
of capital is invested in an average25
 
 conventional farm instead of based upon the relative 
marginal products of capital of all firms in the industry, 4.01€ is foregone. This amounts to 
4.65€ in the organic case. Interestingly, investing extra dairy cows in an average organic farm 
yields a positive marginal value contribution, indicating that the marginal product for dairy 
cows in an average organic farm exceeds the marginal product weighted marginal products of 
all farms in the industry (see formula 23 also).    
6.8 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter focuses on the economic performance of PIoS compared to conventional farms. 
More specifically, hypothesis 2 is tested and confirmed: firms participating in Private 
Institutions of Sustainability create more ‘sustainable value’ than firms who do not. The 
applied method also shows that more value could have been created when the resources 
would have been applied more efficiently. To come to these conclusions we adapted the SV-
methodology developed by Figge and Hahn (2004).    
 
We first argued that the traditional sustainable value formula of Figge and Hahn (2004) needs 
revision by taking the firm specific production functions into account. This allows proper 
assessment of the value created when a firm’s resources are invested in this market and not 
(only) in that particular firm. The sustainable value method heavily depends on the definition 
of the benchmark. Based upon the chosen redistribution mechanism of resources across firms, 
the benchmark definition is different and hence, the obtained sustainable values are different.  
 
The question is of course, what is the correct benchmark, and under which conditions? Both 
Figge and Hahn (2009) and Kuosmanen and Kuosmanen (2009) agree that opportunity costs 
can be defined as the return that would have been created if the resources had been used in the 
best available alternative. Figge and Hahn (2009) depart from the idea that the best available 
alternative and thus opportunity costs should be determined on the individual firm level. They 
argue, following the methodological tradition of financial economics, that the best available 
alternative is defined by an average return on resources of many different companies. Under 
the condition of uncertainty, investing across many economic entities reduces risk through 
diversification, leading to a higher utility for a risk-averse investor.    
                                                          
25 return weighted 
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The ‘Peer only’ benchmark assumes certainty about the return on capital use. The merit of 
this benchmark mainly lies at a micro-economic level, as it shows for each firm what its 
improvement potential is, i.e. how much extra value can be generated when the firm applies 
its resources in a more efficient way. The fact that the return on investment in the real world is 
uncertain is however not accounted for. Under the condition that the resources and the 
production technology are fully identified, both the benchmark firm and the evaluated firm 
are subject to the same risky environment. This benchmark than solely indicates the best 
management for the resources. For our specific case of PIoS we saw that the organic system 
has a higher return-weighted sustainable efficiency, indicating that the potential for 
management improvement is lower in organic farming compared to conventional farming. 
Organic farms thus operate more closely to their peers.    
 
The ‘Share in x’ benchmark is composed of many different economic entities. The weight of a 
firm in this benchmark depends on its resource use. As mathematically shown earlier in the 
text this benchmark definition corresponds most with the traditional Figge and Hahn 
sustainable value benchmark. As it distributes the resources of the evaluated firm over the 
market according to the current resource distribution in the market, this benchmark reflects 
the actual market behaviour best. Typically, both positive and negative sustainable values can 
be obtained with this benchmark, which is logic as some firms perform better than the market 
while others do worse. The outcome of this sustainable value analysis is that we know 
whether a firm has positively or negatively contributed to the current sustainable value 
creation in the market.  
According to Figge and Hahn (2009) investing in a market based benchmark will reduce risk. 
The question emerging in this case is to know what part of the calculated sustainable value 
relates to unsystematic risk and what part is the true measure of sustainable value?  
For our case of PIoS this benchmark shows us that the organic system contributes more to the 
market’s current sustainable value creation compared to the conventional system. The 
marginal value contributions on their turn indicate that additional dairy livestock units create 
most sustainable value when invested in the organic system, while the other resources have 
more potential for increased value creation when they are invested in the conventional system.    
    
The benchmark based upon ‘marginal product of a resource’ allocates an evaluated firm’s 
resources to the firms in the market based upon their willingness to pay for these resources. 
For several reasons this is an interesting benchmark. First it fits perfectly in the definition of 
best available alternative. By decomposing each resource in subunits and investing these into 
firms according to their marginal products, most value is created in the system. Opposite to 
the prior benchmark, this benchmark takes the firms productivity in the use of the resources 
into account. Second it reflects the behaviour of the market when the evaluated firm drops out 
of the market, as firms will then compete for the resources set free. This measure thus 
indicates how much value is foregone by investing into a specific firm instead of investing in 
the market according to the market’s potential for value creation.  
When applied to the PIoS case we see similar scores for the organic and conventional system. 
This can be explained by analysing the marginal products. Organic farming is rather 
efficiently applying resources with the exception of dairy cows. The marginal products for the 
other resources are therefore fairly low, which results into an overall similar score as the 
conventional system. For these resources, the organic farms also do not contribute much to 
the benchmark, because the benchmark is defined in such a way that firms with higher 
marginal products receive more of the resources set free. The organic system’s marginal value 
contribution is positive for dairy cows and extremely negative for fodder.   
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In the organic rules and regulations, the number of livestock units is restricted to 2 per hectare 
(EEC No 2092/91). Our analysis shows that this rule is currently blocking the organic system 
to create more value. For the conventional system the amount of fodder (expressed in 
hectares) is currently a key prohibiting factor for increased value creation. In Belgium 
traditionally the agricultural area has been limiting the growth of farms, as it is a very land 
intensive system.  
 
For this example of Belgian dairy farms in 2004, the price difference between conventional 
and organic milk amounts to 0.0588€/l. A price of 0.30€/l is paid for off farm conventional 
milk. The price difference reflects the surplus value created by organic farming. Although the 
return figure is used as output, a better sustainable value is still found for organic farming, 
according to the three benchmarks. This indicates that the market assumes that the organic 
milk contains (external) quality features additional to the capital forms used in the example. 
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Chapter 7. Social performance - Endogenous development of PIoS 
and convergence to a premium spot market   
 
This chapter is based upon Mondelaers, K. and Van Huylenbroeck, G. (2008). Dynamics of 
the retail driven higher end spot market and its institutions. British Food Journal, 110 (4/5), 
474 – 492. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies the internal social performance of PIoS. PIoS, as hybrids, are initiated in 
a value chain in which different value-chain members cooperate and compete. In farm 
certification schemes farmers and retailers are the most important value chain members. 
According to Bunte (2003), social supply chain performance depends on two elements: (1) 
efficiency (profit) and (2) equity (people). Efficiency, which is concerned with the creation of 
value added, is discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter we focus on equity, which is 
concerned with the division of value added over the respective stakeholders. To explain 
effects on the equity within the PIoS we first illustrate the (potential) evolution of PIoS 
towards a retail driven premium spot market. By comparing the characteristics of this 
premium spot market with these of the regular spot market and of the original PIoS we want 
to test hypothesis 3:  
Private institutions of Sustainability can lead to more equity among value chain members   
 
The analysis in this chapter is qualitative. We start with a scene setting.       
 
In line with broader economic developments, the market for fresh food products has evolved 
from a regional to a global one, as illustrated by Busch and Bain (2004). This enables further 
product differentiation, but also simultaneously increases information asymmetries. The latter 
trigger the need for more elaborate governance systems, such as quality assurance systems. 
Henson and Reardon (2005) view the emergence of private food safety and quality standards 
as an increasingly prominent driving force of agri-food systems across the globe. These 
standards have evolved in response to regulatory developments and, more directly, consumer 
concerns, and have become a means of competitive positioning in markets for high-value 
agricultural and food products. According to Mainville et al. (2005), standards can have 
different functions and are primarily used for standardizing, differentiating and reducing risk. 
They can be used to regulate both intrinsic (such as product safety and health) and extrinsic 
(production system and environment related) quality attributes (Grunert, 2005). They can 
specifically target agricultural production (e.g. EurepGAP), relate to post production 
requirements (e.g. British Retail Consortium, BRC) or combine both (e.g. organic farming). 
The use of these standards can be communicated to end consumers by means of a label, a 
strategy mainly used for diversification purposes.  
 
Baines et al. (2000) have argued that consumers and, indeed, the whole food chain would 
benefit from the development of certification schemes with a common standard for food 
safety, irrespective of the country of origin. Promulgating such harmonized standards would 
reduce the risk and the costs involved in assessing food safety. Giraud-Héraud et al. (2005) 
have documented the emergence of a new type of retailer-led spot market, characterized by 
(predominantly safety) standards that are common to several retailers. They identified 
GlobalGAP as one of the telling examples of retailers’ shift away from more intense (vertical) 
relationships with producers. 
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The preferred type of chain governance system closely relates to the type of relationship that 
exists between primary production and distribution. Traditionally, the partnerships between 
buyers and sellers in the market for fresh agricultural products have ranged from the classic 
spot market to vertical integration. Codron et al. (2005) classified these partnerships into three 
main groups: (1) farmer-driven initiatives, comparable to a ‘national brand’-approach, (2) 
retail driven vertical alliances between producers, manufacturers and retailers and (3) generic 
standards common to several retailers. The Belgian Flandria initiative discussed in this paper 
is an example of the first type, and the Belgian Fruitnet – Delhaize Alliance26 or the ‘Filières 
Qualité’27
 
 of Carrefour are examples of the second type. Where these three types of 
relationship once co-existed, we have recently seen an apparent shift towards the third type, 
with GlobalGAP being the leading example in Europe. Other initiatives now find that they 
need to ensure that they are at least GlobalGAP compatible. The proliferation of the 
GlobalGAP standards is therefore leading to a new type of (hybrid) market organization, the 
retail driven higher end spot market. This market contains all characteristics of the regular 
spot market, with price competition and unrestricted access, except for a series of supra-legal 
demands which are formalized in a private certification standard. The retail chains involved 
are all active in the higher end of the market, although often in different regional settings. In 
this paper we draw on the case of vegetable certification in the region of Flanders to analyse 
the emergence of the higher end spot market and its implications for competing certification 
standards.  
This case study illustrates the problems involved by exploring the transition of the original 
Belgian farmers’ driven vegetable certification system Flandria, to its transitional stage 
FlandriaGAP and then to becoming the GlobalGAP benchmark. It illustrates the influence of 
the higher end spot market on farmer and regional attempts to achieve market differentiation. 
The products we focus on are fresh vegetables marketed through auctions. The main actors 
involved in the higher end spot market are the vegetable growers and six Belgian fruit and 
vegetable auctions, united under the umbrella of LAVA (Administrative and Logistic 
Association of Auctions), Belgian food retailers and independent controlling bodies (e.g. 
Certagro). Government, farm suppliers, pressure groups and consumers are also involved in 
and influenced by the initiative, although less directly. In this chapter we try to explain this 
convergence in PIoS.    
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides the details about the case study 
on which this chapter is based: the Flandria certification scheme and its evolution towards 
GlobalGAP. Next, the theoretical framework is introduced followed by a description of the 
various data sources consulted. The following section describes the institutional setting of 
certification of fresh vegetables in Belgium, which is followed by a description and analysis 
of drivers involved in promoting a premium private market and single certification system.  
The penultimate section considers the new certification system as a balance between the 
stakes of the involved market players and the chapter finishes by drawing some general 
conclusions.   
 
                                                          
26 From 1991 on an intensive cooperation exist between 70 Belgian fruit tree growers following the rules of 
integrated production, and the Delhaize group. Additional quality criteria, such as sweetness, juiciness and 
colour, also have to be met (www.delhaize.be, 28/06/07). 
27 In France, Carrefour has established  245 ‘filières’ with more than 35500 producers of cheese, vegetables, 
fruit, wins, meat and fish, resulting in 74 ‘Filière Qualité’ labelled products. Worldwide, 350 ‘filières’ have been 
realised (www.carrefour.fr, 28/06/07).  
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7.2 From Flandria to GlobalGAP 
The Flandria label was initiated as a quality certification system in Belgium by auctions 
owned by farmer cooperatives. In 1995 the first tomatoes and chicory were sold in the 
Belgian auctions under this new quality label. Today, more than fifty Flandria products are 
offered at the Belgian auctions. The label is a guarantee for a high quality product, cultivated 
in an environmentally friendly way and fully traceable. Particular specifications are set for 
each type of product to ensure environmentally friendly production. For example, for crop 
protection, organic resources are preferred over synthetic ones and early observation and 
warning systems are used. The use of fertilizers is based on the results of soil analyses and 
considerable attention has to be paid to hygiene aspects. There are relatively strict 
requirements for residue monitoring. The first line of control of the products occurs at the 
auctions, with an external control body responsible for second-line control, monitoring the 
automatic control system within LAVA and monitoring and controlling residues. Flandria’s 
market share varies according to the type of vegetable. Of the fruit-type (usually glasshouse) 
vegetable crops (such as tomatoes, peppers and cucumber) delivered to the auction at 
Mechelen, more than 80% is certified under Flandria (for 4 of them it  is more than 90%). 
More than 90% of all the principal salad leaf varieties (lamb’s lettuce, iceberg lettuce, classic 
lettuce) are produced under Flandria standards. Eight out of twelve of the open air vegetables 
(such as cauliflower, broccoli, leeks and carrots) also reach the 90% level. Although covering 
most generic products in Flanders, Flandria vegetables remain a (quality) niche at the 
European level (accounting for approximately 3% of total sales, FlandriaMail). Currently 
about 3,500 (of the 4,508 registered fresh vegetables production units in Flanders) adhere to 
Flandria standards (FlandriaMail, 2005, National Institute for Statistics, 2005). 
 
Shortly after, in 1997, the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (Eurep) launched 
EurepGAP as a quality system to set benchmarks in the agricultural sector. The first 
EurepGAP specifications were established for fresh fruit and vegetables, followed by working 
documents for other agricultural sectors. The documents were drafted in cooperation with 
producer organizations and certification bodies. EurepGAP, in 2008 renamed into 
GlobalGAP, has been developed to become a complete accredited certification system. The 
retailers’ intention is to continue to develop this system into a world standard for different 
sectors of agricultural production. Today, GlobalGAP certificates are issued in more than 60 
countries. The number of GlobalGAP approved farms has nearly doubled every year from 
4,000 in 2002 to 35,000 in 2005 (GlobalGAP, 2005). In Belgium, there are some 2,000 
participating producers (EurepGAP, 2006) and thirty two European retailer and food service 
groups have subscribed as members of the fruit and vegetable pillar. Since it was established 
in 2001, 13 major certification schemes have been benchmarked against the GlobalGAP 
standard (EurepGAP, 2007). 
 
Given the need to meet the requirements of the distribution sector due to the rapid success of 
GlobalGAP, the auctions "Mechelse Veilingen" and "Veiling Hoogstraten" decided to 
benchmark the Flandria quality label to the GlobalGAP standard by adding FlandriaGAP 
specifications. This implied an extension of the environmental production requirements, 
together with rules on food safety and hygiene, work safety and social norms. The two 
auctions switched over completely to the FlandriaGAP Specifications in 2004.  Since 2006  
about 1000 growers associated with the Auction of Mechelen follow the more restrictive 
FlandriaGAP/GlobalGAP standard, a number which has grown rapidly since October 2005 
when there were just 208 (153 greenhouse gardeners and 55 outdoor vegetable growers, MV 
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Info, 2005). The rapid increase in the number of FlandriaGAP certified producers is proof of 
the rising demand from buyers for products that meet these more restrictive process standards.  
 
7.3 Theoretical framework 
Our main research question in this chapter, the equity among value chain members within 
Private institutions of Sustainability, can be approached by studying the effects of the 
evolution towards a premium spot market on the different PIoS value chain members. This 
research question can be broken down into three interrelated questions. The first is: why do 
certification schemes exist? The second is: why do these evolve towards a single standard? 
The third question is then: how does this evolution influence the internal construction of the 
certification value chain? Transaction cost theory usefully explains the existence of 
certification systems. The evolution of multiple certification systems towards a single 
standard can be explained by combining this theory with the principles of system innovation. 
Finally, in describing the influence of a single certification standard on the existing value 
chain equilibrium, we rely on Porter’s theory of competitive (and cooperative) forces. 
 
As explained in chapter 1, economic exchange inevitably entails transaction costs. These 
include the costs involved in searching (for information), negotiating and monitoring and 
enforcement (Hobbs, 2003). They emerge because (1) individuals have a bounded rationality, 
due to the complexity and uncertainty of the working environment; and (2) some economic 
actors exhibit opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1979, Simon, 1982). Both these factors 
can lead economic actors to incur high costs in terms of time and resources, in searching for 
information on the contracting environment and the firm they want to conduct transactions 
with. Transaction cost economics demonstrates that contractual arrangements align with the 
prevailing governance structure; simple transactions use and require simple governance 
structures, while more complex exchanges are associated with more complex forms of 
organization. Deviations from this pattern are less efficient and incur high transaction costs 
(Leiblein, 2003). In this respect the certification system can be seen as a governance structure 
put in place to reduce the transaction costs arising from the variation in both the product and 
process characteristics of many suppliers. These factors can all vary since agricultural 
production is characterized by uncertainties, due to varying climate and soil conditions, 
working with living materials and differences in managerial capacities and attitudes. 
Certification provides a procedure through which a third party gives written assurance that the 
product, process or service conforms with agreed standards, and this acts as a form of 
communication along the supply chain (ISO, 1996). The certification system defines the 
standards, the procedures by which they should be implemented, monitored and enforced and 
the type of agents subject to it. It gives rise to a hybrid market organization, which falls 
between the spot market with loose contractual arrangements between many unrelated agents 
and a single, hierarchically organized firm where transactions are internalized (see chapter 1 
also).  
 
Certification schemes and their resulting networks of actors are constantly evolving. From a 
system innovation perspective the recent (and ongoing) merger of the multiple certification 
schemes towards a single coordinating scheme which creates a higher-end spot market can be 
considered as a sectoral system of innovation. Malerba (2002) defines a sectoral system as an 
innovation that simultaneously combines the creation, production and selling of products by a 
group of agents. Central to the line of argument employed in this paper is that the agents’ 
interactions are shaped by specific institutions (rules and regulations), of which the 
certification scheme is the most important. These institutions typically frame the boundaries 
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of the system and as a result, the dynamics within the sectoral system are highly dependent 
upon the dynamics within these institutions. To capture the dynamics in certification 
standards, we depart from the three processes that drive economic change, as defined by 
Nelson (1995). These are: processes of variety creation, followed by processes of selection, 
which reduce the heterogeneity due to (random) variety creation and a last phase that consists 
of inertia and continuity, i.e. preserving what survived the selection procedure.   
 
The processes triggering change in the certification institutions, particularly towards a single 
coordinating scheme, take place due to a mixture of internal and external forces along the 
hybrid value chain. The certification system, as a social construct, reflects the equilibrium of 
the stakes of directly, and indirectly, involved stakeholders. This equilibrium and the 
dynamics therein are shaped by the competitive pressures and opportunities for cooperation 
between organizations within and outside the certification network. Porter (1979) identifies 
five competitive pressures which limit the profits that an organization can earn in an industry. 
His framework, later defined as a zero sum game, identifies the following competitive 
pressures: internal rivalry, supplier power, buyer power, the threat of substitute products and 
the threat of new entrants. Sanchez and Heene (2004) illustrate how these five pressures might 
be reoriented to become sources of mutual gain through cooperation, thereby creating positive 
sum games. Applying Porter’s concepts to the production of fresh vegetable commodities, the 
vegetable producers participating in a certification scheme can be considered as the core firms 
of the industry. The buyers in our analysis are the retailers, while the suppliers are 
agrochemical companies, breeding stations and other suppliers of agricultural inputs. New 
entrants are those farmers not yet participating in the certification network and substitute 
products come from competing certification schemes in the fresh vegetable market.     
 
7.4 Data and methodology 
Although this paper is mainly theoretical and qualitative it builds upon data collected through 
four sources of information: focus groups with the principal stakeholders, a farmers’ 
questionnaire, in-depth interviews with key players and a literature review. Focus groups are 
discussion sessions between several stakeholders under the supervision of a moderator (see 
Morgan, 1993; Grudens-Schuck et al., 2004). The main subject of the discussion is fixed but, 
the discussion topics evolve depending on the composition and priorities of the stakeholder 
group. The technique is particularly useful in exploring the reasoning behind certain points of 
view and to detecting possible synergies or conflicts in the objectives of the participants.  
 
From March, 2005 to June, 2005, six focus groups were conducted with the principal 
stakeholders, including the vegetable growers, auctioneers, pressure groups, retail and 
government representatives. Each focus group covered a different subject and consisted of a 
different composition of stakeholders, in line with the subject, as shown in Table 7.1. They 
were moderated by two representatives from a bureau specialized in this kind of participatory 
research, while the researchers were present as observers. The bureau was also entrusted with 
the selection of the participants, starting from the researchers’ network of contacts.   
 
The questionnaire was undertaken in January 2006 and involved personally interviewing 68 
farmers participating in the FlandriaGAP initiative. The questionnaire was aimed at 
measuring the (dis)utility for farmers applying the standards required (Van Huylenbroeck et 
al., 2006). Although this paper does not discuss the quantitative results of this survey, the 
contacts with the farmers during the surveying cycle provided qualitative information that 
supplemented the topics raised in the focus groups. In addition private and governmental 
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experts in the field of standards and labelling were consulted and their comments further 
strengthened (or challenged) the results from the cycle of the focus groups. These interviews 
included three meetings with representatives of the Auction of Mechelen, one with a 
representative of the Brava Auction and one with government officials from the Food 
Agency. During four user group meetings, the results of this (and related) research were 
presented to and discussed with a total 24 representatives from the auctions, retail sector, 
consumer groups, the farmers’ union, government officials and pressure groups.    
 
Table 7.1. Structure of focus group sessions 
 Stakeholder type Subject 
Focus group 1 Vegetable growers aligned to 3 different 
certification schemes * (9) 
- motivation for participation in the initiatives 
- (dis)advantages 
Focus group 2 Vegetable growers in FLANDRIAGAP 
and GLOBALGAP (13) 
Consequences of participation at farm level  
Focus group 3a and 
Focus group 3b 
Certification representatives, 
auctioneers, retail, consumers and 
producer organizations (5+4) 
- producers’ stakes versus other stakeholders’ 
stakes 
- certification initiatives versus other measures 
aimed at reducing pesticide use 
Focus group 4 Vegetable growers, initiators, 
auctioneers, retail (6) 
driving forces and evolution within the initiative 
Focus group 5 All involved stakeholders (13) feed back and discussion  
  Number of participants in parentheses 
  * Biogarantie, FLANDRIA and GLOBALGAP 
 
This chapter makes use of descriptive and explorative information from the focus group 
sessions with the aim of testing the hypothesis that PIoS lead to more internal social 
sustainability. It combines the information of focus groups one to five. More detailed 
information w.r.t. focus group design, script, constellation, moderation, reporting, content, 
dynamics and analysis can be found in Mondelaers et al. (2005). 
  
As documented in Strauss and Corbin (1996), a three step procedure was followed, consisting 
of a descriptive phase, an explorative phase and a theorizing phase. To process the focus 
group information open coding, axial coding and selective coding was used, albeit informally. 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1996), open coding is the analytical process through which 
concepts are identified and their properties and dimensions are discovered in the data. For the 
descriptive phase we made use of this approach. Axial coding on its turn is the process of 
relating categories to subcategories, while selective coding refers to integrating and refining a 
theory. For the explorative phase, we used axial coding in two dimensions: to relate concepts 
and opinions to certain stakeholder groups, with the aim of identifying opposing or 
reinforcing opinions, and to upscale certain opinions and views to more broad categories. In 
the final selective coding phase, the identified concepts were positioned in Porter’s theory of 
competitive forces and sources for mutual gain, adapted for the case of PIoS.  
 
The chapter is also structured accordingly. First, descriptive research, which is predominantly 
based upon focus group four and previous in-depth interviews, led to the description of the 
institutional context of certification (paragraph 7.5) and the processes of change (paragraph 
7.6). Second, explorative research starting from the information of focus groups one, two and 
three, led to the identification of perceived advantages and disadvantages according to the 
various stakeholders (paragraph 7.6). Experienced benefits and costs for farmers and retailers 
and the distribution of the costs over the different parties, documented in paragraph 7.6, were 
also discussed in focus group sessions 2, 3a and 3b. Third, in paragraph 7.7, the explorative 
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research is further structured along the dimensions of Porter’s five competitive forces and 
sources for mutual gain. Both paragraph 7.6 on the division of costs and benefits and  
paragraph 7.7 on the sources for competition or mutual gain contribute to the testing of the 
chapter’s underlying hypothesis that PIoS contribute to equity within the value chain.  
 
Validation and objectivity was guaranteed in multiple ways. First, during processing, four 
different data sources (in-depth interviews, focus groups, literature review and a 
questionnaire) allowed to triangulate commonly discussed aspects, such as reasons to 
participate, costs and benefits, construction process etc. After focus groups one to four, a 
descriptive and explorative phase was conducted by two researchers jointly. The obtained 
descriptive and explorative research results were then presented to the focus group 
participants in a final feed back focus group and integrated in areport that was circulated to 
the focus group participants. The resulting conclusions were also presented to the user 
committee of the FWB-project D/2006/1191/23 (Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2006).    
 
7.5 The institutional setting of certification  
For the description of the institutional setting of certification in the fresh vegetable sector, we 
refer to chapter 2, paragraph 4.  
 
Over the past decade several certification standards have been initiated that surpass legal 
requirements to comply with the extra demands from market players downstream in the food 
chain. The economic crisis in 1995 in the tomato and endive sectors led the auctions to 
elaborate and implement the Flandria certification standard, which now certifies more than 50 
product families (fruit and vegetables). The cornerstones are product quality, integrated 
farming practices and traceability. The certification efforts are communicated towards the end 
consumer through the Flandria label. Since the beginning of 2005, the new Flandria 
certification manual has encompassed more stringent measures concerning the production 
process, by including the ICQC standard, which was initiated by a consortium of fresh food 
chain members. 
 
Since 2004 there has also been a more prescriptive FlandriaGAP version of the Flandria 
certification book. This combines the standards of GlobalGAP and other major European 
certification initiatives (e.g. Q&S) and the governmental law on self regulation into a 
workable certification manual for Flemish farming. It places extra emphasis on measures 
related to food safety, environmental care and workers’ health and safety. Only 2 out of the 6 
Belgian auctions in Flandria, follow this certification standard, of which the Auction of 
Mechelen is the most important, with almost 40% of all auctioned vegetable products in 
Belgium passing through it. The auction representative indicated that over 70% of the 
Flandria fresh vegetables are exported, hence this certification standard should be considered 
in an international context.  
 
7.6 Convergence towards a premium spot market with a single certification 
standard 
7.6.1 Dynamics in farm level certification systems 
International buyers, including the major retailers now increasingly demand the GlobalGAP 
standard. The auctions have two options in increasing the supply of the GlobalGAP certified 
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produce: a soft or a more direct transition, with the latter based upon price incentives for early 
converters, a strategy applied by the competing Reo Auction. The Mechlin Auction 
introduced the FlandriaGAP standard, instead of the more standardized GlobalGAP standard, 
to provide a softer transition for its affiliated farmers, because the majority of them operate on 
a small scale. However, the FlandriaGAP-initiative is gradually being fully replaced by the 
GlobalGAP-system, due to the continuous demand for GlobalGAP-products, mainly from 
non-Belgian buyers. The 2005 version of FlandriaGAP was fully compatible with the existing 
GlobalGAP standard and was replaced by it in 2006.  
 
The drive towards GlobalGAP has had other effects apart from the emergence and 
disappearance of the FlandriaGAP certification system. Table 7.2 shows that the Flandria 
standard has been degraded to a second class process standard, but remains a first class 
product standard. Pressure from downstream market players (mainly German retailers) has led 
the auction to now sell the FlandriaGAP/GlobalGAP and Flandria products in separate blocks.  
Initially prices will remain the same, but gradually this system will provide a price premium 
for the FlandriaGAP/GlobalGAP block, further encouraging conversion to this more 
demanding standard (MV Info, 2006).  
 
Table 7.2. Evolution of preferential positioning of Flandria 
Period Product Quality level 2 Product Quality level 1 
Process quality level 2 Process quality level 1 
1995 - 2000 Flandria declassed * Flandria / 
2001 - 2005 Flandria declassed / 
GlobalGAP Q2 
Flandria  FlandriaGAP/GlobalGAP Q1 
2006 - Flandria GlobalGAP Q1 
Q1 = product quality level 1; Q2 = level 2 
* declassed = not up to the Flandria quality level 
 
The gradual shift from the Flandria standard to the GlobalGAP standard can be interpreted as 
a (retail driven) sectoral system of innovation, as described in the theoretical framework. This 
example allows us to derive a more formal analysis of the dynamics operating within these 
certification schemes. Figure 7.1 represents these dynamics graphically. In the first stage, 
several innovative farmers agree upon similar product features and production practices doing 
so as they see a competitive advantage in this harmonization. Certification is then used for 
communicating their efforts to players downstream in the value chain. This leads to a 
consolidation phase taking place, at the farm level. During the maturation of these multiple 
certification systems, a second consolidation phase takes place, between the different co-
existing certification schemes, driven by transaction cost economics (mainly under retail 
pressure) and the economies of learning at the certification level (cross-adoption of 
modifications). This finally results in a majority of farmers participating in a single 
certification initiative (or several look alike initiatives), comparable with the spot market 
situation before the certification round started, although now operating more restrictively. 
Some innovators remain above this spot market level, and they will trigger a second 
certification round, which departs from a higher level.  
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Figure 7.1. Evolution of certification systems 
As in other process of economic change (Nelson, 1995), this cycle involves processes of 
variety creation, followed by processes of selection (at farm and at certification level) and 
processes of inertia/continuity. Currently, the result of the consolidation of certification 
schemes is the GlobalGAP standard, which now acts as the basis for the premium private spot 
market. The dynamics within the fresh commodity sector and its standards will result in this 
premium private standard becoming the basic standard, which will eventually be incorporated 
into the legislation of the regions where the standard is applied. It may then form the basis for 
new initiatives aimed at further improving quality or new forms of differentiation (in other 
words a starting point for a new innovation cycle). 
 
7.6.2 General drivers for a single certification standard  
Many forces influence the adaptation of standards. With FlandriaGAP (2004) these included: 
changes in the current legislation, fine tuning with other private initiatives, changing demands 
from buyers, new production techniques, scientific results, and the views of participating 
organizations (e.g. auctions, auditors and control bodies). The revision of certification 
standards is quite similar among the different certification systems: with a technical 
committee proposing changes and a steering committee analysing and approving them. 
Individual producers have no direct impact on the rules and formulations in the ‘cahier de 
charge’ or standards book, but their views are taken into account when revising the standards.  
Farmers normally communicate problems related to impractical rules to the samplers at 
auction level. These, together with statistics from the control body on the number and kind of 
breaches inform the standard setting and help to adapt unrealistic prescriptions.  
 
Private standards and certification systems are put in place for strategic reasons, for the 
purposes of standardization, differentiation and reducing risk (Mainville et al., 2005). During 
the focus group sessions, those involved in the certification process were asked to discuss 
their primary motivation for participation. Their responses, summarized in Table 7.3, confirm 
the strategic objectives that Mainville et al. identify.   
 
Time T = 0 T = 0’ 
Base level 1 
Base level 0 
Upper level 0 
Upper level 1 
T = 1 T = 2 
1. Spot 
market 
2. Consolidation wave at farm 
level: certifications 
3. Consolidation wave at 
certification level 
1’. New spot market at 
higher level 
Innovator 
Majority 
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Table 7.3. Certification book participation - top of mind reasons  
Producers Auctions Retail Consumer Summary 
Trust – vs. short 
supply chain 
Trust in the chain Protection (due diligence)  Information Risk reduction 
Differentiation Differentiation / 
recognisability 
Differentiation* Choice Differentiation 
 Uniformity / 
standardization 
Uniformity and clarity  Standardization 
Involvement/ 
optimization 
   Optimization 
License to deliver  Imposing demands on 
suppliers 
 Necessity 
* depending on the type of initiative. GlobalGAP e.g. has no differentiating functions 
 
The focus group participants associate the following, closely linked, terms with the question 
‘why is GlobalGAP used?’: basic certification book, uniformity and insurance of the product. 
For the retailers, the most important characteristic of GlobalGAP is its focus on food safety, 
while producers see GlobalGAP as a safeguard for the retailers. Retailers find that it provides 
a useful mechanism for reducing their liability, under the due diligence principle enshrined in 
national legislation (Hatanaka, 2005)28
 
. Unlike product standards, such as Flandria, the 
GlobalGAP standards are not communicated to end consumers, making it akin to a private 
label rather than a national brand. This leads producers to see the scheme as something that is 
a ‘necessary condition to enter certain channels’, ‘requested and/or imposed by downstream 
players’, ‘a safeguard for distribution channels ’ which involves ‘passing the burden onto 
producers’, all topics that relate to and reflect market power and chain management.   
However, the non-visibility of GlobalGAP to end consumers is related to other associations 
such as ‘basic product’ and ‘no product quality demands’, as the standard does not offer any 
guarantees about product quality. Retailers avoid using this generic standard as a label, 
because there is a risk that consumers will associate it with low product quality. The 
association of ‘basic product’ is in turn closely linked with the third topic, uniformity. This 
guarantees that products, no matter what their origin, are substitutable as they are produced 
following the same rules. This characteristic increases the negotiation position of the retailers 
on international markets and reduces transaction costs. GlobalGAP has been launched to 
harmonize the multitude of initiatives in the market, and this gives rise to it being associated 
with ‘similarity’, ‘basic conditions’ and ‘too abstract. Product specific requirements, which 
are often closely linked to climatic and regional conditions, are not included. From the point 
of view of those who promoted the Flandria label the emergence of GlobalGAP is not 
favourable, as it has proven to be a direct (and more successful) competitor to their own 
initiative. The farmers have difficulties with the new scheme as it is no longer a farmer driven 
initiative, and they do not identify with it as much.   
 
7.6.3 The single certification standard from a transaction cost perspective 
In general, the adoption of the quality assurance systems can play a role in reducing 
transaction costs in the food chain. However, in the short run, firms incur sunk costs (e.g. 
start-up costs) related to adopting the quality system. These sunk costs will, of course, vary 
                                                          
28 The Belgian Law on product liability (22/03/1991) prescribes that the supplier (the retailer here) is considered 
to be the producer when he is unable to identify the producer.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
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depending on firm size, product type and existing quality system. There is also an evident 
desire to shift the costs of quality control to other actors in the chain.  
 
To position their products in the top quality segment of the market, retailers use strategies of 
horizontal differentiation, based upon the product’s unique features (e.g. its packaging), and 
vertical differentiation, based upon the quality level (see Chan Choi and Coughlan, 2006). For 
the quality based strategy, the retailer might invest in vertical alliances with producer 
organizations (POs). Their joint effort is then communicated to end consumers through a 
retailer or a channel private label (see de Fontguyon et al., 2003 also). However, for their 
main range of bulk products, which are only horizontally differentiated from those of their 
competitors, this strategy is too costly. This opens the doors for a new type of hybrid market, 
the higher end spot market, with generic standards common to several retailers. Given the 
recent mergers at the retail level and the associated increase in market power (Clarke et al., 
2002; McCorriston, 2002), the creation of such a premium private spot market, with higher 
safety and quality standards, seems attainable. But as Codron et al. (2005) indicate there is the 
possible danger that liability problems will occur if the standard is too generic and not 
sufficiently distant from the standard spot market. Conversely if the standard is too severe, the 
compensation mechanisms have to be more elaborate, increasing the associated control and 
monitoring efforts, as well as other transaction costs. Furthermore, the independence of the 
actors involved (i.e. producers) may decrease due to the need for asset specificity. The risk of 
empty shelves may then become a problem because supply may be too small (as was often the 
case for organic products in the past). This higher end spot market results from cooperation 
between competing parties, a phenomenon termed coopetition (Sanchez and Heene, 2004 or 
Tsai, 2002). However, rather than sharing their resource base, retailers now pool their market 
(and negotiation) power to demand common certification standards, enabling them to source 
from different markets all over the globe (see also Chae and Heidhues, 2004). The resulting 
coordinating institution, the certification scheme, with GlobalGAP as a telling example, acts 
as a safeguard for the uniformity of production process, regardless of the region of production 
and differences in regional legal institutions. Parallels can be drawn between this evolution 
and the drive towards modularity in other industries, a concept described by Langlois and 
Robertson (1992). Because adherence to the certification standard is not communicated to the 
end consumer (but is only Business to Business), the retailers retain all the options for a 
private branding policy. As indicated in Fulponi (2006), retailers’ incentives for the presence 
of quality assurance schemes can be summarized in the word ‘reputation’. The main objective 
of the higher end spot market is thus to guarantee, based upon predefined process and product 
safety and quality features, the maintenance of a safety and quality image, even for the bulk 
products of the quality retailer. Furthermore, as argued by Hatanaka et al. (2005), because the 
monitoring of the standard is transferred to an independent control body, the retailers’ 
responsibility for policing the safety and quality of their products is minimized, enabling them 
to invest in other domains (such as R&D). Liability also shifts from the retailers to the third 
party certifiers. The costs of monitoring food safety and quality are mainly shifted to the 
suppliers.  
 
From the farmers’ point of view, the emergence of a premium spot market has both beneficial 
and prejudicial effects on their transaction costs. The benefits come from having to comply 
with only one single certification standard, instead of a multiplicity of public and private 
standards. This reduces their administrative and cognitive burden. In addition their individual 
negotiation and information costs are less than for those farmers not participating in private 
certification systems. The disadvantage emerges from the fact that the premium spot market is 
primarily designed to allow buyers to source products from geographically and temporally 
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separate markets and agents, without increasing their transaction costs. This demand results in 
a certification manual which incorporates all the legal and extra-legal requirements of 
different markets and different, merged, certification standards. The certification standard is 
therefore not well adapted to local farming conditions and might be perceived as too abstract, 
with some parts being redundant. Furthermore, it throws producers from different regions, 
with different climatic and soil conditions, into direct competition with each other. The retail 
sector has largely succeeded in shifting the transaction costs towards the upstream chain 
members.  
 
Transaction costs are also an issue at the consumer level. Retailers have increasingly 
supplemented their national brand product offer with their own private label products. These 
make the upstream supplier quasi invisible and oblige customers to rely more and more on the 
safety and quality systems operated by the retailer. Furthermore, the sheer number of products 
available makes it impossible for a customer to process all the information relating to the 
intrinsic and extrinsic quality cues of these products, obliging the customer to rely upon the 
retailer’s safety and quality mechanisms. Because a major part of consumers’ transaction 
costs are now transferred from the product to the retailer level, these can be significantly 
reduced. Once the choice for a type of retailer is made, the consumer can presuppose certain 
quality and safety product features. The last decade has seen growing consumer acceptance of 
these private label products (see also Nielsen, 2005) which enable the retailer to create more 
customer loyalty than national brands, which are also available in competitors’ stores.   
 
Despite this, national brands that link back to the producers will remain important, especially 
in the agricultural and food processing sector, because consumers are increasingly unaware of 
their food’s origin and the way it is produced. It is important therefore that retailers also invest 
in generic standards as well as in more costly vertical alliances with producers. In that case, 
the generic certification standard still acts as the sine qua non, the starting point for 
negotiation, and is then supplemented with more binding and specific contractual 
arrangements. 
 
7.7 The premium spot market as a zero or a positive sum game? 
The type and number of rules in a cahier de charge and the degree to which they are binding 
are a result of negotiations between the involved stakeholders. The cahier de charge therefore 
reflects the equilibrium between the different objectives and the power of the value chain 
members. This changing equilibrium is the main reason for the merger of certification 
systems.  In this analysis we limit ourselves to examining certification schemes that operate at 
the farm level, where the farmers (and their unions) and food retailers are the principal actors. 
The following section describes the tensions between competitive pressures and the sources 
for cooperative gain when certification systems, constructed by multi-stakeholders, merge 
into a single standard.   
 
Figure 7.2 summarizes the competitive forces that exert competitive pressure on certification 
schemes. First of all, one can distinguish an increase in internal rivalry between the farmers 
participating in a single, cross border certification scheme. Although united under the 
certification (or farmers’ union) umbrella, they are in fact all competing for access to the same 
preferential sales channels. Certification offers the framework for competition, the rules and 
terms under which competition takes place. A first condition is thus to ensure that all the 
actors remain within this framework and avoid free rider behaviour. This necessitates an 
independent, watertight system of monitoring, control and penalties. This framework, by 
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stipulating all the product and process requirements, further limits the opportunity for farmers 
to differentiate their product offer from their fellow farmer competitors on non-price 
dimensions, shifting competition to price. Thus the remaining best option for farmers to gain 
competitive advantage is to lower their operating costs, through pursuing economies of scale 
at the farm level. This contributes to the existing trend in agriculture in general, of a shift 
towards a smaller number of larger scale firms. Small scale firms competing under the same 
(certification) conditions as more cost efficient large scale firms thus risk the danger of 
exclusion.  
 
 
Figure 7.2. Competitive forces for actors in certification schemes 
Source: adapted from Sanchez and Heene (2004) and based upon Porter (1979) 
Certification also acts as a barrier to entry for new competitors, due to the need for asset 
specificity. This restriction is balanced by the preference amongst buyers and the auctions for 
schemes which can guarantee a sufficient supply at all times, which necessitates a minimum 
number of farmer participants. The farmer unions also see unlimited access for farmers as 
linked with increased supplier power. However, there is always risk in this of slipping into 
mainstream bulk production, eroding the preferential position of the certification scheme. This 
further increases internal competition within the scheme, which might explain the negative 
attitude of farmers toward unrestricted access. 
 
Substitute products in this framework should be regarded as the products from competing 
certification schemes. The wave of convergence between different certification schemes has 
substantially decreased the switching costs for buyers (and customers). This process might 
further trigger the price competition and downward pressure on the prices paid to farmers.  
 
Although not the core subject of this paper, it is clear that certification schemes potentially 
increase supplier power. These schemes both narrow the available resource base and impose 
stricter criteria for end product quality, thereby limiting farmers’ choice over the use of 
inputs. The concentration of suppliers further increases this possibility as well as the potential 
for increasing dependency.  
 
The main threat to the viability of certification schemes seems however to come from the 
increasing buyer power, triggered by the (international) wave of concentration at the retail 
level (see also McCorriston, 2002) and cross border alliances (see Dobson, 2003). These 
retailers increasingly operate internationally. Their ability to source from different markets, 
together with their close contact with end consumers, creates a situation of information 
asymmetry, which in turn further increases retailer power. They use this power to lobby for 
convergence between the different certification schemes which helps them to further reduce 
their switching costs. They also use this power to force new demands into the certification 
standards and to push prices at the auction level further downwards. As with suppliers, the 
concentration among buyers also increases the danger for dependency. However, due to the 
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large number of participants, the farmers, through their unions, can also exert buyer and 
supplier power, and thus counter some of these effects.            
 
 
Figure 7.3. Sources for mutual gain through cooperation 
Source: adapted from Sanchez and Heene (2004) 
Certification standards can be regarded as equilibrium constructs which, rather than zero sum 
games (where one organization can only benefit at the expense of another, Porter, 1979) are 
positive sum games, in which cooperation leads to win-win situations for all cooperating 
participants. Figure 7.3 illustrates the sources of mutual gain through cooperation. The 
situation of simultaneous cooperation and competition is more formally termed ‘coopetition’. 
The socio-economic construction of certification systems is one of the best examples of 
market players joining forces to create mutual gains and reduce common costs. 
 
The drive towards a single certification network (and thus a premium private spot market) 
creates synergies among the participating farmers which, in terms of certification system, 
lead to economies of scale and economies of learning. The economies of scale mainly relate 
to the increase in market power (both as buyer and supplier), and accrue at the farmer union 
(auction) level. Thus, although the increase in number of participants reduces the negotiation 
power of individual farmers, their joint negotiation power increases. However, with the 
auctions evolving from producer organizations to mediators in the chain, it is not always clear 
whether they fully exert this market power. Furthermore, the disappearance of FlandriaGAP 
indicates that the supplier power of the auctions was less than the joint buyer power of the 
retailers who drove the shift to GlobalGAP. Economies of scale also reduce some fixed costs 
inherent to certification, due both to the reduction in the number of initiatives and because the 
costs for the remaining initiative can be distributed among a larger group of participants. The 
certification standards also offer an ideal negotiation base for more intense cooperation 
between both suppliers and buyers, without imposing the high transaction costs that occur 
when personal contracts have to be negotiated. For example, through their joint buying power, 
farmers can influence the phytopharmacy industry to develop more crop specific or less 
intrusive pesticides. At the buyer side, the certification book is the key for unlocking the 
preferential sales channels of quality oriented retail chains. Economies of learning emerge 
from the incorporation of all the small size initiatives into a single certification standard, 
which result in a crosspollination of ideas and experiences between participants and 
promoters. The mutual gains of cooperation with new entrants and substitute products are 
mainly due to increased learning effects and increased market power. Certified producers 
experience transaction cost advantages, compared to producers selling to the spot market 
which, in turn, enables more investment in product development.  
 
From buyer (retailer) point of view, the unified certification system results in economies of 
substitution and economies of scope. The former exist when one resource in an organization 
can be replaced by another without incurring the significant cost of redesigning the 
Certification scheme X 
 
   
Cooperation with new entrants 
Cooperation with 
suppliers 
Cooperation with 
buyers  
Cooperation with substitute products 
Helping partners to overcome Barriers to 
entry 
Part 2 Social performance - endogenous development of PIoS         Chapter 7 
141 
 
organization (Sanchez and Heene, 2004). The certification system allows the retailers to 
become modular organizations that can quickly incorporate alternative resources (products) 
into their processes (or product range). The economies of scope exist because the retailers’ 
fixed use assets, which were restricted to a single product type (and thus certification system), 
have become flexible use assets, which can be dedicated to all the certified products, due to 
the single certification standard. The cooperation between different retailer groups, necessary 
to create the single standard, creates further advantages related to economies of scale 
(increased market power). 
 
As multi-stakeholder constructions certification systems provide protection against some 
external threats. Participants are better protected against the adverse effects of food scares 
which are, according to the focus group participants, mainly caused by irregularities among 
uncertified producers. Certification thus creates more trust and credibility in the market. It 
might also improve the cost position relative to substitute products (by working together to 
develop new methods, materials and technologies). The extra added value (compared to the 
regular spot market) opens market opportunities (increased market share or better prices) in 
the higher quality segment. Finally, the promoters of the certification system can act as 
advocates for participants’ interests to government agencies.      
 
7.8 Conclusions 
Our main research question in this chapter, the equity among value chain members within 
Private institutions of Sustainability, is approached by studying the effects of the evolution 
towards a premium spot market on the different PIoS value-chain members.  
 
First, there is an apparent shift from multiple certification systems to a single certification 
standard and a premium spot market, with recent mergers between major certification 
schemes, perhaps the most notable of which is GlobalGAP.  
 
The dynamics of certification standards can be broken down into, and understood in terms of 
three processes that drive economic change (Nelson, 1995). In a first stage, processes of 
variety creation result in several distinct certification initiatives, which all grow in terms of 
member numbers, through subsequent processes of inertia and continuity. The first stage of 
initiation and growth takes place at the farm level, with farmers developing and deciding to 
participate in a premium initiative. The second stage, at the certification system level, is 
driven by processes of selection and merges the different certification systems into one single 
standard. The certification manual, which is a balance between the objectives of all involved 
stakeholders, is however from a meta-stable nature (i.e. it will keep evolving gradually), 
resulting in a continuous repetition of this two-stage two level game of variety creation and 
selection.  
 
The resulting single premium spot market is preferable to quality oriented retailers as it 
lowers their transaction costs when sourcing quality products. Due to the increase in uniform 
supply in this market segment, suppliers once again are driven to be price takers in a 
competitive market. The development of generic certification standards is the direct result of 
several retailer groups joining forces and using their joint market power to influence producer 
organizations (in the Flemish case the auctions), who were once more powerful, to adapt their 
own, national brand-like certification schemes. In this sense it is quite ironic that the initial 
GlobalGAP standard, for the rules regarding hygiene and production conditions, was based 
upon Flandria, the Flemish vegetable standard which is now, apart from its product quality 
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pillar, inferior to and fully absorbed by GlobalGAP. The retailers’ bundling of forces is viable 
because, due to the absence of a label, the certified bulk products can still be sold as retailer 
specific private label products. The only demand is that the quality level of the bulk 
vegetables is in line with the general quality level of all the private label products in the 
retailer’s range. A national brand is mainly preferred for those products that result from a 
vertical alliance with a selected group of producers, and, typically, incorporate the retail brand 
name as well. 
 
From the point of view of the farmers and auctions a single higher end spot market has the 
advantage of reducing transaction costs which are typically higher when numerous 
certification initiatives co-exist alongside each other. However, the single, unified standard is 
designed to be applied to many regions, and is therefore not very well adapted to local 
conditions. This induces extra transaction and input costs. Moreover the farmers and auctions 
have lost the preferential position they acquired as scheme initiators and have become 
followers. They have lost their own certification manual and label and now face increased 
price competition. For some types of firm, the current situation might result in higher levels of 
dependency and exclusion. However, by adhering to this new standard, their access to 
preferential sales channels remains open. 
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PART 3: Improving the performance of PIoS 
In Part 2 the performance of PIoS was investigated. As chapter 5 indicated, farms 
participating in PIoS outperform conventional farms with respect to environmental 
sustainability. With respect to the economic performance, Chapter 6 indicated that farms 
participating in PIoS create more sustainable value compared to farms who do not. In chapter 
7 the social performance of PIoS was discussed by analyzing the retail driven evolution 
towards a premium spot market. This chapter concluded that PIoS on the one hand create 
possibilities for a better internal social performance of the value-chain and on the other hand 
exhibit the potential danger to be used as means to exploit market power.  
 
Another conclusion that can be drawn from these three chapters is that PIoS performance can 
still improve. In the third part of this dissertation we want to estimate the potential for 
improving the environmental, social and economic performance of the PIoS. As a measure for 
the potential of environmental performance improvement, farmers’ desired compensation is 
estimated in chapter 8. This chapter thus investigates the research question 4 “what is the 
desired compensation for a better environmental performance?”. 
Figure III.1 below recapitulates (part of) the conceptual framework outlined in chapter 1. 
When the rules of a PIoS are changed for the environmental better, the environmental 
performance of participants will shift to the right (black arrow). As a result the economic 
performance of the participating farms will change. When the change is positive farmers are 
willing to pay for it, when negative they want compensation. Consider a farm located in point 
A with EPA and EnvPA. A change in the PIoS rules may shift it to point G, with a better 
environmental performance and a lower economic performance. The desired compensation 
for the farmer is then EPA-EPG
 
.   
Figure III.1. Research question in part 3 
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Chapter 9 focuses on the improvement of the internal social performance of PIoS. It 
investigates the research question 5 “How can institutional change in PIoS lead to more 
equity among participants?”. 
The endogenous processes of change within PIoS were explained in chapter 7. That chapter 
also emphasized the important role of retailers. Chapter 9 assesses farmers’ attitude towards 
retail driven institutional change in PIoS. Changing institutions results into a new division of 
costs and benefits over the PIoS value-chain members. To come to equitable institutional 
change within PIoS it is important to assess the value chain members’ expected costs and 
benefits for these changes. In Figure III.1 the arrow between point J and H shows how the 
environmental performance of a farm participating in a PIoS can change without a change in 
equity. The arrow between I and K shows the same change in environmental performance but 
with a positive change in equity within the PIoS.      
 
Chapter 10 focuses on the identification of the economically most interesting PIoS-
configuration when new sustainability targets are introduced. It investigates the research 
question 6 “how sustainable efficient are the farms participating in the PIoS system when new 
sustainability targets are introduced?”. 
Our knowledge with respect to sustainability changes continuously. As explained earlier, the 
environmental performance of PIoS can still improve. Figure III.1 indicates the threshold 
between sustainable and unsustainable resource use. Point B combines the point of sustainable 
environmental performance and maximal economic performance, given the existing PIoS 
configurations. The technique developed in chapter 10 helps to identify the improvement path 
for farms to ensure that the sustainability targets are met and simultaneously value creation is 
maximized.  
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Chapter 8. Measuring the perceived opportunity cost of integrative 
PIoS 
 
This chapter is based upon: 
- Mondelaers, K., Garreyn, F., Roussel, L., Louviaux, M., Mormont, M., Pussemier, L., 
Steurbaut, W. and Van Huylenbroeck, G. (2007). Certified production systems: a way 
forward towards sustainability? In: Towards a safer food supply in Europe. Eds. Van 
Peteghem, C., De Saeger, S. and Daeseleire, E. Belgian Science Policy, Brussels, 
ISBN 978-90-8756-032-4  
- Mondelaers K., Garreyn F., Steurbaut W., and Van Huylenbroeck G. (2008). Farmers’ 
acceptance of further strengthening of private certification systems. Poster with oral 
presentation, EAAE 2008 Congress, Ghent, Belgium, August 26 – 29, 2008.  
 
8.1 I
As shown in chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5, PIoS seem promising vehicles to implement extra 
sustainability targets, as they already incorporate sustainability concerns in their business 
objectives. Due to their private voluntary nature, they are also well accepted by private market 
actors. Introducing extra targets means that the institutions underlying the PIoS will be 
changed.  
ntroduction  
 
Private certification systems that introduce rules to reduce the environmental pressure can be 
considered as examples of institutions of sustainability (IoS). The latter term, introduced by 
Hagedorn (2002), refers to sets of rules (constraints) that we impose on our interaction with 
nature. By making the certification pesticide application more restrictive, the farmers 
internalize part of their external costs. In this context, Hagedorn distinguishes between 
integrative and segregative institutions. Integrative institutions, opposite to seggregative 
institutions, refer to (amongst other) the internalization of gains and costs. When the 
certification institution, as a set of rules, becomes more restrictive, f.e. in its pesticide policy, 
it evolves in the direction of an integrative institution, triggering higher transaction and 
opportunity costs for the participants, but simultaneously allowing them to reap some 
reputational gains from the institutional change.  
 
In this chapter, the possible improvements in the pesticide application rules of an existing 
private certification scheme are taken as example for unravelling the ‘costs of integration’ for 
the farmers, participating in a certification initiative. The opportunity costs are the cost for the 
internalization of part of the external costs. The improvements proposed were obtained by 
comparing the existing certification scheme with a virtual optimal system, that combines the 
sets of rules of ‘the best available alternatives in the market’, based on the judgement of 
environmental experts. The main objective of this chapter is to illustrate how the opportunity 
cost of more integrative institutions can be assessed. This opportunity cost is approximated by 
the monetary compensation private actors expect for the introduction of extra sustainability 
rules. It therefore tests hypothesis 4 that changes in institutions influencing the environmental 
performance of PIoS will change the private actors’ desired pay-off structure.    
 
To know which rules have to be changed, two options can be identified. First option is to 
select the rules of the benchmark that guarantees a better environmental effectiveness. 
Another option is to invent new rules. The former procedure has the advantage that the 
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possible environmental contribution of the rule is known ex ante. In this chapter the rules of 
competing PIoS that potentially would improve the environmental performance of the PIoS 
under study are selected. To test the hypothesis, a two step procedure is followed. In the first 
step rules are selected from competing schemes that, according to environmental experts, 
improve the environmental effectiveness of the PIoS under study. These rules are then, in a 
second step, proposed to the participants in the PIoS, to measure their willingness to accept 
the changes, as a proxy for the opportunity cost of integrative institutions.  
 
The standards applied in PIoS can be decomposed into sets of rules, which are listed in 
certification books (or cahiers de charge). Certification itself is the procedure by which a third 
party gives written assurance that the product, process or service is in conformity with these 
standards, and it can be seen as a form of communication along the supply chain (Börkey and 
Levêque, 1998). The certification books, containing the sets of rules, are social constructs, 
and reflect the equilibrium of stakes of direct and indirectly involved stakeholders. As 
explained in chapter 7, stakes and power distribution are in continuous evolution, making the 
certification book equilibrium only of a metastable nature. In this chapter we propose 
environmentally friendly adaptations of the pesticide rules of an existing  private certification 
scheme in the fresh vegetable sector in Belgium and discuss the acceptance by the main 
stakeholder group, the farmers. The desired monetary compensation is used as proxy for the 
opportunity cost of integration borne by this group. The private scheme taken as a case study 
is the FlandriaGAP scheme, which is already an improvement of its predecessor Flandria. As 
explained in chapter 7, this scheme started in 1995 and became the major certification scheme 
in the Belgian vegetable sector. It offers a guarantee for a high quality product, cultivated in 
an environmentally friendly way and fully traceable. 
    
One of the spearheads of environmental certification in the vegetable sector is the pesticide 
policy. The FlandriaGAP scheme aims at a reasoned cultivation and as such incorporates 
several pesticide related rules. Based upon focus group sessions with key stakeholders, 
improvements in the certification pesticide rules were suggested relating to dose, crop 
rotation, type of pesticide, origin of propagation material, order of pesticide application, crop 
resistance and number of treatments. Through multicriteria analysis, the positive contribution 
to ecological sustainability of these new rules is demonstrated. Restricting the certification 
pesticide rules will not be accepted by the participating vegetable growers without an 
adequate price compensation. By means of a choice experiment, farmers’ disutility and 
willingness to accept (WTA) of these new rules is measured. 
 
8.2 Measuring the opportunity cost of integration 
In Hagedorn’s Institutions of Sustainability framework (2002), introduced in chapter 1, the 
central position of the actor was highlighted. When institutional change takes place, the actor 
compares the gains from recontracting within the existing institutional framework with the 
gains from devoting resources to altering that framework (North, 1990). The opportunity costs 
for altering the framework are the gains from recontracting in the existing institutional 
framework. The actor’s comparison is based upon a perception of reality, as the actor confines 
in mental models which are characterized by bounded rationality. 
 
As explained in chapter 1, the relationship between economic and ecological performance of 
PIoS is either mutually enforcing (section AD in figure 8.1 below) or a trade-off (section DB 
and further in Figure 8.2). Consider a PIoS in point A in Figure 8.1 below with an 
environmental–economic performance combination (EnvPA; EPA).  From an economic 
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perspective, this PIoS would have ideally been located in point D, as this point maximizes 
economic performance. The ‘ideal’ opportunity cost of being in point A and not in D is 
therefore EPD
 
. In such a case there are either some real or some perceived institutional 
constraints that hinder the PIoS from reaching point D.  
 
Figure 8.1. Effect of introducing extra rules on perceived economic and environmental 
performance of PIoS 
Imagine now the introduction of a new rule, improving the environmental performance from 
point A to point D. The economic actor participating in the PIoS associates a positive utility 
with this change. He is indifferent between the current situation A and situation D when he 
has to pay EPD-EPA for the change. Conversely, a change to B creates negative utility for the 
PIoS-participant. Economic performance will deteriorate with EPA-EPB. The actor’s 
perceived opportunity cost of this rule is therefore a good proxy for the economic benefit 
foregone, which is EPA-EPB
 
.  
Two rules can have the same ecological contribution, but a different perceived opportunity 
cost. Rules B and C in figure 8.1 are exemplary. More overall utility is created by selecting B 
instead of C. Option B is the pareto-efficient alternative to option C, as environmental 
performance remains status quo but economic performance increase from EPC to EPB
 
.  
The Choice Experiments (CE) approach is based on the hypothesis that the value of a good or 
service depends on the attributes of the good and the levels these take (Louvière, 2000). This 
is based on the Characteristics Theory of Value of Lancaster (1966) who proved that 
individuals derive utility from the characteristics of a good rather than directly from the good 
itself. This assumption can then be modeled based on the Random Utility Theory (McFadden, 
1974). Random utility models are based on assumptions about individuals’ evaluation of 
goods and services. Such assumptions about individuals’ behaviour are introduced to account 
for the researcher’s inability to fully represent all variables that explain all preferences in an 
individual’s utility function. The probability (Pin) that an individual n (in our case a farmer 
who has to choose between different sets of certification rules) chooses alternative i (which 
has an attribute vector Xin
  for all j ≠ i       (1) 
) from a choice set of J alternatives can be represented as: 
This formula indicates that a farmer will choose alternative i in the choice set if and only if  
this alternative has the highest utility for the farmer compared with all other alternatives in the 
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choice set. The utility function U can be further decomposed into a deterministic part (V), 
function of the observed factors, which are the certification book attributes incorporated in the 
experiment, and a stochastic part (ε in
         (2) 
). The latter comes from unobservable factors which 
affect choice, measurement errors in the explanatory variables in function V and model 
specification errors. Amongst the many statistical distributions available, the one most 
extensively used in discrete choice modeling is the extreme value type 1 distribution (also 
known as Gumbel or Weibull, Louvière, 2000). The basic choice model, called the 
conditional logit choice or multinomial logit (MNL) model (Louvière, 2000), than has the 
following functional form: 
As suggested by McFadden (1974), the deterministic parts Vjn are assumed to be linear and 
additive functions in the attributes (Xs). Hence, Vjn
         (3) 
 can be written as:   
If an element of Xjk appears in the utility expression (Vjn) for all J alternatives, such a variable 
is termed generic (i.e. the utility parameter β of Xjk
       (4) 
 is the same for all j). Because in our 
experiment all attributes (all certification book rules incorporated in the experiment) relate to 
one certification book (namely the existing FlandriaGAP system), the coefficients to be 
estimated can be treated as generic. For the estimation of the model parameters in the MNL 
model, conventional maximum likelihood procedures can be applied. Maximum likelihood 
estimates of β can be obtained by maximizing a log-likelihood function over the parameter 
space. 
In the standard interpretation, estimates of β represent so called taste parameters, as they are 
related to the intensity with which the associated attribute contributes to utility.  
 
An advantage of the choice preference model is that each respondent can be asked to do the 
experiment with different choice sets  a number of times, increasing the number of data points 
without increasing the sample needed in the same order and thus can be applied even with a 
limited number of respondents.  
 
The basic aim of the Stated Choice technique in this context is to obtain utility estimates for 
the different options of the certification book rules incorporated in our experiment (i.e. the 
different attribute levels). This utility measure can then be interpreted (is there a utility 
difference between the levels?) and used for willingness to accept estimates, simulations and 
calculations of the effects of marginal changes to these levels. To obtain the utility estimates, 
multiple choice sets are constructed, each of which constitutes of several alternatives (3 in our 
experiments). The individual farmers were asked to choose amongst the three alternatives in a 
choice set their most preferred one. The alternatives on their turn are a combination of several 
attributes, with each of these attributes having different levels, depending on the choice set. 
As an example, with farmer 1 choosing alternative 1 in the first choice set, we know he 
derives a higher utility from the attribute levels of alternative 1 compared to those of 
alternative 2 or 3.  
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8.3 Experimental set up 
In January, 2006, 68 farmers located in the province of Antwerp were personally interviewed. 
Table 8.1 summarizes the main descriptives and frequencies for the sampled farmer group. 
  
Table 8.1.  Descriptives/frequencies for sampled farmers 
Item Descr. 
Number of farmers 68 
Firm type (combinations possible) 
           Open air  
           Greenhouse traditional 
           Greenhouse substrate 
 
8,6% 
40,0% 
65,7% 
Number of crops 
            1 
            2  
           more 
 
74,3%  
14,3% 
11,4% 
Principal crop types 
           Tomato (and varieties) 
           Lettuce (and varieties) 
 
51,6% 
31,4% 
 
The selection of these farmers was purely at random, based upon visual recognition of the 
farms. This methodology was used because privacy policy forbids the auctions to make 
available the addresses of farmers producing under the certification standard. Because our 
principal aim was to test the methodology, the selection of farmers was for us of secondary 
importance. Therefore the results should be taken as indicative rather than inclusive. The 
survey consisted of three parts. The first part covered questions concerning personal and farm 
characteristics of the farmers affiliated to FlandriaGAP. In the second part, the vegetable 
growers were asked to choose amongst several alternatives based upon changes in the 
certification book as a whole, while in the third part, they were asked to make a choice 
amongst several alternatives with attributes only relating to pesticide use reduction.  
 
The choice experiments are built round three scenarios, a base scenario reflecting the current 
prescriptions level, and two scenarios with more severe prescriptions. The choice experiment 
attributes and their levels as presented to the farmers were selected based upon the outcome of 
focus group sessions with farmers, environmental scientists, government officials, vegetable 
chain members and pressure groups. They imply a further restriction on the pesticide rules 
within the certification manual of the certification system under study. A further restriction of 
pesticide use is not warmly welcomed by the majority of the farmers, given the already 
limited freedom of movement in this area for the gardeners. In Table 8.2 the selected 
attributes and their corresponding levels are listed.  
 
The full factorial (i.e. all possible combinations of attribute levels) results into 5 x 28 = 1280 
alternatives. To reduce this number, an orthogonal main effects plan was constructed, which 
contains a minimum of 16 alternatives for this design. The alternatives in the resulting 
orthogonal plan are randomly combined without replacement into a choice set of 3 profiles (a 
base scenario, reflecting the current situation, and 2 hypothetical scenarios). Participating 
farmers were asked to choose their preferred alternative in each profile set. For the general 
experiment, 16 profile sets were constructed. To reduce the cognitive burden for the 
participants due to a high number of choice tasks (16), the design was split into blocks of 4 
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choice sets per respondent. The farmer was asked to choose amongst A, B, and C, after 
comparing the different attribute levels. 
 
Table 8.2. Certification initiative attributes and attribute levels in choice experiment 2 
Attributes Attribute levels of current PIoS Attribute levels of more integrative PIoS 
Calculation of dose/ha Current system (dose and area)   Driving speed and application pressure 
incorporated 
Crop rotation Not compulsory  Compulsory if technically feasible 
Pesticides allowed SRC list and positive list, subject to 
motivation 
Only SRC* list 
Propagation material  Current level (plant passport 
recommended) 
Plant passport compulsory 
Choice of pesticide Motivation of choice sufficient Follow colour code of SRC 
Choice of crop variety Trade-off between several criteria Minimal dependency on agrochemicals 
Treatments with highly 
noxious pesticides 
Current level Halving of the number of treatments 
Relative change in price   0 %  0,5 %  / 1 %/ 2 %/ 3 % 
* SRC: Service for Residue Control 
 
A first change to the PIoS could be the calculation of dose per hectare. Currently, the 
gardeners participating in FlandriaGAP have to calculate the applied pesticide dose by 
multiplying the dose per hectare with the area of treatment. Aimed at a more balanced 
application, gardeners could also take the driving speed and application pressure into 
consideration. The advantage is that the dose, when correctly calculated and applied, can be 
further reduced, because excess application due to irregular dispersion is no longer needed. 
This measure is currently already incorporated in the certification book of Charte Perfect and 
was rated highly by environmental experts. 
 
In the cahier the charge of FlandriaGAP, crop rotation is recommended, but not compulsory. 
In the choice experiment, crop rotation was integrated because experts judged this measure as 
highly effective with respect to a further reduction of pesticide application. One of the major 
drivers for pest incidence in the current crop variety is, besides temperature and humidity, the 
crop variety in the previous period, because pests and varieties are inextricably linked. A logic 
but not always easy applicable measure is then variation in the crop variety, because pests 
lose their preferred host and thus perish more easily. 
 
Within Flandria (and FlandriaGAP), the list of legally allowed pesticides is further restricted 
to fully comply with the principles of environmentally concerned agriculture. The farmers 
have to comply with the principles as outlined on SRC advice cards. The SRC is a non profit 
scientific institution founded by the LAVA auctions, VBT, the Belgian Farmers’ Union and 
the Province of Antwerp, Belgium. Per type of pest, the SRC advice cards outline the 
pesticides allowed, the dose, the active ingredients, the waiting period before harvesting and 
the maximum number of treatments. For greenhouse gardening, the cards first recommend use 
of biological treatments and natural enemies and only in a second step the use of corrective 
chemical pesticides. For outdoor production, the cards are based on the POCER-indicator 
(Vercuysse & Steurbaut, 2002) with different colour codes depending on the toxicity level of 
the chemical pesticides. Within the FlandriaGAP certification book, the farmer is given the 
freedom to use products allowed by the Belgian government (www.fytoweb.fgov.be), when 
no other options within the list of SRC pesticides are applicable. Whenever this situation 
occurs, the farmer has to motivate his choice of pesticide and obtain a (written) approval. In 
the CE, the latter possibility was removed. This attribute should be considered as a proxy for 
the further restriction of pesticides allowed within the certification standard. 
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In the FlandriaGAP certification book, a plant passport (which documents the origin and 
treatment of the propagation material) is recommended, though not compulsory. Experts 
judge the use of reliable and pest free propagation material as a must for further reduction of 
pesticide application, for the obvious reason that contaminated material will evidently lead to 
higher pesticide application in the longer run. A considerable part of the questioned gardeners 
already comply with this rule, because they use propagation material from Dutch breeders. In 
such a case, documentation is provided and can easily be added to the rest of the registration 
material.  
 
In the experiment, the attribute choice of pesticide was integrated, to measure whether 
farmers are sensitive to a restriction of the order in which pesticides should be applied. 
Currently, farmers can divert from the preferential ordering (which is indicated by the colour 
code Green – Yellow – Red), if they motivate why. In the experiment, the latter option was 
banned, meaning that farmers strictly have to follow the recommended ordering. This 
restriction can have some significant economic drawbacks from farmers’ point of view. First, 
the pest development pattern (sometimes exponential) can urge the farmer to treat the crop 
with the best (often the most noxious) pesticide available. If the farmer first has to try less 
intrusive treatments, crop damage can become significant and quickly exceed the economic 
threshold level. Second, the use of a treatment that probably not fully eradicates the targeted 
pest is costly and economically inefficient, because the most effective pesticide will probably 
be necessary as well. Then why include this proposition? The measure could urge farmers to 
further increase their crop monitoring efforts (i.e. to intervene more timely), which will, in the 
end, prove to be both environmentally and economically advantageous, because less harmful 
pesticides are applied and crop damage (or the use of expensive pesticides) is reduced. 
 
Nowadays, the choice of the crop variety within FlandriaGAP is subject to several stakes, 
which are the crop performance, the exterior product features, the shelf life, the yield and the 
scoring in taste panels (with consumers and experts). The environmental  experts in the panels 
attached a very high score to the rules aiming at a choice of crop variety based upon pest 
resistance. In the CE, the attribute level ‘choice of variety based upon minimal dependency on 
agrochemicals’ was included, as an alternative for the current situation. 
 
Another option for a decrease in the pesticide pressure on both soil and product is a further 
reduction of the number of treatments with the most dangerous chemical products (those 
labelled red on the SRC-cards). The drawback of this measure is that farmers will probably 
increase the dose per treatment. However, maximum dosages are now already fixed. This 
attribute reflects a situation in which more attention is given to the pesticide contamination 
during the product life cycle (and not only at the final product level), which is, up to now, a 
gap in the (European) legislation. The main drawback is the scientific foundation of the 
reduction of treatment numbers. Now, the treatment numbers (in combination with the 
dosage) are based upon the economic efficiency (how many treatments are necessary to stay 
below the economic threshold level) and the effect on ecology. 
 
Different levels of price changes were added to be able to translate the obtained utility 
estimates into monetary units.  
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8.4 Ecological contribution of the proposed changes to the PIoS 
In the study of Garreyn et al. (2006), multicriteria analysis, and more specific the revised 
Simos method (see Simos, 1990a and 1990b, and Figueira and Roy, 2002), was used to 
determine the relative score of all major Belgian fruit and vegetable certification initiatives on 
the ecology axis of sustainability. The developed environmental sustainability analysis 
method is based on an approach already applied in France (Girardin and Sardet, 2002). For a 
detailed description, see chapter 5 or Mondelaers et al. (2007). In short, expert panels were 
asked to rank the rules of different certification systems based upon their contribution to the 
different pillars of ecological sustainability. As such, a hypothetic ideal certification manual 
containing all the best rules of the different initiatives, as well as the relative distance in 
environmental performance of the existing initiatives from this hypothetic ideal, could be 
determined. The environmental performance measure furthermore allows to evaluate potential 
improvements of a PIoS, as illustrated in Figure 8.2. In this figure, the original Flandria 
certificate rules are compared to the FlandriaGAP (this is the EurepGAP aligned version of 
Flandria) standard and the proposed improved FlandriaGAP NEW standard. The proposed 
improvements were the criteria used in the choice experiment (CE). By using the scores from 
the expert panels for the rules integrated in the CE, we are able to calculate the increased 
beneficial effect on ecology of the introduction of these extra rules. For those rules in the CE 
that were not integrated in the general checklist, we used the scores of closely related rules 
(proxies). In total, seven FlandriaGAP-rules were changed.  
 
Figure 8.2. Performance of the Flandria, the FlandriaGap and the FlandriaGap NEW standard 
for ecologic sustainability 
As can be seen in Figure 8.3, although the CE focuses on those measures in the certification 
manual relating to pesticide reduction, beneficial effects can be observed for several other 
environmental sustainability pillars as well.  
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Figure 8.3. Effect of dose recalculation and other rules on environmental sustainability score of 
FlandriaGap 
Thus, by changing one certification rule, induced effects resort for different sustainability 
items simultaneously. As an example, Figure 8.4 shows the effect on FlandriaGAP’s scores of 
adding the rule ‘for the calculation of the pesticide dose, driving speed and application 
pressure should be taken into account’. This measure is not that effective for pest pressure 
reduction, as indicated by the small white section in the pest pressure reduction bar in Figure 
8.4. But, unexpectedly, it contributes highly to the ‘Waste reduction and management’-pillar. 
Furthermore, Figure 8.4 shows that the score of the hypothetical FlandriaGap NEW on Pest 
Pressure Reduction nearly reaches the virtual maximum score. Furthermore, the pillar ‘Air 
Quality’ receives the largest contribution from the 7 adapted rules jointly. 
 
8.5 Perceived opportunity cost of integrative institutions 
In this section we divert our attention to the affected farmer. The Likelihood Ratio test 
reported in Table 8.3 indicates that the choice preference model with estimated parameters for 
the attributes is a significant improvement compared to the model with constants only (the 
Base model). Table 8.4 reports the estimates for the attribute levels. We made use of dummy 
coding, hence the current situation is considered as having a zero utility (no negative nor 
positive utility). The table represents the alternative (more restrictive) attribute levels. The 
significant utility estimates all have the correct sign.  
 
Table 8.3. LL ratio test for the model CE2 
LL model LLbase 
model 
LL ratio 
 
Χ²(6) Sign   
-197,91 -217,76 39,7 1,63 yes 
 
The status quo coefficient is significant in this experiment, meaning that the farmer, 
regardless of the attributes, prefers the current situation over the new alternative, and hence is 
change averse. As was repeatedly indicated during focus group sessions with the farmers, they 
fear that price compensation for more restrictive rules will only be of a temporary nature, due 
to the main retailers’ market power and the convergence towards a premium spot market (see 
chapter 7). 
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The measure Calculation of dose per hectare has the following implications for the 
gardeners: 
− administration will increase and the calculation will become more difficult; 
− application will be more demanding (speed and pressure control) 
− new equipment will have to be bought 
Due to the effects on action and administration level, farmers attach a significant negative 
utility to this measure.  
 
Table 8.4. Farmers’ utility estimates for the proposed pesticide policy changes 
Attribute Coeff S.E. P Wta 
Calculation of dose/ha -0.976 0.285 0.001 2.31 
Crop rotation  0.224 0.259 0.386  
Pesticides allowed  0.341 0.264 0.196  
Propagation material -0.725 0.283 0.010 1.71 
Choice of pesticide  0.225 0.249 0.366  
Choice of crop variety -1.033 0.273 0.000 2.44 
Treatments with 
noxious pesticides -0.451 0.271 0.096 1.07 
Relative change in 
price  0.423 0.125 0.001 
 
Status Quo  1.049 0.365 0.004  
Remark: attribute levels represent the alternative situation 
 
Crop rotation in the CE was only considered obligatory when technically feasible. Because 
the majority of farmers questioned either applied hydroponic cultivation (55%) or greenhouse 
gardening in solid ground (33%), this attribute was not taken into consideration during their 
choice process, resulting into an insignificant coefficient.   
 
The model indicates a non significant utility change for the rule ‘pesticides allowed’, 
indicating that the group of farmers surveyed does not feel further restricted by the 
introduction of this item. This may seem counterintuitive, but based upon the survey sample, 
it is explicable. The extension of the list of pesticides beyond these allowed within 
FlandriaGAP is mainly of importance for the (small) group of farmers with niche products 
(such as parsley), because they have, for reasons outlined before, only a limited number of 
treatment options. This group is within the current sample underrepresented, resulting in an 
insignificant coefficient.          
   
With respect to propagation material the gardeners consider the current situation as more 
advantageous compared to the more restricted situation proposed in the experiment. The 
coefficient associated with the attribute ‘plant passport’ is significant and negative. The 
question remains why farmers attach a negative utility to this optimisation, given that the 
burden of documenting the propagation material mainly resides with the breeder. Besides this, 
plant material from unquestionable origin further protects the farmer from the expensive use 
of corrective measures (whether biological or chemical) in later production stages.        
 
The estimated coefficient for a change in the rule ‘choice of pesticide’ is not significant, 
which indicates that, for the farmers in the sample, the restriction does not decrease (or 
increase) utility. Given that the majority of the sampled farmers are greenhouse gardeners, the 
following of the preferential ordering as indicated by the SRC-cards is a necessity, to preserve 
the populations of natural enemies of pests in the greenhouses. To start and maintain these 
populations is not straightforward (and costly), hence greenhouse gardeners will consider all 
options to reduce adverse effects on these populations. The latter is not the case in open air 
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gardening, where building up populations of natural enemies is not practically feasible. 
Within this group, this attribute would probably proof to be significant.                   
 
However interesting from ecologic point of view, for the farmers (and other chain players) the 
change of choice of crop variety is not advantageous. It is even the most restrictive 
adaptation of the instruction book incorporated in CE, as confirmed by the magnitude of the 
coefficient. In the literature, the negative correlation between crop resistance and crop yield 
(and quality) has been widely discussed.  
 
In the CE the utility measure for a change in treatments with highly noxious pesticides has 
the correct sign, but the coefficient is not significant, indicating that the surveyed farmers in 
general do not disfavour a further reduction of the treatments with red (i.e. the most harmful) 
pesticides. Again, it is worthwhile stressing that the Green – Yellow – Red colour code is 
mainly of importance for outdoor producers, and this group is undersampled in the current 
experiment.         
    
With respect to an increase in price, the associated utility is positive, as one could expect. A 
unity increase in price (in %), results into a utility increase of 0,423. This number is used to 
calculate the Willingness To Accept (WTA) for the remainder of the attribute levels (see 
Table 8.5).  
 
Based upon the estimates for the choice experiment, the most adverse modification of the 
certification book from farmers’ point of view seems to be the demand to use the crop variety 
which minimally depends on agrochemicals. Taking into account that this measure is the one 
that most affects crop yields, this outcome is logic. The other alternative measures are not 
welcomed either, with recalculation of dose per hectare and documentation for propagation 
material as most significant ones. The fact that some of the proposed changes result into non 
significant coefficients is mainly due to the sample constellation, which predominantly 
constitutes of greenhouse (substrate) gardeners. A more extensive sample will probably yield 
more significant coefficients.  
 
8.6 Trade-off between ecological contribution and economic cost 
As an example, the following graph, Figure 8.4, combines the ecological, social and economic 
effects of introducing the new rule on dose calculation. The ecological and social contribution 
is clearly positive and covers different sustainability fields. From farmers’ (economic) point 
of view however, the new rule seems disfavourable, as indicated by a negative WTA. To 
remain indifferent, the farmer expects a 2% increase in the current farm product price.  
 
This negative WTA originates from different economic motivations simultaneously. As 
farmers are in general change averse,  a new rule means the alteration of familiar practices. 
Secondly, the new rule demands a learning effort from the farmers: how does it need to be 
applied in practice, what should be calculated, etc. Thirdly, there is a need for investment in 
the appropriate spraying equipment (whether this is new or adapted equipment). Fourthly, the 
rule demands extra labour in the field, not only for the calculation of the new doses, but also 
during application (maintaining the previously calculated speed and spraying pressure). 
Finally, the rule also increases the registration efforts associated with certification. 
 
 
Chapter 8 Opportunity cost of integration Part 3 
156 
 
 
Figure 8.4.  Impact of the new ‘Calculation of dose/ha’- rule on ecology and economy 
 
8.7 Conclusion  
The method of choice preference analysis allows to assess the perceived opportunity costs of 
more integrative institutions ex ante. When the perceived utility increases or remains status 
quo, the integrative rule can be introduced without additional costs. This is the case when 
ecological and economic performance reinforce each other. When the perceived utility 
decreases, a trade-off has to be made between ecological and economic performance. The 
proposed method than gives an indication of the farm level desired compensation for the 
environmental change. Given this information, some new issues arise. First, a costly new rule 
is not necessarily the cheapest way to obtain the desired environmental effect. As becomes 
clear from the experiment, different rules contribute to the same pillars of ecological 
sustainability, at a different cost. First the pareto-efficient rules should be selected, i.e. rules 
that increase ecological performance and not decrease economic performance. A second issue 
is whether the environmental performance increase is worth the economic price and whether 
we as a society are willing to pay for this. If not, maybe there are cheaper ways to organize 
the environmental performance increase, such as end of pipe technologies or other abatement 
strategies that not reside within PIoS. Finally, if we agree that the environmental performance 
increase is worth the extra price, the question remains who will take the burden. We could 
apply the ‘polluter pays’-principle and leave the cost to the farmer. Or we could subsidize the 
change and bear the cost as a citizen through increased taxes. Another option is to let the PIoS 
signal the change to green consumers and let those pay a price premium. The choice will 
depend on the costs of organizing the environmental policy under these different scenarios, 
and more specifically the transaction cost differences. When changes are made to the 
institutional structure of PIoS, associated transaction costs will also change. The next chapter 
focuses on the transaction cost changes that can be associated with a change in the purpose of 
the standard. 
 
The choice experiment made clear that farmers generally advise against changes in the 
pesticide rules within the certification initiative, because they currently already feel under 
high pressure from government, society and buyers and thus do not see ample room for 
evolution. The resource base of farmers has been narrowed over the years, which is especially 
true for certified farmers, while the demands have become increasingly restrictive. Farmers 
fear that, due to the market power of buyers, a more demanding certification standard will, in 
the end, not be compensated by a corresponding farm level price increase. Thus, from a 
farmer’s perspective, the main advantage of moving towards more integrative institutions is 
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absent. However, by following the new rules, market access to preferred sales channels 
remains open. From a buyer and a society point of view, the new institution is a clear 
improvement, because external costs are internalized at fairly low costs, with possible 
reputational gains and without needing restrictive public interference.      
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Chapter 9. Farmers’ attitude towards institutional change in PIoS 
– the case of FlandriaGAP  
 
 
This chapter is based upon Mondelaers, K. and Van Huylenbroeck, G. (2008). Farmers’ 
preferences in evolving certification and labelling systems. Oral presentation, 8th 
International Conference on Management in Agrifood Chains and Networks, Ede, the 
Netherlands, May 28-30, 2008. Nominated for best paper award  
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter changes are modelled in the building blocks that define a PIoS: the purpose of 
the PIoS, the governance structure and the involved actors. By measuring the farmers’ 
willingness to accept changes in these building blocks, the magnitude of perceived changes in  
transaction costs and opportunity costs can be estimated. While chapter 8 only focused on a 
change in the rules relating to the environmental performance of the PIoS, this chapter also 
analyzes changes in the governance structure and as such allows to estimate transaction costs 
additional to opportunity costs. This chapter also contributes to the measurement of 
institutional equity from the farmers’ point of view, as it estimates their desired pay-off for 
changes in the institutions. It tests hypothesis 5: Institutional changes in PIoS can 
simultaneously improve the equity among value chain members. 
 
Exogenous changes lead to endogenous changes in the institutional structure of PIoS, leading 
to changes in the opportunity and transaction costs for those who implement the PIoS. The 
certification standards, containing the prescription rules, are social constructs, and thus reflect 
an equilibrium of stakes at a certain moment in time. As stakeholder composition, stakes and 
power distribution can change over time the rules may also change.  As described in chapter 
7, we notice in general a demand for further harmonisation and convergence between 
different certification systems from the buyers (retailers) point of view, while farmer 
organisations will try to diversify their certification schemes in order to better position their 
products in the high quality market segment. Therefore, it is important to know in how far 
intended modifications to existing schemes imposed by the retail sector, are accepted by 
individual farmers and reflect their preferences. In this paper, a stated choice preference 
methodology is applied to analyse changes in individual farmers preferences when 
certification standards are modified. As is shown, the methodology applied may help to 
reduce the information asymmetry between stakeholders involved and help in order to 
optimise existing certification schemes. The methodology is applied for the Flandria label for 
fresh fruit and vegetables in Flanders.  
 
9.2 Theoretical framework 
PIoS give rise to an economic organisation structure which, from a transaction cost 
perspective, is termed a hybrid organization, as it is an intermediate between the spot market 
with loose contractual arrangements between many unrelated agents and a single, 
hierarchically organized firm where transactions are internalized. The resulting network of 
firms, composed of both farmers and downstream players, is defined by a set of recurrent 
contractual ties among for the rest autonomous entities. As in Hagedorn’s IoS-framework, 
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Williamson (2002) identifies the following key building blocks informing the logic of a 
contract and the comparative economic organization: the human actors, the unit of analysis, 
which is the transaction, the main purpose of the initiative and the governance structure. In 
our analysis, we consider PIoS as the contractual arrangements framing the hybrid 
organization’s structure. Starting from the before mentioned building blocks we measure the 
farmers’ attitude towards change in the system’s boundaries. For reasons of clarity, we 
rephrase Williamson (2002)’s building blocks as questions:  
- who is subject to the PIoS certification standards (actor level); 
- what is the aim of the PIoS (transaction level); 
- how is adherence monitored, controlled and rewarded (governance system level); 
 
Human actors in the framework of Williamson (2002) are characterised by their key cognitive 
attributes, typically referred to as bounded rationality, their self interest attributes or 
opportunistic behaviour, and other attributes upon which their analyses rest. These human 
characteristics trigger the need for an appropriate governance structure for the certification 
system.  
 
The second building block, the transaction, as unit of analysis, is closely linked to the main 
purpose of the contractual arrangement, Williamson’s third building block. As indicated by 
Mainville et al. (2005), standards can take standardizing, differentiating and risk-reducing 
functions. The mixture of these three functions will determine the certification system’s 
stakeholder composition and governance structure. Internally, the certification initiative aims 
at maximizing standardization of the participants’ product and/or process features, because 
buyers need sufficient homogenous supply, both in time and in place. Meanwhile, externally, 
the initiative aims at maximizing differentiation from competing hybrids (i.e. certification 
systems) and/or the spot market, to maintain a competitive advantage. The system 
furthermore aims at minimizing risks typical for unregulated production. As indicated by 
Williamson (2005), the transaction’s main drivers are asset specificity, possible disturbances 
to which the transactions are subject and the frequency with which transactions recur. Asset 
specificity increases when the distance from minimum legal requirements increases, which 
corresponds with the drive towards differentiation. The frequency with which transactions of 
certified products take place can be approached by the number of farmers engaged in the 
certification system, given that a farmer’s production is either certified or not. An increasing 
number of transactions corresponds with the drive towards standardization. The third 
attribute, the possible disturbances to which transactions are subject, is also of interest in this 
chapter, given our aim of assessing farmers’ attitude towards changes (disturbances) in the 
certification boundaries. As indicated by Menard (2004), partners to a hybrid agreement not 
only compete against other hybrids, they also compete against each other. We therefore 
hypothesize that the more farmers are engaged in the system, the more the system 
characteristics evolve in the direction of a pure market organisation. When this increase in 
members remains restricted to the farm level of the hybrid, it is further hypothesized that the 
incentive intensity will decrease. However, contrary to ‘classic’ transaction cost economics, it 
is hypothesized here that the binding contractual arrangements (the severity of the standard) 
will increase due to competition for the limited preferential sales channels and the resulting 
buyer power. 
The last building block, the governance structure, is, according to Williamson (2002), 
described by the following attributes: incentive intensity, administrative controls and the 
contract law design. The first attribute, incentive intensity, is in the case of a hybrid typically 
intermediate between the high powered spot markets and low powered hierarchies, more 
formally termed as semi-high powered incentives. The type of incentive mechanism depends 
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upon the type of certification system, ranging from access to preferential sales channels to 
fixed price premiums above the spot market price level. Administrative controls, also 
intermediate in the case of a hybrid, are supposed to increase when certification becomes 
more demanding. The contract law applied in the case of PIoS is typically the ‘cahier de 
charge’ or the instruction manual laid out for the farmers.  
 
In this chapter, changes in PIoS are approached from a game theoretic perspective. Hereby we 
decompose the process of change in the certification institution into an iterative two stage 
game, with a first stage being exogenous to the individual decision maker, while the second 
stage is endogenous; as graphically indicated in the centre of Figure 9.1. The exogenous part 
consists of a rule making game at an institution forming level. At this level representatives of 
the different directly (and indirectly) involved stakeholder groups identify and negotiate areas 
of modifications in the PIoS. In the following section, the areas under negotiation are 
introduced and presented. Following Aoki (2006), to guarantee that the proposed changes are 
accepted by all stakeholders, the associated new pay-off structure should be satisfactory for 
the players at the second stage, the implementation level. At this institution dependent level, 
the producers accept or refuse the new standard and by doing so may demonstrate their 
preferences regarding the issues at stake. The negotiators at the institution forming level have 
in general only limited a priori knowledge on the true preferences and associated pay-off 
structures of the players at the institution dependent level. This chapter shows therefore also 
how the methodology of stated choice preference can be used to obtain this information ex 
ante, and thus as such contribute to the negotiation of a certification standard in bringing the 
pay-off structure more in line with expectations of the actors at the institution dependent level, 
creating institutional equity.   
 
 
Figure 9.1. Process of change of certification rules as a two stage two level game  
9.3 Changes at the rule making game level 
Drivers for adaptation of standards are, amongst others, changes in the legislation, 
harmonisation with other initiatives, changing demands from buyers and the availability of 
new production techniques. Market actors do not fully agree upon the evolutionary potential 
of certification standards, resulting in opposite stakes in the chain. The retailers, who have 
largely succeeded in shifting the certification costs to the upstream players (Hatanaka et al., 
2005), still see ample room for improvement. Farmers however question the economical 
feasibility of these modifications. Private voluntary certification initiatives can be classified 
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based on following key features (Börkey et al., 1999): 1) their  individual or collective nature; 
2) their geographical delimitation going from local to global; 3) their binding/nonbinding 
nature; 4) the open or closed access to third parties and 5) whether they are target or 
implementation based. Main obstacles are, according to Börkey et al. (1999), free riding 
behaviour and the bargaining between agents to decide on the division of the cooperative 
gain.  
 
During six focus group sessions with representatives of the different certification system 
stakeholders (farmers, auction and standard representatives, retailers, government officials, 
consumer organizations and pressure groups, see Mondelaers and Van Huylenbroeck, 2008), 
and some additional in-depth interviews, several possibilities for future strengthening the 
position of the FlandriaGAP label were identified as well as current bottlenecks within the 
certification system. The focus group sessions to a large extend reflect the negotiation process 
presently taking place at the institution forming level of the Flandria certification system. 
Following possible areas of change were identified:  
1. The first modification relates to the human actors and questions whether the system 
should be geographically delineated and whether access to foreign poducers should be 
open or closed. The present initiative is geographically delimited to Flanders. 
However, given the success of the system, farmers from abroad (the Netherlands, 
France) are interested in joining the certificate. Both the certification management 
board and the buyers would welcome this, the former because of the possible increase 
in market power, the latter because of the increase in supply and choice.  
2. A second possible change relates to the communication policy of the initiative. If 
communicated to the end consumer, the label name can act as a pull mechanism and as 
such increase the negotiation power vis-a-vis the buyers. However, opposed to this is 
the possible dependency on one channel due to the demand for exclusiveness from the 
buyers. 
3. A next area of possible modifications relate to the governance and control structure in 
place to reduce free riding and to enhance trust in the initiative. From buyer point of 
view, the higher the number of controls, the better, because it makes the standard more 
trustworthy. As indicated by Hatanaka (2005), retailers have transferred part of their 
responsibility to third party certifiers and the costs of certification to the producers. 
Therefore, as another option, a degressive control system, in which the weak elements 
are controlled more than the others, might be more efficient from farmer and 
management board point of view, because fewer resources are needed.  
4. The next rule ‘type of certification, group or individual’, relates to the division of tasks 
between management board and third party certifier. In case of group certification, the 
certification board controls the farmers (internal control) and the third party certifier 
controls the board (external control), while in case of individual certification, the third 
party certifier controls both management board and the farmers, which is more 
restrictive (and more costly) for the farmers and therefore favoured by the retailers. 
5. Another bottleneck issue from farmer point of view is the administration. A more 
transparent monitoring and control policy, as requested by the buyers, entails an 
increase in administration required from the farmer.  
6. Extending the coverage of the standard either requires  adapting the current rules or 
adding new rules, both favoured by the buyers for diversification purposes. In the 
current system, some rules are more compulsory than others (some are recommended, 
other are 100% compulsory). Most changes in the standard therefore amount to 
transferring rules from the recommended to the compulsory level.  
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7. As identified by the participants, possible new rules for the current standard could 
relate to the addition of a more elaborated social component.  
 
Thus, for each rule, different outcomes are possible, depending on the acceptance or refusal 
by the stakeholders at the institution forming level (see Figure 9.2 also). The proposed 
methodology enables us to determine  ex ante in how far the intended modifications would 
result in a new pay-off structure for the farmers at the institution dependent level. As 
indicated before, this may serve as input for the negotiations at the institution forming level. 
In the discussion these above modifications are related to Williamson’s building blocks 
discussed earlier in the text.   
 
9.4 Applied methodology  
As already indicated in chapter 3 and 8, the technique of choice modelling, that is part of the 
family of survey-based methodologies for modelling preference structures, is particularly 
suitable for this kind of analysis. We refer to these chapters for a description of the choice 
preference methodology.  
 
9.5 Experimental set up for the farm level game 
The questionnaire used to analyse the farmers’ preference structure for intended modification 
in the FlandriaGAP certification standard, was first discussed with experts of the standard and 
pretested in December, 2005. After some minor adaptations, the final questionnaire was used 
in January, 2006 in a direct interview survey among 68 farmers located the province of 
Antwerp. The selection of these farmers was purely at random, based upon visual recognition 
of the farms (see chapter 8). This methodology was used because privacy policy forbids the 
auctions to make available the addresses of farmers producing under the standard. The region 
of Antwerp was selected because the auction of Mechlin, one of the main auctions for 
FlandriaGAP is located in this province, with the majority of market gardeners in their 
proximity. Because our principal aim was to test the methodology, the selection of farmers 
was for us of secondary importance and does not hinder the interpretation of the results, but 
may of course be important when generalising the findings. Therefore the results should be 
taken as indicative rather than inclusive.  
 
The survey consisted of two parts. In the first part some questions were asked concerning 
personal and farm characteristics of the farmers affiliated to FlandriaGAP. In the second part, 
the vegetable growers were asked in the choice experiment to choose among several proposed 
alternatives that were constructed by different combinations of the proposed changes in the 
certification standard. The choice experiments are built around three scenarios or choice 
cards, a base scenario reflecting the current prescriptions level, and two scenarios with more 
(or less) severe prescriptions.  
 
Table 9.1 summarizes the descriptives and frequencies of the sampled group of farmers. 
Based on a comparison with general data on vegetable growers, following remarks can be 
made. First, the number of farmers with a diploma of secondary education is higher than in 
the overall population. This suggests that there is probably a correlation between level of 
education and willingness to participate in a (quite difficult type of) survey. The result that all  
interviewees are full time farmers on the other hand is quite logic as hobby gardeners do not 
participate in demanding certification schemes such as FlandriaGAP. Third, the 
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overrepresentation of greenhouse gardeners originates from the sampling procedure, based 
upon visual recognition of the farms.  
 
Table 9.1. Descriptives/frequencies for sampled farmers 
Item Descriptives / Frequencies 
Number of farmers 68 
Average age 45 + 7,5 (s.e.) 
Diploma 94,3% completed secondary education 
Extra diploma 22% (f.e. B or C course) 
Primary occupation farming 100% 
Member of Auction of Mechlin 97% 
Manager since 1984 (average) 
Firm size 16490 + 15593 m² 
Firm type (combinations possible) 
           Open air cultivation 
           Greenhouse traditional 
           Greenhouse substrate 
 
8,6% 
40,0% 
65,7% 
Number of crops 
            1 
            2  
           more 
 
74,3% 
14,3% 
11,4% 
Principal crop types 
           Tomato (and varieties) 
           Lettuce (and varieties) 
 
51,6% 
31,4% 
Net income available/year 
           < €10000 
           €10000 to €20000 
           €20000 to €40000 
            > €40000 
 
6,2% 
37,5% 
43,8% 
12,5% 
 
The modelling results as described below are based upon the full sample of 68 farmers. Each 
farmer was presented 4 choice sets (with 3 alternatives in each choice set), hence resulting in 
272 observations or data points.  
 
Table 9.2. Certification initiative attributes and attribute levels for the choice experiment 
Attributes Attribute levels 
Free access everybody accepted / only Flemish farmers accepted / only Flemish products 
accepted 
Control 2 controls per year / 1 control per year / degressive control system 
Certification group certification / individual certification / free choice for farmers 
Adherence to measures in 
certification book* 
mm 100% / mm 80% / mm 90% 
Administration  ½ h per week / 1 h per week / 1and1/2 h per week 
Social component not integrated / limited / extensive  
Communication  towards end consumer / towards retail / depending on preference retail 
Relative change in price   -0,5% / 0%/+0,5%/+1%/+1,5% 
  *mm = minor must (reference level is mm 80% compulsory) 
 
The attributes (with corresponding levels) are listed in Table 9.2. They reflect the changes 
proposed by the stakeholders in the rule making game. The full factorial (i.e. all possible 
combinations of attribute levels) results into 5 x 37 = 10.935 alternatives. To reduce this 
number, an orthogonal main effects plan was constructed, which contains a minimum of 27 
alternatives for this design. The orthogonality of the design ensures that the attributes 
presented to individuals are varied independently from one another (zero correlation). This 
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property guarantees that the influence of changes in any of the presented attributes on 
respondents’ choices (or utility) can be measured independently (Louvière, 2000).  
 
Next, the alternatives in the resulting orthogonal plan were randomly combined without 
replacement into a choice set of 3 profiles or choice cards (a base scenario, reflecting the 
current situation, and 2 hypothetical scenarios). An example of a choice set is given in Figure 
9.2.  
 
Attribute  Choice A  Choice B  Choice C 
Type of certification    Group certification  Group certification   Free choice 
Communication towards retail or 
consumer   
 Towards retail  Retail preference  Towards consumer  
Mandatory level of minor musts    80%  90%  80% 
Controls at farm level    Degressive system  2 controls/year  1 control/year 
Time for administration    30 min/week  1h30 min/week  30 min/week 
Origin    Only Flemish products  Only Flemish products  Everybody accepted 
Extension with social part  limited  non  non 
Relative change in end price    -0,5%  +1%  0% 
Figure 9.2. Example of choice set  
 
Participating farmers were asked to choose their preferred alternative in each profile set. For 
the general experiment, 27 profile sets were constructed. To reduce the cognitive burden for 
the participants due to a high number of choice tasks (27), the design was split into blocks of 
4 choice sets per respondent. The farmer was asked to choose amongst A, B, and C, after 
having compared the different attribute levels. 
 
9.6 Empirical results  
9.6.1 Utility estimates 
According to Mc Fadden, the deterministic part of the utility can be represented as follows: 
 
With the help of statistical sofware (NLogit), estimates of the taste parameters (the β’s in the 
formula), corresponding with the different attribute levels, were obtained using the Maximum 
Likelihood procedure. The results are represented in Table 9.4. 
 
However, before starting with the interpretation of the model results, it is necessary to check 
the overall model significance, which is done with the LL ratio test (Hensher, 2005). Results 
are given in Table 9.3. 
 
Table 9.3: LL ratio test for the basic model with linear continuous variables 
LL estimated model LL base model LL ratio  
-2(LLbase –LLestimated
Χ² statistic  
) (14 – 3 = 11 df) 
Sign. 
-232,6215 -258,3015 51,36 19,7 yes 
LL unrestricted* model LL restricted** 
model 
LL ratio  
-2(LLrest –LLunrest) 
Χ² statistic  
(4 restrict. = 4 df) 
Sign. 
-225,9172 -232,6215 13,40 9,49 yes 
* unrestricted model: the model which allows for non linear continuous variables 
**restricted model: model which supposes strictly linear continuous variables 
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In our choice experiment, some of the explanatory variables are categorical, while others are 
continuous. The categorical variables are integrated in the model using effects coding. The 
latter is preferred above dummy coding because, in case of dummy coding, the base level is 
perfectly confounded with the grand mean (Hensher, 2005). Effects (and dummy) coding can 
also be used for continuous variables, in case the researcher suspects a non linear relationship 
between the attribute levels of the continuous explanatory variable and the choices made. A 
Wald test shows that the levels of the continuous variable ‘Minor Musts compulsory’ are 
indeed linearly related while the levels of the attributes ‘Administration time’ and ‘Change in 
end price level’ are non linearly related. The Likelihood of this new model is also better than 
the model with only continuous variables (see second part Table 9.3). One of the three options 
in each choice set reflected the base scenario, the current situation. An extra variable was 
therefore introduced in the model to measure the status quo effect in the experiment, i.e. to 
measure whether the gardeners systematically opted for the base case scenario or not. The 
coefficient of the variable ‘Status quo choice’ does significantly differ from zero, implying 
that this is the case. The selection of the third alternative was hence not solely based on the 
attribute levels of this alternative. The significant coefficient indicates that farmers were 
recognizing the base scenario and were therefore attempted to take this scenario (which 
indicates change adverse farmer behaviour).  
 
Figure 9.3 presents the utility measures for the categorical variables as obtained by the MNL 
model in which non linear relations between the attribute levels were tested. Table 9.5 reports 
the numbers and p-levels. The figure gives an impression of the signs and the magnitudes of 
the utility estimates for the different (non continuous) attribute levels. These magnitudes 
should not be interpreted in an absolute sense (what means a disutility of 0,8 e.g.) but rather in 
a relative sense (f.e. farmers associate a higher disutility to a system with an extensive social 
component than to a system with 2 controls per year). To translate these utility measures into 
a less abstract variable, WTP/WTA measures or marginal utility effects can be calculated. The 
latter refers to changes in the probability that an alternative is being selected when changes 
are made in its attribute levels. 
 
Some design orthogonality was lost due to the fact that the number of sampled farmers does 
not fully correspond with the number of choice sets in the orthogonal design. However, the 
method of auxiliary regressions as described by Gujarati (1995), that provides a formal way 
for testing for multicollinearity, shows that multicollinearity is not a problem in our 
experiment (see Table 9.4 below also).  
 
Table 9.4. Test for multicollinearity: regression of the attribute on the remaining attributes 
Dependent variable R² Ri Multicollinearity * 
Type of certification 0,023 1,587 No 
Type of communication 0,005 0,304 No 
Compulsory level of rules 0,006 0,420 No 
Number of controls 0,009 0,577 No 
Administration time 0,006 0,381 No 
Social part 0,010 0,651 No 
Price 0,009 0,638 No 
with H0
* R
: the dependent variable is not collinear with the remaining attributes 
i = R²/(k-2)/(1-R²)/(n-k+1) with k = 10 and n = 544; ** F8, 535 
 
= 1,94 
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Table 9.5. MNL estimates for the choice experiment 
Attribute Attribute level Coeff. Std.Err. 1 P-value 
Type of certification Group Certification 0.16670 0.18306 0.3625 
 Individual Certification -0.54927 0.20032 0.0061 
 Free choice 0.38257 0.17313 0.0271 
Communication Preference retail 0.01781 0.18798 0.9245 
 Towards retail -0.30586 0.18832 0.1043 
 Towards consumer 0.28805 0.17317 0.0962 
Minor must compulsory (c) 80%/90%/100% -0.05387 0.01689 0.0014 
Number of controls 1 0.17716 0.17774 0.3189 
 2 -0.59674 0.19951 0.0028 
 degressive 0.41957 0.17428 0.0161 
Administration (c) 0.5 h/week 0.46476 0.17081 0.0065 
 1.0 h/week 0.47857 0.16691 0.0041 
 1.5 h/week -0.94333 0.21025 0.0000 
Origin Flemish gardener 0.35220 0.17301 0.0418 
 Flemish product -0.10155 0.17291 0.5570 
 No constraint -0.25066 0.18121 0.1666 
Social part Not integrated 0.75304 0.18219 0.0000 
 limited -0.01199 0.18003 0.9469 
 extensive -0.74104 0.21349 0.0005 
Relative change price (c) -0.5 % -1.09694 0.34131 0.0013 
  0.0 % 0.11610 0.23709 0.6243 
  0.5 % 0.18384 0.23634 0.4367 
  1.0 % 0.30145 0.23294 0.1956 
  1.5 % 0.49555 0.27169 0.0682 
Status quo choice  1.08636 0.54625 0.0467 
1: utility estimates for the attribute levels  
 
 
Figure 9.3. Utility estimates for the categorical variables of CE  
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9.6.2 Changes in the pay-off structure: willingness to pay and accept measures 
With both the variable of interest and the monetary variable expressed as utility measures, the 
ratio between them provides a monetary value for a change in the level of the other variable. 
In calculating a measure of WTP, it is important that both attributes used in the calculation are 
found to be statistically significant (Hensher, 2005). In the CE reported, the price attribute is 
highly significant, as well as the other attributes except for ‘Communication’. WTP’s can thus 
be calculated for all other  attributes, based upon the formula:  
- βx / α             (5) 
 
with βx the marginal effect of the xth attribute (in utils per unit of attribute x) and α the 
marginal utility of the premium (in utils/unit of premium). The price component has a 
nonlinear nature, hence a single price taste parameter α is absent. The non-linearity is situated 
around the zero percent change level, as confirmed by the Wald test statistic. The utility 
decrease for a decrease in prices resulted to be much higher than the utility increase for a  
same increase in price. This phenomenon has been described in the literature as the 
endowment or status quo effect (Tisdell, 2009). As suggested by the results in Figure 9.4, both 
the slope and the intercept of a price decrease differ from these of a price increase.  
 
Figure 9.4. Nonlinear price - utility relation 
To calculate a WTP for a positive utility, we should thus use the taste parameter (slope) of the 
line between 0 and -0,5 while for a WTA negative utility changes can better be approached by 
using the slope coefficient of the trend line between 0 and 1,5%. Thus: 
 
If ∆p < 0: α1
If ∆p > 0: α
 = 2,28  
2
 
 = 0,30  
These results are in line with what one could expect considering that farmers are in general 
‘negative price change adverse’ decision makers. A change with a negative utility will only be 
accepted when a rather high price compensation is given (high WTA), while the WTP for a 
change with a positive utility is rather low. 
  
For categorical variables, we opted for the calculation of a WTP based upon the change from 
one attribute level to another, as exemplified in Table 9.6 for the ‘Social component’. The 
obtained result of 2.43% has to be interpreted as follows: for a change from a certification 
standard that does not contain a social component to a certification book with an extensive 
social component, the surveyed farmers on average expect a financial compensation of 2.43%, 
the latter meaning an upward change in price for the end product. Table 9.7 shows WTP and 
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WTA measures for the different components in the CE. It is worthwhile to mention that one 
should be cautious when extrapolating these findings beyond the upper and lower levels of the 
attributes in the experiment. The WTA for the attribute ‘Minor must rules compulsory’ for 
example should be interpreted between the boundaries of 80% and 100%. 
 
Table 9.6. WTA calculation for categorical variable 
Utils for ‘Extensive social 
component’ (UE
Utils for ‘Limited social 
component’ (U) N
WTA = - (U
) 
E  – UN) / α
-0.74104 
2 
-0.01199 2.43% 
With marginal utility of the premium:  α2
 
 = 0.30 
Table 9.7. WTP and WTA measures (% change of end product price) for CE 1 
Attribute (level) WTP measure  WTA measure 
Minor Musts compulsory   0.18% per 1% increase 
2 controls versus 1 control  0.80% 
Degressive controls versus 1 control 0.18%  
Administration (30 min/1h  1h30min)   4.74% 
Extensive social component (versus limited)  2.43% 
No social component (versus limited) 0.33%  
Individual certification versus group cert. 
Only Flemish farmers allowed 
Everybody allowed 
 
0.15% 
1.83% 
 
0.84% 
 
The calculated price changes vary between -0.5 % and + 5%, which is considerable, given 
that in vegetable production the farmer’s margins are under high pressure. However, over the 
years, seasonal price variations can be more substantial. If we compare product prices for 
2004 (a year with low prices ) with those for 2003 and 2005 (see Table 9.8), variations easily 
exceed the 25% level (taken into account that supply was more or less constant (data from 
MV Info, 2006). Within the CE, farmers were asked to imagine an end product price 
occurring in an average year. 
 
Table 9.8. Price variations for tomatoes and lettuce 
Crop type 2003 2004 2005 
Price Price Price change* Price Price change* 
Tomatoes 0.92 0.60 -35% 0.76 +26% 
Cabbage lettuce 0.38 0.28 -26% 0.38 +35% 
* compared to previous year 
   
A farmer expects for a 1% increase in the minor must level (i.e. instead of scoring 80 to 100 
on the rules identified as minor musts, a farmer should at least obtain a score of 81, to be 
certified), an increase in the product price (at auction level) of 0.18%. EurepGAP, contrary to 
FlandriaGAP, has fixed the Minor Must level at 95%, an increase in the minor must 
compulsory level of 15%, which corresponds to a WTA of 2,7%. This may explain why not 
all farmers have so far adapted the more severe EurepGAP benchmarked FlandriaGAP 
standard. 
 
Farmers clearly favour the degressive control system, they are on average willing to forgo 
0,18% of their products’ market price to change to this system. This system has several 
advantages. First, the control costs decrease (because each control has to be paid separately) 
and second, the risk of loosing the certificate decreases. Third, time loss (both for preparation 
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and during the controls) reduces. Fourth, given that the certification books evolve 
continuously, this system can give the farmers some extra time to do the necessary 
investments and adaptations.  
 
9.7 Discussion 
In the following sections we discuss the farmers’ attitude towards the proposed modifications 
in the standard. As explained in the theoretical framework, we distinguish between changes to 
the governance structure, the bargaining position of participants and the objective of the 
certification.  
 
9.7.1 Changes in the governance structure 
To cope with farmer related disturbances, due to opportunistic behaviour and bounded 
rationality, an appropriate governance and control system is put in place. In the choice 
experiment, the items ‘type of process certification’, ‘number of controls’, ‘administration 
time’ and ‘incentive intensity’ were introduced to capture these effects.  
 
The type of process certification principally defines the authority who is performing the 
necessary controls. Together with the choice experiment attributes ‘number of controls’ and 
‘administration time’, it defines the monitoring and control part of the certification’s 
governance structure, which is aimed at countering the farmers’ opportunistic behaviour and 
bounded rationality. Three types of certification were presented to the vegetable growers: 
individual certification, group certification and free choice between these two types for the 
farmer. In case of group certification, the farmers’ cooperative (in casu the auction) is 
controlled and certified by an independent control body. This cooperative, on its turn, is 
responsible for the controls at farm level. The independent (third party) control body only 
examines a sample of the farmers. This is in contrast with individual certification were an 
independent control body directly controls the production process at individual farm level and 
issues an individual certificate. At present, farmers have a free choice, hence the two 
suggested levels imply a restriction for the farmer.  
The game at the institution forming level concerns the trade off between the reliability of the 
standard and the costs associated with it. The buyers (retailers) opt for ‘certification of the 
individual farms’, because this makes the standard more trustworthy. From farmers’ point of 
view, ‘group certification’ is preferable compared to individual certification because the 
farmers have more trust in the auction, which is still a farmers cooperative, than in a fully 
independent body, enabling more farmers to attain the certificate. Most of the farmers also 
prefer a less restrictive control system, given that controls are burdensome and might result in 
a (temporary) loss of the certificate. A part of the farmers favours the individual control 
system because they want to avoid the undermining of the standard by weak fellow farmers, 
or they participate in different certification schemes and thus automatically need an individual 
certificate. From auction’s point of view more farmers attaining the certification standards 
means the creation of a larger supply (and thus more supplier power).  
For the game at the institution-dependent level, the farm level, the experiment shows that the 
coefficients for ‘Free choice’ and ‘Individual certification’ significantly differ from zero, 
which implies that farmers clearly perceive a utility difference between free choice, group and 
individual certification. Stakeholders at the institution forming level should be aware that for 
accepting ‘individual certification’, farmers at the institution dependent level expect an extra 
compensation (1,83% per unit product) compared to the situation of group certification as it is 
judged to be more restrictive.    
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The number of controls is also of importance, for several reasons: the more controls, the less 
chance for evaders to survive in the system; the costs for control (i.e. monitoring costs) are 
borne by the farmer (or the auction, depending on the system) and controls are time- and 
effort-consuming. In the experimental set up, three attribute levels were presented to the 
farmers: 1 control/year, 2 controls/year and a degressive control system. In the present 
situation, farmers are on average controlled once a year. The degressive control system 
rewards farmers with positive control scores by reducing the number of controls in the 
subsequent years. This system is under consideration in several other European certification 
initiatives, among which Q&S (Qualität und Sicherheit) and Biogarantie. The sampled 
farmers clearly preferred the latter, due to reasons mentioned before. The surveyed 
participants perceive a significant negative utility when the number of controls is increased. 
Peeters et al. (2005), after surveying 193 Flemish market gardeners, found that 90% of the 
farmers understand the necessity of controls in relation to certification. The same survey 
indicated that two third of them dislike the controls. In our experiment, a significant positive 
utility is attached to the degressive control system, which indicates that farmers would 
welcome a change in this direction. The degressive control system is favourable from 
farmers’ point of view because the farmer can save both time and costs in the future. The 
farmers will thus try harder to reach the 100% compliance level, resulting in a positive effect 
in the short run. Furthermore, by concentrating their efforts on the weakest elements in the 
system, the effectiveness of the third party controls will further increase, resulting in a better 
quality image for the scheme and reduced monitoring costs. Based on our results, farmers’ 
representatives at the rule making game level may therefore defend this position because it 
reflects the preference of farmers and their expected compensation when this preferred 
situation is not attained.       
 
Administration is one of the major transaction costs associated with certification. Given the 
information asymmetry, there is a tendency to increase the administrative part of the controls. 
There is a positive correlation between administration time and the three drivers of the 
certified product’s transaction (asset specificity, possibility of disturbances and frequency of 
transactions). The administrative burden caused by certification books is a major source of 
complaints by farmers, because it has never been part of their core business and competence. 
The CE results confirm the negative utility farmers experience when administration time 
increases. The auctions have taken several actions to ease this administrative burden, f.e. by 
making crop registration available in an easy computer format and by subsidizing the 
purchase of computers. Farmers acknowledge that the administrative process becomes less 
cumbersome once they are used to the system. When the administration time due to the 
private certification system increases from less than one hour to one and a half hour per week, 
farmers expect a significant price increase of nearly 5%, which is a clear sign of farmers’ 
extreme dislike of changes in this direction.  
 
9.7.2 Changes in the stakeholder’s bargaining position 
Type of communication is introduced in the CE to measure farmers’ fear for dependency 
relations with downstream players. Farmers were confronted with 3 attribute levels capturing 
this aspect of certification standards: communication towards end consumer (through label), 
communication towards retail and communication depending on the retailer’s preference 
(label or not). Two opposite forces are at work here, which is also confirmed in the non-
significant estimates of the experiment. On the one hand, a label might act as a pull 
mechanism (i.e. consumers specifically request the labelled product, which result in better 
prices or increased market shares). On the other hand, retailers prefer private labels instead of 
national brands, to increase consumer’ store loyalty. When a supplier uses his own label, the 
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retailer often requests the supplier’s loyalty. In that case, offering an unlabelled quality 
product, which can still be privately labelled by the retailer, might be a better strategy to gain 
market share and buyer independency. The coefficients in the experiments do not significantly 
differ from zero, indicating that the average farmer is indifferent. Although farmers indicated 
during the focus groups that they feel a sense of pride when they recognize their products in 
the stores, they are, with the introduction of FlandriaGAP and EurepGAP, already used to 
BtoB communication.   
  
Closely linked to the previous item is the question whether ‘Free access’ of farmers is 
allowed. This item is integrated in the choice set because it is assumed that farmers do see a 
market advantage in restricting the number of farmers able to participate in Flandria, for three 
main reasons. Firstly, the name Flandria explicitly refers to the region of Flanders, hence it is 
perfectly suited for communication purposes. Secondly, if Flandria becomes a quality 
vegetable standard accessible to farmers in other countries as well, Flemish farmers could 
loose part of their preferential position in the European market, increasing internal 
competition amongst farmers.  Thirdly, the Flandria certification standards are currently well 
adapted to local cropping circumstances. As is the case for GlobalGAP, a more generic 
certification book risks becoming too generalistic with rules to comply having less sense 
given the local situation. During the contacts with farmers, it became clear that a major part of 
them indeed struggles with the fact that foreign farmers can enter the Flandria scheme. On the 
contrary, a reasonable part of the farmers do not see a major problem in other fellow 
European farmers participating in the initiative, as long as they abide by the rules of the 
Flandria certification book. The different attribute levels presented to the vegetable growers 
are ‘everybody allowed’; ‘only Flemish farmers allowed’ and ‘only Flemish products 
allowed’, the latter because some Flemish farmers also possess production units abroad (f.e. 
in Spain or the United States). The coefficients in the CE have the expected signs, and the 
attribute levels ‘Only Flemish gardener allowed’ and ‘Everybody allowed’ significantly differ 
from zero, at the 10% level, which indicate that the average farmer is not indifferent whether 
foreign farmers also enter the scheme or not. It should be remarked that it is contradictory that 
the attribute level ‘Flemish gardener allowed’ has a higher utility than the attribute level 
‘Flemish products allowed’. This may be due to the fact that the surveyed farmers did not 
really understand the meaning of the latter attribute level.        
  
9.7.3 Changes in the purpose of the certification standard 
Nowadays, measures indicated as ‘minor musts’ in the FlandriaGAP standard are 80% 
compulsory, i.e. at least 8 out of 10 of these measures should be fulfilled. The ‘major must’ 
measures are 100% compulsory. The ‘shoulds’ in the certification book are considered as 
recommendations for the farmer, i.e. not mandatory, and these are not actively controlled by 
the inspectors. This attribute is integrated in the choice experiment to capture (a part of) the 
evolutionary potential of certification books, together with the social component (see further). 
An increase in rules means an increase in asset specificity, which might, in theory, result into 
more dependency. From researchers’ point of view, it is argued that the measures indicated as 
‘minor musts’ will be the first to evolve, to a ‘major must’ level, hence uplifting the 
compulsory level of the minor musts is considered as a good proxy for evolution of the 
current standard. As indicated by Vandenbergh (2004), on average, approximately 90% of the 
minor musts are fulfilled by the market gardeners following FlandriaGAP. The certification 
standard encompasses 55 minor must rules, compared to 68 major musts and 25 shoulds. The 
following levels of compliance were incorporated in the CE: 80% mandatory (base scenario), 
90% and 100% mandatory. The 90% level has a (small) negative measure, indicating that 
farmers do not perceive too many difficulties in attaining this level, as confirmed by 
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Vandenbergh (2004). The 100% level on the contrary is perceived as highly disadvantageous, 
mainly due to the loss of degrees of freedom for farmers. During the focus group sessions, 
farmers indicated that approximately 5 to 10% of the measures in the instruction book are 
perceived as too restrictive, and not adapted to practical considerations. The measures 
obtained in the CE confirm this perception. 
   
The attribute social component may not seem directly linked with certification books (in the 
Flemish context it should perhaps better remain within the legal prescriptions), but major 
retailers (mainly from Great Brittan) are now asking for specific social (labour) measures to 
be included in the prescriptions. The auction representatives question whether these issues 
should be dealt with in a certification standard. They argue that social regulations and welfare 
issues reside within the Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue, not 
within a GAP. They further argue that the market gardener as employer has the end 
responsibility. GlobalGAP has chosen to integrate some of these rules, those which are still 
controllable by the same person responsible for controlling pesticide and fertilizer use, 
although these are two totally different disciplines. GlobalGAP, as a generic standard at 
international level, has opted for this choice due to the problems of child labour and fair trade. 
Three levels were integrated in our CE: absence of a social component, a limited social 
component and an extensively elaborated social component. The latter refers to a situation in 
which the farmer has to document all additional information concerning wages and other 
labour conditions, hours of work, number of contemporary employees etc. Wages should be 
in line with the legal prescriptions. For a limited social component, the farmer has to 
document how he creates a socially desirable working atmosphere (f.e. by providing a lunch 
area, by allowing labourers to question their situation etc.). In the CE, a significant positive 
utility is attached to the case in which no social component is added. The extensive social 
component however receives a highly negative utility, indicating that farmers prefer to avoid 
this situation. 
 
9.8 Conclusion 
As introduced in the theoretical framework, the transitional process in certification rules will 
only be supported if the new rules are generally recognised as necessary and resulting in 
satisfactory pay-offs (Aoki, 2006). Due to the (semi-) voluntary nature of private certification, 
modifications to the institutional rules need to be endogenously supported, both by buyers and 
suppliers. Each of these stakeholder groups is represented in the bargaining process for new 
standards, in this paper identified as the rule making game at the institution forming level. The 
result of this game is a new certification institution, which can or cannot be accepted by the 
individual producers and buyers. Given the bargaining power of the latter (in our case the 
quality retailers)  their demands are normally well integrated in the new standard. Grades and 
standards, as outlined by Mainville et al. (2005), can take differentiating, standardizing and 
risk reducing functions. In each of these three fields, retailers still see ample room for 
improvement (Mondelaers and Van Huylenbroeck, 2007). For the individual producers the 
choice is restricted to participation or opting out. The choice preference experiment helps us 
to reveal ex ante how producers react on changes at the rule making level. The derived 
farmers’ preferences and WTP/WTA measures can help negotiators to better assess the 
implications of modifications in the rules on the pay-off structure of those who have to 
implement the rules. Due to the fact that a decision maker in a choice experiment has to make 
a trade off between different attributes simultaneously, his choice can be considered as 
unbiased, reflecting his true preferences. As such, obtained estimates can be considered as 
indicative of the perceived costs at farm level for the implementation of the new rules. This 
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specific feature is especially interesting for those rules of which associated costs are difficult 
to foresee in advance. The latter is typically the case for certification standards, given that 
they influence many aspects of the production process simultaneously.  
 
The reaction of the farmers in our experiment can be summarized in one term: change 
averseness. North (1990) defines this as path dependency, where organizations shaped by an 
institutional matrix typically have a stake in perpetuating the existing framework, because the 
economies of scope, complementarities and network externalities from that given institution 
bias costs and benefits towards choices consistent with it. The current certification institution 
reflects an equilibrium between the interests of buyers and sellers. The producers’ primal fear 
is the gradual weakening of their power, shifting the equilibrium in favour of the retailers. The 
farmers’ change averseness can also be explained when considering the new pay-off structure, 
which should be satisfactory to make change sustainable. However, for those entering the new 
scheme this pay off structure remains unchanged, apart from a temporary price increase to 
motivate conversion. However, the pay-off structure does change for those who decide not to 
implement the new changes, because they are then excluded from the preferential sales 
channel. We therefore think that the developed methodology may be useful tool for 
facilitating this kind of applications and issues. A more wide application could also reveal the 
relation between pay-off structure and farm or farmers’ characteristics. 
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Chapter 10. 
 
Sustainable efficiency of PIoS when new sustainability 
targets are introduced 
 
This chapter is based upon the paper: Mondelaers, K., Kuosmanen, T., Van Passel, S., 
Buysse, J., Lauwers, L. and Van Huylenbroeck, G. Meeting industry sustainability targets by 
improving firm efficiency.  Submitted to Journal for Environmental Management.  
10.1 Introduction 
There is a high potential for simultaneously increasing sustainability of the earth system and 
economic development by removing inefficiencies currently present both at the production 
input and output side. In this chapter a static view on sustainability is employed, by 
introducing capacity constraints as the boundaries above (or below) which the system cannot 
maintain its stable state. Currently these capacity constraints are often not respected. In this 
chapter it is shown how the efficiency improvement pathway of an industry and the firms 
within it can be calculated to come to a sustainable, profit maximizing state, given the 
existence of these capacity constraints.  The main body of the chapter concentrates on the 
development of the calculation method. To measure whether PIoS contribute more to 
sustainable development when new sustainability targets are introduced, an application is 
worked out in which organic farming, as PIoS, is compared to conventional farming.  This 
chapter will provide an answer to hypothesis 6: Farms participating in PIoS are more 
sustainable efficient than farms who do not when new sustainability targets are introduced 
 
The term ‘sustainable development’ has since its first introduction to the general public after 
Rio29
 
, 1992, gained considerable attention. Many contributions have been made for the 
assessment of sustainable development, some from fragmentary, others from more holistic 
nature. The term sustainable development seems in itself contradictory: ‘to sustain’ versus ‘to 
develop’. This contradiction in fact says that development is subject to the constraint of 
guaranteeing the sustainability of some elements upon which the development is realized.   
Under the constraint of maintaining sustainability, mankind aims at increasing welfare, which 
is done through processes of growth and development. Simple growth, based upon an increase 
in resource use, puts a high stress on the surrounding environment. Development, as it focuses 
on improvements in the way the resources are used, is therefore a more promising path to 
welfare increase. In this chapter we focus on the potential of welfare increase through 
efficiency improvement, while guaranteeing ecosystem sustainability. We first develop a 
method to measure this and then apply it to the case of PIoS.    
 
According to system theory, we can define a hierarchical system in which we find a 
supersystem and multiple subsystems, the latter being embedded in the former. The 
supersystem could be the earth system, while the subsystem could be a firm. Our final goal is 
to guarantee (or move to) a sustainable and welfare maximizing supersystem, with 
‘sustainable’ defined as the ability of a system to continue over a certain time span (Hansen 
and Jones, 1996). What causes continuity (or failure) of the supersystem, can be related to the 
capacity constraints of the system, the thresholds above or below which the system cannot 
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recover. A practical example is global warming, or at a more local level, the pollution of 
aquifers. The current level of resource consumption is not always sustainable (see IPCC, 2007 
f.e.), although this is now assumed in most economic models. To overcome this bottleneck, 
we could depart from the carrying capacity constraints of the supersystem.  
 
We should be aware that the restrictions that determine subsystem sustainability are not 
(always) the same as those that determine supersystem sustainability. They can in fact be 
opposite. Voinov and Farley (2007), who approach the concept of sustainability from a 
system’s perspective, argue that our current obsession with sustaining a growth-driven 
economic system probably comes at the expense of the ecologic supersystem. Advances in 
resource efficiency can be overcompensated because higher efficiency may lead to increased 
use of (environmental) resources. This is called the rebound effect (Mayumi et al., 1998, 
Herring and Roy, 2002). Voinov and Farley (2007) give the example of cancerous cells that 
can be successful as a subsystem and simultaneously have a pernicious effect on the human 
body as a supersystem. Because continuity of the supersystem and subsystem are not 
considered over the same time span, this conflicting situation can occur as the subsystem does 
not experience an incentive to restrict its resource use (its longevity is much shorter than this 
of the supersystem).  
In addition to this, apart from the ultimate aim of guaranteeing survival of the supersystem 
(the earth), we can have the additional goal of maintaining lower level systems. Take the 
example of a river basin. When 1 river basin becomes algae infested, the continuity of the 
earth system is not threatened. We can however simultaneously define the goal of maintaining 
both this river basin subsystem and the supersystem, as long as we consider the former 
subordinate to the latter.    
 
In this chapter we focus on the efficiency score of firms in an industry when this industry is 
characterized by overconsumption of scarce resources and/or overproduction of bad outputs. 
There is a potential for meeting industry sustainability targets by removing (part of) the firm 
level inefficiency. Moreover, there might even be a possibility to create more firm level 
output and profit, given the reaching of these industry constraints, when the remainder of 
inefficiency is removed. The objective of this chapter is to obtain a single firm index of 
‘sustainable profit efficiency’, a term which simultaneously captures the meeting of (higher 
level) sustainability targets and the creation of more firm level value (output or profit). This 
chapter contributes to the literature on efficiency measurement by linking efficiency to 
absolute sustainability targets at industry level, a topic which is not yet deeply investigated. 
Several authors have associated inefficiency with firm level sustainability targets (such as 
Reinhard et al., 1999, Fare et al., 2004a, Coelli et al., 2007). Others have focused on the 
determination of the industry’s efficiency score based upon the firms’ inefficiencies 
(Blackorby and Russell,1999, Li and Ng, 1995 , Fare and Zelenyuk, 2003), while yet another 
stream of efficiency literature focuses on nonradial efficiency scores, the so called directional 
distance functions, with main contributions from Chambers et al., 1998, Chung et al., 1997, 
based upon the work of Luenberger, 1992 and recent advancements by Briec et al. (2003) and 
Kuosmanen et al. (2009). We will use elements from these three streams of literature in 
efficiency analysis to link inefficiency with sustainability targets. The focus on industry 
sustainability targets is of concern, as policy makers and practitioners are seeking the optimal 
way to distribute the burden of production over participants.  
 
The chapter unfolds as follows. In a first part the sustainability targets are mathematically 
defined. The second part focuses on the potential interplay between efficiency and 
sustainability and identifies different states of the industry. In the subsequent parts 4 and 5 we 
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focus on two of these states, an inefficient and unsustainable industry and an efficient but 
unsustainable industry and propose a way to calculate the sustainable profit efficiency of the 
firms in these industries. We then proceed to some extensions, such as multiple sustainability 
targets or uncertainty about the right sustainability target. The method is then applied to the 
case of dairy farms participating in organic and conventional farming. We end with some 
conclusions.  
 
10.2 Defining capacity constraints  
In ecology carrying capacity is defined as the maximal population size of a given species that 
an area can support without reducing its ability to support the same species in the future 
(Daily and Ehrlich, 1992). Seidl and Tisell (1999) mention that a judgement of an 
environmental situation or the decision of limits (e.g. the carrying capacity) is influenced by 
value-judgements and institutional settings. They also extend the biophysical concept with a 
social counterpart. Social carrying capacity, shaped by human consumption patterns, 
technologies, infrastructure and so on, refers to the maximal population size that could be 
sustained under various social systems, while biophysical carrying capacity reflects the 
maximal population size that can be sustained biophysically under given technological 
capabilities. The latter can only be higher or equal to the former. In this text we define a 
carrying capacity constraint as the total amount of a resource that can be consumed without 
endangering the sustainability of the surrounding biophysical ecosystem. Table 10.1 
developed by Daily and Ehrlich (1992) provides a classification of resources based upon key 
sustainability issues. They distinguish between resources that are not necessarily degraded or 
dispersed in use while providing free services to humanity, such as microbial nutrient cyclers, 
natural pest control agents and pollinators (mutual benefit), opposite to resources such as 
food, drinking water and energy that are necessarily consumed, dispersed or degraded to 
derive benefits from them. The second distinction they make relates to renewable versus non 
renewable resources, with the latter being mainly flow limited while the former are generally 
stock limited. Last distinction they make is between availability of substitutes or not. 
Resources, such as fresh water, biodiversity and fertile soils, which have no substitute, are 
termed essential.  
 
Table 10.1. Resource classification scheme with some examples (Daily and Ehrlich, 1992) 
Resource type  Not necessarily degraded or 
dispersed in use 
Necessarily degraded or dispersed 
in use 
Nonrenewable (at 
current use rates) 
Essential Stratospheric ozone, tropical 
forests, biodiversity 
Time or opportunity 
Substitutable Materials that supply some 
services (e.g. diamonds and gold) 
Nonrenewable energy sources (e.g. 
fossil fuels) some other minerals 
Renewable Essential Ecosystem elements that supply 
services (e.g. soil microbes, 
pollinators) 
Solar energy, fresh water, some soil 
used for agriculture 
Substitutable Species that supply some services 
(e.g. animals for power, transport, 
insulin and vaccines) 
Wood for construction, a particular 
food type 
 
To go from Table 10.1 to a capacity constraint, an additional concept is needed. Daily and 
Ehrlich (1992) therefore defined a ‘maximum sustainable use’ (MSU) of a resource 
depending on its classification in Table 10.1. For degradable, substitutable resources Daily 
and Ehrlich (1992) define a quasi-sustainable consumption rate equivalent to the rate of 
generation of the substitutes. For a renewable essential resource that is necessarily consumed, 
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degraded or dispersed in the extraction of value from it, the MSU is equivalent to its renewal 
rate.  
The authors also distinguish between scarce inputs and undesired outputs. For the latter they 
define the maximum sustainable level of abuse (MSA), or the maximal sustainable emission 
rate of a pollutant into the environment. This is the level of emission that produces the highest 
concentration of pollutant  that can be tolerated by the most sensitive system element. 
 
In this paper we do not focus on the way the MSU and MSA are calculated, as this is resource 
and situation dependent. We assume that both the actual resource use and the MSU (or MSA) 
are known. In our reasoning, the MSU is synonymous to the constrained resource use.  
  
10.2.1 The systemic level: firm or higher level 
Capacity constraints (or MSU’s) can be defined at different systemic levels. We can 
distinguish between two cases: the first one relates the capacity constraint to the entities at the 
firm level and the second one relates the capacity constraint to a higher level30. In the first 
case no reallocation mechanism is necessary: if the threshold is surpassed the firm is termed 
unsustainable. This situation of a fixed firm level capacity constraint is similar to the one 
depicted in figure 10.2. A practical example might be nitrate leaching. It is not because it is 
potentially endangers the sustainability at firm level that the sustainability of a higher system 
level is under threat. In the second case, substitution of the impact between firms is allowed 
without necessarily affecting the aggregate capacity constraint. The greenhouse gas emissions 
for example threaten sustainability of a higher system, the earth’s ecosystem. When the 
capacity constraint is situated at a higher level, there is a need for a redistribution mechanism 
over the different sub level entities. The question is, if the total amount of allowed greenhouse 
gases is constrained at f.e. country level, what is then the allowable share of the different 
firms? To attain the capacity constraint at a higher level, we have to reduce overall resource 
use31
 
.  In a ‘classic’ input oriented efficiency analysis we obtain an inefficiency measure for 
each firm in the sample. This inefficiency measure indicates that an equal output can be 
achieved with a lower input. If our objective now is to reduce overall input use (our bad 
output creation), this inefficiency measure can serve as the reallocation mechanism. The 
capacity constraint reflects the maximum amount of allowable total resource consumption. 
The desired reduction in overall resource consumption is the difference between the capacity 
constraint and the actual resource consumption. The best way to reduce the actual resource 
use is by removing the inefficiency until the industry reaches the capacity constraint.  
10.2.2 Mathematical representation of the capacity constraint 
The current resource consumption at a supra farm (f.e. regional) systemic level can be 
computed easily by aggregating over the different farms that are part of this systemic level. 
By means of environmental scientific studies we can obtain an estimate of the desirable 
resource consumption from a sustainability perspective. Imagine that this desired use (the 
MSU) is a percentage α of the current use. The supra farm level constraint can then be defined 
as: 
𝛼𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝑚𝑚1,𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘 ≥ ∑ 𝑚𝑚1,𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘                         (1) 
with 𝑚𝑚1,𝑖𝑖  the actual use of input x1 by firm i, (1-α) the desired (macro level) reduction in input 
use, K the total number of firms subject to this constraint. xc
                                                          
30 The case of a capacity constraint relating to a lower level falls back to the first case when you aggregate over 
the subentities of this lower level 
 indicates the constrained input 
31 our bad output generation, depending on the type of constraint 
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use of firm k of input x1
 
. If not sufficient, input can be contracted further by reducing the 
output.  
The case of a single resource constraint can be easily extended to multiple constraints. We 
will first develop the reasoning for a single higher level resource constraint and afterwards 
extend this to the cases of multiple higher level constraints and farm level constraints. We will 
also consider the case of uncertainty of the correct MSU.  
 
For illustrative purposes, consider a second higher level constraint for resource x2
𝛽𝛽 ∙ ∑ 𝑚𝑚2,𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘 ≥ ∑ 𝑚𝑚2,𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘              (2) 
, described 
as: 
Both constraints together define a feasible set with maximum group boundaries of 𝛼𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝑚𝑚1,𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘  
and 𝛽𝛽 ∙ ∑ 𝑚𝑚2,𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘 . For a firm level capacity constraint K=1, and α is defined at the micro level.  
 
When the number of firms subject to each of the constraints differ, f.e. K1 firms for constraint 
1 and K2 firms for constraint 2, with K2 > K1, this equation becomes: 
 𝛽𝛽 ∙ ∑ 𝑚𝑚2,𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘 ≥ ∑ 𝑚𝑚2,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘  = ∑ 𝑚𝑚2,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐾𝐾1𝑘𝑘 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚2,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐾𝐾2𝑘𝑘=𝐾𝐾1            (3) 
 
10.3 The interplay between efficiency and sustainability 
Following Figure 10.1, representing an industry’s production function with resource (set) X 
and output Y, can be used to explain how sustainability and efficiency relate. To the left of the 
capacity constraint, resource consumption is sustainable. The difference between inefficient 
resource use and unsustainable resource use is also depicted in Figure 10.2. Unsustainable 
resource use refers to the situation in which constant (natural) capital stocks are no longer 
maintained, or, put differently, that strong sustainability thresholds are surpassed. There is 
however no link with the output achieved. Inefficient resource use on its turn reflects a 
suboptimal relation between amount of resource used and output reached. We can distinguish 
between 5 cases, as shown in Figure 10.2.     
 
Figure 10.1. Sustainable versus efficient resource use of an industry. T(X) reflects the production 
frontier and MSU X the maximum sustainable use of X. Following categories can be 
distinguished: A1: efficient and sustainable resource use; A2: efficient but unsustainable; B1: 
inefficient but sustainable; B2: inefficient and unsustainable, but removing inefficiency suffices 
to achieve sustainability; B3: inefficient and unsustainable, and efficiency improvement does not 
suffice to achieve sustainability 
 
A1 
B3 
B1 B2 
A2 
Y 
X 
T(X) 
MSU X 
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Depending on whether the production frontier is situated within the capacity constraint or not, 
the current technology is suited for sustainable production. The value of the classification is 
that relative efficiency and absolute sustainability are not competing but complementary 
criteria. Knowing the status of the system according to this classification is important for 
making appropriate policy decisions. Cases A1 and B1 are ok as far as sustainability is 
concerned. In case B2 it is possible to maintain the current level of output by improving 
efficiency of resource use. Cases A2 and B3 require downscaling of output level; in B3 this 
can be complemented with efficiency improvement. 
 
Figure 10.1 reflects the industry composed of different economic entities. The possible 
positions  of these entities in the figure can also be grouped in these 5 categories. It is thus 
very well possible that an industry is in sustainable equilibrium, with some firms breaching 
their proportional share of the MSU, as this is compensated by other firms who remain below 
their proportional MSU.  
 
In the spirit of sustainable development, we aim to maximize an industry’s value creation, 
while simultaneously meeting the capacity constraints. To this end following possibilities are 
available: we can reduce the technical inefficiency in the industry, we can change the 
industry’s and hence the firms’ input mix, to reach the capacity constraints at the lowest 
(shadow) cost possible, and we can change the output generated. By decomposing the 
aggregate ‘sustainable inefficiency’ into different parts, we can yield more information on 
which components of inefficiency are present both at industry and at firm level. The 
decomposition at industry level is important for policy making, while the decomposition at 
firm (versus industry) level reveals information with respect to the competitive positioning of 
firms in this industry.      
 
10.4 Unsustainable and inefficient resource use  
In figure 10.2, option A1 and B1 do not pose sustainability concerns. In both cases output can 
still be increased up to the point that the capacity constraint is met. In the case of A1 industry 
output can be expanded by consuming extra resources under an efficient technology regime. 
In the case of B1, this can be complemented with some efficiency improvement. B2 offers an 
interesting starting point for our discussion, because it is the most straightforward case (with 
exception of A1 and B1). In this case the economy is characterized by unsustainable and 
inefficient resource use, and removing inefficiency suffices to attain the sustainability 
constraint. The question is here how the sustainability constraint should be divided over the 
different firms.  
 
In this paper it is the aim to obtain an index for a firm’s sustainable profit inefficiency. In the 
static view employed in this paper, a firm is considered to be sustainable profit efficient 
(SPE) when it creates maximum economic value while sustainability constraints (at firm or 
supra firm level) are met. We will distinguish between sustainable technical efficiency 
(STE), sustainable allocative efficiency (SAE) and sustainable profit efficiency, which is a 
combination of both other efficiency measures. 
 
We distinguish between a bottom up approach and a top down approach. In the former all 
firms in the industry are maintained after the optimization, which means that the size of the 
industry remains unchanged. The advantage of this method is that a firm specific efficiency 
measure can be easily obtained. In the latter approach the number of firms in the industry, i.e. 
the industry size, is allowed to change to guarantee an optimal allocation of resources. This 
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method shows the potential maximal output and profit of the industry. Obtaining a firm 
specific index is however more complicated.   
 
10.4.1 Bottom up approach: the use of directional distance (DD) vectors 
As depicted in Figure 10.2 below, an industry B2 can remove technical input inefficiency 
until its members jointly meet the capacity constraint. The remaining inefficiency can be 
removed to maximize output under the constrained regime. The removal of a certain amount 
of input and output inefficiency can be projected on a single vector (IE+OE in Figure 10.3). 
There is a stream of literature focusing on nonradial efficiency measures and directional 
distance vectors (see Chambers et al., 1996, Chung, et al., 1997, Chambers et al., 1998 and 
more recently Lee et al, 2002, Fare et al., 2004, McMullen et al., 2007, Murty et al., 2007, 
Briec and Kerstens, 2009, Kuosmanen et al., 2009), which is helpful for our case, as we want 
to define the necessary input contractions for each firm in the industry to jointly meet the 
capacity constraint as well as the possible output increases for these firms. A directional 
distance vector seems appropriate then.  
 
 
Figure 10.2. Input (IE) and output inefficiency (OE) removal potential for industry B2 
In accordance to Fare et al. (2004), let 𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑅𝑅+𝑁𝑁 denote a vector of inputs and 𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑅𝑅+𝑀𝑀 a vector 
of outputs and the physical component of a technology denoted by T, where 
𝑇𝑇 = {(𝑚𝑚, 𝑦𝑦):𝑚𝑚 can produce 𝑦𝑦}                      (4) 
T is assumed to be closed and convex with freely disposable inputs and outputs. The 
assumption of freely disposable outputs can be relaxed when bad outputs are present. Fare et 
al. (2004), in pursuit of Chambers et al. (1998), define the directional distance function on T 
as    
𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇�����⃗ �𝑚𝑚,𝑦𝑦;𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ,𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦� = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝛽𝛽: �𝑚𝑚 − 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ,𝑦𝑦 + 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦� ∈ 𝑇𝑇�                   (5) 
where the nonzero vector �𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ,𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦� ∈ 𝑅𝑅+𝑁𝑁 × 𝑅𝑅+𝑀𝑀determines the direction in which inputs are 
contracted and outputs are expanded.  
 
Defining the appropriate directional distance vector is straightforward in the absence of 
sustainability constraints, because this boils down to measuring the output inefficiency, i.e. 
𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 0 and 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦 = 𝑦𝑦. When sustainability constraints are present, we need a mechanism to 
define the optimal mix between gx and gy to ensure that output is maximized under the 
restriction of the capacity constraint. This will prove especially challenging for supra firm 
sustainability constraints, as we then need to find the optimal way of dividing the constrained 
input over the firms.  
B2opt 
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We can identify two types of directional distance vectors that are appropriate in our case: 
1. a single directional distance vector (gx, gy
2. a directional distance vector (g
) for all the firms in the industry 
x,n, gy,n
Option 1, depicted in Figure 10.3, is appealing as it shows the general direction in which all 
the firms in an industry have to move to meet the capacity constraint and simultaneously 
improve output. It adequately solves the reallocation problem
) which is firm specific    
32
 
 which occurs when higher 
level capacity constraints need to be distributed over multiple firms. As all firms are evaluated 
in the same direction, the metric found can be easily interpreted. The single direction comes 
with a (minimal) cost, some potential industry output increase is lost compared to the case of 
the firm specific directional distance vector. 
 
Figure 10.3. Improvement path for firms A, B, C and D in an industry when there is a single, 
industry wide directional vector (gy; gx
 
)  
Option 2, the firm specific directional distance vector (gx,n, gy,n), as depicted in Figure 10.4, is 
also appealing as it allows to maximize the potential industry output given the capacity 
constraint. We could specify the x-component of the directional distance vector of firm n as 
gxXn, and the y-component as gyYn. This means that the vector is dependent on a firm’s x and 
y-level, but also that each vector shares a common part with the vectors of the other firms in 
the industry. This makes the reallocation mechanism of the constrained resource x over the 
firms still behaviorally interpretable. The more inefficient a firm is in the constrained resource  
xc the more its directional distance vector projects it in the gx direction. The more inefficient a 
firm is in the output direction, all else equal, the more it is projected in this direction. Firms 
inefficient in not-constrained resources are, logically, projected in the same direction as their 
counterpart efficient in these resources, as the directional vector only depends on xc
                                                          
32 Imagine for example two identical firms and imagine that, given the capacity constraint, industry profit is 
maximized by reducing resource use of one of the two firms, keeping the use of the other constant. Although 
from an industry perspective it doesn’t matter which firm’s input use has to be reduced, from a firm perspective 
it does. The firm who’s input use is reduced after optimization, receives a low efficiency score, opposite to the 
other. When the aim is to obtain a firm level inefficiency estimate, the firm’s mirror should be the optimum from 
firm perspective, otherwise the micro level behavioral rule of private utility maximization is absent. 
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Figure 10.4. Improvement path for firms in an industry when the directional vector (gyY; gx
10.4.1.1 Sustainable technical inefficiency 
X) 
is partly firm specific.    
In this section the aim is to determine the output inefficiency of the firms in a industry, 
corrected for the industry’s unsustainable input use. This correction is achieved by removing 
part of the firm’s input inefficiency to the extent that the MSU is met.  As can be seen in  
option B2 in Figure 10.1, removing only part of the input technical inefficiency at firm level 
is sufficient to guarantee that the joint input consumption of the firms in the industry meets 
the industry MSU. The industry does not need to reduce its input use further, as this level of 
input consumption already guarantees higher (eco)system sustainability33
 
. The remaining 
inefficiency can be used to optimize firm level output. As such we obtain a measure for 
technical output inefficiency corrected for (higher level) sustainability targets, which indicates 
how much the output can be expanded given sustainability constraints.  
When multiple outputs are present, we suggest to maintain the current output mix, as the 
decision maker has some (unobserved) reasons to choose this mix. In the section on 
sustainable allocative inefficiency the input and output mix is optimized to generate 
maximum firm profit in the presence of capacity constraints. As the real prices for the 
constrained resources are unknown and therefore need to be approximated, an indication of 
technical output inefficiency, even for multiple outputs, is informative.  
 
The necessary input contraction at industry level is straightforward, as this is reflected by the 
relative difference between the capacity constraint and the current resource use. This could be 
used as starting point for the capacity constraint component (gx
 
) of the directional distance 
vector. This choice of the directional distance vector however does not guarantee that the 
capacity constraint is met, as some firms already operate on the efficiency frontier (esp. in a 
non parametric setting) and therefore they do not contribute to input reduction. Furthermore, 
each firm has potentially a different input inefficiency for the constrained (and unconstrained) 
resources, uses a different amount of the constrained input and has a different firm size.  
When a non parametric production model is used, the according piecewise linear production 
technology is formulated as (based upon Lee et al., 2002): 
                                                          
33 at least in a static setting 
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𝑇𝑇(𝑚𝑚) = �(𝑦𝑦):𝑦𝑦 ≤ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌, 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌, 𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 ≤ 1, 𝑌𝑌 ∈ ℛ+𝑖𝑖 �           (6) 
The (nonlinear) nonparametric models below guarantee that industry output (as a sum of firm 
inefficiency corrected outputs) is maximized, while simultaneously meeting the sustainability 
target.  
In the first model, the individual firm is projected on the efficiency frontier based upon vector 
(gxx, gyy). θl provides a direct measure of how far (x, y) must be projected along (gxx, gyy) to 
reach the frontier of T(x) (Chambers et al., 1998).  The directional vector  in model 7 is firm 
specific, as it depends on x and y. Vector components gx and gy however are constant over the 
firms. The term (1+gyθl) indicates the remaining firm level output inefficiency after removal 
of a proportionate part of the input inefficiency (1+gxθl). As both indices relate to each other 
by means of θl, the technical output inefficiency can be used as a the efficiency measure. As 
there is only one direction that maximizes output given the capacity constraint, the constants 
gx and gy are not independent. Therefore, by fixing one, the complexity of the model below 
can be further reduced. If for example, gx is set to -1 in the formula below, each firm’s input 
xc,l is contracted with θl times xc,l, while the output is expanded with gy times θl times yl
𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑌𝑌 = ∑  𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1                          (7) 
. This 
approach assures that firms contribute to the capacity constraint according to their 
inefficiency.       
s.t. ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ≥ �1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙�𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙  for each k       (7a)       ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑐𝑐 ≤ (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 ,𝑙𝑙           (7b)       ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢 ,𝑙𝑙             (7c) 
     ∑ (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐,𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1 ≤ 𝛼𝛼∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 ,𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1          (7d)       𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 ≤ 1        𝑌𝑌,𝜃𝜃 ≥ 0  
with Y= industry output, l= firm index, k=also firm index, θ l=firm distance parameter, gy=output component of 
directional distance vector, gx=capacity constraint component of directional distance vector, λ=weight of peer, 
y=output, xc=constrained input, xu=unconstrained input, eT
 
= matrix of 1’s  
By solving this model, the optimal vector and the firm directional distances are found. These 
distances, which reflect technical inefficiencies (Fare et al., 2004), indicate the maximal 
output achievable under the constrained regime. Based upon the right hand side of equations 
7a and 7b, an output and capacity constraint related efficiency measure can be obtained, 
�1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝜃𝜃� and (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃) respectively. As they are inextricably linked through vector (gx, 
gy
 
), reporting the sustainable output technical inefficiency  is sufficient as a measure for a 
firm’s sustainable technical inefficiency.  
For the single industry wide directional distance vector the model becomes:  
𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑌𝑌 = ∑  𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1                        (7bis) 
s.t. ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ≥  𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 + 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙    for each k              ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑐𝑐 ≤  𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 ,𝑙𝑙 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙                   ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢 ,𝑙𝑙              
     ∑ �𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 ,𝑙𝑙 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙�𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1 ≤ 𝛼𝛼∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 ,𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1                 𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 ≤ 1        𝑌𝑌,𝜃𝜃 ≥ 0  
with Y= industry output, l= firm index, k=also firm index, θ l=firm distance parameter, gy=output component of 
directional distance vector, gx=capacity constraint component of directional distance vector, λ=weight of peer, 
y=output, xc=constrained input, xu=unconstrained input, eT
 
= matrix of 1’s  
The index for sustainable technical output inefficiency is now calculated as 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙+𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙
𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙
.  
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Whether option 1 or option 2 is chosen will not change the ordering of firms based upon their 
sustainable technical inefficiency. Option 1 yields a slightly higher overall output. There is a 
minor change in the obtained sustainable technical inefficiency scores, whereby firms which 
are most inefficient receive a better score in the model with firm specific directional distance 
vectors, at the cost of the more efficient. In the latter model, the difference in sustainable 
technical efficiency is thus less pronounced. 
 
10.4.1.2 Sustainable allocative efficiency 
The former procedure allows us to meet the capacity constraint and to optimize output 
generation at firm level. Given this, there is still potential to increase profit generation, by 
optimizing the input mix in function of input and output prices and as such removing the 
allocative inefficiency still present. Chambers et al. (1998) show the duality between the 
profit function and the directional technology distance function. We refer to their reading for a 
formal derivation. As shown in Figure 10.5, the inefficiency of a firm in an industry can be 
decomposed into a technical (TE) and an allocative part (AE, Chambers et al., 1998): 
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 = 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇�����⃗ �𝑚𝑚,𝑦𝑦;𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ,𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦�                     (8) 
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 = [𝜋𝜋(𝑝𝑝 ,𝑤𝑤)−(𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦−𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚 )]
�𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦+𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚� − 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇�����⃗ �𝑚𝑚,𝑦𝑦;𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ,𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦�                   (9) 
with 𝜋𝜋(𝑝𝑝,𝑤𝑤) = maximal feasible profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 − 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚 = actual profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 = price normalization to avoid 
effect of proportional price changes; 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇�����⃗ (𝑚𝑚,𝑦𝑦; 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸,𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸) = directional distance function. 
 
Figure 10.5. Technical and sustainable allocative efficiency measure in a directional distance 
framework (adapted from Chambers et al., 1998)  
Specific for our case of MSU’s is that the input price vector w (and potentially the output 
price vector) will change due to the introduction of a MSU. The point (x*, y*) is determined 
by the tangency between the frontier of T(x) and the line segment whose slope is given by an 
adjusted input price wc
 
.    
The fact that the MSU is exceeded indicates that the constrained resource is not appropriately 
priced, i.e. the price does not reflect the real scarcity of the resource, or the real (external) 
cost, otherwise the industry would not be in this equilibrium. A possible explanation is given 
by Lawn (2007, p82), who argues that resource prices reflect reasonably well the relative 
scarcity of various resource types, but they do not adequately reflect the absolute scarcity of a 
resource type. The stock will determine the total inflow over time, but not the inflow at a 
particular point in time. Ecological economists argue that relative prices are mainly based 
upon flow based forces generated by the interacting market supply and demand forces. Oil is 
a good example. While oil stocks decrease over time, in particular periods prices can also 
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decrease due to a drop in demand. We argue that the correct price is unknown due to absence 
of some information and/or the institutions to determine and enforce the exact price. This can 
both relate to absolute scarcity of a resource and external costs generated by exploiting a 
resource.  
 
In an industry in which all firms are economically (i.e. technically and allocatively) efficient 
under an unconstrained regime (i.e without capacity constraint), the firms are (sustainable) 
allocative inefficient34
 
 under the constrained regime, as depicted in Figure 10.6. With 
sustainable allocative inefficient we mean allocative inefficient when the MSU is respected. 
As shown in Figure 10.7, introducing the MSU constraint will influence the supply and 
demand equilibrium and hence the prices. The industry’s shadow price for the constrained 
resource can be used as a proxy for the real unknown market price, as suggested by Li and Ng 
(1995). Firms with a higher shadow price for this resource will be willing to pay for extra 
units of this resource while firms with a lower shadow price are interested to sell some units, 
until all firms reside in the new economic optimum.  
Figure 10.6. Allocative inefficiency when X1 is not 
constrained and sustainable allocative inefficiency when 
input X1 is constrained 
 
Figure 10.7. Input price change when 
MSU is introduced. S= supply 
function, S'= supply function with 
MSU constraint, D=demand function, 
E=equilibrium, E'=new equilibrium 
 
Introducing the new sustainable price for the constrained resource will change the slope of the 
isoprofit line so that the capacity constraint at industry level is met. By defining the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions of the industry profit function, we can obtain the shadow price which can 
serve as the new market price, see formula 12 and formula 13 further in the text. The dual of 
restriction 13g indicates the potential increase in market price for the constrained resource. 
This price can be used to reconstruct the new sustainable isoprofit line (see Figure 10.5)35
                                                          
34 In this example, every firm will have (the same) sustainable allocative inefficiency score. 
. 
However, to apply this approach the industry technology has to be known. When both prices 
and technology are unknown, we can build further on the approach developed by Kuosmanen 
et al. (2009). To obtain shadow prices, they propose to minimize the sum of firms’ profit 
inefficiencies, whereby the prices enter the inefficiency measure as decision variables of the 
optimization problem and the profit function is empirically determined. This industry distance 
function gives the lower bound for the true but unknown industry profit inefficiency: 
35 For simplicity, we ignored the influence of introducing the MSU on the prices of the unconstrained inputs and 
the outputs (and hence assumed a partial equilibrium model). This could however be accommodated by 
introducing constraints for the other inputs, and allowing for a flexible output price. 
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 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 = min𝑤𝑤 ,𝑝𝑝 ,𝜌𝜌 ∑ 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝜈𝜈            (10) 
 s.t. 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 ≥ (𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚) − (𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)           ∀𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝜈𝜈 
     𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦 + 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 1 
     𝑝𝑝,𝑤𝑤 ≥ 0 
with IPE = estimated industry profit efficiency; w=unknown input price, p= unknown output price; ρn
 
=profit 
inefficiency of firm n 
When only one price is known, f.e. input price Wn, Kuosmanen et al. (2009) suggest to set 
input vector gx equal to 1/Wn and all other elements of the directional vector equal to zero. 
We have no price information for the above problem, as all prices might vary given the 
introduction of the capacity constraint, but we know the industry directional distance vector 
(gx, gy) for the DD fixed at industry level, which we can use as normalization constraint in 
equation 10. This will allow us to determine the prices that minimize industry profit 
inefficiency. For the DD which varies at firm level, we can also isolate the fixed (gx, gy
𝜋𝜋(𝑝𝑝,𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐) = max𝑚𝑚 ,𝑦𝑦 ,𝑌𝑌 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 𝑚𝑚           (11) 
) 
component of the DD and use these for the normalization constraint (see formula 7). Given 
the obtained shadow prices, a firm’s maximal profit relative to T can, in a nonparametric 
setting, be defined as: 
  ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚   𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,𝑀𝑀  
  ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖   𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁   𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0  𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾 
  ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 = 1 
 
With the exception of the adapted prices pc and wc, this is the standard profit maximization 
model as also defined by Fare et al. (2004). Introducing the shadow prices pc and  wc
 
 allows 
to calculate the expected maximum profit and the allocative inefficiency under the 
constrained regime, by applying formula 9. 
Based upon the prior two sections, we can determine a firm’s sustainable allocative 
inefficiency (SAE), its sustainable technical inefficiency (STE) and its sustainable profit 
inefficiency (SPE). Furthermore, with classic efficiency techniques, we can determine a 
firm’s allocative inefficiency and technical inefficiency, in the absence of sustainability 
constraints. Comparison of both metrics will allow us to classify firms with respect to current 
resource use and sustainable resource use. It is possible that a firm is currently termed 
allocative inefficient, while it is at the same time sustainable allocative efficient.    
 
10.4.2 Top down approach: firm specific directional distance vector and the 
optimal size of the industry 
The decomposition proposed above might not guarantee maximal profit at the industry level 
(or equally, that the capacity constraint is met when all firms in the industry reside at their 
respective sustainable allocative efficient point). Maybe it is better that some firms use more 
of the resource while others use less or even disappear, in order to maximize industry profit. 
Li and Ng (1995) introduce the notion of group reallocative inefficiency, which refers to some 
remaining inefficiency even if firm technical and allocative inefficiency are removed. It 
compares the group maximum potential total revenue, after technical and allocative 
inefficiencies at firm level have been removed, with the actual total revenue when these 
inefficiencies have been removed. The industry could potentially gain more when a fewer 
number of firms applies a more profitable input mix while other firms would have to face out. 
To this end, the following industry profit function can be maximized under the constrained 
regime, as shown in formula 13, to obtain the optimal firm size: 
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𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝜓𝜓 = ∑ �𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 �𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝑌𝑌1,𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 �𝑇𝑇�𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,1, … , 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑖𝑖 , 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 � − 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘� +
𝑌𝑌2�𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐 − ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 �                                   
(12) 
with K= number of firms in the industry; yk=output of firm k; py=output price; n=number of unconstrained 
inputs; xk,i=unconstrained input i; wi=price of unconstrained input i; xcj=constrained input; wcj=(shadow) price 
of constrained input; T(.)=production frontier, estimated prior; Xc=MSU for the industry; λ1=lagrange multiplier 
of  the production function constraint and λ2
 
=lagrange multiplier of the capacity constraint 
The corresponding linear programming model maximizing industry profit can be formulated 
as:   max𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 ,𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 ∑  �𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦�𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙� − 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚(𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙)� 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1        (13) 
s.t. ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙                                                                                      ∀𝑙𝑙,∀𝑦𝑦  (13b) 
     ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙                                                                                       ∀𝑙𝑙,∀𝑚𝑚  (13c)       𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 ,𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 ,𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 ,𝑐𝑐                                                                                                  ∀𝑙𝑙,∀𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐    (13d) 
     𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 ≥ 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙                                                                                                          ∀𝑙𝑙,∀𝑦𝑦  (13e) 
     ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 = 1                                                                                                    ∀𝑙𝑙  (13f) 
     ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 ,𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 ,𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1 ≤ 𝛼𝛼∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 ,𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1                                    (13g)       𝑌𝑌,𝜃𝜃 ≥ 0 
with gyl=firm relative output change, gxl=firm relative change in input, l=index for firm, L=number of firms in 
the industry, k=also index for firm, K= number of firms in the industry, λ=weight of peer, y=output, 
xc
 
=constrained input, x=unconstrained input, α= relative amount of constrained resource we want to maintain at 
industry level 
Variable 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙  is a measure for the firm level output change, given the capacity constraint, 
while 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 ,𝑐𝑐  indicates the necessary firm level input contraction to guarantee that the industry 
capacity constraint is met. There is no longer an inefficiency component linked with the firm 
specific directional distance vector, so the direction is only determined by the industry profit 
maximization.  
The above model is very flexible, as it also allows input use to decrease or increase36
 
 at firm 
level, (f.e. by relaxing restrictions 13d and 13e) in order to maximize industry profit, given the 
capacity constraint. Removing restriction 13f introduces the assumption of CRS, which is 
probably unrealistic. Restriction 13g is the capacity constraint.  
The choice is then for the policy maker to either allow some profit loss but to maintain all 
firms in the industry or to reduce the number of firms in the industry. This number depends on 
the consumption of constrained resource by the optimal firms:  
   𝐾𝐾′ = 𝛼𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐�                       (14) 
with K’=optimal size of industry, α= relative amount of constrained resource we want to maintain at industry 
level, ∑ 𝑚𝑚1,𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘 =current resource use at industry level, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 =optimal consumption of constrained resource at firm 
level. 
  
The difference in industry profit generation in the case of the optimal versus the actual 
number of firms can be used to pay off those who have to face out. In order to obtain a firm 
level sustainable development efficiency score, the optimal firm can be used as mirror.    
 
                                                          
36 Firms in this situation experience increasing returns to scale. 
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10.5 Unsustainable but efficient resource use  
Consider situation A2 in Figure 10.1, where all firms, and thus the industry (Fare and 
Zelenyuk, 2003), are operating on the efficiency frontier, and input consumption still exceeds 
the MSU. We can distinguish between 2 cases. First, if the use of substitute products can be 
expanded, we can attain the MSU without physical loss of output (see Figure 10.8 below). 
This will however come at a monetary cost because the price of the constrained resource will 
increase to better reflect the MSU, as well as the cost of using the unconstrained resources. In 
this situation the changes in supply and demand functions of the constrained and 
unconstrained inputs have to be taken into account, as well as the substitutability. Second, if 
substitution is impossible, the MSU can only be attained by sacrificing some (physical) output 
(see Figure 10.9 below). 
 
Under the assumption that all firms in the industry are economically efficient, the introduction 
of the MSU will render the firms sustainably allocative inefficient. By reformulating the 
isocost line (see Figure 10.5), the new economically efficient point can be found, as well as 
the sustainable allocative inefficiency of the firms.  
 
 
Figure 10.8. Group sustainable allocative 
inefficiency when a MSU is introduced. B 
reflects the optimal point for the group, A the 
current resource allocation. 
 
Figure 10.9. MSU cannot be met by only 
changing the input mix. Some output must also 
be sacrificed (y  y’). C reflects the optimal 
point, A the current state of the industry 
When the substitution potential is exhausted, the MSU can only be attained by output 
contraction. As all firms are economically efficient (point B in Figure 10.8), i.e. both 
technically and sustainable allocatively efficient, and the MSU is still not met, the necessary 
output contraction can be obtained by a rather straightforward non linear programming model: 
 max𝑎𝑎 ,𝑚𝑚 ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1           (15) 
 s.t. 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 = 𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 , 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 � 
 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈 ≥ ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1  
Note that the reduction in output (by a factor g) is distributed equally over the K firms, as they 
are all assumed technically and allocatively efficient, hence the reduction should be divided 
equally over the firms.    
 
The objective of this paper is to come up with metrics for the SPE, SAE and STE. In model 7 
we can allow gy to take a negative value, which will reduce the output as well as the input 
∑X1 
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simultaneously. For the rest the models for sustainable technical and allocative efficiency  
remain equal. 
 
10.6 Multiple resource constraints or outputs 
From a sustainability perspective, it is likely that more than one of the inputs is constrained.  
Figure 10.9 is illustrative as it shows an industry A confronted with two higher level capacity 
constraints β∑x1 and α∑x2. In the case of 2 constraints, the directional distance vector should 
now also expand in the direction of the second capacity constraint. To come up with a unique 
solution, we again calculate the size of the output component of the directional distance vector 
by maximizing the industry’s output under the capacity constraint regime. The directional 
distance function 𝐷𝐷�⃗ can then be computed by the following linear programming for the ith 
plant, and by iterating over gx1 and gx2
𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑌𝑌 = ∑ �1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙�𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1             (16) . Under assumption of CRS, this model becomes: 
s.t. ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ≥ �1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙�𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙  for each k              ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑐𝑐 ≤ (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚1𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐1,𝑙𝑙           
     ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑐𝑐 ≤ (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚2𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐2,𝑙𝑙    
      ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘 ,𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢 ,𝑙𝑙   
     ∑ (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚1𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐1,𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1 ≤ 𝛼𝛼∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐1,𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1  
     ∑ (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚2𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐2,𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1 ≤ 𝛽𝛽∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐2,𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1        𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 ≤ 1        𝑌𝑌,𝜃𝜃 ≥ 0  
with Y= industry output, l= firm index, k=also firm index, θ l=firm distance parameter, gy=output component of 
directional distance vector, gx1=capacity constraint 1 component of directional distance vector, gx2=capacity 
constraint 2 component of directional distance vector, λ=weight, y=output, xc=constrained input, 
xu=unconstrained input, eT
 
= matrix of 1’s  
As in the case for a single resource constraint, we can fix the output component of the 
directional distance vector to one. The directions for the input components can then be 
calculated, by means of a non linear programming model.  
 
For the case of multiple outputs, the researcher has to make some normative decision on how 
the output inefficiency is distributed over the different outputs. One way would be to keep the 
output mix constant, as this mix reflects best what is perceived optimal from the private 
decision maker’s perspective. To that end gy,i should be set equal to gy,j 
 
for output i and j. 
Optimization of the output mix is achieved when the sustainable profit efficiency is 
calculated. 
10.7 Undesirable outputs 
Undesirable outputs are treated in a similar way as constrained inputs, as they both need to be 
minimized. We could define a MSA (maximum sustainable abuse) level that meets our 
sustainability goal. The directional distance function 𝐷𝐷�⃗ can then be computed by the 
following linear programming for the ith plant, by iterating over gz
𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑌𝑌 = ∑ �1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙�𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1                      (17) : 
s.t. ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ≥ �1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝜃𝜃�𝑦𝑦       ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 ,𝑐𝑐 ≤ (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝜃𝜃)𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐               ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢   
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     ∑ (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙)𝑧𝑧𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1 ≤ 𝛾𝛾∑ 𝑧𝑧𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1        𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 ≤ 1        𝑌𝑌,𝜃𝜃 ≥ 0  
with θ=distance parameter, OE=’desired output’ component of directional distance vector, gz=undesired output 
component of directional distance vector, λ=weight, y=desired output, zc= undesired output, xu=unconstrained 
input, eT
           
= matrix of 1’s  
10.8 Firm level resource constraint 
It is very well possible that a capacity constraint relates directly to the firm level. Excess 
nitrogen surplus can serve as an example. When this capacity constraint is breached, the firm 
can be termed unsustainable. The case develops in a similar fashion as explained above, with 
the exception that the aggregated constraint is now simply replaced by the firm level 
constraint. Some degree of input inefficiency has to be removed to attain the firm level MSU. 
The remainder inefficiency can be removed to expand the output. The directional distance 
vector can again be obtained by iteration. When inefficiency removal is insufficient to attain 
the MSU, the output will have to be contracted. The individual firm model for a firm level 
resource constraint becomes: 
𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝜃𝜃              (18) 
s.t. ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ≥ �1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝜃𝜃�𝑦𝑦                ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑐𝑐 ≤ (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐                  ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ,𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢   
      𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 ≥ (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃)𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐        𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌 ≤ 1        𝑌𝑌,𝜃𝜃 ≥ 0  
with θ=distance parameter, gy=output component of directional distance vector, gx=capacity constraint 
component of directional distance vector, λ=weight, y=output, xc=constrained input, xu=unconstrained input, 
αxc=capacity constraint, eT
 
= matrix of 1’s  
10.9 Uncertainty about the correct MSU 
In the above settings, it is very well possible that the MSU cannot be calculated with full 
certainty. When a confidence interval for the MSU is available, scenario analysis, based upon 
repeated application of the procedures outlined above, can be used to construct a confidence 
interval for the inefficiency scores.  
 
The ecosystem sustainability depends on the choice of the MSU. As there are many 
unknowns, there is no guarantee that the chosen MSU corresponds to the real MSU. 
Furthermore, in a dynamic setting, exogenous and endogenous system changes might call for 
a new MSU. To accommodate both, we can introduce a probability function for the 
occurrence of certain MSU level. The (normative) choice of this probability function, which 
could be based upon environmental scientists’ predictions, is beyond the scope of this article.  
For each MSU level we can calculate a firm’s sustainable technical inefficiency score and 
sustainable allocative inefficiency score. By integrating over the MSU’s probability 
distribution we can obtain a firm’s average inefficiency scores: 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸����� = ∫ 𝑃𝑃(𝑚𝑚)𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈=𝑚𝑚2𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈=𝑚𝑚1 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚        (19) 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸������ = ∫ 𝑃𝑃(𝑚𝑚)𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈=𝑚𝑚2𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈=𝑚𝑚1 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚         (20) 
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To determine which firms are insensitive to changes in the MSU, i.e. firms with a low 
variation in efficiency score over the range of MSU’s, we can apply following formula:  
𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓(𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸�����) = ∫ 𝑃𝑃(𝑚𝑚)𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈=𝑚𝑚2𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈=𝑚𝑚1 [𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 − 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸�����]2𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚       (21) 
 
10.10 Illustration 
10.10.1 Dairy farming under 1 MSU 
The sample data used in this example consist of 271 Belgian dairy farms in 2004 and are 
derived from EU FADN. We assume that this sample is representative for the Belgian 
population of dairy producers. Physical output is measured as total milk production (in 1000 l) 
while inputs are concentrates (in ton), forage crops (in ha), labor use (in 100 hours), farm 
capital use (in 100€) and dairy cows (number). Some data conversions were necessary to 
construct these physical inputs from the costs reported in FADN. A stochastic frontier 
analysis revealed that these variables influence total milk production. We emphasize that this 
example is developed for an illustrative purpose.  
 
For sake of simplicity, assume now that the global warming problem demands a 10% cut back 
in total number of (Belgian) dairy cows, as these are an important group of methane 
producers. The 90% remaining cows than acts as the capacity constraint or the MSU. 
Currently the sample livestock consists of 14.203 cows.     
 
When all the radial output technical inefficiency would be removed, the total production of 
milk could be increased from 83.637.801 liter to 102.549.026 liter, which is a relative increase 
of 22,6%. When all input inefficiency is removed, the total number of cows drops back to 
11.065, which is below the capacity constraint of 12782 cows, for a total output of 83.637.801 
litre. By maintaining a stock of 12.782 cows (or 90% of the current stock), more output can be 
generated. The directional distance vector will help us to determine how much more. As 
explained in the text, we have two options for the directional distance (DD) vector: fixed at 
industry level (model 7) or firm specific (model 7bis). In this example we apply the firm 
specific DD vector. 
 
For the model with firm specific DDs, the gx and gy
 
 component of the DD’s are -0,4871 and 
1, respectively. The total output generated by the industry under this scenario is 96.844.516 
liter milk. Figure 10.10 below shows the obtained sustainable technical output inefficiencies 
(STE) under the MSU regime, for variable DD. The closer to unity, the more sustainable 
efficient the firm is.  
With respect to sustainable allocative inefficiency, we first have to determine the industry 
shadow prices, by applying formula 10. The prices for labor, farm capital use, concentrates, 
forage crops, cows and milk might change due to the introduction of the MSU. We used 
normalization constraint p+gxw=1, with p the shadow price for milk, w the shadow price for 
cows and gx defined earlier in the example (-0.4871). Remember that gy
 
 was arbitrarily set to 
1. Shadow prices obtained are given in Table 10.2. 
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Figure 10.10. Histogram of Sustainable technical output inefficiency (STE) of the firms when the 
DD-vector varies over firms (STEv). Grey bars indicate count frequency, black line indicates 
cumulative frequency in %. 
Table 10.2. Normalized shadow prices for the model with variable DD vector and average 
normalized  shadow prices for the model with variable DD vector 
 Milk output 
(in 1000l) 
Cows  Labor 
(100h) 
Capital (in 
100€) 
Concentrates 
(ton) 
Fodder (in 
ha) 
Shadow price variable DD 0.7544 0.5042 0.0138 0.0087 0.0192 0.0610 
 
 
Figure 10.11. Histogram of Sustainable profit inefficiency (SPE) of the firms. Grey bars indicate 
count frequency, black line indicates cumulative frequency in %. 
Based upon these prices we can now calculate the sustainable profit efficiency (SPE) and the 
sustainable allocative efficiency (SAE), according to formula 8, 9 and 11. Figure 10.11 shows 
the sustainable profit efficiency. The sustainable allocative inefficiency is simply obtained by 
subtracting STE from SPE. According to formula 9, and taking into account that our DD 
vectors vary per firm, a firm i’s sustainable profit efficiency is normalized by pgyyi+wgxxi, 
which gives it a straightforward interpretation.  A SPE of 0.1 indicates that sustainable profit 
can be raised by 10% by improving sustainable technical and sustainable allocative 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0
0.
15 0.
3
0.
45 0.
6
0.
75 0.
9
1.
05 1.
2
1.
35 1.
5
1.
65
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(%
)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(c
ou
nt
s)
Sustainable Technical Inefficiency
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9 1
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
1.
4
1.
5
1.
6
M
or
e
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(%
)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(c
ou
nt
s)
Sustainable profit inefficiency
Part 3 Sustainable efficiency when sustainability targets are introduced       Chapter 10 
193 
 
inefficiency. A histogram with SPE-values is given in Figure 10.12. The bars show the count 
frequencies (on a total of 271 farms), while the black line is the cumulative frequency 
percentage. The majority of farms has an SPE below 0.5, indicating that they can improve 
their sustainable profit up to 50% of the profit they now would attain under the sustainability 
scenario.  
 
What is now the potential of the industry given the capacity constraint? To know this we can 
insert the shadow prices obtained earlier (Table 10.2) in formula 13. Figure 10.12 combines 
the firm SPE and SAE (and hence also the STE, as this is the difference between both), in one 
figure. The values are ranked in increasing order of SPE.   
 
Figure 10.12. SPE and SAE-values for the firms in the sample, ranked in order of increasing 
SPE. The difference between SPE and SAE is the STE. The higher the SPE the lower the profit 
efficiency 
10.10.2 Dairy farms under more than one constraint  
In their quest for more energy efficiency and reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, it is very 
well possible that the public authorities also impose reduction targets on the non renewable 
energy use on farms. In EU FADN costs for energy use are reported. We can express this cost 
in crude oil-equivalents by dividing it through the cost per litre of crude oil. This EU FADN 
proxy is not very accurate given that energy costs relate to the farm as a whole and not only to 
the dairy production. Farmers producing own forage crops and concentrates are likely to 
consume more energy than those who do not. The latter however consume this energy 
indirectly through their suppliers of forage crops and concentrates. This energy is not 
accounted for in the model. The main aim of this section is therefore to illustrate the potential 
of the method.  
 
Suppose that the government issues a quota on energy use reducing the overall consumption 
to 90% of the current consumption. The model now contains one extra production input, 
energy consumption. The directional distance vector will now consist of three components: gy 
relating to the output, gx,cow to the capacity constraint on livestock numbers and gx,en to the 
capacity constraint on farm energy consumption. Capacity constraint related DD vectors have 
values gx,cow =-0.575 and gx,en=-0.564, while gy=1, as explained before. This combination 
ensures that both the capacity constraints are met and that industry output is maximized. For 
each firm the associated STE is calculated. To calculate the sustainable profit efficiencies, the 
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shadow prices are first derived, applying formula 10. Table 10.3 shows the shadow prices for 
the model with and the model without the energy capacity constraint. 
 
An interesting question is how the introduction of an extra capacity constraint influences the 
sustainable technical efficiencies of the firms. Due to the extra constraint, the frontier 
becomes more restricted, resulting in an increase or a status quo in sustainable technical 
efficiency estimates for the firms in the sample, as efficiencies are relative measures. Total 
maximum industry output drops from 95.623.708 litre to 94.805.359 litre, which is still more 
than the initial production (83 million litre).  
 
Table 10.3. Average normalized  shadow prices for the models with one or two capacity 
constraints   
Shadow price Milk output 
(in 1000l) 
Energy (100 
l oil) 
Cows  Labor 
(100h)
* 
Capital  
(in 100€) 
Concentrates 
(ton) 
Fodder  
(in ha)* 
Livestock constraint 0.7405 0.0778 0.4888 / 0.0091 0.0188 0.0037 
Energy and 
livestock constraint 
0.7071 0.1223 0.3893 / 0.0100 0.0172 / 
* zero as the observed unit is projected to the weakly efficient subset of the DEA frontier   
 
10.11 Application on a PIoS: organic versus conventional dairy farming 
In the above set of 271 dairy farms, 13 adhere to the organic principles (see chapter 6). The 
share of organic farms in our sample is thus only 4,8%, which corresponds reasonably well to 
the share of organic dairy farms in the overall dairy farm population. In what follows we 
document on potential differences in sustainable technical efficiency and allocative efficiency 
between organic and conventional dairy farms. We are aware that due to the limitations of the 
FADN data w.r.t social and ecological capital forms, as well as due to the limited 
observations for organic farms, our analysis can only be considered as exemplary for what 
could be measured with the technique developed in this paper. We will restrict our analysis to 
the capital forms defined above (with the exception of energy use).  
 
The directional distance vector, which is defined at the macro level, remains the same 
compared to example one. All firms are supposed to move in the same direction, i.e. the 
direction that maximizes output while guaranteeing that the livestock number capacity 
constraint is met. The sustainable technical efficiency is therefore calculated considering all 
firms jointly.  
 
The firm with the best sustainable performance is the one that maximizes output (or value) 
creation while respecting the sustainability constraints. Figure 10.13 and 10.14 depict possible 
scenarios. Figure 10.13 shows how the technical production frontier of the conventional 
system potentially envelops the technical production frontier of the organic system, due to the 
restrictions in the organic standard. Conversely, Figure 10.14 shows how both frontiers might 
intersect. This occurs when the organic standard stimulates the use of a production technology 
which is more efficient in the use of the constrained resource when small amounts of this 
resource are used. The latter is in line with the sustainability considerations made while 
devising the organic standard, as it steers farms towards lower consumption of the constrained 
resource.   
 
All farms are considered jointly to estimate the sustainable technical efficiency frontier, as the 
sustainability target is defined at the macro level. The frontier that envelops both organic and 
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conventional frontier represents the best technology available for meeting the sustainability 
constraints with the highest economic performance. What really matters are the sustainability 
constraints, the targets, not the differences in designed private standards. When the organic 
standard is well designed to contribute more to sustainability compared to conventional 
farming practices, organic farms should be closer to the sustainable efficiency frontier (under 
the assumption that the technical efficiency of both organic and conventional farms is equal). 
Graphically this is the situation presented in Figure 10.14.  
 
  
Figure 10.13. Difference in sustainable 
technical inefficiency between organic and 
conventional farming in the direction dd, when 
the organic frontier is enveloped by  the 
conventional frontier. The peer for firm a is 
firm c. If firm a is an organic farm, its best 
performance is b, due to the restrictive organic 
production function.   
Figure 10.14. Organic and conventional 
frontier intersect. The peer for firm a is firm c. 
If firm a is an organic farm, its best 
performance is b. If a’ is an organic farm, its 
best performance is c’. If farm a’ is 
conventional, its peer is also c’, an organic 
farm 
We can distinguish between two situations: 1) either the capital forms used in organic and 
conventional farming have equal physical properties or 2) they have different physical 
properties. The organic farming standard prescribes that only a limited list of conventional 
inputs can substitute organic inputs, and this only to a limited extend. As said in chapter 1, 
organic farming renounces the use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers, amongst other rules.  
 
10.11.1 Assuming inputs with the same physical properties 
For the different capital forms studied we can assume that there are no physical differences 
between the organic and conventional inputs and outputs. One hectare of organic fodder is 
equal to one hectare of conventional fodder with respect to physical quality attributes such as 
nutritional value, dry matter content, crop types, internalized externalities etc. The same 
applies for concentrates, labour, dairy cow breeds used, and litre milk produced.  
 
Fare and Zelenyuk (2003) propose a way to aggregate (Farrell) firm inefficiencies. We can 
use their approach to calculate average efficiencies for organic and conventional farming. The 
weighting across firms in the aggregation process is based upon the farm’s share in total 
farming system’s output. As such size differences between firms are taken into account. When 
the arithmetic mean is taken, each firm has the same weight in the overall efficiency estimate. 
Table 10.4 shows the output weighted and arithmetic mean sustainable technical efficiency 
(STE), sustainable allocative efficiency (SAE) and sustainable profit efficiency (SPE) for 
organic and conventional farms. The STE can be interpreted as the potential relative output 
expansion. The STE is also proportional to the constrained input contraction. Interestingly, 
differences between organic and conventional farming are generally small, in the scenario of 
one sustainability constraint. The (output weighted) average organic firm can expand milk 
y 
x 
dd a 
b 
c 
conventional frontier 
organic frontier 
a’ 
b’ 
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production with 17% (and simultaneously contract the number of cows with 8,4%, i.e. gx
 
 
times STE), without other input changes. The (output weighted) average conventional firm 
can expand milk production with 16% and contract the number of livestock units with 7,6%.  
When the arithmetic mean is taken, the average STE changes considerably. For conventional 
farms we can note an increase in STE and for organic farms a slight decrease, indicating that 
conventional farms with a higher output are also more sustainable technical efficient. For 
organic farms the opposite case is true. The high output organic farms are less sustainably 
efficient compared to the smaller organic farms. SAE increases both for conventional and 
organic farms when the arithmetic mean is taken, indicating that farms which produce more 
are more sustainable allocative efficient. The average sustainable allocative efficiency is 
about 0.10. Profit efficiency of conventional farms is higher when the output weighted 
average is taken (i.e. 0.25<0.29). When the arithmetic mean is taken, it is lower.       
Table 10.4. Output weighted average sustainable technical efficiency, sustainable allocative 
efficiency and sustainable profit efficiency for organic and conventional farms 
  STE SAE SPE 
  Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. 
Output weighted organic farming 0.1725 0.1576 0.1206 0.1098 0.2930 0.1593 
Mean* conventional farming 0.1572 0.2327 0.0993 0.1697 0.2565 0.2716 
Arithmetic mean organic farming 0.1629 0.1572 0.1358 0.1087 0.2987 0.1592 
 conventional farming 0.2024 0.2283 0.1132 0.1691 0.3156 0.2651 
* one way Anova indicates no difference between groups 
 
Another interesting question is whether the organic farms already reach the sustainability 
target of 10% reduction in overall livestock units, as the organic standard prescribes a 
restriction in livestock equivalents of two per hectare. When taking the arithmetic mean for 
conventional farms, the reduction in livestock units amounts to 10%. For organic farms this is 
on average 8%.  
 
Interesting is also to know whether the conventional production technology envelops the 
organic (see Figure 10.13) or opposite. Given the directional distance vector, we can calculate 
the STE scores for organic farms when the only production technology considered is the 
organic. Figure 10.15 is illustrative. The organic frontier is composed of 11 of the 13 organic 
farms in the sample (only firm 8 and 13 not), which is typical for DEA-estimates when a 
small number of observations is used. More interesting is that 4 out of the 13 farms are part of 
the metafrontier as well (farm 1 to 4). For the remainder of farms the metafrontier is 
composed of conventional farms. We can therefore conclude that Figure 10.14 is the 
appropriate representation of the two frontiers. The metafrontier itself is composed of 58 
farms (or 1 out of 5 farms).   
 
Figure 10.15. Comparison of STE-score of organic farms when the metafrontier is applied 
(grey+black) versus when the organic frontier is applied (black) 
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10.11.2 Assuming inputs with different physical properties 
The assumption that organic and conventional inputs and outputs have the same properties 
can be considered too restrictive, given the set of rules in the organic certification manual. 
The market values organic inputs and outputs differently compared to conventional inputs and 
outputs. We can use this value difference as proxy37
 
 for the difference in quality between 
organic and conventional inputs and outputs. To make organic and conventional capital forms 
comparable, we can multiply the physical inputs with the actual market prices for these 
inputs. As such, the single meta-frontier model with an industry-wide capacity constraint can 
still be applied. Price differences between organic and conventional in- and outputs are 
reported in Table 10.5. Capital and labour are equally costly in organic and conventional 
agriculture. Concentrates and fodder are more costly in organic farming, due to the specific 
requirements with respect to breeds, pest treatments, organic fertilizer application and 
associated costs in organic farming. At farm level, one litre of organic milk is nearly 20% 
more expensive compared to conventional milk.  
Table 10.5. Farm input and output prices for conventional and organic farming in 2004  
 Milk output 
(in €/l) 
Cows*** Labour 
(€/h) 
 
(€/cow/year) 
Capital 
(in €) 
Concentrates 
(€/ton) 
Fodder (in 
€/ha) 
Conventional farm price 0.3 195.7* 8.5* 1 * 165 507.5 ** 
Organic farm price 0.3588 210** 8.5** 1 * 280 684.5 ** 
* = based upon FADN 
** = based upon KWIN (2007) 
***
 
= cows can be maintained productive for 5 years 
Apart from the reconversion of the physical inputs into monetary inputs, the calculations can 
remain the same. Physical input ‘cows’ is not changed as it is assumed that both conventional 
and organic dairy cows contribute equally to greenhouse gas emission38
 
. The DD measure 
defines the direction in which each firm has to evolve to jointly meet the industry wide 
capacity constraint and attain industry level maximum output (which is revenue now). Note 
that the monetary inputs are only proxies for the physical inputs. The introduction of the 
capacity constraint will change the optimal mixes of the different inputs and will therefore 
affect the shadow prices of the inputs, even when these are expressed in monetary values, as 
these monetary values express the input value prior to the introduction of the capacity 
constraint. Following shadow prices are obtained (Table 10.6): 
Table 10.6. Average normalized  shadow prices for the model with variable DD vector for 
organic and conventional farms  
 Milk output 
(in 1000l) 
Cows  Labor 
(100h) 
Capital  
(in 100€) 
Concentrates 
(ton) 
Fodder  
(in ha) 
Shadow price 0.4766 1.056 0.0884 0.1683 0.1564 0.1672 
 
Table 10.7 reports the revenue weighted and arithmetic mean STE, SAE and SPE of organic 
and conventional farms in the sample. SAE measures are similar. The mean STE is 
                                                          
37 We are aware that price differences may also result from non quality related differences  such as differences in 
market structure. Even then the price differences still reflect different values attributed to the inputs.  
38 When difference in greenhouse gas emissions between conventional and organic livestock units are 
quantifiable, the capacity constraint can be adapted to account for this difference. Currently there is no reason to 
assume a differential emission per cow in organic and conventional farming. In chapter 3 it is reported that the 
methane emission per hectare in organic farming is approximately 66% of the conventional emission. This is 
mainly due to the lower livestock density in organic farming.    
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considerably smaller for organic farms, indicating that organic farms are on average more 
sustainable technical efficient when the resources are transformed based upon market prices. 
 
Table 10.7. Revenue weighted average sustainable technical efficiency, sustainable allocative 
efficiency and sustainable profit efficiency for organic and conventional farms 
  STE SAE SPE 
  Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. 
Revenue weighted organic farming 0.1022 0.1132 0.1201 0.0909 0.2223 0.1503 
Mean* conventional farming 0.1576 0.2312 0.1074 0.1581 0.2650 0.2581 
Arithmetic mean organic farming 0.0975 0.1131 0.1274 0.0905 0.2249 0.1503 
 conventional farming 0.2024 0.2268 0.1181 0.1577 0.3205 0.2521 
* one way Anova indicates no difference between groups 
 
 
10.12 Conclusions 
What can we learn from this decomposition of the firm’s inefficiency into different 
components? The directional distance component indicates in which direction the firm should 
improve the  management of its inputs in order to reduce the use of the constrained input to a 
sustainable level and to increase the output. The variable directional distance vector is 
extremely helpful to determine how much constrained input inefficiency should be removed 
to guarantee that the capacity constraint, and thus the sustainability target, is met. The 
remainder inefficiency can then be removed at the output side to increase output generation 
and as such increase the development side of ‘sustainable development’. The sustainable 
allocative inefficiency on its turn indicates to what extend input substitution can increase the 
firm’s profit.  
 
The main question is however whether it is defendable to compare the firm with its peer on 
the frontier based upon the directional distance vector. There are different pathways for 
individual firms that still guarantee that the higher level capacity constraint is met. The main 
advantage of using the directional distance vector to determine a firm’s reduction in 
constrained input use is that the decision rule is not arbitrarily imposed but based upon 
differences in efficiency between firms. From a sustainable development perspective, 100% 
efficiency guarantees that most value is created for a given input use. Therefore, more 
efficient firms are entitled to more of the constrained resource. The directional distance can be 
interpreted in a similar way as technical inefficiency. By improving the management of the 
resources, some constrained input and some output ‘inefficiency’ can be removed, keeping 
the non constrained inputs constant. The vectors shown in Figure 10.3 are a weighting 
between technical input and output efficiency. The weighting thereby depends on the size of 
the capacity constraint. If we want to steer the economy towards sustainable development, i.e. 
growth with sustainable resource use, it is helpful to have an overall direction. The directional 
distance vector gives this direction. From a sustainability perspective it is only relevant that 
the MSU is not exceeded. From a micro-economic perspective it might be interesting to know 
what the sustainable allocative inefficiency is, to maximize profit in monetary terms, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
The method developed also allows to compare PIoS with other systems when additional 
sustainability constraints are introduced. PIoS claim to internalize externalities, and to 
contribute to sustainable development. By including these externalities as resources (or 
outputs) in the analysis, the sustainability contribution of PIoS can be measured. If the claim 
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is legitimate, the conventional farms will have a lower sustainable profit efficiency compared 
to PIoS. In the example, the comparison of organic and conventional farms shows no 
difference when the inputs are assumed to have similar physical properties. When the inputs 
are adapted for physical differences, organic farming clearly has a higher sustainable technical 
and sustainable profit efficiency.     
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Chapter 11. Conclusions 
Lessons learnt from the different chapters combined with insights from literature gives a 
comprehensive overview of the contribution of PIoS to sustainable development. To conclude 
on the key determining features of PIoS, we use a description of two extreme types of PIoS, 
the premium private spot market and the private firm strategy. Next, we revisit the hypotheses 
tested in this PhD-dissertation. Finally, we focus on the potential role for the public regulator 
(third section), the methodological and contextual limitations of the study (fourth section) and 
some suggestions for future research (fifth section). 
 
11.1 A continuum of PIoS-types 
As explained in the introductory chapter, PIoS prevail in the presence of externalities, which 
relate to the misuse of public or private goods, due to ill defined property rights or wrong 
pricing. In the conceptual framework we introduced farm certification schemes as private 
institutions of sustainability, building further on Hagedorn’s Institutions of Sustainability-
framework (2005, 2008). He distinguished between four determining aspects that come 
together to form IoS: the actor, the transaction, the institution and the governance structure. 
The primary actors involved in farm certification schemes as PIoS are the value chain 
members that participate in the certification network. The object of transaction on its turn is 
the certified product. The private institution, or the rules of the game, is the certification 
standard. The governance structure established to facilitate the implementation of these rules 
is the certification organisation. This organisation governs the incentive mechanisms, support 
services and the administrative controls associated with the certification standard. When 
multiple actors are involved, a hybrid configuration emerges which is an intermediate 
between the regular spot market organization and an intra firm hierarchy.  
 
In analogy with Williamson’s distinction between spot markets and hierarchies (1979), in 
PIoS, we can identify two extreme configurations, based upon a number of characteristics. 
The first, spot market like, configuration is a sector wide meta-certification scheme while the 
second is a single firm initiative. In between all kinds of configurations can be found, in 
analogy with the hybrid configuration of Ménard (2005). Table 11.1 lists different 
characteristics that can be associated with these two extreme types. We will use these key 
determining issues to reintroduce the important features of PIoS. 
 
Table  11.1. Types of PIoS and characteristics 
Sector wide meta-systems Intermediary hybrids Single firm strategy 
Premium spot market   Hierarchy  
Semi-public character   Private character 
Quasi-obliged   Voluntary 
Absence of strong public regulation   Presence of public regulation 
Centralized institutions   Decentralized PIoS 
Higher to global level   Local level 
Standardizing functions   Differentiating functions 
Generic    Restrictive 
Homogeneity in preferences   Heterogeneity in (consumer) preferences 
Seggregative   Integrative 
Static   Dynamic 
Certainty about claim   Uncertainty about externality 
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The premium spot market can be considered as a regular spot market, with the exception that 
the contract law is not public but privately designed and organized. Giraud-Héraud et al. 
(2005) explained the phenomenon for food safety issues, where retailers voluntarily impose 
minimum quality standards that surpass the legal requirements. Codron et al. (2005) describe 
the presence of private minimum quality standards, comparable to premium spot market, and 
premium private labels, comparable to single firm strategy. They notice that, when the 
definition and monitoring of minimum quality standards is difficult and costly, public 
authorities leave it to private parties to organize the private minimum quality standards. The 
classic distinction between hierarchies and markets is based upon the incentive and control 
mechanisms applied. In the case of the market, prices provide all relevant information and 
competition is the main safeguard, while in hierarchies (firms), risk is mitigated but the 
incentives to maximize profits are weak and additional bureaucratic costs occur (Van 
Huylenbroeck et al., 2008). Similar distinctions can be made between premium spot markets 
and  single farm strategies. We will identify additional reasons why some PIoS are organized 
by single firms and other are market covering.  
 
As also concluded after part 1, a PIoS can occur either as a voluntary proactive private 
strategy or as a quasi-obliged reactive private strategy, to pre-empt a more stringent 
regulation. The premium spot market closely resembles a public minimum quality standard, 
with the exception that costs for organizing and monitoring are borne by the private parties. 
The single firm strategy can be considered similar to any quality differentiation strategy, with 
the exception that the quality claim relates to the environment and not to the product itself. In 
accordance to Codron et al. (2005), we could term this a premium private label strategy. The 
semi-public character of premium spot markets is also reflected in the collective acceptance of 
the standard as the basis for competition. As explained in the conceptual framework, Ménard 
(2004) identifies three key features describing hybrids: 1. the pooling of resources, where 
activities are organized through interfirm coordination; 2. the use of more or less formal 
contracts; and 3. competition both within the hybrid and with other hybrids. In the case of 
premium private spot markets, a firm’s private authority with respect to the environmental 
issue is transferred to the level of the collective hybrid spot market. The environmental issues 
are completely organized by interfirm coordination and competition does not relate to these 
issues, as they are non-discriminatory for all participants. For the single firm strategy, no 
pooling of resources takes place and coordination rests fully within the firm. Competition can 
be based upon the environmental issue. In reality we will see that even in the case of a single 
firm strategy some authority is transferred to a third party, as third party certification is used 
for monitor and control, to guarantee credibility of the environmental claim. The premium 
private spot markets are typically organized when no strong public regulation is present. We 
see this for example when retailers sourcing globally enter developing markets. As it is too 
costly for each retailer to organize and enforce a separate environmental certification strategy, 
they pool resources and impose the standard jointly for all producers, leaving the monitoring 
and control to third parties. When public regulation and monitoring for an environmental 
issue is strong, private actors have no incentive to jointly organize a premium private spot 
market, as it already exists. A single firm environmental strategy surpassing the public spot 
market requirements might however pay off. When public regulation is largely absent but 
liability rests with the private actors, the incentive to organize the premium spot market 
increases.  
 
We now come to the reasons why the choice is made for either a collective or an individual 
strategy. The more a coordination institution is organized at the collective level, the higher the 
degree of centralization. As explained in chapter 7, under centralization economies of scale, 
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scope and learning can be realized. It also allows the exhibition of market power over other 
private and public institutions. Arguments against centralization relate to the divergence of 
individual preferences from the collective, leading to free riding and defecting behaviour, 
triggering the need for increased monitoring. The possibility that a small but powerful group 
within the PIoS misuses the PIoS to exert market power over a larger group is also imminent. 
There is also a hidden danger that this will have adverse effects on the environmental 
contribution of the PIoS, as this group can have another agenda.   
 
In the introduction and in chapter 10 we portrayed the ecosystem as a system in which many 
subsystems are embedded. Sustainability can be defined at each of these systemic levels. 
Higher system sustainability issues need more centralized institutions while lower system 
sustainability issues are better organized decentrally. As an example, global warming requires 
a global strategy while nitrate leaching in Flemish rivers requires a local strategy. In chapter 5 
the heterogeneity in environmental states urged us to conclude that environmental 
certification rules need to be goal driven and be defined in relation to the proper systemic 
level.     
 
The more centrally an institution is organized, the more its standardizing functions increase. 
Opposite, the more decentrally the more its differentiating functions increase. As explained in 
chapter 7 and 9, inside a PIoS the standardizing functions are important as these reduce 
transaction costs, as they facilitate handling, packaging and control and guarantee uniform 
product quality. Between PIoS’s the differentiating functions are important as these reduce the 
transaction costs, which mainly relate there to the costs for signalling the difference with other 
PIoS to buyers. Related to this is the implementation cost of the environmental claim. The 
more restrictions an environmental issue demands, i.e. the more costs need to be made to 
attain the environmental claim, the more decentrally the institution is organized, as less value 
chain members and consumers are willing to bear these costs. Signalling costs will however 
be lower as it is not so difficult to prove the difference with other PIoS (or with the legal 
minimum). PIoS with strong differentiating functions are therefore often communicated to 
consumers while PIoS with standardizing functions are mainly communicated to PIoS value-
chain members. 
 
Another related issue is the degree of homogeneity of consumer preferences. As indicated in 
chapter 3, some consumers are more sensitive to the incorporation of environmental issues 
compared to other. In that light we also explained the consumer-citizen trade-off, where a 
consumer has to choose between free riding, with the danger that the environmental issue is 
not met when many people act similarly, or paying premiums, with the danger that he pays 
while other free ride. The more homogenous the preferences of buyers (and consumers), the 
more centrally the institution can be organized, as differentiating functions (towards the 
consumer) have no added value there.  
 
The above distinction between premium spot markets over clusters of firms to single firm 
strategies can also be related to the dichotomy of integrative and seggregative institutions as 
explained by Hagedorn (2005) and operationalised in chapter 8. The more integrative 
institutions are, the more the actors, who make decisions on transactions, can profit from 
beneficial effects, but are simultaneously held responsible for adverse effects. This means that 
they can reap the benefits from the integration while simultaneously having to bear the 
additional costs. Hagedorn (2005) also distinguishes between the transaction costs and the 
opportunity costs of additional integration.  
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An up to now ignored but important issue is the uncertainty about the existence of an 
externality. Above we explained the difference between the voluntary proactive strategy 
versus the semi-obliged reactive strategy. The latter occurs when the public authority transfers 
the burden of organizing the environmental strategy to the private actors. The voluntary 
proactive strategy focuses on (perceived) externalities not addressed by public regulation. 
Different reasons can be appointed for this lack of governmental action. First, there can be 
uncertainty whether the externality is really a concern or not. As an example, even today not 
everybody is convinced of the contribution of human activity to global warming. Likewise, 
the impact of GMO on plant and human health is still question of debate. This uncertainty 
opens up possibilities for private actors to set own standards going beyond these legally 
required. It is possible that future developments show that the path chosen by the PIoS is 
wrong. A good example is the production of bio-ethanol from the first generation, which,  as a 
sustainable substitute for non-renewable energy sources, was questioned for its competition 
with regular food production. A second reason relates to the slow process of establishing legal 
frameworks. Private actors can take progressive steps and profit from this by anticipating 
public action. There is some similarity between this strategy and the process of ‘arbitrage’, as 
contemporarily advantage is taken from the absence of a regulatory framework and the 
presence of consumer concern. A good example is Certus, a certification scheme which 
advertised its watertight traceability measures. Currently these are obliged by the General 
Food Law (Regulation (EC) 178/2002). Ceteris paribus, the more certain an externality is the 
more the PIoS will be organized as a central institution and in the end it will be incorporated 
in the legal framework.   
 
Associated but not synonymous to this is the credibility of the environmental claim. Several 
reasons can be appointed why environmental claims might lack credibility: 
1. Uncertainty about the real existence of an externality; 
2. Externality is well identified but the technology to address the externality is poorly 
designed or not yet existing; 
3. Wrong level of centralization of the institutions, such as local issues addressed at 
higher levels and vice versa; 
4. Underdeveloped governance system making that the actual implementation of the rule 
cannot be guaranteed. 
Lack of credibility makes the appropriability, or the ability to extract economic benefits from 
the environmental claim, difficult. Contrary, to make the claim more credible, more resources 
(costs) need to be invested, which brings us back to more integrative versus seggregative 
institutions.    
 
Finally, we can make a distinction between static and dynamic character of institutions. There 
is some analogy with Williamson (2000)’s  four levels of institutions and Ostrom’s multiple 
levels of nested institutions (1990), as introduced in the conceptual framework. Centralised 
institutions evolve slowly compared to decentralised institutions. It takes a long time before 
they are established and they are not easily changed. Their acceptance evolves progressively,  
as an increasing number of actors adhering to it make it a force to be reckoned with. 
Switching costs become higher as outside options reduce. Simultaneously, the centralised 
institution is criticized for its rigidity and new PIoS-strategies emerge. Figure 11.1 shows the 
development trajectory of simple certification schemes to higher order certification schemes. 
The deming-circles represent continues cycles of planning, doing, checking and acting. A 
simple PIoS starts with registration of the actions taken. A more complex form also sets 
reduction targets. Certification schemes than evolve to optimize the farm management. Higher 
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order certification schemes considers the individual farm as part of a higher system and 
optimizes these jointly.  
 
Figure 11.1. Evolution from simple certification schemes to complex higher order schemes 
We can now conclude from these observations that, to make PIoS well targeted, a 
combination of centralised and decentralized institutions and associated governance systems 
is required. PIoS should consist of different nested levels of institutions of which the higher 
levels are rigid and well established and much alike public regulations while the lower levels 
are more flexible, less homogenous and form the main basis for competition. With this is 
mind we can now revisit the hypotheses tested in chapters 5 to 10.  
 
11.2 Hypotheses revisited 
The general objective of this research was to measure and optimize the performance of PIoS.  
Following hypotheses were therefore developed in the conceptual framework and tested 
throughout the dissertation. The first three hypotheses measure the current environmental, 
economic and social performance of PIoS, while the last three focus on the optimization. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Firms participating in Private Institutions of Sustainability contribute more to 
ecosystem sustainability than firms who do not  
 
Hypothesis 2. Firms participating in Private Institutions of Sustainability create more 
‘sustainable value’ than firms who do not  
 
Hypothesis 3. Private institutions of Sustainability can lead to more equity among value chain 
members  
 
Hypothesis 4. Improving the environmental performance of PIoS will change the private 
actors’ desired pay-off structure   
 
Hypothesis 5. Institutional changes in PIoS can simultaneously improve the equity among 
value chain members 
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Hypothesis 6. Farms participating in PIoS are more sustainable efficient than farms who do 
not when new sustainability targets are introduced  
   
In what follows we recapitulate the lessons learnt from the chapters testing these hypotheses.     
 
11.2.1 H1: Firms participating in PIoS contribute more to ecosystem 
sustainability than firms who do not 
 
Given the focus of PIoS on ecosystem sustainability themes, it was expected that this 
hypothesis, tested in chapter 5, would be confirmed. In chapter 5 the case of  organic farming 
is studied, as it is the most telling example of PIoS. Chapter 5 also reports results from other 
environmental certification schemes. From the meta-analysis we could conclude that the 
environmental state on organic farms is generally better than the environmental state on 
comparable conventional farms. Soils in organic farming systems have on average a higher 
content of organic matter, organic farming contributes positively to agro-biodiversity (breeds 
used by the farmers) and natural biodiversity (wild life) and nitrate leaching, phosphorous 
leaching and greenhouse gas emissions are lower per unit area. Hypothesis 1 seems 
confirmed. 
 
Two question marks need to be placed. First, the land use efficiency was considerably lower 
compared to conventional farming, leading to non-significant differences in environmental 
efficiency indices between organic and conventional farming for some of the other 
sustainability themes. This has two important, albeit totally different, implications. 
First, if land scarcity is a sustainability issue, organic farming can be termed less sustainable 
for this issue compared to conventional farming, as it needs more land, ceteris paribus. To 
know which system to choose, we have to consider whether it is better to use more land for 
extensive production or less land in an intensive way. The choice may be different in different 
regions, and also depends on increasing pressure from both non agricultural human activities, 
non food agricultural production and nature.  
The second implication is more from a conceptual nature. The organic and conventional 
farming systems are for these environmental themes seemingly located on the same isoquant, 
as shown in figure 11.2 below. This could indicate that for these issues there is no 
technological progress made when shifting from conventional production to the PIoS-
production, as we move along the same isoquant instead of shifting to another isoquant. The 
significant difference per hectare mainly originates from a difference in input intensity (less 
fertilizer use, lower animal density, no chemical inputs). 
 
Figure 11.2. Similar relation between output and sustainability themes in organic and 
conventional farming systems  
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The meta-analysis in chapter 5 also reports high levels of heterogeneity between studies, due 
to different reasons. Important for PIoS is that this finding confirms that the same institutions 
can have totally different effects in different regions and institutional settings, which argues 
for choosing the proper level of decentralization of the institution and the related governance 
structure, as explained in the previous section.     
 
11.2.2 H2: Firms participating in PIoS create more ‘sustainable value’ than firms 
who do not  
The previous study shows opposing indices at a disaggregated level. This calls for the use of 
an aggregated indicator to assess the overall contribution to sustainability of the PIoS. As 
explained in chapter 6, the Sustainable Value (SV) method developed by Figge and Hahn 
(2004) is an interesting starting point for analyzing and comparing the overall sustainability 
performance of firms or systems, especially because it offers a value oriented perspective. As 
a methodological contribution to the literature, chapter 6 critically analyzes and extends the 
traditional Figge and Hahn sustainable-value method by redefining the opportunity costs of 
the benchmark. Several complementary benchmark definitions are proposed, each having a 
different economic interpretation. These benchmarks are then used in an empirical analysis to 
compare the Belgian organic and conventional dairy production system. From this empirical 
analysis we can conclude that the organic system currently produces the most sustainable 
value.  
 
So, when the ecological and economic objectives are combined in one single index, the 
sustainable value index, farms participating in PIoS outperform conventional farms. By taking 
the full production function into account, the trade-offs between the different resources are 
now properly accounted for. These results indicate that investing in PIoS is socially more 
desirable, as more value is created for the same overall environmental impact.  
 
11.2.3 H3: PIoS lead to more equity among value chain members  
Under section 1 of this chapter we already explained the possible existence of premium 
private spot markets. Chapter 7 of this dissertation exemplifies, by means of a Belgian case 
study, the transition of multiple certification schemes currently employed in the food sector 
towards a single retail driven higher end spot market. The chapter furthermore argues that the 
dynamics of certification schemes are characterized by processes of contraction (mergers) 
followed by relaxation (diversification). 
 
In this chapter, the hypothesis that PIoS lead to more equity among value chain members was 
qualitatively tested by comparing the position of participants in the hybrid PIoS (the 
FlandriaGAP-standard) with their position in the resulting premium private spot market (the 
GlobalGAP-standard). The chapter indicated several sources of mutual gains and losses from 
cooperation within PIoS-hybrids. Gains at the PIoS-level mainly relate to economies of scale, 
scope and learning that are transaction cost minimizing. As an example, the harmonization of 
different certification manuals reduces the administrative burden for farmers. A hidden danger 
is that the initiative is ‘captured’ by strong stakeholder groups, opening the doors for buyer or 
supplier power. As asset specificity increases due to an increasing standard, dependency 
might also increase. Another danger is the fact that more centralized institutions are less 
individually adapted, creating higher personal transaction costs. With increasing standards, 
barriers to entry rise and exclusion of actors is more likely. Henson and Reardon (2005) argue 
that the risk exists that, as private standards that surpass regulatory requirements come to 
predominate, broad swathes of the supply chain that are driven by regulatory compliance can 
be excluded. A key concern is thus that the process of vertical coordination through 
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certification will exclude a large share of farmers, and in particular small farmers. The most 
important reasons are transaction costs favouring larger farms in supply chains, small farms 
are more constrained in their financial means for making necessary investments and small 
farms typically require more assistance from the company per unit of output (Swinnen, 2005). 
Especially the actors from developing countries are vulnerable, as these are often most 
isolated from markets and are the smallest and least powerful actors in the chain (FAO, 2003).  
 
The chapter concludes that the retail sector are the primary beneficiaries of the shift towards a 
single premium spot market. For the remainder of the food chain members, it is less clear 
whether the overall effect is positive.  
 
11.2.4 H4: Improving the environmental performance of PIoS will change the 
private actors’ desired pay-off structure 
Another conclusion from chapter 4 was that the environmental performance of PIoS can still 
improve, as for example indicated by the multicriteria-analysis. The main objective of chapter 
8 is to illustrate how the opportunity cost of more integrative institutions can be assessed. 
When the certification institution, as a set of rules, becomes more restrictive, f.e. in its 
pesticide policy, it evolves in the direction of an integrative institution, triggering higher 
transaction and opportunity costs for the participants, but simultaneously allowing them to 
reap some reputational gains from the institutional change. This opportunity cost is 
approximated by the monetary compensation private actors expect for the introduction of 
extra sustainability rules. As such hypothesis 4, that changes in institutions influencing the 
environmental performance of PIoS will change the private actors’ desired pay-off structure, 
is tested.  
 
Some theoretical lessons can also be drawn from the experiment. When the farmers’  
perceived utility increases or remains status quo, the integrative rule can be introduced 
without additional compensation. This is the case when the ecological performance 
improvement also improves the economic performance. When the perceived utility decreases, 
a trade-off has to be made between ecological and economic performance. The proposed 
method than gives an indication of farmers’ desired compensation for the environmental 
change. Given this information, some new issues arise. First, a costly new rule is not 
necessarily the cheapest way to obtain the desired environmental effect. As becomes clear 
from the experiment, different rules contribute to the same pillars of ecological sustainability, 
at a different cost. First the pareto-efficient rules should be selected, i.e. rules that increase 
ecological performance and not decrease economic performance. A second issue is whether 
the environmental performance increase is worth the economic price and whether we as a 
society are willing to pay for this. If not, maybe there are cheaper ways to organize the 
environmental performance increase, such as end of pipe technologies or other abatement 
strategies that not reside within PIoS. Finally, if we agree that the environmental performance 
increase is worth the extra price, the question remains who will take the burden. We could 
apply the ‘polluter pays’-principle and leave the cost to the farmer. Or we could subsidize the 
change and bear the cost as citizens through increased taxes. Another option is to let the PIoS 
signal the change to green consumers and let those pay a price premium. The choice will 
depend on the costs of organizing the environmental policy under these different scenarios, 
and more specifically the transaction cost differences. When changes are made to the 
institutional structure of PIoS, associated transaction costs will also change. The next 
hypothesis focuses on the transaction cost changes that can be associated with a change in the 
purpose of the standard. 
 
 Conclusions Chapter 11 
209 
 
11.2.5 H5. Institutional changes in PIoS can improve the equity among value 
chain members 
Hypothesis 3 highlighted that there is a hidden danger that PIoS are captured by powerful 
stakeholder groups. In chapter 9 a method is presented to assess ex ante what the perceived 
opportunity costs and transaction costs are associated with changes in the governance 
structure, the bargaining position of farmers and the purpose of a PIoS-standard. This chapter 
provides a measure for institutional equity from the farmers’ point of view, as it estimates 
their desired pay-off when institutions change. The methodology is tested on the FlandriaGAP 
certification system, the major fresh fruit and vegetable standard in Flanders (and Belgium). 
 
The reaction of the farmers in our experiment can be summarized in one term: change 
averseness. The current certification institution reflects an equilibrium between the interests 
of buyers and sellers. The producers’ primal fear is the gradual weakening of their power, 
shifting the equilibrium in favour of the retailers. The farmers’ change averseness can also be 
explained when considering the new pay-off structure, which should be satisfactory to make 
change sustainable. However, for those entering the new scheme this pay off structure 
remains unchanged, apart from a temporary price increase to motivate conversion. The pay-
off structure does change for those who decide not to implement the new changes, because 
they are then excluded from the preferential sales channel.    
 
11.2.6 H6. Farms participating in PIoS are more sustainable efficient than farms 
who do not when new sustainability targets are introduced 
 
Chapter 6 assumes that current resource use is sustainable, which is questionable. In chapter 
10 this restrictive assumption is abandoned. In this chapter a static view on sustainability is 
employed, by introducing capacity constraints as the boundaries above (or below) which the 
system cannot maintain its stable state. Currently these capacity constraints are often 
breached. The methodology developed builds upon the potential to simultaneously increase 
sustainability of the earth system and economic development by removing inefficiencies 
currently present both at the production input and output side. In this chapter it is shown how 
the efficiency improvement pathway of an industry and the firms within it can be calculated to 
come to a sustainable, profit maximizing state, given the existence of these capacity 
constraints.  In the practical example it is shown that organic farming as example for the PIoS 
performs better than the conventional counterpart when overall sustainability targets are 
introduced. Organic farming thus operates closer to the efficiency frontier compared to 
conventional farming. 
 
11.3 Role for the public regulator 
As indicated in chapter 2, public authorities have an important role to play in guaranteeing the 
transition towards a more sustainable society. According to the stakeholders consulted in this 
chapter, the three ecologically most advantageous strategies to improve the environmental 
performance are training and advice for farmers, more governmental control and adapted 
legislation. These strategies can be positioned in the public policy sphere, aiming at an 
optimisation of the current policies. The two economically and ecologically most beneficial 
systems (training and control) do not require major financial adaptations from the market 
players, instead, the government bears the extra costs. The implementation process for both 
strategies is also quite uncomplicated, and they result into a direct pay-off. The most 
important role of a public regulator is of course to set the legal framework under which 
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production and competition can take place. This not only relate to the allowed processes and 
products but also to the legitimacy of the claims made.     
 
In the first section of these conclusions, we already explained why PIoS can occur additional 
to the legal framework. The main reason why public authorities give room to  private actors 
for self regulation is to transfer associated costs to the private players. As Codron et al. (2005) 
say, government action is conditioned by how it will affect the distribution of costs and 
benefits over actors. They argue for setting an intermediate public minimum quality standard 
as this will still allow private actors to develop products differentiated from this standard, 
while simultaneously guaranteeing that a minimum level of environmental quality is met. 
When designing and implementing environmental policies, public authorities also experience 
transaction costs. Falconer and Whitby (1999) indicate that the most important public 
transaction costs are the costs of the administrating agencies. These result from a set of 
administrative activities including (OECD, 2003): designing a policy, which can be 
determining the modalities of payments (e.g. amounts, selection criteria, etc.) or defining 
cross compliance conditions; obtaining consensus on the policy; collecting revenues to pay 
the policy; selecting which areas fall under the policy; implementing the policy by payment of 
the private actors; monitoring whether the condition required by the policy is met and 
enforcing the policy when the condition is not met. The public transaction costs should be set 
against the effectiveness of the policies, in order to improve the value for money of the public 
expenditure on the environmental policy (Falconer & Whitby, 1999). The lower the public 
minimum quality standard, the lower the public design and monitoring costs, but the higher 
the environmental damage.  
 
In Chapter 10 we saw that there are consumption levels for resources (Maximum Sustainable 
Uses, MSU or Minimum Sustainable Abuses) that guarantee long term sustainability. As 
depicted in the Figure 11.3 below, there are two ways to attain these levels. Either the MSU 
(EnvPideal) or the technology to reach it (PIoSB) is imposed by the public regulator, triggering 
high public transaction costs for the design and monitoring of the standard and high private 
transaction costs as private actors are constrained by the rules laid out in the public regulation. 
In the end, the consumer (and tax payer) has to bear these costs.  The second possibility is to 
set a lower environmental target (f.e. EnvPmarket). As Figure 11.3 shows, the different 
technologies employed in the market can reach this level. Public and private transaction costs 
are low and private actors have the possibility to differentiate based upon the environmental 
issue. Graphically this is represented by the market curve, PIoSA- curve and PIoSB
 
-curve 
reaching the same level of economic performance (point F, A and N). The problem under this 
scenario is that there is uncertainty whether the MSU will be met.   
The public regulator should thus help in the transition of market players towards the more 
environmentally sound production technologies of PIoS, which can be done by the different 
instruments explained in chapter 2. Demand driven instruments are for example the creation 
of consumer awareness or lower end product prices through subsidies, taxes, more freedom 
with respect to monitoring and control etc.  Figure 11.4 shows how the PIoS under such a 
scenario can attain a higher economic performance compared to the market, either through the 
stimulation of consumer interest or direct government incentives. The market actor now has to 
make the trade-off to produce at a lower economic performance level or to bear the switching 
costs to the better performing PIoS.    
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Figure 11.3. Economic and environmental performance for participant in the market and in A 
PIoSA and PIoS
 
B 
Figure 11.4. Economic and environmental performance for participant in the market and in A 
PIoSA and PIoSB
Also with respect to equity issues, the government has a role to play. The public regulator has 
to outweigh the costs for avoiding equity issues versus the potential welfare gains. The 
monitoring of social issues is extremely costly as these are difficult to define and measure.  As 
explained in chapter 7, the threat of market power abuse and exclusion is a reality in PIoS. A 
recent apparent shift in PIoS is however the increased focus on social issues. Chapter 9 for 
example tests the farmers’ acceptance of extra social measures. The government can further 
stimulate the inclusion of social issues into the PIoS certification manuals, with the 
instruments outlined above. These certification manuals offer a rather uncomplicated way for 
monitoring and control of these social issues. In a similar sense internal social sustainability 
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issues, such as the division of rents and duties across participants, can be framed into the 
PIoS.   
 
An increasing role is currently played by non-governmental pressure groups who influence 
both the behaviour of private actors (consumers and producers) and the public regulator. They 
partly take over the monitoring and control function of the public authorities and can therefore 
also be considered as PIoS. We however did not specifically focus on these institutions in this 
dissertation. 
 
11.4 Strengths and weaknesses of the methods applied and developed  
In this section a description is given of the main strengths and weaknesses of the applied and 
developed methods. Table 11.1 distinguishes the different quantitative methods based upon 
their use of single or multiple indices and their descriptive or prescriptive nature.  
 
Table 11.1. Characteristics of the different quantitative methods in this dissertation 
 Descriptive Prescriptive 
Single index Sustainable Value modified Sustainable efficiency 
Choice preference 
Multi-Criteria Analysis 
Multiple indices  Meta-analysis Choice Preference 
 
11.4.1 Stated choice preference, nested logit and latent class models 
In chapter three, eight and nine the technique of stated choice preference is used. The 
advantages are manifold. Opposite to conjoint analysis (which is often erroneously used as a 
synonym), stated choice preference has a solid theoretical basis, which rests upon Random 
utility theory.  
Opposite to contingent valuation methods, which assess utility for a good or a service as a 
whole, it allows to decompose goods or services into their main characteristics and to obtain 
utility estimates for these characteristics separately. The different experiments in this 
dissertation made specific use of this ability. As a choice option consists of multiple 
attributes, strategic behaviour of respondents, typical for contingent valuation, is reduced. The 
disadvantage is however the complexity of the experiment, both for the designer and the 
respondent.    
Opposite to revealed preference methods, the method of stated choice preference allows to 
make ex ante assessments, enabling to test hypothetic options which cannot be readily 
observed in the market. This possibility is extremely helpful when new modifications are 
explored. In addition, it also captures non use values, which enables to incorporate attributes 
which are currently not marketed, such as biodiversity. 
 
In chapter three, the basic multinomial model was extended with more advanced models such 
as the nested logit model and the latent class model, which enabled to incorporate preference 
heterogeneity into the experiment. As such underlying preference structures could be revealed 
that suggest to reinterpret the results of traditional multinomial logit models. The application 
of a combined nested latent class choice model has not been performed as the technique is up 
to now not developed.    
 
The advanced techniques used in chapter three indicate that within the general preference 
structure of a sample, divergent preference structures can be identified. As the sample size of 
chapter three is sufficiently large, this decomposition was possible. This is at the same time 
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the drawback of the applications in chapter eight and nine, where the classic multinomial logit 
model was applied. This choice was inspired by the small sample size, which prohibits more 
in depth analysis. A non significant coefficient for a new rule can be the result of all farmers 
being indifferent, or one group of farmers, f.e. the laggards, being opposed while another 
group of farmers, f.e. the innovators, being in favour.  The non significant coefficient does not 
allow us to make a distinction.  
 
Another issue in the current study is the use of orthogonal designs, which guarantee that each 
attribute in an experiment is considered independent from other attributes. The disadvantage 
is the loss of some efficiency. The same estimates could have been obtained with more 
precision (i.e. lower confidence intervals) when efficient designs would have been used, albeit 
at the expense of introducing some degree of collinearity.   
 
11.4.2 Multi-Criteria Analysis 
A second quantitative technique referred to in chapter three is Multi-Criteria Analysis. There 
are some similarities and dissimilarities with the stated choice preference method outlined 
above. First, both methods are prescriptive, i.e. they say something about a wanted but 
unexisting situation. In both methods different alternatives are compared with respect to 
multiple criteria. The applied method is however totally different. While stated choice 
preference rests upon the random utility theory with a single utility maximizing choice per 
respondent, Multi-Criteria Analysis compares alternatives two by two for each criterion. As 
such the MC method shares some similarity with traditional conjoint analysis where 
alternatives are artificially ranked and rated. As this does not link directly to behavioural 
theory, it is opposed to real life situations where a single, actual choice between alternatives is 
made. This poses a first criticism. The MC-procedure’s main advantage is the possibility to 
distinguish between alternatives based upon different, sometimes totally unrelated, criteria. 
An important drawback relates to the use of weights which exhibit the potential danger of 
being subjective. First, to determine the preference of one alternative over another for a given 
criterion, a preference function is constructed. The choice of a preference function should be 
carefully considered, as this will influence the alternatives’ scores. Second, to end up with a 
single index, the scores for different criteria are aggregated. To do so, a weighting is chosen 
which is again open for subjectivity. In the reported study, weights for the different 
certification book chapters and scores of PIoS on these chapters were determined by experts. 
It is assumed that these have the appropriate knowledge and objectivity to guarantee reliable 
results. Given that multiple experts were consulted to construct the scores, the objectivity was 
further improved.  
 
11.4.3 Meta-analysis 
Chapter 5 uses a meta-analysis, which, as opposed to the previous methods, does not 
aggregate the scores of an alternative into a single index. It is also not a prescriptive method, 
as it is reports the existing situation. As Arnqvist and Wooster (1995) explain, meta-analysis 
refers to a specific set of statistical quantitative methods that are designed to compare and 
synthesize the results of multiple studies. In many ways, the procedures involved are 
analogous to those of standard statistical methods, but the units of analysis are the results of 
independent studies rather than the independent responses of individual subjects. 
 
The use of the meta-analysis technique is interesting for two main reasons. First, it allows to 
calculate an overall, site-unspecific effect, which makes it possible to generalize findings over 
different study sites. Second, it indicates whether it is allowed to combine different studies 
into a single effect measure or not, depending on the heterogeneity between studies. 
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Given these advantages, it was interesting to use the meta-analysis in this study, especially 
because proponents of PIoS and of conventional production keep falling back on different 
studies to build up their argumentation. The application presented in chapter 5 is the first 
meta-analysis comparing organic and conventional farming for different environmental issues 
in a single study. The holistic study of Hansen et al. (2001) is for example from a qualitative 
nature, while the study of Bengtsson et al. (2005) only focuses on biodiversity. The 
disadvantage is however, as in standard statistical analysis, that sufficient independent 
observations are necessary to guarantee unbiased results. When a small number of studies are 
used, effect sizes of the opposed systems will probably not differ, due to broad confidence 
intervals. In our study, this is the case for greenhouse gas emissions. Extra studies are needed 
there to make the findings more robust. 
 
11.4.4 Sustainable value analysis 
Chapter 6 reports another single index method. In this chapter the sustainable value method of 
Figge and Hahn (2004) is further improved. To determine the opportunity costs, the original 
method uses a specific and restrictive weighting between firms and between resources, which 
makes it akin to Multi-Criteria Analysis. The adaptations presented in chapter five depart 
from this in two ways. First, it is proposed to base the weighting between resources upon the 
production functions of the firms. This is behaviourally more appealing, as it takes the 
interdependency between resources and value creation into account. It also allows to 
incorporate firm level substitution between resources. Second, Figge and Hahn’s specific 
weighting between firms in the overall benchmark is made more generic by proposing a 
formulation with different possible weights, each of them having another economic 
interpretation and hence a different potential use.  
 
To operationalize the method, non parametric production frontiers were used. In such a case, 
the production function is not subject to a predefined functional form. The drawback is that no 
correction is made for outliers when defining the benchmark. Parametric benchmarks do take 
noise into consideration, but they impose a restrictive functional form. The stochastic frontier 
models attribute the difference between the benchmark and a particular firm partly to random 
noise and partly to inefficiency. When using either parametric or non parametric production 
functions, assumptions are made which can be contested.  
 
The empirical application in chapter 6 is based upon EU FADN data. As these data are 
primarily meant for accountancy purposes, some physical and social resources are not very 
well approximated. Nutrient balances cannot be derived, pesticides and fertilizers are only 
expressed in costs, labour is not divided over the different farm activities, information on 
knowledge, education, satisfaction, networks and so on is absent. Currently, proxies were 
constructed to overcome this problem. To obtain more accurate data, it is necessary to 
conduct farm level surveys.  
 
11.4.5 Sustainable efficiency 
In chapter 10 recent advancements in efficiency analysis, relating to the use of directional 
distance vectors instead of radial distance measures, were used to develop a new 
methodological extension. This extension enables to approximate the profit inefficiency of 
firms or systems in the presence of newly defined sustainability constraints. Introducing new 
constraints alter the prices of inputs and outputs. Under this scenario it is interesting to know 
which firm or system applies the best hypothetic technical input and price mix, as this can 
indicate the future direction of the best technology available. The application potential is 
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manifold. A particularly interesting one relates to the incorporation of non commodities which 
are not priced at all in the market.  
 
As the method rests upon a non parametric efficiency approach, the limitations of the latter 
also apply to this method (see above). Furthermore, the method uses existing firms and 
systems, although the capacity constraint can be normative (as in the examples of chapter 10). 
The use of existing data opposes to the use of an ‘ideal’ system, which can be constructed 
based upon expert knowledge. The latter is however also not free of limitations. Another 
drawback relates to the fact that sustainability is not a static concept. Hence, identifying a 
single direction in which the industry should move to come to a profit maximizing and 
sustainable state is potentially dangerous. As a suggestion for future research we propose to 
maintain a certain degree of heterogeneity in production functions to guarantee resilience to 
shocks in the system.    
 
As the application presented in chapter 10 also uses EU FADN data, the limitations of these 
data identified earlier also apply here.                 
 
11.4.6 Qualitative research in this dissertation   
In chapter two, four and seven qualitative research techniques have been used. For chapter 
two and seven, a combination of in depth interviews, a questionnaire and focus group sessions 
provided the relevant data. Objectivity and triangulation are the main issues when performing 
qualitative research. They were guaranteed both across these data sources and within the 
focus groups. As an example, the results of the first five focus groups were presented and 
rediscussed with all focus group members in a final focus group.   During each focus group 
one moderator and two observers were present. The process was also videotaped.  
 
Qualitative research can be descriptive, explorative or testing hypotheses (Mortelmans, 2007). 
In chapter two the focus groups were used to explore stakeholders’ attitude towards different 
sustainability approaches. In chapter seven the focus groups, in combination with other 
sources, were used for descriptive research, explorative research and, indirectly, to test the 
main hypothesis. Focus group four for example focused on the construction process of the 
certification standard, which resulted in purely descriptive research. Focus group one and two 
focused on the advantages and disadvantages of certification and the costs and benefits for 
farmers, which is explorative research. By linking this with the transaction cost theory and 
Porter’s theory on competitive forces, the hypothesis could be tested. 
  
11.5 Limitations of the study 
The research presented here is of course not free of limitations. We here identify some of the 
theoretical, conceptual, methodological and empirical limitations.  
 
With respect to applied theories, focus in this dissertation rests heavily upon institutional 
economics. Recent advancements in network theory, supply chain management, new business 
economics, contingency and resource dependency theory amongst others, could also have 
been considered. We are however convinced that this theory offers the best lens for the 
analysis of  PIoS. 
 
Conceptual limitations in this dissertation might relate to the narrowing down of 
environmental performance to an analysis of the environmental effectiveness, economic 
performance to resource use efficiency and social performance to inter supply chain equity. 
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These issues are more complex and additional measures could be developed to fully take into 
account these concepts. Within the frame of this dissertation, it was not possible to construct 
more composite indicators.   
Furthermore, the analyses of performance and the optimizations rests upon the comparison 
with a benchmark. In this dissertation we mainly worked with an existing benchmark, as 
opposed to a normative benchmark. The benchmark mainly used is the conventional farming 
system. This benchmark can be question of debate as all kinds of firms can be encountered in 
the conventional spot market. All benchmarks have always been constructed to guarantee 
maximum representativeness possible. 
 
The main empirical limitations relate to the case study approach and the data used. The 
theoretical and conceptual findings of this dissertation are illustrated mainly by two case 
studies. The first one, the organic, represents an environmental quality niche approach, while 
the other, Flandria, is more widespread and less environmentally restrictive. Generalizing the 
findings from one of these PIoS-types to the other or to other PIoS should be done with great 
caution, as each type uses its own set of endogenous institutions of sustainability. The 
principles identified in this dissertation should however allow to identify which institutions 
should be analyzed in what way to assess the environmental, social and economic 
contribution of the PIoS under study. Data related limitations were already explained in the 
previous section 11.4.        
 
11.6 Alleys for future research 
While answering questions, new questions arise. Below we list some of the many possible 
arrays. Chapter 6 showed indications for the potential of exhibition of market power. In future 
research it could be interesting to operationalize the measurement of this market power. 
Chapter 7 compares the sustainable value creation of PIoS at farm level with the sustainable 
value creation of conventional farms. PIoS are however defined over a value chain, therefore 
it would be interesting to calculate the sustainable value at the product level. Chapter 10 
developed a static view on sustainability as ‘attaining capacity constraints’. This view could 
be made more dynamic. Throughout the dissertation the potential role of public authorities 
was indicated. It could be interesting to empirically determine which policy instruments are 
necessary to support PIoS, to attain maximum social welfare. 
  
11.6.1 Measurement of market power in PIoS 
The choice preference method applied in chapters 3, 8 and 9 can potentially be used to 
measure the difference in market power between participants in PIoS (or more generally in 
the supply chain), by comparing participants’ willingness to pay for changed contract 
attributes, with the current situation. In the ideal case the current PIoS is preferred by all 
participants, indicated by the highest utility estimates for the current PIoS attributes. In this 
case market power is unobserved. When for one participant in the PIoS low or negative 
utilities are found for the current PIoS attributes, and positive utilities for another participant, 
there is an indication of opposing stakes. High negative utilities for one actor combined with 
low positive utilities for another actor (or vice versa) then indicates that the latter party 
possesses market power, as this party was able to influence the current state more. The 
difference in distance between the preferred situation and the current situation could be a 
measure for market power. Figure 11.5 shows this graphically.  
 
It is furthermore also possible that the current contractual arrangement between the parties is 
suboptimal and that value creation in the chain could be increased. When the willingness to 
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accept a certain change, expressed in euro, is lower than the willingness to pay of the other 
party, changing the contract in this direction leads to a win win for both parties. Identification 
of these contract attributes can lead to optimized contracts for all PIoS parties.        
 
 
Figure 11.5. Difference between current and desired market situation, for example for product 
quality. While retailers want a higher quality level, the farmers desire a lower level, given the 
current prices. In the negotiation process the farmer has less market power as the current 
situation deviates more from his desired situation compared to the retailer.  
 
11.6.2 Sustainable value at chain and product level 
In this dissertation an adapted version of the sustainable value method has been applied at 
farm level. As PIoS are typically hybrid configurations, it could be interesting to come to 
calculations of Sustainable value creation over the total value chain. In the ideal case the 
sustainable value of end products is calculated, as this can have a high communicative power. 
This necessitates aggregation of sustainable value scores at different stages in the supply 
chain, which also bears some resemblance with life cycle costing. As such the most 
‘sustainable’ product and supply chain can be determined. The main difficulty is the 
determination of the benchmarks for each actor in the value chain. Another option would be 
to calculate the sustainable value for all value chain members jointly. As explained in chapter 
7, also here the production technologies should be taken into account to calculate the value 
that a benchmark value chain would have created with the resources of the value chain under 
study. It is clear that this will not be straightforward.  
 
11.6.3 Dynamic sustainability: resilience 
In the static perspective developed in the chapter 10, all firms are projected towards a single 
point on the frontier, i.e. the sustainable profit efficient point. This would work well when 
there are no (unforeseen) changes in the system. As there are many known and unknown 
unknowns, in a dynamic perspective this outcome can’t be a guarantee for sustainability.   
 
The concept of resilience could therefore be used to take uncertainty and risk into 
consideration when assessing sustainability. Carpenter et al. (2001) define resilience as the 
magnitude of disturbance that can be tolerated before a socio-ecological system moves to a 
different region of state space controlled by a different set of processes39
                                                          
39 In contrast, sustainability is an overarching goal that includes assumptions or preferences about which 
system states are desirable. 
. We are interested in 
economic system resilience, knowing that economic resilience is conditional upon ecosystem 
resilience. A lower level system cannot survive when the higher level collapses. We are 
currently uncertain whether the capacity constraints defined in chapter 10 reflect the real 
maximum sustainable uses. We can thus define a two stage two level game (see figure 11.6 
below) when the ecosystem is under threat due to an external shock. The consequence of the 
shock is a change in the use of a resource (or the production of a bad output) at the economic 
system level, if not the ecosystem goes into disequilibrium. The most topical example is 
Farmer Retailer 
desired situation  
deviation 
deviation  
current situation 
desired situation  
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global warming. Not changing current resource consumption results into the undermining of 
the ecosystem’s resilience, which leads to a switch to a new ecosystem state. Assuming that 
we do not want that, as this will impact heavily on our societal system, cutting resource 
consumption is the alternative. The question we could pose ourselves is whether our 
economic system is resilient to such a change in resource consumption.  
 
Economic resilience can be defined as the degree to which an economic system is able to 
maintain its current level of value creation given a shock in a resource x. A system disposes of 
3 mechanisms to rebuild this value creation after a shock: it can improve the technical 
efficiency of its subsystem units; it can reallocate resource x from allocative inefficient to 
allocative efficient firms and it can make technological progress.  
 
 
 Ecosystem level 
 
 
 Economic system level 
 
 
 
Figure 11.6. reaction of ecosystem and economic subsystem to an external shock 
The procedure in chapter 10 shows how sustainability targets at the higher level and output 
increase at the firm level can be achieved jointly by simultaneously removing technical 
inefficiency at the input and output side. We also showed how profit can be maximized by 
applying the sustainable allocative efficient combination. Technical efficiency relates to the 
production function, the efficient conversion of physical inputs into outputs. Sustainable 
allocative efficiency occurs when the production function is applied that generates maximum 
profit, given prices for inputs and outputs. Remarkably, firms (radial) technically inefficiency 
score is independent from a system shock t1, while the allocative inefficiency score is shock-
dependent. An allocative efficient firm in t0 can become allocative inefficient after shock t1
 
 
and vice versa. A technical inefficient firm remains as inefficient after the shock.   
It is not because the technical inefficiency is shock independent that it does not impact on a 
system’s resilience. By becoming technical efficient an inefficient firm can set free some units 
of resource x to help absorb the shock. Thus, the more inefficient firms in the system, the 
more adaptive capability a system has to external shocks, ceteris paribus. However, the more 
technical inefficiency the less value is created in the system, ceteris paribus. 
 
To objectively measure a system’s resilience, i.e. its adaptive capability to shocks, we have to 
focus on the allocative inefficiency in the system. As explained above, the allocative 
inefficiency is shock-dependent, because a system shock in one resource changes the relative 
amounts of resources and therefore also the relative prices. There exists a direct relation 
between allocative inefficiency and an economic system’s value creation potential under 
uncertain conditions. The more allocative inefficiency present in t0, the more value can still 
Shock in resource x 
  Change in resource use Status quo 
Ecosystem persists Ecosystem fails 
Resilient Not resilient 
Economic system  
fails 
Economic system  
fails 
Economic system  
persists 
 Conclusions Chapter 11 
219 
 
be produced in the short run after a shock t1 40. When there is no allocative inefficiency in t0, 
i.e. only the optimal production technology for regime t0 is in use, a sizeable shock may 
imbalance the whole system. Accordingly, switching costs to a new system configuration are 
high, as the optimal technology is not yet in use. When different production technologies are 
in use, some allocative inefficient firms in t0 become allocative efficient in t1
 
. The switching 
costs for the system will be considerably lower. Even more, in the short run some system 
elements will still be able to generate positive value. There is thus a tradeoff between present 
value creation and the potential to create value under uncertain conditions. 
In Figure 11.7, the probability density function pdf(t0) reflects the distribution of technologies 
f(x1) across the firms in a system around f(xopt1,t0), which is the technology that creates most 
value in regime t0. From efficiency theory, we know that several technologies can generate 
the same output, but that in a steady state only one maximizes profit, i.e. the allocative 
efficient combination. A change in the stock of the resource at ecosystem level creates a new 
most valuable point xopt1,t1, i.e. the new allocative efficient point. We can calculate how much 
value is destroyed in the short run due to the shock t1, how much value remains, how much 
value can be regenerated in the longer run by reallocating x1 across firms with existing 
technologies and how much of the initial value can only be restored after new technologies 
are introduced. The distribution of technologies in system 2 in Figure 11.7 is characterized by 
a much wider spread compared to system 1. As a consequence, less value is created in system 
2 under regime t0.  On the other hand, given a shock t1
 
, less of its original value is destroyed. 
System 2 is thus more resilient to shocks compared to system 1. 
Figure 11.7. Distribution of firms in 2 systems around the value maximizing technology. When a 
shock in one of the resources occurs, only part (or none) of the technologies are still usable to 
rebuild the system. Some combinations are redundant while other have become more important 
to restore value creation. A shock of size t2
We therefore argue that a good measure for an economic system’s resilience is the amount of 
value that can be created under uncertain conditions, which relates to the amount of allocative 
inefficiency present in the system. The above concepts could be further operationalized into a 
calculation method.   
 brings system 1 in total disequilibrium, while system 
2 can still partly use existing technologies to rebuild its value creation and resilience 
 
11.6.4 Public-private interaction and social optimum 
Both in chapter 2 and in the conclusions the important role of the public regulator was 
highlighted. A very strict regulatory framework inhibits the proliferation of PIoS, while a very 
                                                          
40 under the assumption that the shocks are random and allocative inefficiency is not unidirectional 
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unregulated market might result into the creation of premium spot markets. The question is 
now where the social optimum is located and how costs and benefits are then distributed over 
the different stakeholders. Different papers, such as Giraud-Héraud et al. (2005), Roe and 
Sheldon (2001), Ben Youssef and Abderrazak (2009), Bougherara and Piguet (2009) develop 
theoretical models to address this. It would however also be interesting to see this confirmed 
in empirical analyses, where the assumptions underlying these theoretical models can be 
relaxed.  
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Summary 
 
The demand for an ecologically and socially more responsible production has increased 
dramatically. Traditionally, public authorities intervene by means of regulations and 
economic stimuli, but also private market parties integrate social and ecological concerns into 
their business objectives. As such they hope to create added value. Consequently, this can 
result into a win-win for both the private actor and the society. 
 
To operationalize these private initiatives in the farm sector, certification schemes with 
private standards and labels are used. These certification schemes can be considered as an 
example of Private Institutions of Sustainability, which are sets of rules voluntary followed by 
private market actors to reach a sustainability target.  
 
The doctoral thesis investigates whether these certification schemes and labels, as examples of 
Private Institutions of Sustainability, are a promising instrument to realize sustainable 
development.  
 
The introductory part focuses on why market actors are interested in these Private Institutions 
of Sustainability. A first descriptive analysis places PIoS between other sustainable 
development initiatives. According to different market actors PIoS are promising both from 
economic and ecological perspective. An important condition for the success of these schemes 
is consumer interest. By means of ‘choice preference’-modelling it is shown that there are 
strong consumer preferences for some sustainability claims. Moreover, different types of 
consumers perceive the same claims differently. A second important precondition for the 
success of these schemes is retail interest. In a qualitative analysis different retail strategies 
for sustainable production were identified.   
     
The second part of the thesis focuses on whether these private systems deliver what they 
promise, which is effectively contributing to ecological, economic and social sustainability. 
First the contribution of PIoS to ecological sustainability is investigated by means of a meta-
analysis. The contribution is confirmed, although some question marks can be placed. To 
assess the economic performance of these systems the sustainable value method is further 
optimized. The analysis reveals that firms participating in PIoS create more added value by 
using ecological resources more efficiently. The social performance was investigated by 
means of a qualitative analysis of social equity within the value chain. PIoS are not 
automatically a guarantee for social equity within the value chain.    
 
In part three of the dissertation changes are modelled in the PIoS to further improve 
sustainability. By means of ‘choice preference’-modelling the cost experienced by market 
actors for ecological changes in the certification scheme is estimated. This enables us to 
estimate the private cost for further ecological sustainability. In a following step it is shown 
how the ‘choice preference’-methodology can be used to estimate the desired compensations 
for institutional changes within the certification scheme. This allows to reduce the information 
asymmetries during negotiations between participants in the value chain. Finally, a 
methodology is developed to assess the sustainable efficiency of firms and certification 
schemes when new sustainability targets are introduced. From the analysis it became clear 
that firms participating in certification schemes have a higher sustainable efficiency compared 
to firms who do not.  
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The research shows that there is still room for further ecological and economic improvement 
by removing current inefficiencies in the systems. Given that these institutions are private, a 
trade off is made between private and social objectives. Although the role of public authorities 
has shifted from initiator to monitor, it is important that these give the necessary impulses for 
further improving PIoS’ sustainability. Finally, the contribution of PIoS to internal value 
chain social sustainability depends on whether specific rules have been incorporated that 
safeguard the equity between participants. 
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Samenvatting 
 
De vraag naar een ecologisch en sociaal meer verantwoorde productie klinkt steeds luider. 
Traditioneel stuurt de overheid bij door middel van wetgevingen en economische stimuli, 
maar  ook private marktdeelnemers nemen  proactief sociale en ecologische thema’s in de 
bedrijfsobjectieven op. Op die manier hopen ze meerwaarde te creëren en kan een  mogelijke 
win-win situatie voor de private marktdeelnemer en de maatschappij ontstaan. 
 
Om dergelijke private initiatieven te operationaliseren gebruikt men certificatieschema’s met 
private standaarden en labels. Deze certificatieschema’s kunnen gezien worden als een 
voorbeeld van Private Instituties van Duurzaamheid. Dit zijn sets van regels die een private 
marktdeelnemer vrijwillig volgt om een duurzaamheidsobjectief te behalen. 
 
In de doctoraatsthesis wordt onderzocht of deze certificatiesystemen en labels, als voorbeeld 
van Private Instituties van Duurzaamheid, een veelbelovend instrument zijn om duurzame 
ontwikkeling te realiseren.  
 
In het inleidende deel wordt bekeken waarom marktdeelnemers geïnteresseerd zijn in deze 
Private Instituties van Duurzaamheid. Een eerste beschrijvende analyse plaatst deze Private 
Instituties van Duurzaamheid tussen andere initiatieven die een duurzamere ontwikkeling 
beogen. Volgens de verschillende marktdeelnemers zijn Private Instituties van Duurzaamheid 
zowel vanuit economisch als ecologisch perspectief veelbelovend. Een belangrijke conditie 
voor het welslagen van deze private systemen is interesse van de consument. Door middel van 
‘keuzepreferentie’-modellering wordt aangetoond dat er duidelijke consumentenvoorkeuren 
zijn voor bepaalde duurzaamheidsclaims. Bovendien reageren verschillende types 
consumenten anders op dezelfde claims. Een tweede belangrijke voorwaarde voor het 
welslagen van deze private systemen is interesse vanuit de grootdistributie. In een 
kwalitatieve analyse werden verschillende strategieën binnen de grootdistributie voor 
duurzame productie geïdentificeerd. 
  
In het tweede deel van deze thesis wordt nagegaan of deze private systemen doen wat ze 
beloven, namelijk effectief bijdragen tot ecologische, economische en sociale duurzaamheid. 
Eerst wordt aan de hand van een meta-analyse onderzocht of deze certificatiesystemen 
ecologische duurzaamheid bevorderen. Dit blijkt zo te zijn, met inachtneming van enkele 
kanttekeningen. Om de economische performantie van deze systemen in te schatten werd de 
duurzame waardemethode verder geoptimaliseerd. Uit de analyse blijkt dat deze private 
systemen meer toegevoegde waarde creëren door een efficiënter gebruik van ecologische 
middelen. De sociale performantie wordt vervolgens onderzocht door een kwalitatieve 
analyse van sociale gelijkheid binnen de waardeketen. Deze certificatiesystemen blijken niet 
automatisch een garantie voor sociale gelijkheid binnen de waardeketen te zijn.   
 
In deel drie van de thesis  worden veranderingen in de Private Instituties gemodelleerd die de 
duurzaamheid verder bevorderen. Aan de hand van ‘keuzepreferentie’-modellering wordt 
nagegaan welke kost de private marktdeelnemers ervaren voor ecologische veranderingen in 
het certificatieschema. Op die manier wordt een inschatting gemaakt van de private kost voor 
een verdere ecologische verduurzaming. Een volgende stap beschrijft hoe de 
‘keuzepreferentie’-methodologie kan gebruikt worden om de gewenste compensaties voor 
institutionele veranderingen binnen het certificatieschema in te schatten. Zo kan de 
informatieasymmetrie tussen de verschillende deelnemers van de waardeketen tijdens 
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onderhandelingen gereduceerd worden. Tenslotte wordt een methodologie ontwikkeld om de 
duurzame efficiëntie van bedrijven en certificatiesystemen in te schatten wanneer nieuwe 
duurzaamheidsdoelstellingen worden geïntroduceerd. Uit de analyse blijkt dat bedrijven die 
deelnemen in certificatiesystemen een hogere duurzame efficiëntie hebben dan bedrijven die 
dit niet doen. 
 
Het onderzoek toont dat er nog ruimte is voor ecologische en economische vooruitgang door 
het verwijderen van huidige inefficiënties in de systemen. Gegeven dat deze instituties privaat 
zijn, wordt er bovendien een afweging gemaakt tussen private en sociale objectieven. Hoewel 
de rol van publieke autoriteiten verschoven is van initiator naar monitor, is het belangrijk dat 
deze de nodige impulsen geven zodat deze systemen verder verduurzamen. Tenslotte hangt de 
bijdrage tot interne sociale duurzaamheid af van het feit of specifieke regels die de gelijkheid 
tussen ketenpartners verhogen, worden opgenomen in de Private Instituties van 
Duurzaamheid. 
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